Eco-social risks and eco-social policies: a conceptualisation

A central task of modern welfare states is to mitigate social risks (Gough, Reference Gough2017). During the first phase of the development and consolidation of the welfare state, social policies addressed the Fordist or first-generation social risks such as unemployment, old age, sickness and accidents at work. The changes in social, economic and demographic structures – triggered by the transition to a post-Fordist economy – have led to the emergence of new post-industrial or second-generation social risks, such as the reconciliation of work and family life and the possession of low or obsolete skills (Taylor-Gooby, Reference Taylor-Gooby2004; Bonoli, Reference Bonoli2006).

Changes in social risks have led to the realignment of party positions and the creation of a new political space (Häusermann, Reference Häusermann2010; Reference Häusermann, Bonoli and Natali2012; Beramendi et al., Reference Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi2015). In the post-Fordist era, political parties are expected to take a position on the old and new social risk policies. Such positions can move in a similar direction – i.e., parties can decide to expand or retrench both of these policies – but they can also diverge – e.g. parties can retrench old social risk policies but expand new ones (Häusermann, Reference Häusermann, Bonoli and Natali2012; Enggist and Pinggera, Reference Enggist and Pinggera2022). Consequently, the classic left–right divide that characterised the political contestation over old social risk policies – or social consumption policies – became less straightforward when considering new social risk policies – or social investment policies.

Against this backdrop, climate change further multiplies the kind of social risks that the welfare state must address. These new eco-social or third-generation risks go beyond the work–welfare nexus, which characterises the Fordist and post-Fordist social risks (Fitzpatrick, Reference Fitzpatrick and Fitzpatrick2011; Johansson et al., Reference Johansson, Khan, Hildingsson, Koch and Mont2016). The research literature conceptualises climate change’s social effects – and the resulting social risks – as direct and indirect (Gugushvili and Otto, Reference Gugushvili and Otto2023).

Directly, climate change represents a threat to physical health and human well-being. Heavy storms and floods, heat waves, water pollution, forest fires and deforestation are a source of social risk in that they threaten people’s health and living and working environments and, thus, their general well-being, employment and economic security (Gugushvili and Otto, Reference Gugushvili and Otto2023). Disadvantaged social groups are expected to be disproportionately affected by such new risks since they are less equipped to counter them compared with high-income social classes (Gough, Reference Gough2017).

Indirectly, climate change demands policy measures – that is, climate protection policies – that may have adverse social impacts. First, regarding the allocation of (scarce) resources, climate policies could subtract funds from the welfare state (Schaffrin, Reference Schaffrin and Fitzpatrick2014) potentially leading to cuts to social expenditure. Second, climate policies could potentially impact economic growth, which remains the first financing source of the welfare state (Büchs and Koch, Reference Büchs and Koch2017). Third, the transition towards clean energy implies social costs that are not equally distributed between the social groups, thus contributing to increasing social inequalities (Gough, Reference Gough2013; Reference Gough2017; Jakobsson et al., Reference Jakobsson, Muttarak and Schoyen2018).

As pointed out by the literature, climate-focused policies may lead to job destruction in fossil-fuel-based industries and economic fields while creating new jobs in emerging green industries (e.g. Gough, Reference Gough2021). In addition, climate policies could have other regressive effects: low-income groups – who are overall less responsible for global warming – could be severely penalised, for example, by paying disproportionately more for the energy transition through higher energy bills (Gugushvili and Otto, Reference Gugushvili and Otto2023). Eco-social risks are, therefore, resulting in direct and indirect social consequences of climate change and climate change policies. Such risks include declining purchasing power, poorer health, higher labour market insecurity and the risk of eco-poverty/exclusion (Fitzpatrick, Reference Fitzpatrick and Fitzpatrick2011).

In this sense, eco-social policies aim at countering these new eco-social risks. The concept of eco-social policies first emerged in the comparative welfare state literature (Gough, Reference Gough2017). The definition of eco-social policies is still controversial in the literature, and several conceptualisations exist (e.g. Bohnenberger, Reference Bohnenberger2020; Brandl and Zielinska, Reference Brandl and Zielinska2020). Understandings of eco-social policy vary from ecomodernist to transformative (Gerstenberg, Reference Gerstenberg2024). Since our aim is to analyse contemporary political parties’ positions on eco-social policy design, we refrain from using a narrower definition, such as those used in the sustainable welfare literature, which often take degrowth or post-growth policies as reference points (ibid.). Instead, we opt for a broad definition that includes green growth as a potential element of eco-social policy.

