1. See especially Ruth T. McVey's superb study of the early history of the party until 1927, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (1965)Google Scholar; also Benda, and McVey, , eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926–1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents (1960)Google Scholar; Hindley, , The Communist Party of Indonesia: 1951–1963 (1964)Google Scholar; van der Kroef, , The Communist Party of Indonesia (1965)Google Scholar; Brackman, , Indonesian Communism: A History (1963)Google Scholar; for a pre-war study, see Blumberger, , De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (1935, 2nd ed.)Google Scholar

Major studies contributing to an understanding of Indonesian parties generally include Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (1952)Google Scholar; Kahin, , “Indonesia,”Google Scholar in Kahin, , Major Governments of Asia (1964, 2nd ed.)Google Scholar; Feith, , The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1962)Google Scholar; Feith, , The Wilopo Cabinet (1958)Google Scholar; Feith, , The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (1957)Google Scholar; Feith, , “The Dynamics of Guided Democracy,”Google Scholar in McVey, , Indonesia (1964)Google Scholar; Blumberger, , De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (1931)Google Scholar; Pluvier, , Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 (1953)Google Scholar; Wertheim, , Indonesian Society in Transition (1959, 2nd ed.)Google Scholar. See also Ministry of Information, Kepartaian dan Pailementaria Indonesia (1954)Google Scholar. There have been a few doctoral dissertations in American universities dealing specifically with political parties, notably the Islamic ones. The Central Javanese branch of the PNI published a spotty history of that party in 1959. The Communist Party has published masses of useful material, but by and large the literature of the other major parties is scanty.

2. See Benda, , The Crescent and the Rising Sun (1958).Google Scholar

3. For a full list and classification of the parties, see Feith, , The Indonesian Elections of 1955.Google Scholar

4. Ibid., p. 62.

5. The Sundanese, though in agreement on some Islamic issues with outer island groups, were nevertheless closer both geographically and culturally to the Javanese, despite considerable hostility between the two groups.

6. Geertz, C., The Religion of Java (1960)Google Scholar and The Social History of an Indonesian Town (1965)Google Scholar; Jay, , Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (1963)Google Scholar. The majority abangan and prijaji are nominally Moslems, which permits the statistical characterization of Indonesia as more than 90% Islamic. But there are some who are hostile enough to Islam to deny even nominal adherence. There are also Catholic and Protestant converts in these groups. Within the prijaji elite, though predominantly Indie influenced and syncretic, there are some who are quite strongly Islamic and who became leaders of Masjumi.

7. A few highly educated urban types joined the NU, often because it seemed to offer them an opportunity to rise more rapidly than other parties with a surplus of intellectuals, but their influence was only occasionally evident except in the case of the youth movement, ANSOR.

8. Wertheim, , of. cit., p. 212.Google Scholar

9. The Islamic bureaucracy especially — in the Ministry of Religion, the religious offices, and the Islamic courts — has had a clear interest in this accommodation with the state. The process is not a new one. Wertheim, , op. cit., p. 203Google Scholar: “The Dutch left the practice of the Islamic faith free, no longer impeded pilgrimages and in turn received from the scribes a pronouncement to the effect that the Moslems, if unable to found an Islamic state themselves, should submit to the authority of a non-Islamic government.” Officials in the Ministry of Religion have expressed this last sentiment in exactly the same terms in recent years once it became clear after the decline of Masjumi that the Islamic parties did not have the power to control the state.

10. See Geertz, , Social History, p. 127Google Scholar ff, and “The Japanese Village,” in Skinner, Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium (1959).Google Scholar

11. Popular attitudes towards authority supported this view, of course. It should be mentioned that even those newcomers who did not strictly belong in the traditional elite also tended to assume a natural right to rule, based not on birth, however, but, for example, on having taken part in the revolution. Many army officers, who rose to positions of power during the revolution, frequently asserted this standard of legitimacy.

