1. Winstedt, R. O., Malaya and Its History, 1962Google Scholar edn., e.g., makes no mention of it; nor, more surprisingly, docs R. Emerson, Malaysia, 1937Google Scholar; and it is omitted from the historical summary in Gullick, J. M., Malaya, 1963Google Scholar. Most remarkable of all, there is no account beyond a short footnote on it in Su-ming, Chan, ‘Kelantan and Trengganu, 1909–1939’, JMBRAS XXXVIII. i (1965)Google Scholar, although it is mentioned in a passage which she quotes (p. 178). A brief and typically deprecating account of the Kelantan Rising by a former British Administrator, emphasising its triviality and suggesting that its leader, To' Janggut, may have had Indian blood (because he had a beard) appears in Malaysia, the British Association of Malaysia's magazine of April 1968, and a similar though slightly fuller account of the 1928 Trengganu Rising in the issue cf the previous month.

2. The history of the central Malay States, 1874–1896, is an exception. There it suited British officials to stress the need to proceed in their own time and along the lines they themselves thought best lest they should share the fate of J. W. Birch — but their real reason was to minimise interference from Singapore and London.

3. This is not the place to summarise recent Central and East African historiography. Suffice it to say that it is a good deal more sophisticated than this account suggests. My aim here is merely to provide a framework for criticism of older ideas. To those who wish to know more about it, I recommend T. O. Ranger, ‘Connections between “primary resistance” movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa’, University of East Africa Social Science Conference Paper, Dec. 1966; idem, ‘The role of Ndebele and Shona religious authorities in the rebellions of 1896 and 1897’, The Zambesian Past (eds. R. Stokes & R. Brown), 1966Google Scholar; esp. p. 96; idem, ‘Revolt in Portuguese East Africa’, St. Anthony's Papers XV (1963), pp. 54–80Google Scholar; Iliffe, J., ‘The Organisation of the Maji Maji Rebellion’, Journal of African History VII. iii (1967)Google Scholar; Lonsdale, J., ‘The emergence of African Nations: a historiographical analysis’, African Affairs vol. LXVII (no. 266), 01 1968Google Scholar; and, for an extreme view, the contribution of A. B. Davidson of Moscow University in Emerging Themes of African History (ed. T. O. Ranger), 1968.Google Scholar

I am indebted to my colleagues in Makerere, Dr. D. Denoon and Dr. G. Uzoigwe for discussions which helped me to formulate my own ideas of what the concept of resistance might involve: they are not, however responsible for these ideas.

4. Gwassa, G. K. & Iliffe, J., Records of the Maji Maji Rising (i), Dar-es-Salaam, 1968, p. 29.Google Scholar

5. Dr. W. Rod's recent work The Origins of Malay Nationalism 1967 traces it back a good deal further than 1945 but does not set out to trace any possible important links between it and the Pcrak or Sungei Ujong Wars or the Pahang, Kelantan of Trengganu Risings.Google Scholar

6. As recently as 1965 V. Purcell declared that before the Second World War Malay nationalism had ‘scarcely come into being’. South and East Asia since 1800, Cambridge, p. 152.Google Scholar

7. CO 273/426. Young to CO telegrams of 3.v.1915 and 8.v.1915, confidential despatch of 5.V.1915 and tel. of 11.v.1915.

8. At least so the Adviser said in the despatches. But Graham, W. A., Kelantan, 1908, pp. 74 and 92Google Scholar suggests that while it was true that unused land was untaxed, padi-land at least was taxed by acreage. (Graham, Siam's Adviser in Kelantan, notes that the introduction of this system in padi-land led to peasant suspicions). It is likely that fruit etc. was subject to a produce-tax. But most of the population lived by growing rice; and it is hard, to see why bad rice harvests should have led to hardship only as a result of the latest tax-reform. This should have been the case ever since Graham's time — unless, of course, it had previously been possible to pay one's tax the following year, in which case one could make up for a bad harvest by planting less for the next harvest and so paying less tax.

9. This is presumably Wan Jaffar's ‘sub-State’ of Limbat referred to by Graham, 1908, pp. 41–3. Although he makes no mention of the title Tunku Sri Mahkota in connection with it.