A widely cited definition has been provided by Mandelli (Reference Mandelli2022, p.340), who defines eco-social policies as ‘public policies explicitly pursuing both environmental and social policy goals in an integrated way.’ Thus, policy integration and explicitness are considered the two defining features of eco-social policies. Accordingly, eco-social policies, per definition, aim ‘not to address environmental or social objectives by themselves, but rather to reconcile them by tackling their interconnections’ (ibid.).

Thus, eco-social policies differ from classic social policies in two respects. First, they recalibrate the focus to policies that were previously on the fringe of the welfare state. These include, for example, energy policy, public transport policy, housing or food policy. Second, by linking the policy goals of social welfare and environmental protection, these policies have an even more significant variance, complexity and trade-off potential, which varies when it comes to type of provision, steering and logic of distribution.

Therefore, we expect that the emergence of eco-social policies has two effects on the politics of the welfare state: (a) a new focus on synergies and trade-offs of policy objectives when addressing eco-social risks and (b) the readjustment of party positions along established (sub-)dimensions of conflict around the design of these policies.

The politics of eco-social policies

Having defined eco-social risks and policies, we turn our attention to the following question: How is political contestation structured around such a new set of public policies? Reviewing the literature on eco-social risk policies, we differentiate two general dimensions of conflict structuring the political space.Footnote ¹

The first conflict concerns concerns the ideational approach of political actors to the relationship between social and ecological goals and the extent to which political actors emphasize eco-social policies as a political solution to eco-social risks. We conceptualise this as the first dimension of conflict around the politics of eco-social policies characterised by the extent to which political actors emphasise synergies or trade-offs.Footnote ²

More specifically, the definition previously provided has stressed integration and explicitness as the core features of eco-social policies (Mandelli, Reference Mandelli2022). Conceptually, it would imply a synergistic relationship between environmental and socio-economic goals and their realisation through integrated policies. However, when it comes to the politics sphere, such a synergistic approach cannot be taken for granted, and political actors can frame the eco-social nexus as a trade-off, especially regarding questions of economic growth (Mandelli et al., Reference Mandelli, Sabato and Jessoula2021; Mandelli, Reference Mandelli2022). Therefore, the first dimension of conflict concerns how the eco–social nexus is interpreted by political actors, with those promoting a synergistic view clashing with those taking a trade-off position.

In the first case, ecological and socio-economic goals align and can be achieved through a consistent package of public policies – eco-social policies. In the second case, these goals are seen as mutually exclusive and thus not achievable simultaneously with the same set of policies. Political actors frame the nexus as intrinsically irreconcilable, thus indirectly contesting the usefulness and effectiveness of eco-social policies. The promotion of climate and environmental goals is highlighted as detrimental to the social (and/or economic) status quo. Clearly, we expect political actors’ position to be more nuanced: A political actor can have an overall synergistic position but at the same time emphasise some trade-offs (and vice versa). In other words, the extent to which the synergy and trade-off approaches are supported is likely to vary among parties.

The second dimension of conflict is about how to design eco-social policies. Relying on the existing literature on eco-social policy designs (e.g. Mandelli Reference Mandelli2022; Cigna et al., Reference Cigna, Fischer, Hasanagic Abuannab, Heins and Rathgeb2023), we conceptualise that political actors position themselves along four potential sub-dimensions of conflict: the role of government, social policy instruments, policy beneficiaries and growth strategy.

Growth strategy

The final sub-dimension concerns the way in which political actors link eco-social policies to economic objectives. On the one hand, eco-social policies are embedded in a green growth/ecological modernisation perspective: The capitalist system is not questioned but rather re-oriented through an ecological perspective via investment in research and innovation and the idea of decoupling economic growth and ecological impacts (Jacobs Reference Jacobs and Falkner2013). Eco-social policies thus aim at covering the adverse effects of such re-orientation, thereby making the transition (more) just while economic growth continues to be pursued (Wang and Lo, Reference Wang and Lo2021). On the other hand, political actors can undertake a post-growth or degrowth agenda, thus aiming at de-coupling economic growth from the development of social policies (e.g. Büchs and Koch Reference Büchs and Koch2017; Gough Reference Gough2021). In this case, eco-social policies radically call into question the capitalist production system and are instrumental in establishing a new welfare state more compatible with planetary boundaries.

