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Cicero and Divination: the Formation of a Latin Discourse*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2012

Mary Beard
Mary Beard
Affiliation:
Newnham College, Cambridge
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Extract

This article is intended to be read in association with that of Schofield which follows. They share a common outlook—for we both believe that an understanding of the literary form of De Divinatione is integral to an understanding of its philosophical and historical point. But in detail our approaches are rather different. My own paper is the work of an historian and is concerned principally with the intellectual and cultural context of De Divinatione. My analysis of the text, highlighting its tensions and unresolved contradictions, follows from my analysis of that broader context. Schofield, by contrast, studies De Divinatione as an example of Hellenistic philosophical argumentation and explores the ways Cicero translates this not merely into Latin, but into a specifically Roman rhetorical mode. Other differences—in particular some disagreement as to how far it is possible to identify a ‘Ciceronian position’ on religion—are signalled in the text and notes of what follows.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 76 , November 1986 , pp. 33 - 46
Copyright
Copyright © Mary Beard 1986. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

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References

1 The classic formulation of this view is that of Taylor, L. R., Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (1949), 76–97Google Scholar, and it remains the dominant view. For more recent expressions, see Dumezil, G., Archaic Roman Religion (1970), 549–50Google Scholar and Momigliano, A., ‘Religion in Athens, Rome and Jerusalem in the First Century BC’, AnnScNormPisa 3, 14 (1984), 873–92.Google Scholar

2 Throughout this article ‘Marcus’ (like ‘Quintus’) refers to the character in De Divinatione, ‘Cicero’ to the author of the dialogue.

3 Div. 2, 27, 58.

4 Div. 2, 68, 140.

5 Div. 2, 26, 56.

6 For a clear and balanced account of the orthodox position on Div. and the other theological works, see Rawson, E., Cicero: a portrait (1975), 241–5Google Scholar. The bibliography on Div. is now vast; the important article of J. Linderski (‘Cicero and Roman Divination’, PP 36 (1982), 12–38) contains a useful collection of references, as does also L. Troiani, ‘La religione e Cicerone’, RSI 96 (1984), 920–52. The most recent treatment—N. Denyer, ‘The Case against Divination: an examination of Cicero's De Divinatione’, PCPhS n.s. 31 (1985), 1—takes a different line from most; he argues convincingly for the philosophical inadequacy of Marcus’ demolition of the Stoic case.

7 Leg. 2, 13, 32–3.

8 For example, Ad Att. 1, 16, 6; Cat. 2, 13, 29; Sull. 14, 40.

9 For example, Latte, K., Römische Religiongeschichte (1960), 285Google Scholar; Gall, J. Le, La religion romaine (1975), 143–4Google Scholar.

10 A. Momigliano, ‘The Theological Efforts of the Roman Upper Classes in the First Century B.C.’, CPh 79 (1984), 199–211; J. Linderski, art. cit. (n. 6).

11 Difficulties with the application of the concept ‘belief’ are fully discussed by Needham, R., Belief, Language and Experience (1972).Google Scholar For a clear introduction to the debates on the status of the author, see Belsey, C., Critical Practice (1980).Google Scholar

12 Div. 2, 72, 150. This is reiterated at Fat. 1, 1, with Cicero's explicit statement that in ND and Div. he laid out both sides of the question at issue ‘so that each (reader) might more easily adopt the view that seemed to him the most probable’ (‘quo facilius id a quoque probaretur quod cuique maxime probabile videretur’).

13 I lay great stress on the fact that these words are (literally) the conclusion of the dialogue—in contrast to Schofield (below, pp. 56–60), who locates the ‘authorial conclusion’ in the immediately preceding chapters and their denunciation of ‘superstition’.

14 ND 1, 5, 10.

15 ND 3, 40, 95.

16 For the place of Fat. in the programme of theological works, see Div. 2, 1, 3. I stand by this justification for leaving the fragmentary treatise out of my consideration; but I cannot help but be struck by Schofield's observation that Fat. is a ‘philosopher's work’, constantly avoided (for one reason or another) by historians and literary critics. See below, p. 50.