10. CO 273/426. Young to CO confidential of 18 v. 1915, and of 25.v. 1915; 249 and confidential of 2.vi. 1915.

11. This use of krah may have been very significant. In Kedah the Sultan had employed krah against the Chinese Rising in Kulim shortly before the British takeover, and resisted efforts to abolish it on the grounds that it was the only way he had of defending his State. If the Kelantan Ruler now sought to use it, it seems far more likely that he had ideas of using it against invading foreign troops than against Kelantan rakyat in Pasir Puteh — but we cannot be sure; he may genuinely have felt that what was happening in Pasir Puteh was aimed against himself and his government. In any case, Langham-Carter was strangely insistent that it would be unwise to use krah to get the Pasir Puteh Road built after the troubles: he preferred a punitive tax, and this was imposed.

12. Graham, , 1908, pp. 42–3Google Scholar, speaks of the beating of gongs as characteristic of Kelantan Malay warfare.

13. CO 273/427. Young to CO conf. of 12.viii.1915. 100 new (Indian) police were sent to Kelantan at the same time.

14. This may not refer to police officers. If it does, it is difficult to know who the Sikhs were to whom the despatch referred, unless they were employed by the Duff Development Company.

15. Young to CO of 20.vii.1915 in CO 273/427, in which Maxwell's, Fauci's and Langham-Carter's reports and recommendations are enclosed.

16. W. A. Graham, an Englishman employed by the Government of Siam, was sent to be Adviser in Kelantan as a result of an agreement between Bangkok and London in 1902; but Britain formally assumed such powers as Siam had previously exercised over the State only as a result of the Anglo-Siamese Convention of 1909, which was supplemented (the previous relationship between Siam and Kelantan being obscure to, and misunderstood by the British) in 1910 by a ‘Treaty’ between Britain and Kelantan following the normal pattern of such agreements between Britain and the Malay States. H. W. Thompson, who had been seconded to Siam from the Malayan Civil Service, and who later returned to it, provided some link between the periods before and after 1909 but not much of one; and the transfer of power to Britain as represented by the Singapore establishment which also dominated the F.M.S. represented a major break with previous de jure arrangements.

17. Young to CO conf. of 12.viii.1915. Oddly enough, Young mentioned in this despatch that the State Council was considering a lightening of the tax-load.

18. CO 273/444. Young to CO conf. of 25.ii.1916 citing the Sultan of Kelantan to Young of 8.ii.1916. In 1901 the Sultan of Pahang had written to Swettenham asking for Butler to be replaced as British Resident, Pahang, and the Governor firmly refused. Chamberlain backed him and had the reply sent in his name. CO to Swettenham of 21.v.1901, CO's Despatches conf., 1901, Singapore National Library.

19. See Allen, j. de V., ‘Anglo-Kedah Relations 1905–1915’ JMBRAS XLI, i (1968).Google Scholar

20. In 1933 Sultan Ismail of Kelantan told his Adviser that “in days gone by he had been very perturbed over the mixed marriages and personal eccentricities of some of his Advisers …” B. A. Kelantan to Governor dementi of 6.ix.1933, Clementi Papers, File: Malaya 8. It is unlikely, however, that this referred to Langham-Carter. Sultan Ismail came to the throne only in 1920.

21. Young to CO conf. of 6.xi.1913, CO 273/400. As usual, Young reported that he had consulted the Unofficial members of Federal Council about this, but had not yet consulted the F.M.S. Rulers though he had ‘little doubt they would agree’. It is hard to see why the unoflicials should have agreed except in the hope of getting Kelantan into the Federation.

22. Graham, 1908, p. 57Google Scholar. There is even a picture of it, p. 64.

23. CO 273/426.

24. Memo of 31.v.1915 in Young to CO conf. of 20.vii.1915, CO 273/426.

25. Maxwell's recommendations enclosed in Young to CO conf. of 2.vi.1915, CO 273/426. Anderson had also thought that when the railway was complete Kelantan could be federated: Anderson to Stubbs pr. of 28.vii.1909 filed with Anderson to CO 245 of 3.viii.1909, CO 273/350.

26. Young to CO Conf. of 20.vii. 1915, CO 273/427.

27. Emerson 1937, pp. 255–6. The assumption that Kelantan should pay for the Deed of Cancellation, while technically based on the supposition that Kelantan was responsible for the Duff Concession in the first place (although both Siam and Britain had approved it), was no doubt in practice justified by the argument that as soon as the matter was straightened out the railway could be completed and Kelantan could enter the Federation, to its own huge advantage. But it was really the F.M.S. railway, and Kelantan never joined the F.M.S.

28. $1000 for the Sultan of Trengganu's visit to Singapore in 1910, e.g., came out of F.M.S. funds, although this was not apparently a loan. Federal Council Proceedings, 2.xi.1910.