Table 1 summarises the two dimensions and the multidimensional space of political conflict. Building on this conceptualisation, the next section formulates some hypotheses regarding the preferences and positions of political parties along these (sub-)dimensions.

Table 1. Dimensions of conflict structuring the politics of eco-social policies

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

The politics of eco-social policies: expected party positions

Using the distinction between the first and second dimension of conflict, we can elaborate on political parties’ positions on eco-social policies.

Social democratic parties are expected to potentially emphasise the synergy potential of eco-social policies aligning social and ecological goals (Mandelli, Reference Mandelli2023). However, given that they are (still) representatives of old labour and industrial workers, they might selectively point out specific welfare trade-offs of the eco-social transformation (Mandelli, 2023). Regarding the policy design, they are likely to support strong government involvement in managing the green transition, especially in fossil-based industries, and a combination of SC and SI policies, with a tendency towards the latter (e.g. Häusermann, Reference Häusermann2010). While they are likely to prioritise universal measures – since they are more popular among the new social middle classes (Häusermann, Reference Häusermann, Bonoli and Natali2012) – they maintain programs selectively targeting labour and the lower classes. Finally, social democrats – given their strong relationship with trade unions (Esping-Andersen, Reference Esping-Andersen1990; Taylor, Reference Taylor, Gillespie and Paterson2013) – embed the expansion of eco-social policies in a (green) growth strategy, while degrowth positions will not prominently enter the agenda.

Green parties, given their history of strong environmental and left progressive policies (Carter, Reference Carter2013; Mandelli Reference Mandelli2023), are expected to stress synergies rather than trade-offs between environmental/climate issues and social security. If trade-offs are addressed in the context of eco-social policies, then primarily with regard to the achievement of ecological goals (Mandelli 2023). Regarding policy design, they are likely to largely favour a strong state over market-oriented solutions. However, they are expected to have a more social investment-oriented approach than social democratic parties and to propose a universal/inclusive strategy rather than need-based redistribution (Häusermann, Reference Häusermann2010; Reference Häusermann, Bonoli and Natali2012). Since green parties are the result of new social movements around climate protection, post-materialism and anti-capitalism (Kriesi et al., Reference Kriesi, Grande, Dolezal, Helbling, Höglinger, Hutter and Wüest2012), they could be more inclined to include degrowth stances in their agenda (Petridis et al., Reference Petridis, Muraca, Kallis, Martínez-Alier and Muradian2015); this also may be because the party’s connection with the trade unions is historically less relevant, and green parties are mostly supported by the well-educated new middle class (Carter, Reference Carter2013).

In recent decades, radical left parties have increasingly embraced environmentalism and (Fordist) social policies (Fagerholm, Reference Fagerholm2016; Enggist and Pinggera, Reference Enggist and Pinggera2022). They are thus expected to generally prioritise synergies between environmental and social goals and emphasise eco-social policy approaches, reject market solutions, advocate for strong public involvement and favour universal/inclusive measures combined with targeted and need-based programs. Compared with social democrats and green parties, they are more likely to promote social-consumption-based measures (Enggist and Pinggera, Reference Enggist and Pinggera2022). Their growth strategy might be ambivalent in nature. On the one hand, these parties have increasingly incorporated anti-growth stances from social movements and might thus favour degrowth positions (Petridis et al., Reference Petridis, Muraca, Kallis, Martínez-Alier and Muradian2015). On the other hand, several of these parties still have a strong connection with trade unions and rely on an industrial electoral base, which could feel unrepresented by anti-growth positions. Thus, the radical left could adopt a mixed position in which degrowth and (green) growth positions are both supported.

Liberal parties are also expected to emphasise the potential of creating synergies between social and environmental goals, but only under the precondition of a general orientation or compability of these policies towards economic growth, which is seen as essential for social prosperity. They are likely to favour and advocate market-based solutions, with the state having the role of an enabler, but remain sceptical towards economic regulations and state interventionism (Farstad, Reference Farstad2018). In terms of specific social measures, they are likely to prefer social investment instruments – especially activation policy – rather than social consumption (Enggist and Pinggera, Reference Enggist and Pinggera2022) and to target the upper middle class specifically, thus favouring selective stratified measures.

