Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-mkpzs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T19:11:50.007Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Cicero's Officium in the Civil War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2012

P. A. Brunt
P. A. Brunt
Affiliation:
Brasenose College, Oxford
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

If great men were the driving force in historical development, the history of antiquity according to Beloch could not be written; our knowledge of their actions is incomplete and their personalities are virtually unknown. ‘In the best case we have only a couple of anecdotes of altogether dubious value, but almost never a line from their own hand; the first and nearly the last of whose character we can form a picture in some degree adequate is Cicero; apart from him we may perhaps count Julian, who already stands on the threshold of a new age.’ In this judgement there are obvious exaggerations, but its truth in many instances is beyond question, and those historians who feel obliged to hold that the course of history is not entirely determined by impersonal factors, which may also be no better known, must acknowledge that any reconstruction of developments in the ancient world is speculative to a greater degree than for some more recent periods.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 76 , November 1986 , pp. 12 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © P. A. Brunt 1986. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Gr. Gesch. i2. 16.

2 The best discussions known to me are in Gelzer, M., Cicero (1969), 245 ff.Google Scholar and Bailey, D. R. Shackleton, Cicero's Letters to Atticus (1965–1967; cited as S-B) 1. 29–44Google Scholar. On the immediate causes of the war, negotiations, war aims and propaganda, see above all Raaflaub, K., Dignitatis Contentio (1974)Google Scholar, supplemented by Chiron 1974, 293 ff.; 1975, 247 ff. I cite Cic., ad Att. and ad Fam. as A. and F., and use Old Style dates; the official calendar was some eight weeks in advance of the Julian.

3 He recalled, without endorsing, the example of L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91), who submitted to Cinna but joined Sulla when it was safe, thinking fit ‘cum sit necesse, servire tempori et non amittere tempus cum sit datum’ (A. 8. 3. 6).

4 For Atticus' counsels, S-B, loc. cit. (n. 2); esp. A. 9. 10.

5 A. 7. 1. 4; Cicero's later claim to have advised Pompey both against prolonging Caesar's command and against conceding the ratio absentis (Phil. 2. 24), if true, must refer to private discussions. For the law cf. A. 7. 3. 4; 7. 7. 6; 7. 9. 3 f.; Caesar, BC 1. 9. 2; 32. 3.

6 cf. A. 7. 12. 3; 14. 3; 17. 4; 8. 2. 2; 8. 8. 2; 8. 9. 1; 8. 15. 2; 9. 6. 4; 9. 12. 1; 10. 1. 4; 10. 8. 2 and 5.

7 A. 8. 12. 2, cf. de Fin. 3. 58: ‘est enim aliquid in his rebus (officiis) probabile, et quidem ita ut eius ratio reddi possit; ergo ut etiam probabilis acti ratio reddi possit; est autem officium quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit’, cf. de Offic. 1. 8; 10; Diog. Laert. 7. 107; ἔτι δὲ καθῆκόν ϕασιν (Stoics) εἷναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἴσχει ἁπολοἴσμόν = (108) ὅσα λόγος αἱρεῖ ποιεῖ;ν.The exact nature of the distinction between the katorthoma or perfectum officium of the sapiens and the medium officium of the ordinary man is debated and cannot be discussed here.

8 The term res publica, which often means simply the property, interest or concern of the people, when referring to the state, designates that form of state which involved the participation of the citizens and for Cicero above all of the senators; in this sense I render it as ‘commonwealth’, cf. Biblioteca di Labeo 6 (1982), 238 f.Google Scholar and esp. Stark's, R. dissertation, mostly reproduced with addenda in Oppermann, H., Röm. Wertbegriffe (1967), 42 ff.Google Scholar

9 A. 8. 9a. 1, cf. 7. 3. 3 (with S-B 1. 30 f.); 8. 14. 2; 15. 2; 9. 10. 7.

10 Decorum, de Offic. 1. 94; 96; 99; 107; 124; note use of decere in Phil. 13. 14; A. 15. 2. 1; F. 11. 3. 3 (Brutus and Cassius); ad Brut. 24. 11 (Brutus, if genuine). Persona, de Offic. 1. 107; 111–15, cf. Brunt, PBSR 43 (1975), 10–16 (for Cato's acceptance of the notion ibid. n. 40, cf. Ser. Sulpicius in F. 4. 5. 5); in F. 7. 23. 2 Cicero contemplates laying down the persona of a public man. Cf. n. 47.