17 Although the search for Cicero's sources is no longer at its height, the simple fact that Cicero is the source for so much of Hellenistic philosophy, necessarily focuses the interests of philosophers rather differently than those of historians. See, for example, recently Schäublin, C., ‘Cicero, “De Divinatione” und Poseidonius’, MusHelv 42 (1985), 157–67.Google Scholar

18 See Rawson, E., Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (1985), esp. pp. 282–97Google Scholar.

19 For the statue, see Pliny, NH 34, 6, 26. In my view, Jocelyn, H. D., ‘The Ruling Class of the Roman Republic and Greek Philosophers’, BullRylandsLib. 59 (1976), 323–66Google Scholar seriously overestimates the degree of active Roman philosophical interest indicated by this statue.

20 Ennius, Var. 45–146 (Vahlen); and for a convenient compilation of other references to Greek philosophy in Roman Republican writing, see Garbarino, G., Roma e la filosofia greca dalle origini alia fine del II secolo A.C. (1973)Google Scholar.

21 See, for example, Plautus, Pseud. 465 (Socrates); Rud. 1003 (Thales); Pers. 123 (Cynics); Terence, And. 55–9; Eun. 262–4.

22 Plautus, Capt. 282–4.

23 See, for example, De Or. 2, 37, 155; Aulus Gellius, NA 6, 14, 8–10; Plutarch, Cato Motor 22, 1–5.

24 Suetonius, Gramm. et Rhet. 2, 1–2.

25 Athenaeus 12, 68, 547a; Aelian, VH 9, 12; Suidas, s.v. Epikouros, 2405. The consul of the year is recorded only as L. Postumius, whence the confusion of dates. See further Garbarino, op. cit. (n. 20), 374–9.

26 Suetonius, Gramm. et Rhet. 25, 1.

27 For the relationship of Panaetius and Scipio, see Astin, A. E., Scipio Aemilianus (1967), 294–306Google Scholar. For Censorinus and Clitomachus, Lucull. 32, 102.

28 See, for example, Pliny, NH 35, 11, 135.

29 De Or. 1, 11, 45–7 (Crassus); 1, 18, 82 (Antonius) And in general, see Rawson, op. cit. (n. 18), 6–7.

30 Brut. 25, 94.

31 De Or. 1, 53, 227; Brut. 30, 114. Rutilius Rufus was, it seems, sufficiently expert in philosophy to be cited by Posidonius, Off. 3, 2, 10.

32 Tusc. 4, 3, 6–7. No precise date is given for Amafinius, but the implication is that these Epicureans had chronological priority over the early Stoics. For Amafinius' imitators, see Acad. Post. 1, 2, 5; Ad Fam. 15, 16, 1; 15, 19, 1.

33 Brut. 35, 131.

34 For libraries in Italy, see Rawson, op. cit. (n. 18), 39–42.

35 Tusc. 4, 1, 1–3, 7.

36 In this I broadly follow the arguments of Astin, op. cit. (n. 27), 9–10.

37 Ad QF 3, 5 (5–7), 1–2, with Garbarino, op. cit. (n. 20), 18–20.

38 See above, n. 32. An apparent exception to this would be the second-century Q. Mucius Scaevola (whose views on the tripartite division of the divine are quoted by Augustine, CD 4, 27). I have, however, been convinced by the views of Cardauns, B. (Varros Logistoncus über die Göttervererhung (Diss. Köln, 1960)Google Scholar), that Augustine is in fact quoting not from any philosophical work of Scaevola, but from the words of the character of Scaevola in a Varronian dialogue.

39 As E. Rawson notes (op. cit. (n. 18), 57), this defensiveness on Cicero's part should warn us against overestimating the amount of early Roman philosophical activity on the basis of those early Roman philosophers he cites. It is likely that, in self-justification, Cicero is not selecting, but parading all such characters that he can find.

40 Brut. 35, 131. For Athens as the obvious location of philosophical debate, see De Or. 1, 11, 45–7; 1, 18, 82.

41 Lucretius was surprisingly (in modern eyes) uninfluential in the history of Roman philosophy; he may almost be seen as the final flowering of the tradition of Epicurean writing started by Amafinius. See Rawson (op. cit. (n. 18), 285) and—for his Greek, rather than Roman, character—Boyancé, P., Lucrèce et l'épicurisme (1963), 7–32Google Scholar. The assessment of Varro's theological works is made particularly difficult by the fact that almost all the substantial fragments are preserved in the Christian polemic of St Augustine.