The positions of conservative and Christian-democratic parties could be more cautious when it comes to eco-social policies and the compatibility of social and ecological goals, mainly due to the economic focus and the pro-business stance of these parties (e.g, Båtstrand, 2015). However, within this party family, there can be significant differences, particularly among the Christian-democratic parties. These parties may privilege – to a varying degree – a combination of state- and market-based solutions; in particular, the Christian democratic parties would refrain from one-sided neo-liberal solutions (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, Reference Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen2010). As with the liberals, sustaining economic growth as a core aspect of welfare production remains relevant for these parties, and thus degrowth solutions are neglected. In this sense, they should foster a green growth approach. Regarding policy instruments, they should prefer social consumption policies rather than social investment. Particularly Christian democratic parties could make selective use of old social compensation recipes – such as early retirement – to tackle new eco-social risks (Häusermann, Reference Häusermann2010; Reference Häusermann, Bonoli and Natali2012). Finally, these parties are expected to promote selective measures, mixing stratified policies with need-based ones.

Radical right and far-right parties are expected to be the main antagonists of eco-social policies (Selk and Kemmerzell, Reference Selk and Kemmerzell2022). Based on their sceptical position on man-made climate change and their anti-establishment orientation, they are likely to emphasise trade-offs (Schwörer and Fernández-García, Reference Schwörer and Fernández-García2023, p.5): Environmental goals, if addressed at all, are likely to be framed as detrimental to national economic prosperity and welfare. If eco-social risks should be emphasised in exceptional cases, then it is likely meant to protect their core clientele, i.e., through market-based and selective social consumption measures (Fischer and Giuliani, Reference Fischer and Giuliani2023).

Overall, eco-social conflicts introduce a new layer of environmental considerations, forcing political parties to reconcile social justice with ecological sustainability. We expect this to exacerbate the existing multidimensional ideological conflict structure, particularly regarding the question of the integration of social and environmental goals, which divides the political mainstream and the radical and far-right, and to partly redefine the political priorities of the parties regarding the design of welfare policies, particularly on social equity and economic growth.

Empirical illustration: the case study of 2021 German federal election

In this section, we present an empirical illustration of our explorative analytical framework by focusing on the 2021 German national election.

Germany is an illustrative case for two reasons. First, from a party politics perspective, the German party system in 2021 allows us to detect positions for all the core party families for which we have made some assumptions: the Christian democrats/conservatives (Christian Democratic Union of Germany [CDU]/Christian Social Union in Bavaria [CSU]), the social democrats (Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]), the liberals (Free Democratic Party [FDP]), the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens), the radical left (The Left) and the far right (Alternative for Germany [AfD]). Second, in the 2021 election, environmental and climate protection was a key topic of the electoral campaign, as demonstrated by the high voter turnout for Alliance 90/The Greens (14.8 per cent of the votes).Footnote ³

From a methodological perspective, following the approach developed by Budge et al. (Reference Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Tannenbaum, Fording, Hearl, Kim, McDonald and Mendes2001), we assumed that parties express their positions in their political programs and thus conducted a content analysis of their party manifestos for the 2021 German national election. The content analysis strategy is similar to that of Enggist and Pinggera (Reference Enggist and Pinggera2022) and Giuliani (Reference Giuliani2024). To identify party positions on eco-social policies, we recoded the data as quasi-sentences from the Manifesto Project Dataset. The quasi-sentences were assigned to the two core dimensions of conflict that we have identified in our analytical framework.Footnote ⁴

We proceeded with a two-step analysis: First, we coded all the quasi-sentences that the parties specifically devoted to integrating social and environmental policy goals and pursue eco-social policies (or not, i.e., the first dimension of conflict: synergy versus trade-off). We then coded all the quasi-sentences concerning the design of eco-social policies (second dimension of conflict). We assigned each quasi-sentence (coded) to the four potential sub-dimensions of conflict discussed in the previous section. We also analysed the salience of eco-social policies. First, we calculated the percentage of all quasi-sentences devoted to eco-social policies (regardless of the ideological direction of these quasi-sentences) in the party programs. Second, we focused on the design dimension and calculated the respective salience for each of the four sub-dimensions.

