The nature of constitutional government in any society must strongly be dependent on whether the people to be governed are relatively homogeneous or belong to different communal groups with differing interests.

In a relatively homogeneous society, constitutional provisions usually reflect certain generally accepted values while at the same time giving sufficient scope for efficiency in administration. Admittedly the degree to which the values reflected are in fact ‘generally acceptable’ may be open to dispute; but agreement with, and opposition to, constitutional provisions in such a society are not generally the outcome of rigidly compartmentalized attitudes. Consequently, it is possible to rely on what is often called ‘popular opinion’.

Stimulated by the publications of Moreland and Blagden who have both discussed the institution of the Shahbandar, this paper presents the results of some further research on this subject. It gives special attention to some specific points, such as the origin of the institution in the Archipelago and the functions of the Shahbandar from the view-point of international relations, i.e. his dealings with foreigners and foreign powers.

The formation of the Kuomintang in 1912 was the culmination of a period of reform and revolution. The reformist movement in China began with the rise of men like K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Chang Chih-tung, who saw in the foreign penetration a threat to China's territorial integrity. These reformists prevailed upon the Emperor Kuairg Hsu, to adopt modern measures with a view to strengthening China. In 1898 a series of edicts were speedily passed for the reformation of China. These edicts, commonly known as the “Hundred Days Reform”, came to. nought when the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi carried out a coup d'etat and China returned to her former ways.

Emigration from China to Singapore in particular and South-East Asia in general during the nineteenth century was not an easy process at all. The Chinese authorities at first frowned on it and sometimes the emigrants were refused re-entry into their homeland. At the same time these emigrants were not well treated on the voyage down and on arrival at their destination. Yet despite this hazardous existence once a person left China, the emigrants increased in number from 2,069 in 1838-1839, to 10,928 in 1849-1850. By 1890 the annual figure had risen to 95,400 and it passed the 100,000 mark in 1895, with 190,901. The reasons for this phenomenal rise in the number of emigrants were to be found partly in the conditions in China which were so bad that the Chinese -were willing to brave any danger to make a new start in life, but mainly in the new attractions of Singapore and South-East Asia which were so promising that they could induce the Chinese, a people naturally conservative and tied to the homeland for ancestral reasons, to emigrate, even permanently in some cases. These may seem to be sweeping statements, but a further analysis of the the facts will confirm them.

It is unfortunate that historians, as a rule, do not follow the example of social anthropologists in devoting some part of their monographs to a discussion of the theoretical problems involved in the material they have been handling. This is not of such importance in the history of Europe, where much can be taken for granted on the part of the reader. But when the European historian turns to the study of Asian history, and writes in the same way as he would were he writing the history of a European people, merely substituting an Asian set of names and places, then the result frequently lacks interest, and may even be a distortion of the general picture of the past that he wishes to relate.

