1. Early studies that conveyed what was basically the French view of the Mekhong crisis include Thompson, Virginia, Thailand: The New Siam, (New York, 1941), esp. introd., xxviiiGoogle Scholar; Christian, John L. and Ike, Nobutake, “Thailand in Japan's Foreign Relations”, Pacific Affairs, XV, (1942., esp, 214Google Scholar; Levy, Roger, Lacam, Guy and Roth, Andrew, French Interests and Policies in the Far East, (New York, 1941), esp. 64–66; 171–75; 184–89.Google ScholarSirCrosby, Josiah, Siam: The Crossroads, (London, 1945), esp. 117–21Google Scholar added more detail but failed to do justice to the Thai case, which was all the more curious in that Crosby was rightly accused by the French of being one of the chief supporters of the Thai side. The classic French view comes out clearly in Decoux, Amiral, A la Barre de l'Indochine, (Paris, 1949), 128–47Google Scholar, and Charles-Roux, François, Cinq mots tragiques aux Affaires étrangères, (Paris, 1949), 264–66.Google Scholar Subsequent Western-language works have generally followed the theses in the above studies.

2. See the “Bibliography” section in Flood, Edward, “Japan's Relations with Thailand: 1928–41”, unpubl. diss. (University of Washington, 1967).Google Scholar

3. Text in Duke, Pensri, Les relations entre la France et la Thailande, (Bangkok, 1962), 283–85.Google Scholar The discussion in (Luaŋ〉 Sidthisajaamkaan, , sanjaa thaaŋ Phraraadchamajtrii rawaaῃ Sajaam kab Taaŋ Pratheed, (2nd edition, Bangkok, 1963), 59 ff is excellent.Google Scholar

4. Text in Duke, , 289–92.Google Scholar See also Sidthisajaamkaan, , 71 ff.Google Scholar

5. Chajjanaam, Direeg, Thaj kab Soῃkhraam Loog Khraŋ Thii Sooŋ, (Bangkok 1966), I, 53Google Scholar; Sidthisajaamkaan, , 303Google Scholar; (Krommamyyn) Naraathibphoŋpraphan, , Prawad Kaanthuud khooŋ Thaj, (Bangkok, 1964), 53Google Scholar; Crosby, , 177.Google Scholar

6. Texts of the. treaty and special convention in question in Her Majesty's Foreign Office (comp.), British and Foreign State Papers, (London), Vol. 124. 576 ff.Google Scholar See the exhaustive analysis in Sidthisajaamkaan, , 288–348.Google Scholar

7. Direeg, , 1, 55–57Google Scholar; Naraathibphoŋpraphan, , 53–54Google Scholar; Boulanger, Paul Le, Histoire du Laos français, (Paris, 1931), 351–52.Google Scholar

8. Direeg, , I, 53.Google Scholar

9. Naraathibphoŋpraphan, , 55–58Google Scholar on Thai treaty problems.

10. Ibid. On Thai “imperialism” see inter alia Bernard, Colonel, La Sécurité de l'Indochine et l'Imperialisme siamoise, (Paris, 1937)Google Scholar, passim. Decoux' remarks, 128–47 are similar in tone.

11. Text in Levy, et al. , 76–81.Google Scholar See also Direeg, , I, 88.Google Scholar

12. Western writers on this subject (too numerous to cite here) usually attribute the impetus for the nonaggression negotiations to Thailand, and thereby misconstrue the nature of the ensuing dispute.

13. According to Premier Phibuun's own testimony in a radio speech of October 20, 1940 reproduced in Direeg, I, 88–103. An English abstract is in Vadakarn, Luang Vichitr, Thailand's Case, (Bangkok, 1941) 40–41.Google Scholar

14. Direeg, , I, 42.Google Scholar

15. Direeg, , I, 42–43Google Scholar; Witheedsakoranii, (pseud.), Jugthamin, (Bangkok, 1960), 452–54.Google Scholar The latter point has frequently been misunderstood by Western writers.