Concerning the first dimension of conflict, Figure 1 shows that all the centre-left/left parties (SPD, Greens and The Left) as well as the centre-right CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP shared a consensus towards a pro-synergy position. In other words, in their manifestos, these parties generally emphasised the idea of achieving social and ecological goals together through integrated policies. However, the extent to which a synergistic relationship between these goals was emphasised varied. The SPD showed a strong pro-synergy position in its 2021 manifesto, referring to conflicts between ecological and social goals only related to energy transition. Several trade-offs were discussed in the manifestos of the other parties. However, the reasons for emphasising trade-offs differed. Whereas CDU/CSU and FDP focused on adverse effects on economic growth, the left-leaning parties (Greens and The Left) focused on social concerns. For example, the CDU/CSU emphasised that ‘decarbonization and green transition have to be economically viable’ and that ‘all Green Deal strategies must be linked to an impact assessment and measures to accompany the transition’ (CDU/CSU, 2021). The Greens highlighted that, ‘if the climate targets were to be achieved by pricing CO2 alone, this would inevitably lead to considerable social imbalances’ (Alliance 90/The Greens, 2021).

Figure 1. German political actors’ configuration in regard to the first dimension of conflict (synergy versus trade-off).

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the Manifesto Project Dataset.

An antagonistic attitude towards eco-social goals and policies was displayed by the AfD. The far-right party took a clear trade-off position. Here, it is interesting to note that the party justified its position through both social and economic arguments. For example, according to AfD, the green transition would ‘[limit] the standard of living of broad sections of the population, especially the lower income groups’ (AfD, 2021). At the same time, employing an economically oriented perspective, the AfD manifesto stated that ‘politically initiated upheavals such as the “climate rescue” require enormous investments and restructuring and hit some sectors hard. This is weakening the core of the German economy’ (AfD, 2021).

The empirical analysis thus highlights that all German political parties acknowledged the importance of eco-social policies, except the far-right AfD – as we hypothesised in the previous section. Furthermore, the examination of the German manifestos confirmed our expectations that party positions along the first line of conflict can be nuanced: Most of the parties did take a pro-synergy position overall, but they also emphasised some trade-offs on the basis of their party profile.

As shown in Figure 2, eco-social risks and policies entered party manifestos to a moderate extent – if compared with the other policy issues such as welfare and environment. It is interesting to note that there was a discernible difference between centre-left/left and centre-right/right parties, with the former devoting a higher share of sentences to eco-social policies (on average, 4.6 per cent) compared with the latter (2.0 per cent on average).

Figure 2. Overall salience of eco-social issues in German party manifestos (percentage of the quasi-sentences devoted to the issue).

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the Manifesto Project Dataset.

More specifically, on the centre-left and left poles, the SPD was the party that discussed this issue to the greatest extent, devoting 5.6 per cent of its 2021 manifesto to what was coded as eco-social policies, followed by the Greens (4.4 per cent) and The Left (3.8 per cent). On the centre-right and right poles, the CDU/CSU and the FDP showed a substantially lower interest in this issue (respectively, 2.3 per cent and 2.0 per cent of their manifestos were devoted to eco-social risks and policies) and, as expected, eco-social policies were almost absent from the far-right AfD manifesto (1.6 per cent). Therefore, the data suggest that most of the German parties did acknowledge the relevance of eco-social policies. Although these third-generation welfare policies were of low to medium salience in the 2021 election manifestos, they are increasingly relevant for German welfare politics (see online Appendix).

Table 2 shows the salience of the second dimension of conflict (eco-social policy design) in the 2021 German election for the main political parties.

Table 2. Dimension salience (percentage of coded quasi-sentences) in the 2021 German national election

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

When it comes to the centre-right/right bloc, the results for sub-dimension I ‘the role of government’ are the most salient ones. It is interesting to note that this was the only dimension that entered the AfD’s party program. For the CDU/CSU and the FDP, sub-dimension IV ‘growth strategy’ was also relevant (respectively, 32.5 per cent and 28.6 per cent of the total sentences were devoted to eco-social policy in their manifestos). On the contrary, sub-dimension III ‘policy beneficiaries’ received scarce attention (3 per cent for the FDP and 10 per cent for the CDU/CSU). The latter was completely neglected by the AfD (0 per cent).