11 S-B 1. 35 f., cf. texts cited in n. 18.

12 A. 7. 11. 1; the moral implication, hardly respected by Caesar (BC 1. 9. 2 etc.; note Pompey's comment cited in n. 68), for which see TLL s.v. dignitas 1135 f., esp. Scipio Aemilianus' dictum ‘ex innocentia nascitur dignitas’, is not fully brought out by Drexler, H., Dignitas (1944)Google Scholar, reprinted in Klein, R., Das Staatsdenken der Römer (1966), 231 ff.Google Scholar

13 de Orat. 2. 334 f.; Part. Or. 89 f.; de Invent. 2. 157.

14 F. 9. 5. 2, cf. de Offic. 1. 99; 147 f. That this conception is typically Roman may be argued from the use of honestum to signify ‘morally good’, since primarily it refers to honour conferred by others.

15 Iliad 22. 105, quoted in A. 7. 1. 4; 12. 3; 8. 16. 2 and (in other contexts) in 2. 5. 1; 13. 13. 2; 13. 24. 1.

16 A. 7. 13. 3; 14. 3; 23. 2; F. 14. 14. 1; 18. 2.

17 The Marcelli (but cf. n. 26), Ap. Claudius, perhaps Q. Metellus Scipio (though Cicero allows other possible motives) allegedly feared Caesar as a personal enemy (A. 9. 1.4).

18 A. 8. 2. 2; 16. 1; 9. 1. 3 f.; 2a. 3; 5. 3; 7. 6. After Pharsalus: n. 7. 3; 10. 2; 12. 1; F. 9. 2. 2; 9. 5. 2.

19 A. 7. 1; F. 14. 5. 1; Caelius' predictions probably reached him at Athens, cf. S-B's comments on F. 8. 14.

20 A 7. 2; 7. 3. 6–12; 7. 5. 1–3; 7. 7. 1–4; 7. 8. 1–3; F. 16. 11. 3; n. 70.

21 A. 7. 1. 5–7, cf. 2. 6; 3. 2; 4. 2; 8. 5.

22 A. 7. 7. 6; 7. 9. 4 demonstrate that there was a terminal date, but not when it was. With Stockton, D. L., Historia 1975, 232 ff.Google Scholar I would set it in 50, but what I write above would be unchanged if it were on 1 March 49. ‘Hoc anno’ in F. 8. 8. 9 proves that as late as Sept. 51 it was envisaged that Caesar could become cos. II before 48. Pompey was in effect dispensed from the Lex Annalis for his consulship in 52, to which Caesar's prior agreement had probably been obtained on the footing that he could secure a similar dispensation; this was of course not required after the elections in 50.

23 Suet., , Caesar 30. 3 f.Google Scholar (cf. 23. 1), discounted by S-B 1. 39 ff., whose arguments I answer. If Caesar had been elected in absence in 49 and been voted a triumph, he could have deferred the triumph till December and retained his imperium in the interim.

24 Curio: App., BC 2. 27–31; Plut., Pomp. 58; the motion he carried by 370 to 22 in Dec. 50 that both Pompey and Caesar should surrender their commands could not deprive Pompey of a command he held until 47 by lex which a SC could not override. Caesar's letter; ibid., 32, cf. F. 16. 11 2. Pompey's view: A. 7. 8. 4 (σύγχυσιν τῆς πολιτείας, for which there was no Latin phrase), cf. 7. 9. 3. His attitude had hardened since summer 50 (F. 8. 11. 3; 13. 2), but he later resiled, cf. nn. 31; 33 f.