12. Cf. Utrecht, , Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia (Introduction to Indonesian Law, 1959, 5th ed.) p. 456.Google Scholar

13. Feith, , Decline, p. 553.Google Scholar

14. The Pantjasila comprises the five principles of the One Almighty God, Nationalism, Humanity, People's Sovereignty, and Social Justice. First enunciated by Sockarno in 1945, it became the official doctrine of the state and was included in the Constitutions. Although the PNI made a special claim to the Pantjasila, other parties did not specifically reject it as a national symbol, but it became a banner for the secularist parties in the ideological conflict with Islamic groups, which often demanded that the Pantjasila must be given an Islamic content. The official doctrine of the PNI was Marhaenism — also Soekarno's creation — which represents the idea of the Indonesian poor man, distinct from European proletarians.

The PNI, in many ways actually a non-ideological party, was more prone to the splintering process because of its lack of meaningful doctrines. As political and ideological conflict intensfied and polarized during the years of parliamentarism, the PNI fell into a blurry center between the extremes of Communism and Islam, as the latter was represented primarily by Masjumi. Yet though it gained contempt for this, it also gained the support, however reluctant, of those who sought an essentially non-ideological middle-way.

15. Soedjatmoko, , “The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia,”Google Scholar in Thayer, , Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (1956) p. 133.Google Scholar

16. This is not to say that party ideologies or ideological symbols generally were totally empty or that they did not have important psychological functions. For a very thought provoking consideration of the uses of ideology, see Geertz, C., “Ideology as a Cultural System,“Google Scholar in Apter, , Ideology and Discontent (1964).Google Scholar

17. The 1957 elections were held only in Java, South Sumatra, Riouw, and Kalimantan because of the disorders of the regional crisis. PKI support showed a marked rise even in South Sumatra, a strong Islamic area, though it is possible a large part of the increase came from Javanese immigrants. The Communist vote also increased in Kalimantan. The PKI rose from fourth to first place among the parties between 1955 and 1957, having received about 21% of the major party vote in 1955 and approximately 31% in 1957.

18. Presidential Decree 6/1959 restored the pamong pradja to something like its pre-war position, thus overturning the parliamentary Decentralization Law 1/1957, which had provided for the eventual abolition of the pamong pradja in favour of elected and more autonomous regional government institutions. The PKI especially had wanted the pamong pradja destroyed, for the party had little hope of gaining great influence in this powerful traditional institution. Army leaders, on the other hand, wanted it strengthened as a means of reinforcing central control over the regions as well as of blocking the Communists. See Ministry of Information, Penetapan Presiden 6/1959 (1960?).Google Scholar

19. Masjumi members were excluded from the new parliament. At the same time, Soekarno gave PNI and NU leaders the opportunity to rid their own parliamentary memberships of men whom they considered undesireable. The new parliament was reorganized, with a great deal more emphasis on closed committee work. It was not altogether a rubber-stamp institution.

20. Perti (Pergerakan Tarbijah Islam) is a small Sumatran based Islamic party often politically on the left. IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia — League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence) is an army connected party originally organized by former officers, including Gen. A. H. Nasution before he was restored to the chief-of-staff position in 1955. Partindo (Partai Indonesia) is a clique of PNI members, joined later by others, who pulled out of that party in 1958 with Soekarno's encouragement; it later followed the PKI line closely. Murba was banned in 1965 shortly before October 1st. In the political turnabout since October, 1965, there has been talk of the possibility ot reviving the more important banned parties, including Masjumi, Murba, and the PSI.

21. Almost but not quite, for the system of Guided Democracy always implied the possible use of violence in political conflict, and the army was better equipped for that eventuality than the PKI. The PKI continued in a sense to gain ‘electoral’ support, but was never able to shape this into a militant force of violence. When the sudden showdown came after October 1st, 1965, the PKI was unable to put up any resistance to its own execution.