16. Witheedsakoranii, (1960), 453–54Google Scholar and, by the same author, Mya Toojoo Thuug Khwεεn Khɔɔ, (Bangkok, 1965), 322–23.Google Scholar In his Oct. 20, 1940 speech Phibuun maintained that there was an “oral understanding” that the “natural border” (kheeddεεn thammachaad) would be discussed at the negotiations. Direeg, , 1, 88.Google Scholar

17. Direeg, , I, 43.Google Scholar

18. Direeg, , I, 43–44Google Scholar; Witheedsakaranii, , (1960), 453Google Scholar, Vichitr, Luang, 40–41, 44.Google Scholar

19. Decoux, 130 (for the factual material presented). Concerning the issues that divided the “liberals” (such as Lépissier and Mandel) from the “conservatives” (such as Decoux and the Pétainists in Vichy) cf. the discussion in Levy, et al., 122 ff. See also Aron, Robert, The Vichy Regime 1940–44, trans. Hare, Humphrey, (New York, 1958), 3–67.Google Scholar

20. The foregoing is reconstructed from Direeg, , I, 44Google Scholar; Witheedsakaranii, , Jugthamnin, 323Google Scholar; Catroux, Général, Deux actes du drame indochinoise, (Paris, 1959), 38–39Google Scholar; Decoux, 130–132; Vichitr, , 40–41Google Scholar; Nan'yō Kyoku Dai Ni Ka, “Shōwa Jū Go Nendo Shitsumu Hōkoku” (hereinafter cited “Shitsumu Hōkoku”), 126–27.

21. See Flood, , 239–59 for details.Google Scholar

22. Official Thai text in Direeg, , II, 769–72.Google Scholar

23. Texts in Direeg, , II, 773–74Google Scholar (Phibuun to Lépissier) and 775–76 (Lépissier to Phibuun); English trans, in Flood, 260–61. See also Charles-Roux, 264.

24. Direeg, , II, 774.Google Scholar

25. Trans, from Witheedsakoranii, Mya Toojoo, 324.Google Scholar The same text is reproduced in the same author's earlier work Jugthamin, 454Google Scholar, without quotation marks. These are the only available texts ot this note. It should be noted that the list of names appended just below the text in the above two works came in a later communication (September 10, 1940) from France, as is clear from Direeg, I, 74–75. The date of the notification quoted is inferred from the sources noted, though none gives a specific date for it.

20. Levy, et al. , 155Google Scholar; Baudouin, Paul, The Private Diaries; trans, SirPetrie, Charles (London, 1948)Google Scholar, Ch. VI. 27). On the tragic fate of Mandel, see Aron, Robert, The Vichy RegimeGoogle Scholar, esp. 484. For Decoux' views of the Thai people, Lépissier, Crosby and the Franco-Thai non-aggression talks see Decoux, , 123–30.Google Scholar

28. These contacts during June and July were made by Direeg at Phibuun's order. Direeg, , I, 69.Google Scholar

29. Direeg, , I, 63.Google Scholar

30. Chū-Tai taishikan-tsuki Bukan Rikugun Taisa Tamura Hiroshi, ‘Taikoku Kankei Tamura Bukan Memo Sono Ichi: Bibō Roku” (Hereafter cited: Tamura, , “Memo Sono Ichi”)Google Scholar, unpag.

31. Tamura, , “Memo Sono Iichi”Google Scholar; Flood, , 171, 604 ffGoogle Scholar and notes (for further details and documentation).

