1. The Malaysia Agreement differentiates between a Malaysian who is a Singapore citizen and a Malaysian citizen who is not a citizen of Singapore. And although it states that “citizenship of Singapore shall not be severable from citizenship of the Federation” (Singapore p. 20); the Agreement lays down that “A Singapore citizen is not qualified to be an elected member of either House of Parliament, except as a member for Singapore and a citizen who is not a Singapore citizen is not qualified to be a member of either House for or from Singapore” (p. 26).

2. The Manifesto of the P.A.P. promulgated in 1954 declared inter alia “Though, because of the division of Malaya into two territories, we are technically a political party operating in Singapore we shall in all our approaches to the problems of this country, disregard the constitutional division. We are as actively interested in the problems of our fellow Malayans in the federation as we are in those of Singapore. When Malayans in the Federation who agree with our aims join us we shall work throughout Malaya”.

3. For more detailed background to this episode see ‘Politics in Singapore’ by the present author, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (05 1964).Google Scholar

4. “Although seeking to appeal to a multi-racial audience, the P.A.P., as must be the case with any mass party in Singapore, depends primarily on its ability to muster the Chinese vote.” Osborne, Milton E., Singapore and Malaysia, Data Paper No. 53, Dept. of Asian Studies Cornell University, 07 1964, p. 3Google Scholar. This work contains a wealth of information and mature observation on the period preceding and after Singapore's entry into Malaysia.

5. Straits Times, 4 09 1963.Google Scholar

6. Another difficulty facing the P.A.P. was highlighted in a paper presented to an M.C.A. Seminar of Secretaries and publicity officers held in March 1904: “Unless the P.A.P. toes the line of (sic) which the M.C.A. is doing at the moment, the P.A.P. can never dream to come into the fold of the Alliance and if the P.A.P. adopts the principle which we in the M.C.A. is (sic) practicing at the moment, is there any anxiety for the Chinese to elect and support the P.A.P. to replace the M.C.A.”

7. Singapores's total imports for the first half of 1964 compared with the same-period in 1963 fell by 23% and exports by 31%. This does not include transactions in the former barter trade with Indonesia. See Far Eastern Economic Review 26.11.64.

8. The speech in the Singapore Parliament did indicate the reasoning which the P.A.B. was to use publicly to justify its intervention in the mainland elections. “It is fairly obvious that if it were possible for the M.C.A. to hold the towns in Malaya then the present structure to the Central government and the policies it pursues can be unchanged. But if the towns decisively reject all M.C.A. candidates then there must be a re-appraisâl by U.M.N.O. They will then have to decide whether they can come to terms with a leadership that can command the loyalty of the sophisticated urban populations, Chinese, Indians, Eurasians, and others or govern without the partnership of the leadership of the towns.” Legislative Assembly Debates, Singapore, Vol. 22, No. 4, cols. 141/2.Google Scholar

9. Straits Times, 21 03 1964.Google Scholar

10. The Tunku said just this on 20th September 1964. Ibid. 21 September 1964. It is of interest that on 18 March the chairman of the Elections Commission, announced in Kuala Lumpur that only Federation citizens could take part in the election campaign. This would have excluded Malaysian citizens who were citizens of Singapore. The following day, however, the Attorney-General of Malaysia ruled that as Singapore citizens were Malaysian citizens they would not be committing any offence by campaigning in Malaya. This was probably a recognition that any prohibition of this nature would have to be reciprocal.

11. The Central Executive Committee of the P.A.P. was to admit “The fears and anxieties of the Malay rural base which would be aroused by large urban crouds mainly of Chinese and Indians rallying to our party banner was (sic) under estimated.” “Our First Ten Years, P.A.P. 10th Anniversary Souvenir, Singapore, 21. 11 1964, p. 111.Google Scholar

12. Ibid.

13. Results in seats contested by the P.A.P.

(a) Kluang Utara- (Johore)

All. (M.C.A.) 9,138 S.F. 6,674 P.A.P. 1,276

(b) Bandar Malacca- (Malacca)

All. (M.C.A.) 13,789 S.F. 10,658 P.A.P. 3,461

(c) Seremban Timor — (Negri Sembilan).

