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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2017
For nearly 100 years the Indian Congress organization has flourished in and through the press. Of the 72 representatives who gathered in Bombay at the first Congress meeting in 1885, more than a dozen were professional journalists. Not only did the early and subsequent nationalist leaders collect news for, editorialize in, or own outright, important vernacular and English-language newspapers—one thinks of, among others, Tilak's Kesari, Surendranath Banerjea's Bengalee, Motilal Nehru's Leader and Mahatma Gandhi's Young India and Harijan—but they readily submitted themselves to the curious, often naive probings of foreign correspondents from Europe and America. It was Gandhi who taught the Congress both how to spin its cotton and how, when it served a purpose, to wash its linen in public. Jawaharlal Nehru, when prime minister, brought to a high art the interview granted to the favored Indian or foreign correspondent.
1 Annie Besant observed that ‘among the representatives [were] noted editors of well-known Indian newspapers, of the Dyan Prakash, The Quarterly Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, The Maratha, The Kesari, The Nababibhakar, The Indian Mirror, The Nassim, The Hindustani, The Tribune, The Indian Union, The Spectator, The Indu Prakash, The Hindu [and] The Crescent…’ Cited from How India Wrought for Freedom 1915 Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, The History of the Indian National Congress (Madras: Working Committee of the Congress, 1935), 1: 26–7Google Scholar. For the role of journalists in early Indian nationalism, see Natarajan, S., A History of the Press in India (Bombay: Asia, 1962), chs 12–13Google Scholar, and the more recent Narain, Prem, Press and Politics in India, 1885–1905 (Delhi: Munshiram Manorharlal, 1970).Google Scholar
2 Barrier, N. Gerald, Banned: Controversial Literature and Political Control in British India, 1907–1947 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974).Google Scholar
3 A general examination of the place of press freedom and other civil liberties in the nationalist movement can be found in Mishra, Bharat, Civil Liberty and the Indian National Congress (Calcutta: Mukhopadhyay, 1969)Google Scholar. It has not always been the case, despite stated principles, that Congress governments in power have allowed unbridled press freedom. Natarajan, speaking of the 1930s, wryly noted that ‘as experience of the Congress in power grew, [the press] felt it was able to support the Congress in adversity much more than endure it in prosperity.’ Natarajan, , History of the Press in India, p. 235Google Scholar; see also Barrier, , Banned, pp. 140–2, 160–2Google Scholar. Nor can one overlook the spectacular repression of the press and abuse of other media during Mrs Gandhi's ‘Emergency’ of 1975–77: see Sorabjee, Soli, The Emergency, Censorship and the Press in India, 1975–77 (New Delhi: Central News Agency, 1977)Google Scholar and India, White Paper on Misuse of Mass Media during the Internal Emergency (New Delhi, 1977).Google Scholar
4 The term ‘Quit India’ is itself an American journalist's invention, suitable for compact headlines; Gandhi's initial phrase for the movement was ‘an orderly British withdrawal,’ though he, too, in time used the journalists' tag. Chopra, P. N. (ed.), Quit India Movement: British Secret Report [Wickenden Report, 1943] (Faridabad: Thomson Press, 1976), p. 10Google Scholar. Studies and documents on the Quit India movement have recently proliferated. For documents, in addition to Chopra just cited, there is Mansergh, Nicholas and Lumby, E. W. R. (eds), The Transfer of Power, vol. 2, ‘Quit India,’ 30 April–21 September 1942 (London: HMSO, 1971)Google Scholar, and Gandhi, Mohandas, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vols. 76–78 (1942–1944) (New Delhi: Government of India, Publications Division, 1979)Google Scholar. Recent studies, based upon an examination of documents and interviews, are (i) Hutchins, F. G., Spontaneous Revolution, the Quit India Movement (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1971)Google Scholar; (ii) Zaidi, A. Moin, The Way Out to Freedom (New Delhi: Orientalia, 1973)Google Scholar; (iii) Bhuyan, A. C., The Quit India Movement, the Second World War and Indian Nationalism (New Delhi: Manas, 1975)Google Scholar; (iv) Mathur, Y. B., Quit India Movement (Delhi: Pragati, 1979).Google Scholar
5 Details of the arrests and raids are given in Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 267–70Google Scholar; Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 64–6.Google Scholar
6 Gandhi's own estimate of the place of Harijan in national life was given in an article, ‘If Harijan is Suppressed,’ dated July 19, 1942, Collected Works, vol. 76: 288–9Google Scholar. He noted in passing that Harijan ‘is being published in English, Hindi, Urdu (2 places), Ooriya, Marathi, Gujarati, Kanaree (2 places). It is ready to be published in Bengali, only awaiting legal permission. Applications have come from Assam, Kerala and Sind. All but one edition have a large circulation compared to the other weeklies.’