32. Direeg, , I, 66–67.Google Scholar I have inferred the date from the context.

33. Direeg, , I, 69.Google Scholar

34. On the pro-Japanese clique in the Thai government see “Shitsumu Hōkoku”, 102; Gaimushō, “Kiroku” (hereafter GKR) File No. L-3-3-0 No. 8–12, Top Secret Memo, nd (but July, 1940) by Ōa Kyoku, Dai San-ka Chō Ishizawa, concerning the visit of Wanid Paananon; GKR, File No,. A-6-0-0 No. 1–27, Vol. II Taiwan Nanpō Kyōkai Kaichō Morioka Jirō to Õa Kyoku, Dai San-ka, nd (but late 1940): this is an intelligence report by an espionage agent; Direeg, I, 108.

35. An excellent example in this regard is Wanid Paananon's trip to Tokyo in mid-July, 1940, ostensibly for commercial reasons but actually to sound out the intentions of the new Konoye cabinet concerning Asia and the British. Wanid was reassured by the Japanese foreign office that Japan really intended to come to grips with British power in Asia. GKR, File Nq. L-3-3-0 No. 8–12, Top Secret Memo, nd (but mid-August, 1940) by Ōa Kyoku, Dai San-ka Chō Ishizawa See also Flood, 281–84.

36. Asada was described by a colleague who knew him well as uncommonly headstrong for a diplomat, full of personal schemes for furthering relations with the Thai, and on exceptionally good terms with Army Attaché Tamura and Thai Premier Phibuun. See Rokuro, Amada, “Pibunsan no Omoide”, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 06 30, 1965.Google Scholar

37. “Shitsumu Hokoku”, 103–104.Google Scholar

38. Ibid., 104.

39. See Gakkai, Nihon Kokusai Seiji (Hen), Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi, (hereafter TSM), VI, 204–205.Google Scholar

40. Decoux, 97.

41. Direeg, , I, 67–70Google Scholar; U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Far East (hereafter USFR), Washington D.C.), 1940, IV, 74–75, 79–80, and 84 (U.S. reply).Google Scholar

42. Direeg, , I, 70.Google Scholar

43. USFR, 1940, IV, 111–12. Concerning two other “good will missions” Phibuun sent to Europe and the British Commonwealth countries at this time see Flood, 288.

44. On Japanese navy thinking, see TSM, VI, 156–58; VII, 16–20. On the army's attitude, see, inter alia TSM, VI, 162.

45. For details and documentation see Flood, , 191–95Google Scholar and notes.

46. TSM, 104, 246; VII, 89; Sakō, Tanemura, Daihon'ei Kimitsu Sensō Nisshi, (Tōkyō, 1952), 22, 39, 40.Google Scholar See Flood, , 312Google Scholar, for additional documentation.

47. “Shitsumu Hōkoku”, 134.Google Scholar

48. Ibid., 184–35.

49. TSM, VI, 246; VII, 89; Flood, . 313Google Scholar (additional documentation).

50. Thai vernacular newspaper Prachaachaad, 08 31, 1940.Google Scholar See also ibid., September 4, 1940 for Phrom's press coference in Saigon.

51. On this point see Flood, , 274–75Google Scholar for details and documentation.

52. Decoux, , 132–33Google Scholar gives details on the Phrom visit. Jones, F. C., Japan's New Order in East Asia, 1937–1945 (London, 1954), 235Google Scholar, note 2 gives an inaccurate picture of this visit.

53. Decoux, , 133.Google Scholar

54. “Shitsumu Hōkoku”, 106.Google Scholar This document is the basic source for the Phrom visit to Tokyo.

55. Phrom later told French Minister Lépissier that the Japanese offered the Thai almost anything they wished in Indochina if the Thai would only go along with their desires. Phrom said he rejected this. USFR, 1940, IV, 197. From the evidence adduced in the text Phrom's account appears exaggerated.

