Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T01:49:07.814Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Electoral Cycles, Budget Controls and Public Expenditure*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

James Alt  and
K. Alec Chrystal
James Alt
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Washington University in St Louis
K. Alec Chrystal
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Essex
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper presents the results of tests of a number of models of public expenditure growth which have achieved wide currency. The main types of models examined are a permanent income model, electoral cycle models, and stabilization policy models. The models are tested with data from Britain and the United States of America and the results are compared with evidence from other countries. The paper concludes that government expenditure grows in proportion to national income because politicians find it convenient to plan that way; electoral-cyclical factors are relatively unimportant in determining public expenditure; there appears to be a limited role for public expenditure in economic stabilization policy; in a comparative context institutions of expenditure control are important in determining relative rates of growth of public sector consumption expenditure.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , February 1981 , pp. 37 - 59
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1981

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Alt, J. (1979) The Politics of Economic Decline. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Alt, J. and Chrystal, K. A. (1980) Political-economic models of British fiscal policy. In Hibbs, D. and Fassbender, H. (eds.), Contemporary Political Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Alt, J. and Woolley, J. (1980) Reaction functions and institutional differences: sources of variation in the political economy of macroeconomic policy. Presented to the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.Google Scholar
Aranson, P. and Ordeshook, P. (1978) The political bases of public sector growth in a representative democracy. Mimeo.Google Scholar
Bacon, R. and Eltis, W. (1976) Britain's Economic Problem: Too Few Producers. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J. and Wagner, R. (1977) Democracy in Deficit. New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Chrystal, K. A. (1979) Controversies in British Macroeconomics. London: Philip Allan.Google Scholar
Chrystal, K. A. and Alt, J. (1979a) Endogenous government behavior: Wagner's Law or Götterdämmerung? In Cook, S. T. and Jackson, P. M. (eds.), Current Issues in Fiscal Policy. London: Martin Robertson.Google Scholar
Chrystal, K. A. and Alt, J. (1979b) Some problems in formulating and testing a politico-economic model of the U.K. Economic Journal, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Chrystal, K. A. and Alt, J. (1980) Public sector behaviour: the status of the political business cycle. In Proceedings of the 1979 AUTE Conference.Google Scholar
Cowart, A. (1978) The economic policies of European governments, British Journal of Political Science, 8, 285–312 and 425–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fiorina, M. (1979) Legislative facilitation of government growth. Washington University, Center for the Study of American Business, Working Paper 48.Google Scholar
Frey, B. (1978a) Modern Political Economy. London: Martin Robertson.Google Scholar
Frey, B. (1978b) The political business cycle: theory and evidence. In Buchanan, J. M.et al., The Economics of Politics. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.Google Scholar
Frey, B. and Schneider, F. (1978a) A politico-economic model of the U.K., Economic Journal, 88, 243–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, B. and Schneider, F. (1978b) An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the United States, Review of Economics and Statistics, 60, 174–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frey, B. and Schneider, F. (1979) An econometric model with an endogenous government sector, Public Choice, 34, 29–44.Google Scholar
Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. (1980) Post election redistributive stategies of representatives. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C.Google Scholar
Hayward, J. (1973) The One and Indivisible French Republic. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Heclo, H. and Wildavsky, A. (1974) The Private Government of Public Money. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Hibbs, D. (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy, American Political Science Review, 71, 1467–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jennings, E. (1979) Competition, constituencies, and welfare policies in American states, American Political Science Review, 73, 414–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnston, J. (1972) Econometric Methods, 2nd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Klein, R. (1976) The politics of public expenditure: American theory and British practice, British Journal of Political Science, 6, 401–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knott, J. (1978) Politics and economic stabilization. Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
Kohl, J. (1980) Trends and problems in post-war public expenditure development in Western Europe and North America. In Heidenheimer, A. and Flora, P. (eds.), The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.Google Scholar
Lord, G. (1973) The French Budgetary Process. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Macrae, D. (1977) A political model of the business cycle, Journal of Political Economy, 85, 239–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meltzer, A. and Richard, F. (1978) Why government grows (and grows) in a democracy, The Public Interest, 52, 111–18.Google Scholar
Mosley, P. (1976) Towards a satisficing theory of economic policy, Economic Journal, 86, 59–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Niskanen, W. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine.Google Scholar
Nordhaus, W. (1975) The political business cycle, Review of Economic Studies, 42, 169–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nutter, G. (1978) Growth of Government in the West. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute.Google Scholar
Peacock, A. and Wiseman, J. (1961). The Growth of Public Expenditure in the U.K. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Price, R. W. R. (1978) Public expenditure. In Blackaby, F.et al., British Economic Policy 1960–1974, chapter 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Rose, R. and Peters, G. (1978) Can Government Go Bankrupt? New York: Basic Books.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tufte, E. (1978) The Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wagner, A. (1883) Finanzwissenschaft. Translated and reprinted as ‘Three extracts on public finance’, in Musgrave, R. A. and Peacock, A. T. (eds.), Classics on the Theory of Public Finance. London: Macmillan, 1962.Google Scholar
Weingast, B., Shepsle, K. and Johnsen, C. (1980). The political economy of benefits and costs, Journal of Political Economy.Google Scholar
Wildavsky, A. (1975) Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Winters, R., Johnson, C., Nowosadko, P., and Rendini, J. (1979) Political behavior and American public policy: the case of the political business cycle. Dartmouth College, mimeo.Google Scholar