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Paternalism and Social Policy*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2009
Abstract
This paper discusses the notion of paternalism, and its application to the evaluation of social policies. It attempts first to define the concept, using Mill's distinction between self- and other-regarding actions. A paternalistic policy is one in which the government renders a self-regarding action less eligible for a citizen, with the intention of benefiting the citizen in question. This concept is then applied to the analysis of redistribution by means of social policy measures. Two questions are discussed: (a) whether any redistribution must be paternalist, and (b) whether redistribution in kind is more paternalist than redistribution in cash. It is argued that paternalism need not be the explanation for the policy in either case. Finally three criteria are specified in terms of which paternalistic interventions by the state might be assessed as justified or not.
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References
1 For example, ‘Public expenditure on goods and services, however desirable, leaves people with less to spend out of their pockets. Transfer payments are intrinsically less paternalistic (especially when, like pensions and unlike housing subsidies or investment grants, they are not tied to specific purchases). For they do not reduce the amount available for personal consumption and private investment, although they do redistribute it.’ Brittan, S., Steering the Economy, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1971, p. 112.Google Scholar
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