22. If adequate data were available, it would probably show a steady rise in the age level of party leadership over the last two decades. Among the parties the PKI represented the youngest age group, possibly a result in part of the destruction of Communist leadership after the 1926–1927 revolts and the 1948 Madiun affair. For some incomplete statistics, in the Parliament elected in 1955 the average year of birth of PNI, Masjumi, and NU members was about 1912 of 57 (two no data), 57, and 45 (one no data) MP's respectively. The average year of birth of the Communist MP's was 1917. Calculated from Parlaungan, Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen Parliamentary Personalities, 1956).Google Scholar

23. As the Communist peasant organization (BTI) began to press more aggressively for land redistribution and better shavecropping contracts in Java, Bali, and elsewhere, PNI and NU landowners in the provinces began to organize more tightly in response, leading to vicious clashes which no doubt greatly added to the brutality of the post-October 1st massacres. National PKI leaders were likely quite worried about the BTI activities in the field, for the effect was to mobilize the other parties for a hard defense. Especially during the years of Guided Democracy a certain amount of tension developed in the PKI between national leaders who were willing to compromise with the system, for the sake of survival, and more activist cadres in the regions.

24. Few Masjumi leaders respected the NU, though they gave it passive support as an Islamic and anti-Communist organization. The more fervent ex-Masjumi hopes were pinned on the Islamic university student organization, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), which to some extent represented the same general outlook as the old Masjumi.

25. The closest thing to a state party was the National Front, composed of a large number of constituent organizations and given a place in regional government. In earlier years, before the PKI gained influence in the organization, army leaders had hoped to develop the National Front into a replacement for the parties. But Soekarno; fearing army control, would never permit this.

26. The army is more uniformly present in every part of the country than any party, and more uniformly authoritative than the bureaucracy. As the army has moved increasingly into control of the country over the years, its organizational character has become essential to understanding the structure of the state. One facet of this is that as a political army of diverse components organized territorially, its structure is not an ideal type pyramid. Rather it is an irregular pyramid made up of smaller pyramids, the latter representing the lower level commands which often tend to act more or less independently of the general staff and the central government in matters affecting their own interests and those of their regions. The army is thus a kind of federalizing structure for the entire archipelago. The considerable infiltration by army officers into the bureaucracy and the economy also tends to strengthen the structural centrality of the army to the state.

27. Representing a social and political insider group, the PNI has always been close to the inner workings of the government, even during its weakest moments as a party. It is significant that the PNI alone of the parties has not hesitated to call openly on the government for help in its internal party affairs. In mid-1965, when PNI Chairman Ali Sastroamidjo's group forced several other leaders out of the party, the government was asked to help stop the activities of the dissidents. After the October 1st coup, the Ali group was discredited because of its previous apparent cooperation with the PKI, and those who had been forced out of the party now had the advantage in beginning to organize a rival PNI. General Suharto, army chief-of-staff following the coup, participated in the effort to re-unite the PNI under the leadership of Osa Maliki, Hardi, and others who had opposed Ali.

28. The army and the other armed forces are represented, as a functional group, in both bodies. An election, by giving formal legitimacy to the parties and whatever other groups participate, may threaten army control of the government. Assuming that the army will not itself put up candidates, army leaders may attempt to maintain their control of the government through control of the other functional groups. In mid-1966 the provisions of a new election law are still being discussed.

29. It is significant that KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia — Indonesian Students United Action) which since its establishment soon after the October 1st coup has taken considerable political initiative and has already clashed with the army — whose leaders now, to some extent, represent the older generation — cuts across all ethnic and religious lines, and even includes many young Chinese. KAMI's present leadership has a large outer island, especially Sumatran, component, reflecting in part the powerful anti-Communist swing of the pendulum; this may serve, for a while at least, to reduce centrifugal tendencies in Sumatra and Sulawesi at a time when confused conditions and inadequate power in the renter encourage regional political autonomy. It is important too, with respect to KAMI and similiar groups which have arisen since the October coup, that they are acting quite independently of the parties, for which many younger people have contempt. How this will affect the immediate future of the parties and of political organization generally is not dear. There is no question, however, but that these new groups represent a powerful force.