25 A. 7. 11. 5; 13. 2; 14. 2; 21. 1; 23. 3; 8. 1. 1; 11B. 2; 9. 2a. 2 (where Cicero asserts his foresight ‘de municipiorum imbecillitate, de dilectibus’); F. 16. 12. 4 (too optimistic); Caesar, BC 1.6; 12–18; 23. 5; 24. 3. Caesar found the same reluctance to serve: A. 9. 19. 1; 10. 12a. 3; perhaps 7. 18. 2.

26 Caesar, BC 1. 1–6. The moderates included the once bellicose consul of 51, M. Marcellus (1. 2. 2, confirmed by F. 4. 7. 2).

27 F. 16. 11. 2 (4 Jan.); 16. 12. 2 (28 Jan.); 4. 1. 1 (April), cf. in retrospect Lig. 18; F. 6. 6. 6; 7. 3. 2: ‘extra ducem paucosque praeterea (de principibus loquor) reliqui primum in ipso bello rapaces, deinde in oratione ita crudeles ut ipsam victoriam horrerem (cf. n. 39); maximum autem aes alienum amplissimorum hominum (cf. A. 9. 11. 4). quid quaeris? nihil boni praeter causam’. Cf. Caesar, BC 1. 4; 3. 83; nn. 39; 43; 49; and texts in n. 90 for different view.

28 A. 7. 3. 4; 7. 7. 6 f.; 8. 3. 3; 8. 8. 1; 9. 5. 2; 10. 4. 1–3. Cf. de Offic. 3. 83.

29 A. 7. 7. 5–7; 7. 9. 4; F. 16. 11. 2; 12. 2 (Dec-Jan.); A. 8. 11D. 1 and 6 -8 (to Pompey, 27 Feb.).

30 A. 7. 14. 3 (25 Jan.): ‘equidem ad pacem hortari non desino; quae vel iniusta utilior est quam iustissimum bellum cum civibus’, cf. Phil. 2. 37; the qualification omitted rhetorically in F. 6. 6. 5. These and other retrospective allusions (F. 4. 7. 2; 4. 9. 2; 5. 21. 2; 6. 1. 3 and 6; 6. 3. 3; 6. 4. 4; 7. 3. 2) are confirmed by letters of the time (n. 29).

31 F. 6. 6. 6; 16. 11. 2; A. 7. 12. 3; 8. 11D. 7 allude only darkly to his attempt at mediation, which Caesar, BC also ignores, but cf. Suet., , Caesar 30. 1Google Scholar; Plut., , Caesar 31Google Scholar; Pomp. 59; App., BC 2. 32 (chronologically misplaced). Raaflaub (n. 2) analyses fully all peace negotiations.

32 S-B iv. 438 ff. Cicero veiled his inactivity in writing to Pompey (A. 8. 11B and D) and his acceptance of Pompey's leadership to Trebatius and Caesar (7. 17. 4; 9. 11A. 2). To Pompeians around him he would have appeared one of themselves, to Caesarians neutral.

33 A. 7. 11. 3; 12. 2 f.; 13. 1 f.; 21. 1 f.; 8. 3. 4; 7. 2; 8. 1; 11. 2, etc. There had been earlier talk of abandoning Rome and even Italy, but leading Pompeians clearly did not know that this was his plan from the first (if it was). See now esp. Seager, R., Pompey, A Political Biography (1979)Google Scholar for clear presentation and ingenious interpretation of the evidence.

34 A. 7. 10; 12. 2 and 4; 20. 2; 23. 2; 26. 3; 8. 1. 2; 2. 4; 3. 5; 7. 2; 12. 3; 15. 2; the professions to Pompey in 8. 11B are untruthful.

