This paper contributes to the ongoing debate over European Monetary Union (EMU), reviewing the economics literature on the merits of a single currency (‘optimum currency area’) and on the requirements for astable currency (‘credibility’). To understand Europe's drive for EMU and the transition strategy adopted at Maastricht both issues must be analysed together. The controversial convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, in particular, primarily address valid concerns about the (price) stability performance of a future single currency by determining the timing and membership of EMU. In general, we propose to interpret the Maastricht design as a mechanism that must reconcile conflicting interests, solve credibility problems over time and extract information about candidate countries’ ‘stability culture’ in the run-up to monetary union.

Whereas many studies of democratization evaluate it in idealist terms, Winston Churchill offered a relativist criterion, democracy being a lesser evil compared to other types of regime. Since everyone in a post-Communist society has lived in at least two different regimes, the New Democracies Barometer survey of post-Communist countries can ask people to evaluate five alternative regimes: a return to Communist rule, the army taking over, monarchy, rule by a strong leader, and decision making by economic experts. Factor analysis shows endorsement of three alternatives—the return to Communism, army rule, and personal dictatorship—form an authoritarianism scale. It also shows support for authoritarian rule is confined to a minority. Five hypotheses are tested to see what accounts for this. The political legacy of the past is more important than current government performance, economic attitudes, social structure differences, and national culture and traditions. Endorsement of economic technocrats making decisions is not related to authoritarianism; it reflects some national differences. Given the importance of experiencing both democratic and undemocratic regimes, the Churchill hypothesis does not apply in a country that has not yet attempted to introduce democratic institutions.

The failure of attempts at neoliberal social security reform in Brazil since 1990 demonstrates the limited political influence of seemingly powerful economic forces, especially private business and international financial institutions. Besides power-dispersing constitutional structures, the fragmentation of social forces, the weakness of political parties, and the internal segmentation of the state apparatus have hindered the efforts of Brazilian governments to gain the political support necessary to cut entitlements and thus stem the rapid rise in pension spending.

A new form of barter economy is emerging in many industrial nations. People are exchanging goods and services through Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS). These are local associations whose members list their offers of, and requests for, goods and services in a directory and then exchange them priced in a local unit of currency. Using a United Kingdom case study of Totnes LETS, this paper presents a preliminary appraisal of their economic, social equity and community-building objectives. It finds that although LETS are fulfilling these objectives, achievements could be substantially improved with some alterations in public policy towards LETS.