42 Amongst the many modern studies of ‘prescientific’ thought and transition in modes of thinking, note especially: Goody, J., The Domestication of the Savage Mind (1977)Google Scholar; Horton, R. and Finnegan, R. H. (edd.), Modes of Thought: Essays in Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies (1973)Google Scholar. The terminology in this area is far from standard. I have used the following pairs of opposites interchangeably: traditional/non-traditional; mythological/nonmythological; pre-scientific/scientific; symbolic/encyclopaedic. I have used inverted commas wherever these technical terms might be confused with popular usage.

43 Gernet, L., ‘Choses visibles et choses invisibles’, Anthropologie de la Grece antique (1968), 405–14Google Scholar (translated in The Anthropology of Ancient Greece (1981), 343–51Google Scholar); Lloyd, G. E. R., Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science (1979), 1–8Google Scholar; Vernant, J.-P., ‘La formation de la pensée positive dans la Grèce antique’, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (1965), 285–314Google Scholar (translated in Myth and Thought among the Greeks (1983), 343–74Google Scholar). Even the most traditional studies of the pre-Socratics discuss such issues; see, for example, Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy 1 (1962), 58–62Google Scholar (on Thales).

44 Lloyd, G. E. R., Science, Folklore and Ideology (1983) 7–57Google Scholar.

45 On the formal traditions of augury, see J. Linderski, ‘The Augural Law’, ANRW 11, 16, 3 (1986). For the augural books, Regell, P., De augurum publicorum libris (1878)Google Scholar; Fragmenta auguralia (1882).

46 Div. 2, 33, 70.

47 Div. 1,1,1.

48 For a rare appreciation of the extent of the difficulty involved in translating Greek philosophy into Latin, see A. E. Douglas, ‘Platonis Aemulus’, G&R 9(1962), 41–51.

49 For a clear illustration of the fact that Greek and Roman ethical systems could be perceived as strikingly different, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Rom. Ant. 5, 8 (Greek distaste for the traditional severity of a Roman father).

50 See, for example, Div. 1, 3, 6–4, 7 (‘nos’ referring to the Academics) and ND 1, 5, 11–12 (both passages from the authorial statement in the introduction, not from the dialogue proper).

51 I would emphasize relatively here. Although we readily perceive apparent similarities between Stoic and traditional Roman views of the gods (the pervasiveness of the divine; divine benefits for man), even here, as I suggested above (p. 41), an active reinterpretation of both was required before they could convincingly be seen to overlap.

52 ND 1, 1, 2.

53 ND 3, 2, 5.

54 Div. 2, 33, 70.

55 As Schofield points out, appeal to tradition can also be seen as characteristic of the sceptical philosopher, in places where reason appears to be insufficient to establish the truth (below, pp. 55–6).

56 See below, pp. 45–6. Note also the sophisticated approach offered by P. Levine, ‘The Original Design and the Publication of the De Natura Deorum’, HSCPh 62 (1957), 7–36.

57 ND 3, 40, 95.

58 Only Fin. approaches the theological works in formal character; but it is still hardly comparable, being much more an explicit exposition of the different ethical systems of the different Greek schools (Fin. 1, 4, 12).

59 For various solutions to the identity of ‘A’ in Tusc., see T. W. Dougan (ed.), ad 1, 5, 9. For my purposes it is sufficient to recognize that the interlocutor (whoever he is) is of clearly inferior status.

60 For a fuller discussion of the role of Quintus, Schofield, pp. 60–1.

61 See the articles of Momigliano, cited nn. 1 and 10; and Rawson, op. cit. (n. 18), 298–316.

62 The clearest account of this aspect of the incidents of 186 is given by J. A. North, ‘Religious Toleration in Republican Rome’, PCPhS n.s. 25 (1979), 85–103.

63 Note Appius Claudius’ book on augury (Ad Fam. 3, 4, 1), his debate with C. Marcellus on the nature of the augural discipline (Div. 2, 35, 75; Leg. 2, 13, 32) and his popular (almost humorous) image as the keen augur par excellence (Varro, RR 3, 2, 2). Other contemporary religious experts include P. Nigidius Figulus and Aulus Caecina (for whom, see Rawson op. cit. (n. 18), 309–12 and 304–6). They are wrongly called ‘traditionalists’ by, for example, Wardman, A., Religion and Statecraft among the Romans (1982), 46–7Google Scholar.