Poverty in developed countries is commonly defined in relative terms. It is argued that a relative definition formalises the insight that poverty is a context-specific phenomenon, and that the understanding of what constitutes poverty changes with overall economic development. Yet this article argues that tagging a poverty line to mean or median incomes does not automatically anchor it in its social context. Relative measures rely on the implicit assumptions that social norms are formed at the national level, and that median income earners set social standards. A comparison with studies on ‘Subjective Well-Being’ (SWB) shows that these assumptions are rather arbitrary. At the same time, relative indicators do not take account of changes in the product market structure that disproportionately affect the poor. If low-cost substitutes for expensive items become available, the poor will be relatively more affected than median income earners. Conventional ‘absolute poverty’ indicators will be equally dismissed for not solving these problems either. A combined ‘Consensual Material Deprivation’ and ‘Budget Standard Approach’ indicator will be proposed as a more robust alternative.

The literature on path dependence has emphasized positive feedback effects that make it difficult to shift from a policy regime once it is in place. This article argues that policy regimes may also have strong negative feedback effects that undermine the political, fiscal or social sustainability of an existing policy regime. The prospects for a shift in policy regime depend largely on the balance between positive and negative feedback effects; the availability of incremental reform options that can be used to patch the status quo; and the availability of politically and fiscally attractive regime transition options. The paper argues that differential survival rates of different public pension regimes in western industrial countries can be understood by the interaction of these three factors.

While there is much research on the developmental trajectories of post-Communist state institutions and the external and domestic influences that have shaped their paths, much less is known about institutional performance, that is, the manner in which institutions operate and the extent to which they produce predictable patterns of effects. Academic analysis has been reluctant to shift attention from institutionalisation to effects, not least because of the fluidity of many formal institutions. The present article documents that over the last decade state institutions in East Central Europe have increasingly stabilized, especially at the macro-institutional level. The analysis highlights insights from institutional theory – notably how degrees, time, preferences and resources matter – to encourage further research in the field.

The impact of political institutions on policy performance has been a major research question in studies of advanced democracies. This study analyzes the effects of institutions and political actors on economic, social and environmental policies in ten Central Eastern European countries from 1995 to 2004. Using time-series-cross section (TSCS) regression analysis, this study shows that the impact of institutional veto players on policy output is more significant than international pressure. Moreover, the communist legacy has a much higher effect on policy output than expected.

Since the 1980s public investment expenditures have been cut back in many OECD democracies. One explanation is a priority for fiscal stringency in order to curb big government in the context of neo-liberal ideas, which is reinforced by EMU requirements in the 1990s. Another is the potential impact of left and right partisan politics on investment policies. The main finding here is that the overall decrease in public investment expenditure appears to be caused by collateral damage due to the downsizing of total government outlays. This is particularly the case where there is a policy legacy of the Left with high levels of total public spending on the welfare state prior to the 1980s. Where the Right in government has been dominant after 1980, this downward development in public investment is particularly noticeable.

One would expect the common agenda of improving the quality of care in hospital sectors across nations to bring about a convergence of their quality assurance systems. However, one finds great variations in the ways in which such schemes are constructed and communicated to the general public in different countries. This paper examines three universal health care systems (England, Sweden and Japan) and explores the degree to which political institutions and public opinions affect the processes of quality assurance system building within them. It argues that the inputs from governments in response to public concerns are the key to understanding the changes in this seemingly profession-dominated policy domain; therefore policy changes are significantly affected by dynamic interactions between events, public discourses and governance structures within these countries. The findings also demonstrate that public access to information has begun to have a large impact on policy debates in all three countries.

Despite a pervasive trend towards state retrenchment in Latin America since the 1980s, there remains significant variation in the levels of privatization across the region. However, very few cross-national studies of the determinants of privatization have been conducted and we still do not truly know why states privatize. This paper examines the determinants of privatization for 14 Latin American states over the period 1975 to 2003. I contend that privatization is best conceptualized as a two-stage process involving an initial decision to privatize, followed by a subsequent decision concerning the extent and intensity of privatization. In addition, privatization cannot be simply explained by either international or domestic level-variables. Rather, endogenous and exogenous variables will have different impacts at different stages of this process. The results of the statistical tests yield two important insights. Firstly, the initial decision to privatize is primarily shaped by international factors, in particular, international diffusion, while variation in the level of state divestiture across the region can primarily be explained by domestic economic and political conditions.