29. When in 1917 the Sultan of Trengganu asked for a European police officer, Young told him none could be spared — a decision which the Colonial Office regretted. Young to CO 68 of 6.iii.1917, CO 273/459. One year later a police scandal was one of the reasons for the appointment of a commission to enquire into the affairs of Trengganu which led ultimately to the abdication of Sultan Zainal Abidin's successor and t e signing of a new Treaty. Young to CO 277 of 8.x.1918, CO 273/473.

30. ‘Anglo-Kedah Relations, 1905–1915’ and ‘The ancien regime in Trengganu, 1909–1919, JMBRAS XLI. i (1968), pp. 23–53, & 54–94.Google Scholar

31. Graham 1908, pp. 50–52; cp. Clementi Smitli to CO conf. of 17.vi.1891, Governors' Despatches (conf.) 1891, Singapore National Library.

32. Anderson to CO 107 of 23.xi.1904, Governors' Despatches (Conf.) 1904 ibid. There Engku Chik Penambang was described as an ‘uncle’ of the Ruler.

33. According to Graham, (1908, pp. 41, 46) Muhammad II (also known as Raja Snik) was the first Ruler upon whom the Siamese conferred the title of Sultan. He was known as Sultan Mulut Merah. His successor and the two Rulers following him were also known as Sultan, but the fourth in line, the second Raja Snik, (Muhammad IV) did not assume the title of Sultan (p. 53) until it was granted him by Britain in 1910 (see below). Perhaps this was because the two preceding Sultans had both ‘died suddenly’; but perhaps Siam withheld the title intentionally.

34. FO to CO of 28.V.1908, CO 273/343. The Times correspondent also reported this opposition. Times of 24.v.1909. CO reaction was typical: one official suspected Graham's influence, another the ‘Malay rajahs who have been running the various departments’ (minutes of 29.v.1908). That Kelantan might not want to be British was inconceivable.

35. Anderson to CO of 2.viii.1909, CO 273/350.

36. B. A. Kelantan to Anderson of 14.vii.1910 in Anderson to Collins pr. of 2l.vii. 1910 encl. with Anderson to CO 96 of 20.ii.1911, CO 273 372.

37. Anderson to CO tel. of 6.x.1910 and conf. of 26.x.1910, Governors' (Conf.) Despatches 1910, Singapore National Library; Anderson to CO tels. of 28.ix1910 and 30.ix.1910, CO 273/362. The discrepancy between the dates is odd, but not important. At the same time that this was arranged the Ruler's eldest son was recognised by Britain as heir apparent.

38. B.A. Kelantan to Anderson of l4.vii.1910, cited in fn. 35.

39. ‘… the Sultan and the wicked uncles who form his council are fit only for an idiot asylum — with the possible exception of the Raja Muda. It is not opium, Thomson says, but women …’ Anderson to Stubbs pr. of 28.vii.1909 encl. in Anderson to CO 245 of 3.viii.1909, CO 273/350. Stubbs, a CO official who had toured Malaya a little earlier, reported in 1911 that all the East-coast rajahs ‘looked like degenerates or criminal lunatics’ but he could not recall whether it was the Yam Tuan Muda of Trengganu or the Raja Muda of Kelantan who was ‘reported to display no interest in anything but pederasty’. Minute of 21.iii.1911 on Anderson to CO 105 of 22.ii.1911, CO 273/372.

40. Parkinson, C. N., British Intervention in Malaya, 1960, p. 211.Google Scholar

41. It is just conceivable that this nickname had significant overtones. According to Graham a Raja Janggut came from the East to overthrow the first Ruler of Kelantan with Trengganu aid and superseded him (pp. 39–41). But since the word Janggut only means ‘beard’ this need not be pressed too far.

42. ‘The ancien regime in Trengganu, 1909–1919’, JMBRAS XLI. i (1968), pp. 23–53.Google Scholar

43. Graham, 1908, pp. 31, 113Google Scholar; Su-Ming, Chan, ‘Kelantan and Trengganu’, JMBRAS XXXVIII. i (1965), p. 161Google Scholar, quoting Graham, declares that prior to the appointment of the To' kampong the imam had been the only local influence, and that the two functioned side by side for 30–40 years before the imam lost all temporal authority.

44. Assuming, as seems fair, that the ‘independent state of the Tenku Sri Mahkota’ is the same as ‘Raja Wan Jaffar's sub-state’ (see fn. 9), then it was tiot ruled from Kota Bahru until after its local chief had been exiled to North Siam, along with the Orang Kaya Semantan, in 1894. Graham 1908, pp. 43–4.

