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Pricing, Insurance and the National Health Service*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2009

Abstract

Since the birth of the National Health Service in 1948 there have been periodic discussions of the potential role of pricing and insurance in the United Kingdom health care system. This article is concerned with discussing the problems inherent in these mechanisms and it advocates more careful articulation of the cost and benefits of such policies. The first section gives a description of some quite recent proposals to extend the role of the pricing and insurance mechanisms which have been made by the British Medical Association and the McKinsey consultancy company. The second section uses economic analysis to show that both the pricing and the insurance mechanisms have inherent problems which may vitiate their efficiency in many western health care markets. The third section is concerned with the mechanisms by which the efficiency of the health care system can be improved, and radical experimentation is advocated. Without radical experimentation and the implementation of suitable incentive systems, inefficiency and inequality will continue in the National Health Service.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1979

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References

1 McKinsey and Company, Realising the Promise of the Notional Health Service, London, 1977.Google Scholar

2 See BMA, ‘Royal Commission on the National Health Service: Report of the Council to the Special Representative Meeting’, British Medical Journal, 29 01 1977.Google Scholar

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6 BMA, ‘Royal Commission on the National Health Service’. The evidence presented by the BMA to substantiate this underspending hypothesis was thin and spurious. Reference was made to the relatively low percentage of expenditure on health care in the United Kingdom as a percentage of gross national product. Such casual arguments ignore arguments about income effects – see Kleiman, E., ‘The Determinants of National Outlay on Health’, in Perlman, M. (ed.), The Economics of Health and Medical Care, Macmillan, London, 1974Google Scholar; and Newhouse, J. P., Development and Allocation of Medical Care Resources, XXIXth World Medical Assembly, Japan Medical Association, Tokyo, 1975Google Scholar, reprinted in the Journal of Human Resources, 1976 – about price effects and about the possibility that the provision of health care services and the production of improved health status may not be correlated.

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15 The Bernouilli theorem states that an individual will prefer insurance with some premium, £x, which covers him against all losses, to facing without insurance a probability distribution of such losses whose arithmetical mean is £x.

16 Without competition to keep them efficient, managers may not allocate resources efficiently. As a result costs (both marginal and average) may be greater than they might otherwise be. see Liebenstein, H., ‘Allocative Efficiency versus X-Efficiency’, American Economic Review, 56 (1966)Google Scholar; and Crew, M., Jones-Lee, M. and Rowley, C. K., ‘X-Theory versus Behavioural Theory’, Southern Economic Journal, 38 (1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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21 Eventually, increased consumption of health care will inflate premiums, as insurers adjust their behaviour to remain solvent.

22 This results from the price reduction consumption increases from QM to QI. The total resource consequence of this is equal to QM XYQI. Of this rectangle QM XQI is a measure of the benefit of additional consumption to patients. The rest, XYQI, is a welfare loss: no benefit is generated, and alternative consumption opportunities are forgone.

23 Pauly, M. V., ‘A Measure of the Welfare Cost of Health Insurance’, Health Services Review, 4:4 (1969).Google ScholarPubMed

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33 The costs and benefits of the alternative payment mechanisms are summarized in Maynard, A., ‘The Medical Profession and the Efficiency and Equity of Health Services’, Social and Economic Administration, 12:1 (1978)Google ScholarPubMed; and in Maynard, A., ‘The Containment of Health Care Costs in the United Kingdom’, in Schweitzer, S. (ed.), Cost Containment in Health Care Systems, papers presented at the Fogarty International Conference, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1978.Google Scholar

34 Maynard, , ‘The Medical Profession and the Efficiency and Equity of Health Services’.Google Scholar