7 Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp, 97–9Google Scholar. Gandhi had requested newspapers to protest press controls by ceasing publication; see his speech to AICC on August 8, 1942 in Collected Works, vol. 76, pp. 392–3Google Scholar. In addition to simple censorship of the nationalist press, the governments of both India and Britain waged a steady campaign against the British-owned and edited Statesman in India, against the London Times, and against the American wire-services, to persuade them to report news of the Quit India movement in a pro-government light; this campaign was successful only in the case of the Statesman. See Transfer of Power, vol. 2, docs no. 512, 513, 521, 533, 545, 577, 669, 753; vol. 3, docs no. 6, 7, 21, 75, 84, 90, 95, 98, 124, 128, 131, 136, 137, 144 and 233.Google Scholar
8 Gandhi, , Collected Works, vol. 76, appendix 10, p. 461.Google Scholar
9 Ibid., p. 392. Pyarelal has cast some doubt whether Gandhi actually said ‘Do or Die’ at the time of his arrest, but the slogan was widely circulated in India as the Mahatma's ‘final instruction.’ Nair, Pyarelal, Gandhiji's Correspondence with the Government, 1942–44, 2nd edn (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1945), p. xxv.Google Scholar
10 Mansergh, and Lumby, , Transfer of Power, vol. 2, 853–4, doc. no. 662Google Scholar. But Linlithgow's view of the revolt in this message to Churchill was more extreme than any he expressed in his regular correspondence with the Secretary of State for India, and Amery himself referred to this message disparagingly as ‘Linlithgow's agitated telegram.’ Ibid., p. 867, doc. no. 670.
11 The earlier, rather more paranoid interpretation of the movement is given in India, Home Department, Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances, 1942–43 (Delhi, 1943)Google Scholar, especially the Conclusion. The best argument against a Congress conspiracy for the widespread disruption and violence which surfaced in August 1942 was that the Congress leadership had been divided about the wisdom of any movement against British rule in the course of the war; Gandhi exercised intolerable pressure upon the AICC to compel its assent, which was not formalized until June 1942. Wickenden points out that ‘until the Bombay session [early August 1942] no definite programme had been drawn up’; Chopra, , British Secret Report, p. 208.Google Scholar He goes on to assert that the post-arrest movement was not ‘a spontaneous and uncontrolled outbreak,’ which is a different matter; ibid., p. 209. For the discussion of possible Japanese connections, see Transfer of Power, vol. 2, docs. no. 621, 632, 687 (paras. 3 and 7), 743, 756; vol. 3, docs. no. 57, 91, 94 and 117, and Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 326–8.Google Scholar
12 The Times (London), 10 08 1942, p. 3Google Scholar. Similar statements had been made by the Government of India itself on August 7 or 8 (Transfer of Power, vol. 2, pp. 600–2, doc. no. 447), by Gandhi, (Collected Works, vol. 76, app. XII, pp. 463–4)Google Scholar and by Churchill on August 10 (Mathur, , Quit India Movement, pp. 115Google Scholar, citing India Office Library, London, LI/1/756, F. No. 462/21F, pp. 99–102).
13 Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, p. 90.Google Scholar
14 Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, p. 272.Google Scholar Pyarelal was perhaps the first historian to suggest the importance of Amery's speech; see his note on Mashruwala, Kishorlal: Nair, Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, the Last Phase (Ahmedabad: Navajiran, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 709–10, note 1.Google Scholar
15 Ibid., pp. 270–1; Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 103–4Google Scholar. Those principally involved in the August 9, 1942 secret meeting in Bombay were Maulana Azad, Sadiq Ali, Dhayabhai Patel, Pyarelal Nair, Ram Manohar Lohia, Achyut Patvardhan, and Mrs Sucheta Kripalani.
16 Text of the ‘Twelve-Point Programme’ is given as appendix V in India, Congress Responsibility, pp. 57–62. The instructions are very similar to Gandhi's ‘Draft Instructions for Civil Resisters,’ dated August 4, 1942 and prepared as a confidential document for the AIWC. See Collected Works, vol. 76, pp. 364–7.Google Scholar
17 Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 270–1Google Scholar; Chopra, , British Secret Report, pp. 90–1Google Scholar; India, Congress Responsibility, p. 27.Google Scholar
18 References to underground publications will be found in India, Congress Responsibility, appendices IV–XV, pp. 55–86Google Scholar; Chopra, , Secret Report, pp. 100–3, with numerous extracts and examples in the appendices, esp. pp. 317–27Google Scholar; Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 274–5Google Scholar; Mathur, , Quit India Movement, pp. 30–7, 45–6, 54–7, 67–71, 86–8, 90, 97Google Scholar. Most, but not all, underground publications appeared in English.