35 A. 7. 14–17; F. 16. 12; Caesar, BC 1. 8–11.

36 cf. A. 7. 8. 4 f.; Plut., Pomp. 60; App. 2. 37.According to Plut. (Cato 53 f.) Cato bitterly regretted the war and wished to minimize bloodshed.

37 F. 16. 12. 4. Labienus' reports of Caesar's weakness (A. 7. 13a. 3; 16. 2) help to explain this.

38 A. 8. 16. 2; 9. 4. 2; 7. 4 f.; 10. 2 f.; 10. 8. 4.

39 A. 8. 11. 2 and 4; 9. 10. 2 f. and 6; n. 3 f. On evacuating Rome Pompey had already proclaimed that he would regard all who stayed behind as Caesarians (Caesar, BC 1. 33; Plut., Pomp. 61; App. 2. 37; Dio 41.6), cf. n. 48; Raaflaub (n. 2), 227–61.

40 His letter to Balbus and Oppius (A. 9. 7C) was no doubt intended for dissemination and typical of professions to which he remained true to the end.

41 Frederiksen, M. W., JRS 1966, 128 ff.Google Scholar Caesar's later measures are indignantly reprobated in de Offic. 2. 83 f.

42 Good propaganda, and probably sincere, cf. Raaflaub (n. 2), 262 ff.

43 A. 8. 13 (1 March) is the first indication, cf. 8. 16; 9. 1. 2; 5. 3; 12. 3; 13. 4 (‘municipia vero et rustici Romani ilium (Pompeium) metuunt, hunc (Caesarem) adhuc diligunt’); 15. 3; 8. 9. 2 (29/30 March, misplaced in our collection).

44 A. 8. 12. 3; 9. 2a. 2; 10. 8. 5. (It is hard to believe that every road was blocked to a resolute man.)

45 A. 10. 12. 2, cf. S-B iv. 461 ff.

46 It is not clear when or where he wrote A. 11. 1f.

47 A. 11. 4; ‘quod ita nihil poterat agi ut mihi et meis rebus aptum esset’, cf. S-B ad loc. and supra on his persona.

48 A. 11. 6. 2 (Nov. 48), cf. F. 4. 9. 3; 4. 14. 1; 6. 3. 3; 6. 21. 1; 9. 6. 3; Marc. 16; 18.

49 F. 7. 3. 2; Marc. 15; Lig. 28; Phil. 2. 38; Plut., Cic. 38.

50 See e.g. T. Rice Holmes, Roman Rep. iii. ch. xxi.

51 A. 11. 7. 3; F. 5. 21. 3.

52 A. 11. 10. 2; 12. 3; 18. 1.

53 A. 11. 7. 3; F. 15. 15. 1 (to Cassius, July 47); 7. 3. 3–5 (to M. Mariu's, perhaps April 46); 9. 5. 1 and 6. 3 (to Varro, May-June 46); 4. 7. 2 (to M. Marcellus, perhaps Sept. 46). He could claim ‘quoad licuerit, dignitati rei p. consuluisse et hac amissa salutem retinere voluisse’ (6. 21. 1) but also that after submission it was possible ‘cum spe, si non optima, at aliqua tamen vivere’ (9. 6. 3), since ’res p. … in perpetuum iacere non potest’ (6. 10. 5), and he could not agree ‘melius esse deleri omnino rem p. quam imminutam et debilitatam manere’; its destruction would leave no hope, but much survived in its ‘reliquiae’ (15. 15. 1).

54 A. 7. 7. 6 f.; 22. 1; 23. 2 (contrast 26. 1); after Corfinium 8. 7. 2; 8. 9. 3; 9. 13. 4; 10. 2. 2.

55 A. 7. 3. 5; 7. 7. 7; 7. 13. 2; 8. 15. 2; in regard to Spain 10. 8. 10; 10; 13. 3.

56 A. 7. 1. 2; 7. 7. 7; 7. 18. 1; 8. 14. 2; g. 8. 7; g. 10. 3; 9. 13. 3; 10. 4. 3. Ser. Sulpicius had made similar predictions at the beginning of 51, F. 4. 3. 1.