All. (M.C.A.) 9,604 P.A.P. 5,410 S.F. 5,124 U.D.P, 1.670

(d) Batu — (Selangor)

S.F. 10,122 All. (MCA) 9,734 P.A.P. 2,459

(e) Bukit Bintang

All. (M.C.A.) 9,107 P.A.P. 6,667 S.F. 5.000 P.M.I.P. 650

(f) Bangsar

P.A.P. 13,494 S.F. 12,686 All. (MCA) 9,761 P.P.P. 2,219

(g) Damansara

All. (M.G.A,) 9,148 S.F. 8,602 P.A.P. 3,191

(h) Setapak

All. (M.C.A.) 12,292 S.F. 7,888 P.A.P. 4,214

(i) Tanjong — (Penang)

U.D.P. 12,928 S.F. 8,516 P.A.P. 778

14. Straits Times, 29 04 1964.Google Scholar

15. Our First Ten Years, op. cit.

16. Malaysia — Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. Cmd. 22 of 1963, Singapore, Government Printing Office, p. 46.

17. This has been admitted by Singapore's deputy Prime Minister, DrChye, Toh Chin. “The merger of Malaysia has possibly led a section of Malays in Singapore to anticipate that special rights for Malays as practiced in Malaya will apply equally to them.” Our First Ten Years, p. 126.Google Scholar

18. Melayu, Utusan, 13. 07 1964.Google Scholar

19. Straits Times, 21 07 1964.Google Scholar

20. What exercised the Central government above all else was an editorial in the Sunday Telegraph 13 09 1964Google Scholar which merits quoting in full:

The Real Malaysian Crisis

The most serious threat to Malaysia does not come from the foreign enemy, Indonesia, and cannot be contained by British military retaliation of the kind now being considered in London. It comes from the gravest possible internal weakness — mounting racial distrust between the two communities (Chinese and Malay) — which can only be remedied by the Malaysian authorities themselves.

The Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, himself a Malay Prince, shows no signs of realising the need for urgent and far-reaching Government measures to reassure the Chinese section of his fellow-countrymen, whose share of posts in the Army, the Civil Service and the state agencies is still intolerably small. He seems to take the same complacent attitude about the pace of Chinese advancement to parity as Sir Roy Welensky once took about African advancement in the Central African Federation, with results which are all too grimly clear this weekend.

Britain was mesmerised by Sir Roy's complacency at the outset of African Federation, and there seems a real danger that the Tunku is exercising the same fatal fascination in these early days of Asian Federation. What is urgently needed is for the British Prime Minister to bring the strongest possible pressure on the Tunku to give the Chinese a fair deal while there is still time for concessions to bear fruit.

Unless such pressure is succesfully exerted, there is no point in Britian becoming involved in ever more dangerous and burdensome military operations against Soekarno. For even if they are effective they will leave the internal crisis unresolved. Britain should make it absolutely clear that a condition of her willingness to succour Malaysia is the Malaysian Government's own willingness to build a non-racial united community really worth saving.

21. A further instance of this technique but in relation to the United States' government occurred in February 1965 with the expected reaction in Kuala Lumpur. See Washington Post 02 5th and March 6th 1965.Google Scholar

22. Straits Times, 21 09 1964.Google Scholar

23. Sunday Times (Singapore) 27 09 1964.Google Scholar

24. Straits Times, 29 10 1964.Google Scholar

25. Ibid, 2 November 1964.

26. Ibid, 31 December 1964.

27. Ibid, 21 December 1964.

28. Siaran Akhbar, 30 01 1965.Google Scholar

29. Musa bin Hitam, Political Secretary to the Minister of Transport in the Central government has claimed that all utterrances of P.A.P. leaders on the racial problem are in themselves evidence of the party's communal base. “The very subtle insintions of the P.A.P. leaders by proagation non-communalism and equality of status in Malaysia at the moment naturally provoke communal sentiments. And as long as the P.A.P. leaders imply in their speeches that no race should enjoy privileges and protection from the other so long will there be a hardening of attitudes in the different communities in Malaysia.” Straits Times, 9 02 1965.Google Scholar

30. See Yew, Lee Kuan's letter Straits Times 9 12 1964.Google Scholar