The difficulties of implementing large institutional reforms are legendary. Reform programs may face strong resistance from designated losers, falter at successive veto points, or stall when multiple decision makers have diverse goals. Institutional theories have successfully accounted for failure of reform in many settings, but scholars have paid less attention to how the strategic design of a reform process can have a positive effect on reform initiatives. We seek to fill this gap by studying the impact of planned ambiguity in reform processes. We hypothesize that reform proposals are more likely to succeed when policy entrepreneurs strategically hide the cost-benefit profile of a reform proposal behind a veil of vagueness until the final stages of the process. Designated losers with limited information about the impact of proposed reforms are less likely to succeed in thwarting the reform. We test the theory on four institutional reforms or reform attempts in Denmark.

This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998–2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.

In trade policy France ranks as one of the most protectionist countries in the European Union. From an outside perspective, the French attitude is usually explained as a consequence of the strength and influence of the agrarian lobby. The article argues that farm groups in France have lost their formerly privileged position and the power to pursue their interests politically. A closer look at domestic politics shows that agricultural reforms were successfully implemented against the opposition of the farm lobby during the last ten years. But at the same time, French policy-makers were keen to create the impression that they were unable to make concessions in international trade talks due to the resistance of the agricultural sector. The EU-Mercosur negotiations demonstrate how the French government fended off demands for liberalization using farm interests as bargaining chips.

Risks that emerge during the implementation and enforcement stages of defense procurement help explain procurement outcomes. Adverse events have impacts on the timing, cost and quality of goods supplied. The procurement process is analyzed on the basis of an original dataset covering 48 defense procurement contracts signed by the French Ministry of Defense with 18 European contractors. Contractual problems create the most adverse events in this sector, while technological risk is the second most significant risk. Although opportunism takes various forms, it is found only rarely in these defense contracts.

Relying on social choice theory, this paper argues that uncertainty regarding future public policies is likely to be related to party institutionalization and legislative organization. The argument is evaluated using survey data from businesses in eight EU member states in East Central Europe. It finds that firms report lower concern over policy uncertainty in systems with higher party institutionalization. There is also some evidence, although less robust, that restrictive parliamentary agenda control leads to lower perceptions of policy uncertainty and this effect mediates the influence of party institutionalization. These results tend to hold if one controls for the effect of other national and firm-level factors.

Security is generally considered a core public good provided by the state. Since outsourcing military and security tasks erodes the state's monopoly of force, we would expect regulation in this area to be stronger than in areas that do not have potentially lethal consequences. But neither caution nor careful regulation is evident in state responses to the emergence of private military and security companies; instead, the industry's rapid growth has outpaced government efforts to control their activities. This article assesses whether two industry associations, the US-based International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), have adopted mechanisms necessary for effective self-regulation, and it evaluates different national approaches to self-regulation. Neither the IPOA nor the BAPSC has established self-regulatory mechanisms able to monitor or sanction member companies' behavior. The IPOA's activities correspond to American patterns of self-regulation, while the BAPSC's efforts suggest weaker linkages with the British government than seen in other self-regulatory mechanisms.

Given far-reaching changes in the legal systems of East Central Europe since the mid-1990s, one might expect administrative court judges to have modified the way in which they decide cases, in particular by embracing less formalistic adjudication strategies. Relying on an original dataset of over one thousand business-related cases from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, this article shows that – despite some variation across countries and time – judges have largely failed to respond to the incentives contained in the new constitutional frameworks. They continue to adopt the most-locally-applicable-rule approach and are reluctant to apply general principles of law or to rely on Dworkinian ‘policies’ in deciding hard cases. The analysis links these weak institutional effects to the role of constitutional courts, case overload and educational legacies.

Policy protagonists are keen to claim that policy is successful while opponents are more likely to frame policies as failures. The reality is that policy outcomes are often somewhere in between these extremes. An added difficulty is that policy has multiple dimensions, often succeeding in some respects but not in others, according to facts and their interpretation. This paper sets out a framework designed to capture the bundles of outcomes that indicate how successful or unsuccessful a policy has been. It reviews existing literature on policy evaluation and improvement, public value, good practice, political strategy and policy failure and success in order to identify what can be built on and gaps that need to be filled. It conceives policy as having three realms: processes, programs and politics. Policies may succeed and/or fail in each of these and along a spectrum of success, resilient success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure. It concludes by examining contradictions between different forms of success, including what is known colloquially as good politics but bad policy.

This article compares the performance of state institutions and compliance with EU law in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. The public institutions highlighted are of crucial relevance when it comes to enforcing EU social standards and include the court and legal systems as well as labour inspectorates and equal treatment authorities. Expert and practitioner assessments point to major shortcomings in their institutional performance. The procedural compliance pattern to which these shortcomings give rise closely resembles that found by previous studies in some Western European countries, notably Ireland and Italy. Thus, the four countries examined here fall within a ‘world of dead letters’ as far as their compliance with EU law is concerned. In this ‘world’, EU directives tend to be transposed in a politicised mode (although so far, this happened rather timely and correctly) and there is frequent non-compliance at the later stages of monitoring and enforcement.