57 A. 8, 11D. 7, cf. 7. 26. 3; 8. 12. 2; 10. 8. 5. Unpopularity: 1. 16. 4; 2. 3. 4; 8. 3. 5; Phil. 7. 4; Ascon. 37 C.

58 A. 7. 12. 3; 19. 7; 22. 2; 8. 2. 4; 12. 5; 15. 2; 9. 6. 4. Cf. n. 60.

59 RE iv. 1300 ff. (Münzer). He admits personal charm, A. 6. 6. 1; 7. 3. 12; 11. 2. 2.

60 A. 7. 13. 3; 17. 4; 19.

61 A. 9. 6.4: 10. 8. 1; 9. 3 f.; 11. 9. 1; 25. 1.

62 Shackleton Bailey, CQ 1960, 253 ff.

63 Brunt, , Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 1965, 1 ff.Google Scholar

64 A. 10. 4. 3; the idea is more explicit in F. 4. 5. 3 (Ser. Sulpicius).

65 Caesar's ‘public’ case: BC 1. 2. 6; 3; 5. 1–3; 6; 7. 2–6; 9; 22. 5; 32; 85; 3. 91. 2. (He could hardly have made much of violated tribunician rights after himself overriding L. Metellus' veto in April, cf. n. 73.) He sums up his care for peace in 3. 57. 4; 90. For the Pompeian case, implicit in Cicero's reproaches against Caesar, see e.g. App., BC 2. 37: Plut., , >Cato 53Cato+53>Google Scholar; Raaflaub (n. 2), 152–219.

66 A. 9. 4. 2; 5. 2 f. (cf. 8. 11D. 6).

67 A. 9. 7A; 10. 8A, B; Caesar also professed a wish to renew his friendship with Pompey. Other letters between Cicero and Caesar or his partisans, and his accounts of conversations with them, all presuppose that his amity with them was deemed to continue; knowing well enough that he would not accept that Caesar was acting ‘rei p. causa’, they never asked him to side with Caesar on that basis.

68 A. 8. 6. 2; 11C; 12A-D (seven allusions to the res p.), cf. Caesar's summary of his letter in BC 1. 8. 3 (‘semper se rei p. commoda privatis necessitudinibus habuisse potiora. Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate (cf. n. 12) debere et studium et iracundiam suam rei p. dimittere’), to which Caesar responded inter alia (1. 9. 5): ‘ad omnia se descendere paratum atque omnia pati rei p. causa … libera comitia atque omnis res p. (all public business) senatui populoque Romano permittatur’. But references to the res p. are rare in BC (note 3. 10. 6 and 9; 90. 2) and occur only once in Caesar's letters in the Ciceronian collection (9. 7C), not in 9. 6A; 13A. 1; 14. 1; 16. 2; 10. 8B. Cicero writes to him of his anxiety ‘de Pompeio … tibi ac rei p. (!) reconciliando’, a hypocritical phrase that must have deeply offended Pompeians.

69 e.g. A. 4. 15. 10; Q. fr. 3. 1. 9 and 18; 5. 3 (letters to Quintus could easily have fallen into Caesar's hands, cf. 3. 1. 21); F. 7. 5.

70 A. 7. 1. 7; 2. 6 f., cf. n. 20. Later he feared that Caesar might embarrass him with the offer of a triumph, which he would refuse: 8. 3. 6; 9. 2a. 1; 7. 5.

71 A. 7. 12. 5; 18. 2; F. 16. 12. 4; oddly he thought that Caesar's criminality would be less if the Pompeians gave in to him (7. 15. 3).