19 India, Congress Responsibility, pp. 27–8.
20 Ibid., p. 39. Zaidi gives an account of government efforts to stop the production of illegal pamphlets, etc., by seizing presses and duplicators and by controlling the distribution of paper and other necessary printing supplies. Zaidi, , The Way Out to Freedom, pp. 28–9.Google Scholar
21 The classification which follows is not based upon first-hand examination but from a perusal of the information referred to in note 18 above.
22 Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 270–1, 290–2Google Scholar; Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 103–4Google Scholar. See also the evidence in Chopra, , Secret Report, pp. 334–59.Google Scholar
23 Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 104–11.Google Scholar
24 Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, p. 297.Google Scholar
25 Gandhi, , Collected Works, vol. 76, p. 329Google Scholar: ‘Interview to a Journalist,’ c. July 25, 1942.
26 Instructions from the All-India Congress Committee to the Provincial Congress Committees and Others,’ (August 1942), reproduced as appendix XI in India, Congress Responsibility, pp. 76–7.
27 Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 111–17.Google Scholar
28 Ibid., pp. 116–17, quoted from ‘To All Fighters of Freedom,’ dated September 1, 1943.
29 Chopra, , Secret Report, appendix A, pp. 317–18, no. 68.Google Scholar
30 India, Congress Responsibility, appendix XI, part 2, p. 78.
31 Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 84–7Google Scholar; Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 278–80Google Scholar. Throughout the Viceroy's reports to the Secretary of State for India in August and September 1942, he refers to students and ‘hooligans’ as the prime actors, Transfer of Power, vol. 2, passim. See also Chopra, , Secret Report, pp. 189–92.Google Scholar
32 Chopra, , Secret Report, appendix H, pp. 328–9.Google Scholar
33 Mathur, , Quit India Movement, pp. 55–6.Google Scholar
34 Ibid., p. 97.
35 Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 77–8Google Scholar; Zaidi, , Way Out to Freedom, pp. 129–33.Google Scholar
36 Bhuyan, , Quit India Movement, pp. 93–102Google Scholar. Collective fines, rewards to informers, machine-gunning of crowds from the air, special detention legislation, arson of Congress-supporters’ houses, etc., were all employed by the police, army and security forces to discourage mass actions. A particularly clear statement of government methods was given by an I.C.S. officer who protested against these excesses: Niblett, R. H., The Congress Rebellion at Azamgarh (Allahabad: Uttar Pradesh Government, 1957)Google Scholar. That the movement no longer constituted a real threat to the Government of India by the end of September is evident from the Viceroy's reports beginning early in the month. Transfer of Power, vol. 2, p. 906. doc. no. 697, para. 7; pp. 915–16, doc. no. 704.Google Scholar
37 India, Congress Responsibility, pp. 79–86; Mathur, , Quit India Movement, pp. 45–6.Google Scholar
38 Chopra, , Secret Report, pp. 351–3.Google Scholar
39 Ibid.
40 India, Congress Responsibility, p. 86.
41 Mathur, , Quit India Movement, p. 54.Google Scholar
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 55.
44 Ibid., p. 56.
45 A Bengali version, edited and with an introduction by the present author and Dr Hiren Chakraborty, will be published by Rddhi Publications (Calcutta) in 1983. An English translation by Mukul Roy, with an introduction by the present author, is forthcoming under the auspices of the American Institute of Indian Studies.
46 Samanta, S. C., Bhattacharyya, S. B., Das, A. M., Pramanik, P. K., August Revolution and Two Years' National Government in Midnapore, Part I (Tamluk) (Calcutta: Orient Book Co., 1946)Google Scholar; Anon., Swadhinata Sangrame Medinipur (‘Midnapur in the Freedom Struggle’) (Calcutta: P. K. Pramanik, 1973), chs 6–7Google Scholar. Also see the introductions to the published versions of Biplabī.
47 Swadhinata Sangrame Medinipur, chs 1–5; Das, N. N., History of Midnapur, Part II (Calcutta: Midnapur Samskriti Parishad, 1969), chs 2–5.Google Scholar
48 Kearney, Robert N., ‘Introduction: Political Mobilization in South Asia,’ in Crane, Robert I. (ed.), Aspects of Political Mobilization in South Asia, Foreign and Comparative Studies, South Asian Series, No. 1 (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1976), p. 1.Google Scholar
49 A piśāch is, literally, a corpse-eating demon. The anti-European virulence of underground publications from Bengal was specially noticed; see India, Congress Responsibility, p. 39.