Shifting the attention to the centre-left/left parties, the picture is more heterogenous. Sub-dimension I  was the SPD’s most salient dimension (45 per cent), followed by sub-dimension II ‘policy instruments’ (22.5 per cent). The latter was highly debated in the party manifestos of the Greens and The Left (respectively, 34.1 per cent and 33.8 per cent). For the Greens, sub-dimension IV ‘growth strategy’ was equally relevant (35.7 per cent), while The Left paid particular attention to sub-dimension III ‘policy beneficiaries’ (29.4 per cent).

The data suggests that the classic left-right distinction regarding the role of the state and the market remained a salient sub-dimension of conflict, especially for the mainstream right (CDU/CSU and FDP) and the mainstream left (SPD), thus confirming that the conflict over eco-social policies mobilises traditional cleavages – albeit partially re-adapted, for example, concerning the salience of the growth sub-dimension. Furthermore, all four sub-dimensions were debated by most political parties – except for the AfD – demonstrating that the conflict on eco-social policies can be considered multidimensional.

Figure 3 shows the political parties’ positions along the four sub-dimensions of the second line of conflict.

Figure 3. German parties’ configuration in regard to the second dimension of conflict (design dimension).

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the Manifesto Project Dataset.

Considering sub-dimension I, a rather classic left–right positioning can be observed. The centre-left/left parties supported strong state involvement: The green transition should be advanced through public investment that helps cushion the new eco-social risks. As theoretically assumed, The Left was very vocal about increasing public involvement. The SPD’s position was also strongly state-centred, though the party emphasised some market solutions, for example, by ‘steering private capital flows into the establishment and expansion of sustainable economic structures’ (SPD, 2021), while the Greens emphasised the role of climate taxation as an important eco-social instrument. Looking at the centre-right parties, the CDU/CSU interestingly also adopted a more state-oriented position, contextualising its traditional social market ideology. In its manifesto, the CDU/CSU also emphasised that, ‘on the path to climate neutrality, we [CDU/CSU] rely on efficient market-based instruments as leading instruments within a mix of instruments,’ (CDU/CSU, 2021). However, the state has to be prominently present and to accompany the transition, especially in the social sector – for example, by providing social housing. The FDP, on the other hand, in line with its liberal economic ideology, tended to favour market-based solutions that aim to incentivise environmentally friendly behaviour on the part of companies and make the transition more economically favourable. A complete market-oriented position was held by the far-right AfD, which, for example, intended to ‘reject the EU’s “Green Deal” and all other forms of planned economy’ (AfD, 2021).

In sub-dimension II, the conflict appeared to be much more articulated, with parties diverging from their traditional left–right positioning. The Greens showed a tendency to favour SC policy instruments. The party’s vision for a fair green transition implies strong support for labour market regulations to strengthen employees’ rights and collective wages, and increase trade unions’ bargaining power. The party also supported social investment measures to cushion new eco-social risks, but overall, the emphasis was on regulative policies. The Left adopted a more balanced strategy, though leaning more towards SC policies. The party upheld cash transfers and labour market regulations, but it was more vocal than the Greens in supporting re- and upscaling measures to upgrade workers’ obsolete skills. A position favouring SI policies was taken by the SPD, which depicts re- and upskilling as important policy recipes for tackling eco-social risks. However, social consumption measures such as stricter labour market regulation were also part of the agenda. Data for the CDU/CSU and the FDP depicted a predominance of SI policies. The CDU/CSU promoted training as a central policy instrument to counteract the new eco-social risks, and the FDP mostly supported innovation and research. While a pro-SI position was to be expected from the liberal FDP, it was more surprising for a Christian democratic party such as the CDU/CSU. However, these results seem to confirm a rising trend among the centre-right parties towards a realignment in favour of SI policies.

Also in sub-dimension III, we found an articulated structure of contestation. Overall, the Greens promoted mostly universal measures aimed at benefiting large sections of society, from the lower to the middle classes. The SPD, in contrast, was more inclined to support selective measures aimed at the poor or, more generally, at those lower social strata that risk being left behind in the green transition. The Left took an intermediate position, combining universal proposals with measures targeted at the poor. The party was also very vocal in calling for a fair redistribution of financial resources. On the centre-right pole, it is interesting to notice that the CDU/CSU shifted away from its traditional selective-stratified positions and mostly supported inclusive measures. A universalistic/inclusive stance was also taken by the FDP, which, proposed a climate dividend to the benefit of all the citizens. However, its position needs to be taken cautiously and should not be overestimated: As previously stressed, the party paid scarce attention to this specific dimension.

