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The Strategic Significance of Singapore, 1917–1942. The Naval Base and the Commonwealth*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2009
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The transfer of the former Royal Navy dockyard to the Government of Singapore, at a ceremony on 8 December 1968, went almost unnoticed in the press of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Yet twenty-seven years earlier, to the very day, the Japanese landings at Kota Bahru, followed immediately by the bombing of Pearl Harbor, inspired alarming headlines. In Australia and New Zealand, where for twenty years the Singapore naval base had been given the central place in all defence planning, the Japanese attack gave rise to the first real fears of invasion. As they faced this possibility they regarded the ‘impregnable fortress’ of Singapore as their first line of defence.
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References
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