1. See Milne, R. S.'s excellent analysis in Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (09, 1965), pp. 104–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar, entitled “Political Parties in Sarawak and Sabah”. Three articles by Tilman, R. O. are also very useful: “Elections in Sarawak”, Asian Survey, III, 10 (10, 1963), pp. 507–518CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian Politics: Bornean Variations on a Theme”, South Atlantic Quarterly, LXIII (Winter 1964–1965), pp. 60–74Google Scholar; and “The Sarawak Political Scene”, Pacific Affairs, XXXVII, 4, (Winter 1964–1965), pp. 412–425Google Scholar. Lee, Edwin, Sarawak in the Early Sixties (Singapore: Malaysia Publishing House, 1964)Google Scholar and Leigh, Michael, The Chinese Community in Sarawak: A Study in Communal Relations (Singapore: Malaysia Publishing House, 1964) both contain thoughtful material.Google Scholar

2. Approximately one half of the population is classified as “Dayak”, approximately one third as Chinese, and most of the remainder as Malay. The so-called “Dayaka” are divided up into 246,000 Ibans or Sea Dayaks, 61,000 Bidayuh or Land Dayaks, 46,000 Melanaus, and 39,000 “others” (including Kayans, Kenyans, Punans, Kelabits, Bisayas, and Kedayans). These various Dayak groups speak a variety of languages, only some of which are mutually intelligible, but many also know “Bazaar” Malay. While the Malays, Bisayas, Kedayans, and a large number of Melanaus are Muslim, most of the other groups are Christian (some only nominally so) or animists or Buddhist-Taoist-Confucianist (Chinese). For more information, see Harrisson, Tom, The Peoples of Sarawak (Kuching: Sarawak Museum, 1959).Google Scholar

3. I use this term with reservations. Among the Chinese, it is not so much “nationalism” in the classic sense as it is a feeling of “being” Chinese, and of alienation from the realities of Malaysia. The Malays share this sense of identity, plus a pride in the accomplishments of Malayan leaders and a feeling of group superiority and solidarity. For Dayaks, “Nationalism” implies that the traditional loyalty to longhouse is being replaced by a loyalty to Sarawak, and a feeling of brotherhood with other Dayaks.

4. A great deal is known about the CCO. The Danger Within (Kuching: Govt. Information Office, 1965)Google Scholar documents Government charges of their activities, while Justus van der Kroef has publicized the official view in “Communism and Chinese Communalism in Sarawak”, The China Quarterly, 20, (10–12 1964), pp. 38–66Google Scholar, and “Communism and the Guerrilla War in Sarawak,” The World Today, 20 (02 1964), pp. 50–60Google Scholar. A recent book touching on the subject is Brackman, Arnold, The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1966).Google Scholar

5. Straits Times, 05 3, 1966Google Scholar. Dato Ningkan's statement noted that “from a National point of view it was best for all states to ‘march together’ in implementing the National Language” but that Sarawak “shall not be ready for any change until 1973 if indeed any change is required at all. What I should like to see would be for any changes that are to be made to be considered for the whole of Malaysia and not to come into operation anywhere in Malaysia until 1973”.

6. For more information on Sarawak and the National Language, see the Sarawak Gazette, 05 31, 1966.Google Scholar

7. Tengku Rahman unwittingly contributed to these fears during his February, 1966 visit, during which he donated a large Federal grant to the new Masjid Besar in Kuching as well as smaller grants totalling M$ 100,000 to several small mosques. Grants to non-Muslim causes totalled M$102,000. Sarawak by the Week, 02 20–26, 1966.Google Scholar

8. With Sarawak in a somewhat devastated condition following the Japanese Occupation (1942–1945), the Third Rajah decided to cede his state to Britain. This move was bitterly opposed by many Malays, who had enjoyed a favorable position under the Brookes. Anti-Cession agitation continued for several years, culminating in the assassination of the British Governor in 1948.