Considering sub-dimension IV, we observe that all parties take a pro-growth (more specifically, a green growth) position – except for The Left. Nevertheless, the intensity of such positions slightly varied among the political actors. The FDP maintained a complete pro-growth stance, while the SPD and the CDU/CSU included some minor references to degrowth in their programs. For instance, the SPD was critical regarding measuring economic success only ‘in terms of gross domestic product’ and also pushed to consider ‘the well-being of society and nature as a whole’ (SPD, 2021). Clearly, the support for degrowth remains extremely limited and does not substantially alter these parties’ endorsement of (green) growth. Degrowth entered the Greens’s party manifestos in a more visible way. The party was vocal in criticising the current economic growth orientation, promising to ‘change the way we do business accordingly, because there can be no infinite growth on a finite planet’ (Alliance 90/The Greens, 2021). Therefore, the Greens’ support for the (green) growth paradigm was weaker compared with that of the SPD and the CDU/CSU. Only The Left brought forward a degrowth agenda, in which the capitalist economy is profoundly criticised since ‘it is associated with resource consumption and pollutant emissions’ (The Left, 2021). It assumed that the green transition can be achieved only through its profound change and that ‘climate justice also means reducing the consumption of raw materials and resources in Germany’ (The Left, 2021). It also has to be noted that the party did not maintain a complete degrowth position: In its manifesto, The Left also emphasised that the green transition could ‘enable us to create over 2 million new, well-paid jobs with a future over the course of ten years’ (The Left, 2021). In other words, the party’s degrowth position, which we have analysed only in the context of eco-social policy positions, was moderate and included considerable support for measures to enable green growth.

Several considerations can be drawn from the positioning of the German parties along the second dimension of conflict.

First, the traditional left–right differences in political positions persist, albeit with some readjustment. The differences between the right and left blocs become apparent when looking at the salience of the sub-dimensions. The centre-right is mainly concerned about who (the state or the market) has to manage the social effects of the green transition, while, overall, the (centre-)left seems to be more ‘operative’, focusing on the policy instruments for managing such effects. When considering party positions, FDP and AfD clearly contrasted with the centre-left/left parties, as the former are clearly embedded in the neoliberal ideology and thus favour market-oriented solutions. However, there was also a clear difference between the FDP and the AfD. The liberal FDP acknowledged the possibility of achieving environmental and social goals, but only through and with the market. The far right AfD, in contrast, emphasised only trade-offs and promotes a strategy that mixes a neo-liberal narrativeFootnote ⁵ with a selective pro-welfare rhetoric appealing to the lower social classes.Footnote ⁶ The CDU/CSU’s position is intriguing. Its long-lasting adherence to the social market paradigm appeared to be more oriented towards the state and universalistic measures. In its 2021 manifesto, the party seemed to be aware of the magnitude of the social challenges posed by the ecological transition, which cannot be resolved by a purely neoliberal approach.

Second, a more nuanced picture emerges when considering the specific policy instruments to address the new eco-social risks. The new left (Greens and The Left) backed SC policies – particularly stricter social regulation policies. The mainstream right (CDU/CSU and FDP) together with the SPD were more supportive of SI instruments. This means that, if differences in the synergy/trade-off dimension are overcome, there could be room for compromise on eco-social policies. In terms of the policy instrument sub-dimension (SC versus SI), while tightening regulation is likely to be contested by the centre-right, re-skilling and up-skilling policies could find a broad consensus among all mainstream parties.

Third, when looking at the beneficiaries of policies, it is worth noting that no party in the 2021 German election openly promoted measures that would only benefit the upper classes. Positions range from proclaiming universalistic/inclusive (CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens) to selective/need-based measures (SPD and The Left). This suggests that, given the social implications of the green transition, a position favouring those with the greatest resources to navigate it – and who bear the most responsibility for climate change – was electorally untenable, at least in this election campaign.

Fourth, degrowth stances did enter the mainstream party’s agendas in the context of eco-social policy, albeit to a limited degree. While, overall, the mainstream parties (SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP) have adopted a pro-growth position – though each to a different degree – the Greens and especially The Left included support for degrowth in their manifestos. It is interesting to note, however, that neither of these parties adopted an outright degrowth position: The current growth strategy was partly called into question, but they did not advocate a paradigmatic reversal. Even The Left has combined eco-social degrowth stances with support for (green) growth.