72 A. 7. 11 and 13; 8. 3. 4; 9. 7. 5; for tyranny cf. 7. 12. 2; 20. 2; 8. 2. 4; 3. 2; 16. 2; cancellation of debts, 10. 8. 2; return of exiles, 9. 14. 2; 10. 4. 8; 10. 8. 2 (partly effected by leges Antoniae later in 49, MRR 11. 258), cf. n. 79. App., BC 2. 33 says that Antony threatened proscriptions before fleeing from Rome.

73 A. 10. 4. 8; for its support of Caesar see 7. 3. 5; 8. 3. 5; 10. 8. 6; Plut., Pomp. 61. 2. No doubt this prevented the consuls re-entering Rome and seizing the treasury without an adequate military force (7. 21. 2).

74 A. 10. 4. 8; 9A. 1. For fears of forced levies of money, massacres and confiscations even after Corfinium see 9. 13. 4; 14. 2; 10. 8. 2; 10. 5.

75 Once devoted to Pompey, they were alienated by his menaces against neutrals, according to A. 8. 16. 2.

76 A high proportion of Caesarian aristocrats were young men (cf. n. 62), many no doubt heavily in debt from extravagance; the difficulties of filiifamiliarum must have been the greater, as they had no property of their own, cf. Y. Thomas, MEFR 94 (1982), 527 ff., esp. 561 ff.

77 F. 8. 14. 3; A. 7. 3. 5; 9. 7. 5, cf. n. 73.

78 F. 16. 12. 2; A. 9. 10. 7; 12. 3; 19. 1; for Antony, 10. 8. 5, cf. Phil. 2. 53. Cicero speaks well of Matius (A. 9. 11. 2) and Trebatius (10. 1. 3), not of other ‘friends’ such as Caelius and Curio.

79 A. 9. 7. 5; 10. 8. 2 f. The dictum ‘status rei p. maxime iudicatis rebus continetur’ (Sulla 63) corresponds to Cicero's real thoughts, cf. Sest. 73; 92; 98; Q.fr. 3. 4. 1.

80 A. 8. 11. 1 f.; 9. 7. 1; 9. 10. 2 and 6; 10. 4. 4; 7. 1; 14. 1 (Ser. Sulpicius shared his views); F. 4. 9. 2 (to M. Marcellus), cf. n. 39. His doubts in 8. 3. 5 (and perhaps 8. 2. 4) whether Pompey will save or restore the commonwealth seem to spring from pessimism about his chance of winning.

81 A. 8. 11D. 7 f. (but cf. 11C; apparently Pompey never adverted to his personal claims on Cicero, cf. 9. 1. 4); 8. 1. 4; 9. 10. 2; see also 9. 2a. 2; 7. 3; 10. 7. 1; F. 6. 6. 6. In 8. 3. 2; 9. 5. 3 he refers to Pompey's services to him; I think that this is a rhetorical plural for the singular beneficium of 57, which probably explains why in December he had held that he should publicly support whatever views Pompey adopted (7. 3. 5; 6. 2).

82 Thus in 61 (A. 1. 13. 4), 58 (Q. fr. 1. 3. 9), 57 (A. 4. 1. 7; F. 1. 1. 3 and 2. 3), 55 (A. 4. 9. 1), 54 (4. 15. 7; Q. fr. 3. 6. [8] 4). Caelius pretended to greater perspicacity (F. 8. 1.3).

83 For the years 62–50 Rowland, R. J., Riv. St. Ant. 1976–1977, 329 ff.Google Scholar (with bibliography) seems to me right on essential points. He conceded, however, that Pompey was behind Cicero's prosecution of Verres; contra E. Gruen, AJP 1971, 1 ff.; Brunt, , Chiron 1980, 282 f.Google Scholar That Pompey backed Cicero for offices cannot be inferred from Comm. Pet. 5; 14; 51, nor from A. 1. 1.2 (cf. S-B ad loc), though his advocacy of the Manilian law and other eulogies of Pompey would make the electors think that he was acceptable to the national hero. He discredited Rullus' bill by specious arguments that it was directed against Pompey (leg. agr. 2. 24 f.; 47–54; 60–2), but this need not be the source of his opposition; he detested agrarian legislation (cf. A. 2. 3. 3).