9. Both Taib and Rahman, as well as BARJASA's other Cabinet Minister, Awang Hippni bin Pengiran Annu, are Muslim Melanaus. However, this group is assimilating more and more into the more dominant (and politically favored) Malay community. This has prompted several Melanau leaders to foresee the future disintegration of their race, and has resulted in the formation of the Tugau United Peoples Party (see below).

10. Today's leaders may come from prominent families, like Ong Kee-Hui, whose great-grandfather came to Sarawak in the 1850's to establish the state's best-known Chinese family, or be highly educated, like Stephen Yong. But they may also have been teachers, civil servants, small traders, or even agriculturalists.

11. The new Chief Minister's father, for example, was a “Tua Rumah” (or “Longhouse Chief”) and he himself became the “Penghulu” (“district chief”) for the whole Simanggang area of the Second Division in 1963, after a long career as a teacher and civil servant. For a profile on Tawi Sli, see Strdits Times, 07 3, 1966.Google Scholar

12. See Tilman, , “Elections”, op. cit.Google Scholar

13. According to this system, the electorate votes for candidates at the local level, for 24 district councils. These councils then elect representatives to the Divisional Advisory Councils, which in turn elect the 36 members of the Council Negri, or State Senate. (There are also three ex-officio and three nominated members). Council Negri in turn selects 24 Sarawak representatives to sit in the Dewan Ra'ayat (Federal Parliament) in Kuala Lumpur. The final results for the Council Negri were: Pesaka 11, SNAP 7, BARJASA 6, SCA 3, SUPP 5, PANAS 3, and one Independent. The composition in May, 1966, after changeovers, was Pesaka 15, SNAP 6, BARJASA 5, SCA 3, SUPP 5, PANAS 3, Machinda 1, and Independent 1. This hardly reflects voter aspirations, though, as SUPP received 24.5% of the total vote and dominated all three Urban and two large Rural District Councils. PANAS earned 15.2% of the total vote carrying a very large proportion of the Malay electorate.

14. An obvious choice, Temenggong Jugah, was not considered because he cannot speak English, the main language used in Council Negri.

15. The Cabinet included BARJASA's Abdul Taib bin Mahmud as Minister of Communications and Works, and Awang Hippni bin Pengiran Annu as Minister of State, SNAP's Dunstan Endawie as Minister of Local Government, and SCA's Dato Teo Kui-Seng, Minister of Agriculture and Forestries.

16. Straits Times, 03 4, 1966.Google Scholar

17. See Sarawak Vanguard, 05 4, 10 and 22, 1966Google Scholar. The smaller races of Sarawak are undergoing a crisis in identification and reassessment, induced not only by the growth of Islam on one hand and Westernization on the other, but by the increasing power and influence of the Ibans, the only large and well organized native group.

18. Pesaka's Tajang Laeng and Penghulu Francis Umpau were appointed Ministers of State, and PANAS Chairman Abang Othman was given a new portfolio, Welfare, Youth and Sports.

19. Sarawak Vanguard, 02 12, 1966.Google Scholar

20. Sarawak Vanguard, 04 19, 1966.Google Scholar

21. Sarawak Vanguard, 04, 1, 1966.Google Scholar

22. Saraxvak Vanguard, 06 13, 1966.Google Scholar

23. Straits Times, 07 2, 1966Google Scholar. As has been noted, it is essential to have at least token Chinese support. Before SCA decided to support Tawi Sli, there was a report that Leong Ho-Yuen, a Machinda leader and Council Negri member, had declined the offer of a Cabinet post in the new Government. Sarawak Vanguard, 06 16, 1966.Google Scholar

24. Straits Times, 06 20, 1966.Google Scholar

25. See Hua Daily News (Sibu), 06 27, 1966.Google Scholar

26. The political leader in the Belaga area of Sarawak's Third Division, Tajang Laeng, is a low-caste Kayan. He is disliked by many upper-caste Kayans, who have joined SUPP in protest. In this regard, caste has been a more important divisive force than races. SUPP has a large band of Kayan followers in this area. There are also several very small ethnic groups living in this Kayan territory, most notably the Kajamans and Skipangs. Their leaders have aligned themselves with the Alliance and Tejang Laeng.