45. Anderson to Stubbs pr. of 28.vii.1909 in Anderson to CO 245 of 3.viii.1909, CO 273/350.

46. See fn. 44.

47. ‘The ancien regime in Trengganu’, cited above, deals with this in some detail.

48. ibid. There was still a clear ‘nationalist opposition’ party in the Trengganu State Council in the 1930s, led by the Dato Luar, Auditor-General and Superintendent of Education, described as a ‘foreign Malay’. B.A. Trengganu's Report on the Working of the Adviser System in Trengganu forwarded by Governor Clementi in his despatch to CO of 7.xi.1932, Clementi Papers, File 13.

49. B.A. Kelantan to Anderson of 14.vii.1910, cited in fn. 35, pointed out that the Ruler's query of his (the Adviser's) right to fly the Union Jack over his residence, and the incident regarding the arrest of the To' Kweng, took place just after the receipt of a telegram from Kedah containing an ‘official communique’ denouncing Britain's conduct. He described events at this time as part of the “Kedah backwash”.

50. Young to CO 336 of 28.vii.1915 enclosing the Trengganu Report for June, 1915, CO 273/427.

51. The Engku Besar, Che Isakak and Haji Said, it will be recalled, took refuge either in Ulu Kelantan or in Trengganu. Sultan Zainal Abidin was said to be doing his best to help capture them (ibid.; in 1896 he was described as helping to catch the Pahang rebels ‘after some demur’ — Mitchell to CO conf. of 13.v.1896, Governors' (Conf.) Despatches 1896). The northernmost district of Trengganu was ruled by the third generation of a family intermarried with the Kelantan Royal House.

52. Emerson, 1937, p. 266Google Scholar; Memo by H. P. Bryson and W. F. N. Churchill in the Papers of the British Association of Malaysia, Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London, Item 11. 4.

53. Sheppard, M. C. Ff., ‘Trengganu’, JMBRAS XXII. iii (1949)Google Scholar suggests that Red Flag and White Flag Malay Secret Societies were connected with the 1928 Rising (pp. 64–66). Governor Guillemard to CO secret of 25.xi.1922 in CO 273/518, enclosing Malayan Bulletin of Political Intelligence for November, 1922, mentions that during the First World War there had been ‘some revival’ of Malay Secret Societies in the Perak River area and in the Temerloh District of Pahang, perhaps connected with the fear that Britain might lose the war. It is worth considering whether these Secret Societies might not provide a link, if one exists, between the Perak War of 1875, the Pahang Rebellion, the Trengganu and Kelantan Risings, and even — in view of the number of Malay leaders since 1945 who come from Temerloh and central Pahang — Malay ‘incipient independence movements’ in more recent years.

54. Several more Europeans were sent to Kelantan in 1915 in spite of the shortage of personnel caused by the war. E. Pepys, e.g., became D.O. of Pasir Puteh.

55. B.A. Kelantan to Governor dementi of 16.ix.1933 and B.A. Kelantan to Governor Clementi of 10.i.1931 in Clementi Papers, Files Malaya 8 and Malayan Federation (i) 10 respectively.

56. Notes on a Policy in Respect of the Unfederated Malay States by W. G. Maxwell, Eastern no. 135, dated 15.x.192O, CO 717/10.

57. Young pr. to Dixon of 11.ix.192O quoted ibid.

58. Anderson to Stubbs pr. of 28.vii.1909 end. in Anderson to CO 245 of 3.viii.1909, CO 273/350. In 1905 the population of Kelantan had been estimated at ‘about 300,000’ (FO to CO, File 27579 of 28.vii.1908, CO 273/343) which figure Graham reckoned to be if anything on the small side in 1908 (1908, pp. 17–8). The 1911 census, however, estimated 286,500. This is lower than the number of FMS. Malays given in the 1901 census figures (about 313,000) and in the 1911 census figures (about 421,000) but still large enough. Anderson may have been going on Swettenham's estimate for Kelantan of 600,000.

59. Pace Graham, (1908, pp. 70–71)Google Scholar, it seems impossible that the Kelantan aristocracy of 1900 could have exploited and oppressed some 250–300,000 rakyat with the same random nonchalance that the Perak or Pahang aristocracy of; 1870–1880 exploited a rakyat of 30–50,000. Far more sophisticated political institutions must have been necessary; and it may be assumed that the rakyat of Kelantan may not altogether have lacked their own institutions, organisations and movements to resist oppression.

60. vid. fns. 55 and 56.