84 ‘Possum ego satis in Cn. Pompeium umquam gratus videri?’ (post red. sen. 29); it would be tedious to accumulate references.

85 A. 7. 1. 3, cf. 5. 6. 1; 5. 7; F. 2. 8. 2 (51). Significantly Cicero would have liked to be quit of obligation to Caesar for the loan, A. 5. 6. 2.

86 A. 9. 9. 2; 13. 3; 19. 2; 10. 4. 1 and 3. Seneca in de Benef. 6. 4 f. and ep. 81 (pointed out to me by Miriam Griffin) discusses only the case of gratitude due when injury has succeeded benefit, but ep. 81. 25 could apply to Cicero's case: ‘non offensae potius quam offici meminit (sapientia)’. But see A. 7. 3. 4; 9. 13. 3; 19. 2; 10. 4. 1–3.

87 A. 7. 3. 2; 20. 2; 23. 2; 8. 2. 2; 9a. 1; 11D. 8; 9.7. 3 f.; 11. 3; 10. 4. 3; 8. 8; F. 7. 3. 2.

88 Har. Resp. 54. Cicero's allusions to Sulla inspeeches, mostly pejorative, are indications rather of theattitudes he assumed in his audiences than of his ownviews; for these, however, see de Fin. 3. 75: ’Sullam quitrium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis magister fuit’; de Offic. 1. 43, condemninghis confiscations like Caesar's as unjust violations of property rights; 109 (his dissimulation); 2. 27–9:‘secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria’, marred by cruel proscriptions and sequestrations, theseeds of future conflicts. By analogy the Pompeian victory could also be ‘honesta’, however misused. Brutus 227 implies that Sulla restored ius and dignitas to the res. p. In 47 Cicero rejected Atticus' assimilation of the Caesarian regime to the Sullan, ‘in quibus omnia genere ipso praeclarissima fuerunt, moderatione paulo minus temperata’ (11. 21. 3)!

89 e.g. A. 2. 8. 1; 14. 1; 18. 2; 21. 2; Qu.fr. 2. 7. 3; 3. 4. 1; 3. 5.4.

90 Presumably he had in mind that besides the consuls of 49 ten consulars sided with Pompey, besides many other ‘lumina rei p.’ (Phil. 2. 37 f.; 52–4; 13. 28–30); for many of them he felt less respect at the time.

91 Marc. 13; Lig. 17–19, cf. F. 6. 6. 10.

92 See the apologies offered by or for Q. Ligarius (Lig. 4 f.; 20), L. Tubero (ibid., 21; 28), T. Antistius (F. 13. 29. 3 f.), Caelius (F. 8. 17. 1, but cf. 14. 2 f.), Pollio (F. 10. 31. 2 f.) and Matius (F. 11. 28. 2). All later writers ascribe Curio's conduct to venality; they did not know, though Lacey, W. K., Historia 1961, 318 ff.Google Scholar cannot disprove the imputation.

93 A. 7. 13. 1, cf. 12. 5; F. 14. 14. 2; 16. 12. 4. Syme, , JRS 1938, 113 ff.Google Scholar = Roman Papers 1, ch. 7, treats Cicero's explanation of Labienus' volte-face with silent contempt. Dio 41. 4 supposed a private quarrel with Caesar. Perhaps Labienus believed what he told Pompey, that Caesar could not win.

94 In Pompey had raised an army in Picenum, partly from his father's clients (Gelzer, , Roman Nobility, 94Google Scholar); A. 7. 13. 3; 16. 2, etc. suggest that men remembered this, but the Picene towns welcomed Caesar and furnished him with recruits; men enlisted by Pompey's officers disbanded or joined Caesar (BC 1. 12 f.; 15).

95 Caesar, BC 1. 32 f.; Dio 41. 15–17, cf. A. 10. 4. 8 f.