In this paper I want to compare the history and structure of the Roman and Chinese empires and in particular to point out some striking contrasts between them.. We may talk about “the Chinese and the Roman empires” and use the same word “empire” to describe them both. Are we, however, justified in so doing? The thesis of this paper is that although the Chinese and Roman empires had a number of superficial characteristics in common, they were really quite different kinds of institutions or sets of institutions, and were based on quite different sorts of society. There are two fundamental contrasts between the Roman and the Chinese empires. Firstly, the Roman empire was maritime, mercantile, urban and militaristic. It was based on the Mediterranean and the unity of the trade routes, crisscrossing the Mediterranean and spilling out into the black Sea. The Chinese empire, on the other hand, was territorial, agricultural, rural and civilian. It was based on the river valleys of the Hwang Ho and Yangtse and on the unity of agricultural techniques over this area. Secondly, the Roman empire was socially unharmonious, was torn by class conflict, and was highly unstable. The Chinese empire, on the other hand, was socially harmonious, had no irreconcilable class conflicts and was highly stable. Unless these two contrasts, of structure and stability of structure, are recognised, the use of the same word “empire” to describe both China and Rome is misleading in the extreme.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the revenue of the Straits Settlements Colony was derived to a very considerable extent from opium. Imported from India, opium in bulk was sold by the Government to Chinese merchants in Malaya who applied for the right to retail it. This monopoly, or farm, supplied the Government with almost half of its annual revenue. By 1904, in fact, it accounted for 59% of the revenue, and although measures of control were introduced in 1910, leading reluctantly to measures of restriction, the sale of opium provided Singapore and the two other Straits Settlements (Penang and Malacca), with a revenue right up to the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Currently two historical societies exist in the Philippines, the Kapisanang Pangkasaysayan ng Pilipinas (Philippine Historical Association) and the Philippine National Historical Society. Each of these organizations sponsors a journal. The Kapisanang Pangkasaysayan issues the Historical Bulletin, formerly entitled Buletin ng Samahang Pangkasaysayan ng Pilipinas and Buletin ng Kapisanang Pangkasaysayan ng Pilipinas, in English, Tagalog, and Spanish; and the Historical Society publishes The Journal of History, formerly called the Journal of the Philippines Historical Society, in English. Other scholarly journals that from time to time contain articles about Philippine and Southeast Asian history are the Ateneo de Manila's Philippine Studies, the University of Manila's Journal of East Asiatic Studies, the University of the Philippines' Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, Silliman University's Silliman Journal, Centro Escolar University's Graduate and Faculty Studies, the Universidad de Santo Tomás' Unitas, and the Philippine Sociological Society's Philippine Sociological Review. Moreover, Philippine newspapers — notably the Philippines Free Press, the Fookien Times, Sunday Chronicle, Daily Mirror, and The Sunday Times Magazine — feature some historical essays. All of these publications are in English except Unitas, which is in both Spanish and English, and the Fookien Times, which is in Chinese and English.

Relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands have shown a rancour on the Indonesian side, and en obduracy on the part of the Netherlands, unparallelled in the relations between any other ex-colony and its former imperial master. The bitterness of Indian nationalists has dissipated itself into a reverence for things English above all others, whilst the French attitude in Indo-China, similar in many ways to that of the Dutch in the Indies, and the fighting in the Indo-Chinese war, far heavier than those of the Netherlands military actions in 1948 and 1949, have still left the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos with warrior feelings for France than the Indonesian government has for the Netherlands.

Soon after Raffles founded Singapore in 1819, the Chinese began to arrive in slowly increasing numbers and to form an important section of its population. Most of the immigrants came from the two southernmost maritime provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien. In the Straits there were five major groups: the Macaos, natives of Canton and neighbouring towns and villages; the Khehs from the interior of the province of Kwangtung; the Teychews, from Swatow and its vicinity; the Hailams, natives from the Island of Hainan; and the Hokiens, from Amoy and the other places in the province of Fukien.

In their declining decades colonialists all but universally produced a series of attitudes and a set of administrative schemes which would have been incomprehensible to earlier, more robust imperial rulers. These views end actions, apparently typical of moribund colonialism, are generally labeled humanitarian. A multiplicity of interpretations can be offered to explain the phenomena to be observed in virtually all colonies in the final and rather confusing years before national freedom is won.

The strategic location of Acheh at the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca coupled with the Sultanate's control of the pepper districts of north Sumatra were vital factors affecting British policy towards Acheh in the late 18th and early 19th century. During this period, Britain was involved in a series of wars with France in Europe, and these wars came to affect Anglo-French relations in the Indian Ocean. British possessions in India, especially those situated in the Bay of Bengal, were vulnerable to French naval attacks during the period of the north-east monsoons. The danger of French attack was first felt during the Seven Years War (1756–1763) and after peace was signed in 1763 the Directors of the Company recommended the search for a base to the east of the Bay of Bengal. The result of this protracted search was the foundation of Penang in 1786. But settlement at Penang did not entirely remove the fears of the British vis a vis the French naval threat to their Indian possessions. There were, in Southeast Asia, other stations which the French could use “with complete impunity” to launch an attack on the Company's settlements in the Bay of Bengal. Acheh was one base which seemed to fit into French strategy. During the War of American Independence, de Suffren, the brilliant French naval commander, had utilised Acheh as a refit and supply station, after having launched an attack on British territories in India. In 1796, another French commander, Sercey also refitted his fleet at Acheh. The outbreak of Napoleonic Wars in Europe, and the fear of renewed French actions in the Bay induced the Directors to sanction the building of a naval base in Penang in 1805. In their instructions to the newly created Penang Presidency, the Directors drew its attention to the existence of “an inviting port opened to him [European enemy] in Acheen” which the French could use. In an attempt to counter any French designs, the Directors were prepared to sanction a policy of extending political control over Acheh. This course of action, however, was rendered unnecessary, as the French defeat at Trafalgar in 1805 released British warships for service in the Indian Ocean. The danger from the French, however, continued to exist owing to the presence of French privateers but they ceased to operate after the termination of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814. The establishment of peace in Europe saw the restoration of the Dutch possessions in the Archipelago by the British. Soon fears were aroused of the probable Dutch domination of the main routes of the Archipelago, especially the Straits of Malacca. Consequently, the securing of free passage through the Straits of Malacca assumed great significance in the formulation of British policy in Southeast Asia in general and in Acheh in particular.

