Many studies of privatisation and liberalisation in utility industries stress the importance of national institutions for reform. However, powerful transnational forces and cross-national policy convergence in telecommunications have led to a questioning of the role of institutions. Single sector studies are limited in their ability to assess the relative influence of sector-specific technical and economic forces in the policy process. This article presents a cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis of privatisation and liberalisation in telecommunications and electricity in Germany, France and Britain in terms of national institutions, techno-economic forces and ideas. Although institutions shape shorter-term policy responses and the emerging regulatory regimes, in the longer term their role is limited to the pace and timing of policy change rather than its impetus and direction. To understand the latter it is necessary to investigate sources of the key ideas which led to reform. The ideas were not embedded within institutions but originated from outside as a response of interests to techno-economic forces and from groups ideologically predisposed to favouring neo-liberal ideas.

This study explores variations in macroeconomic policy and performance in contemporary Latin America on the basis of a theoretical model that emphasizes the complex interplay of partisan control of the government, labor strength, and electoral competition. The plausibility of the model is assessed on the basis of a cross-national time series analysis of economic policy choice and performance in nineteen nations. Contrary to the view that internationalization of the world economy leaves limited room for domestic actors and institutions to influence public policy, the findings suggest that macroeconomic performance in contemporary Latin America reflects eminently political processes of policy formation shaped by partisanship, electoral competition, and union strength. The study thereby points to the broader relevance of the literature on the political economy of the advanced industrial democracies, which has emphasized the impact of domestic political institutions, particularly political parties and trade unions, on policy choice and performance.

Restrictive policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of bank failures during recessions tend to increase the probability of a credit crunch. We examine whether this policy-dilemma is empirically observable, and whether policy-makers concentrate more on preventing bank failures or avoiding a credit crunch. We find that although capital-asset ratios in the total population of US banks in the 1990s are pro-cyclical, the most vulnerable banks (substantially undercapitalized ones) tend to increase their capital-asset ratios during recessions. These findings suggest that policy-makers are indeed experiencing a dilemma, and that they try to balance the relative probabilities of the two evils: they force the weakest banks to improve their capital-asset ratios while mitigating the risk of a credit crunch by accepting a reduction in the capital-asset ratios of less vulnerable banks.

In Germany, where manufacturing has traditionally dominated the economy, this article examines the opening up of telecommunications, insurance and to some extent postal services to international competition. It highlights two issues for policymakers to consider when they engage in service sector reforms. First, it is difficult to measure trade in services. However, this problem can be addressed by supplementing price analyses with proxy indicators of market access such as market share, availability of licenses, etc. The use of such indicators promotes transparency and facilitates negotiations to reform services. Secondly, the article argues that lobbying by producers and users of services cannot fully explain reform nor does EU membership significantly constrain reluctant member states. A major key to reform was the ability of the government to re-interpret services as regular tradable products combined with new regulation to shelter exposed groups such as consumers and workers against harm. The implication is that domestic governments have a key role to play in “selling” services reform to the electorate.