50 Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 301–2.Google Scholar
51 Ibid., p. 301.
52 Biplabī, editions of 9/12/42, 19/12/42, 23/12/42, 13/1/43, 26/1/43, 21/2/43, 1/5/43, 7/6/43. 3/8/43, 19/2/44.
53 Gandhi had made this position clear at least as early as 1924: ‘Everyone, and therefore every Hindu, is bound to defend with his life the honour of his mother, sister, wife or daughter, in fact all those under his exclusive or special protection … my dharma enables me to say that where choice lies between running away to the neglect of one's charge and killing the would-be ravisher, it is one's duty to kill and be killed…. In a society of brave men, evidence of completed rape should be almost impossible. Not a man should be alive to report such a crime.’ Young India, 12 18, 1924, p. 411, cited in Gandhi, M. K., The Way to Communal Harmony, U. R. Rao (comp.) (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1963), p. 204.Google Scholar
54 N.B. the January 25, 1943 edition of Biplabī, as follows: ‘But what makes us “shamefaced to the point of death” is the attitude of the menfolk of the villages. How can we call human those who save themselves by running away and leaving behind their helpless mothers and sisters when enemy soldiers approach? How did these cowards find their way into Midnapur the land of heroes, Midnapur the devotee of freedom? It is the strict duty and obligation of every male to protect women. If there is no alternative, then a woman's chastity must be protected even if it involves wounding the human-beasts who are madly bent on rape … Ahimsa is not to be equated with cowardice.’
55 Hutchins, , Spontaneous Revolution, pp. 301–2.Google Scholar
56 Samanta, et al. , August Revolution, pp. 41–2, 50–2.Google Scholar
57 See Bengal, , Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings, 64, no. 1 (02 1943), p. 72 (N. Sanyal), pp. 79–82 (P. Banerji), and p. 90 (S. P. Mookerji)Google Scholar. The Chief Minister, Fazlul Huq, agreed to an inquiry (ibid., p. 98) and, in fact, preliminary inquiries had been made in Midnapur by Mr B. R. Sen, I.C.S.; Biplabī, January 26, 1943.
58 Greenough, P., Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal, the Famine of 1943–44 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).Google Scholar
59 The Government's anxieties about the change in Gandhi's public attitude toward violence were expressed in Congress Responsibility, pp. 13–16. Gandhi had clearly stated in a published ‘Conversation with Members of the Rashtriya Yuvak Sangh’ on May 28, 1942, that ‘I always thought that I would have to wait till the country was ready for a non-violent struggle. But my attitude has undergone a change … today we have to go a step further. We have to take the risk of violence to shake off the great calamity of slavery … The people do not have my ahimsa … I will certainly launch a non-violent movement. But if people do not understand it and there is violence, how can I stop it.…’ Collected Works, vol. 76, pp. 159–60.Gandhi further made sure that the Viceroy was directly informed that he would not call off the movement on account of violence; see summary of Mirabehn's talk on July 17, 1942 with Laithwaite, the Viceroy's aide, Transfer of Power, vol. 2, pp. 407–8.
60 ‘Appeal to Students’ (1943), reproduced in Narayan, Jayaprakash, Towards Total Revolution, vol. 3, India and Her Problems, edited by Brahmanand, (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1978), p. 26.Google Scholar
61 See the account of the attack on Tamluk police station, September 29, 1942 in anon., Swadhinata Sangrame Medinipur, p. 55.
62 Collected Works, vol. 77, pp. 265–8, 429–30.Google Scholar
63 In a press statement dated August 5, 1944 Gandhi said inter alia that ‘the second thing that I should like done … is for those who have gone underground to discover themselves. They can do so by informing the authorities of their movements and whereabouts or by simply and naturally doing their work in the open without any attempt to evade or elude the police.’ Collected Works, vol. 78, p. 10Google Scholar. The publication of Gandhi's demand sparked a protest from certain Congressmen; Pyarelal discusses this problem at some length. Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase, vol. 1, pp. 36–45.Google Scholar
64 In his ‘Discussion with a Friend,’ dated about May 6, 1944, Gandhi singled out Jayaprakash for criticism. The latter was bitter, both privately at the time and later in print after his release from prison in 1946. See Bhattacharyya, Ajit, Jayaprakash Narayan, a Political Biography, rev. edn (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p. 102Google Scholar for diary entries dated August 5 and August 11, 1944. Also see Jayaprakash's, ‘The Revolution in 1942’ (1946) in Towards Total Revolution, vol. 2, Politics in India, p. 49.Google Scholar