56. “Shitsumu Hokoku”, 106–107.Google Scholar

57. “Shitsumu Hōkoku”, 107–23Google Scholar; GKR, File No. A-4-6-1 No. F/S11–2 (Bessatsu), Tai Futsuin Kokkyō Funsō Chōtei Kaigi Chōshō” (hereafter cited CKC), 338–39 (per original pagination, not microfilm). See also the correspondence in GKR, File No. L-3-2-1 No. 3–7 relating to Phrom's Imperial Audience. The account of Phrom's visit to Tokyo in F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order, 235, is misleading for the Japanese at no time during the talks professed neutrality. Nor is there evidence that the Thai asked for Cambodia. Jones relied on the New York Times, which reported the matter inaccurately, and he also relies on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, “Transcript of Proceedings”, 6873, which is based on IPS Document No. 1411 (Exhibit 618-A) which in turn is a misleading abstract (in poor English translation) of the much lengthier “Shitsumu Hokoku” cited in the original herein. Similarly, Lu, David J.'s From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, (Washington, D. C, 1961), 144–45Google Scholar puts the matter precisely backward by saying the Japanese “…brushed aside any talk of an alliance.” Far from seeking an alliance, it was the Thai who were brushing aside any talk and it was the Japanese who were actively seeking one, as the present article shows.

58. Direeg, , I, 74Google Scholar; Witheedsakoranii, , Jugthamin, 454Google Scholar, See Flood, , 348 for the list of names.Google Scholar

59. Direeg, , I, 75–76Google Scholar; Vichitr, , 44–45; USFR, 1940, IV, 113–14.Google Scholar

60. Text of September 12 reply in Direeg, 1,77. The discussion in Kuwaanon, Caruun, Chiwid Kaantɔɔsuu khɔɔŋ cɔɔmphon P. Phibuun Soŋkhraam, (Bangkok, 1953), 110–11Google Scholar is extremely useful. Prachaachaad, 09 14, 1940Google Scholar carried Phibuun's remarks on the September 12 (11th in Bangkok) demarche with some interesting comments on the exaggerated reports appearing in the world press concerning Thai requests during this period. Unfortunately such reports were accepted as accurate by many Western writers on the subject.

61. Lu, David, From the Marco Polo Bridge, 144Google Scholar and TSM, VI, 102, err on this point, apparently on the basis of the same source — a badly garbled Privy Council Report.

62. When, the Thai minister at Vichy was handed this note he verbally protested the French denial. But his insistence that Baudouin had really made such a request was brushed aside with the assertion that, in any case, it was trivial matter, Direeg, , I, 79.Google Scholar

63. English text of the French aide memoire of September 17 in Vichitr, , 46–47Google Scholar; Thai text in Direeg, , I, 78–79.Google ScholarCharles-Roux, , 264, distorts these points.Google Scholar

64. Direeg, , I, 73Google Scholar; Witheedsạkoranii, Jugthamin, 455–56.Google Scholar See Flood, , 349Google Scholar, for the list of Thai dignitaries.

65. Thai text of the September 25 note in Direeg, I, 80–82; Engl. transit in Vichitr, 47–50. See also the article by Prince Wan (writing under the pseudonym “Wajwan”) in Prachaachaad, 09 14, 1940Google Scholar, outlining the Thai case for making the Mekhong the border from the north as far south as Cambodia. Prince Wan was chief advisor to the Thai foreign office at this time.

68. Direeg, , I, 83–85.Google Scholar On Lépissier's sympathy for the Thai case see also USFR, 1940, IV, 117, noting his concurrence with the crucial Thai estimate that the status quo in Indochina was already altered as a result of the Matsuoka-Henry Agreement of August 30, 1940. This conflicted with U.S. Minister Grant's view that the status quo was guaranteed thereby.

67. For details see Flood, 48 ffl.

68. Tamura, , “Memo Sono Ichi”Google Scholar, unpag.

69. Admiral Torigoe Shin'ichi Interview (December 5, 1964); Tamura, , “Memo Sono Ichi,” unpag.; TSM, VI, 106, 246Google Scholar; VII, 90. See Flood, 350 for further citations.

70. Through agreement with the Japanese Self-Defense Agency authorities, a considerable amount of material from the War History Division (Senshi-shitsu) used in the preparation of this paper has not been cited here.