It is well known that British political control in the Malay States began with the Pangkor agreement of January 1874, which was soon followed by the appointment of the first Resident in Perak. The Earl of Kimberley's famous instructions' of 20 September 1873 have generally been accepted as providing the basis for this new phase in the history of Malaya and of the British empire. Sir Andrew Clarke was told that the conduct of Britain's relations with the Malay States which were not subject to Siamese influence, would be an important part of his duties as governor. Since growing anarchy was injuring trade and British interests generally, the government had to consider whether it could do anything to improve matters in the States. Although the British government had no desire to interfere in the affairs of the Peninsula, said Kimberley, Clarke should inquire into the condition of each state and report any steps which the Straits government could take to restore peace and to protect trade. Kimberley also added the often-quoted words:

“I would wish you especially to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British Officer to reside in any of the Malay States. Such an appointment would only be made with the full consent of the native government.…”

The development of the Indonesian party system in the first quarter of this century can be traced to various factors. The defeat of Russia by Japan started a chain of now ideas in Asian minds which finally led to the overthrow of the European powers in Asia. But this event in isolation could not have achieved much. The overthrow of the Manchu Empire in China in 1911 by the Chinese nationalist revolutionaries under the leadership of Sun Yet Sen, created a new national consciousness among the Chinese in Indonesia, and Indonesian nationalism partly owes its origin to reaction against-this new-born nationalism among overseas Chinese in Indonesia.

The two administrative units of Sumatra with which this paper is concerned are East Sumatra, stretching along the Strait of Malacca, and North Tapanuli, extending from the mountainous interior around Lake Tobe to the Indian Ocean.

Charles Kingsley, a popular novelist, — he had written Westward Ho among other books and was yet to write The Water Babies, — was appointed to the Regius Chair of Modern History in Cambridge in May 1860. His lectures, it was said, were those of ‘a poet and a moralist, a politician and a theologian, and, above all, a friend and counsellor of young men’. They were, his critics agreed, certainly not those of an historian and a scholar. Such attacks upon him as an historical novelist rather than an historian, combined with the strain of coming up to Cambridge from his rectory twice a year to deliver his lectures, caused him to resign his chair in 1869, to be succeeded by John Robert Seeley. Seeley was a classicist, who had also published a religious work, Ecce Homo, the centre of one of those ferocious Victorian doctrinal controversies. He had published nothing historical but historical speculation had always interested him, and thus qualified, he became Regius professor, holding the Chair until 1895. After his Inaugural Lecture, W. H. Thompson, the witty and acid Master of Trinity, observed, ‘Well, well. I did not think we should so soon have occasion to regret poor Kingsley.’ Such were the beginnings of the serious study of imperial and colonial History in English universities.

This is the first attempt at a world wide compilation, and although useful, it can not claim to be as yet comprehensive, as information from a number of Universities was not to hand when this issue went to press. Greater efforts will be made in 1962 however, and this feature of the Journal may well become an annual supplement. It is in the interests of scholars all over the world to be aware of current research, and as it is our aim to make this Journal of the utmost utility to the world-wide brotherhood of South-East Asian historians, we hope that the compilation will be given maximum support. Information for inclusion should reach us by August of each year.

It is generally accepted that history is an element of culture and the historian a member of society, thus, in Croce's aphorism, that the only true history is contemporary history. It follows from this that when there occur great changes in the contemporary scene, there must also be great changes in historiography, that the vision not merely of the present but also of the past must change.