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The Politics of Monetary Policy: A Critical Review*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

John T. Woolley
John T. Woolley
Affiliation:
Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara
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Abstract

The Federal Reserve Bank of the United States is a pre-eminent banking institution, and an institution that has been subject to scrutiny from a wide variety of scholarly perspectives. The object of this article is to review prominent works dealing with the politics of the Federal Reserve, particularly its relations with other institutions and their effects on monetary policy. The review shows that the formal legal independence of a central bank such as the Fed does not mark the end of monetary politics, and its record suggests a greater measure of modesty and caution on the part of enthusiasts for independent central banks.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , January 1994 , pp. 57 - 85
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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