1. A.G. Becker v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 519 F. Supp. 602 (1981).

2. For a few examples of the voluminous literature on Chevron, see Pierce, Richard J., “Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions,” Vanderbilt Law Review 41, no. 2 (1988): 301–14;Google Scholar Farina, Cynthia, “Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,” Columbia Law Review 89, no. 3 (1989): 452–528Google Scholar; Sunstein, Cass, “Law and Administration After Chevron,” Columbia Law Review 90, no. 8 (1990): 2071–2120Google Scholar; and Merrill, Thomas, “Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,” Yale Law Journal 101, no. 5 (1992): 969–1042.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. See, for instance, Schiller, Reuel E., “Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment,” Virginia Law Review 86, no. 1 (2000): 1–102;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Schiller, “The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and Administration in Postwar America,” Law & History Review 26, no. 2 (2008): 415–28; Tani, Karen M., “Flemming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of ‘New Property,’” Law & History Review 26, no. 2 (2008); 379–414Google Scholar; Lee, Sophia Z., “Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present,” Virginia Law Review 96, no. 4 (2010): 799–886;Google Scholar Grisinger, Joanna, The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics Since the New Deal (Cambridge, 2012)Google Scholar; and also Tani, “Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor,” Cornell Law Review 100, no. 4 (2015): 825–900.

4. For a fuller explanation, see Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, 2001), 1–13.

5. The literature on deregulation has focused so far on legislative reforms and increased control of rulemaking by executive offices like the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This article demonstrates that government bureaucrats were themselves crucial in chipping away at bureaucratic government. For the extant literature on deregulation, see Derthick, Martha and Quirk, Paul J., The Politics of Deregulation (Washington, D.C., 1985)Google Scholar; and Harris, Richard A. and Milkis, Sidney M., The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies (New York, 1989)Google Scholar. More recently, historians interested in the rise of “neoliberalism” have uncovered the networks of intellectuals and organizational support that undergirded policy prescriptions such as deregulation. Thus far, however, these works have failed to examine the important role administrators played in the same process; see, for example, Burgin, Angus, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the Depression (Cambridge, Mass., 2012)Google Scholar; Jones, Daniel Stedman, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Princeton, 2012)Google Scholar; Mirowski, Philip and Plehwe, Dieter, The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, Mass., 2009)Google Scholar; and Phillips-Fein, Kim, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New York, 2009).Google Scholar

6. Ronald Reagan, “OSHA: A Four-Letter Word,” 121 Cong. Rec. 32911 (1975), 32944–45; and also Reagan, “First Inaugural Address,” delivered in Washington, D.C., 20 January 1981.

7. See William D. Jackson, “Regulation Q and Interest on Deposits,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report No. 79-185-E, Washington, D.C., 1979, 1–9.

8. The real interest rate refers to the nominal rate of interest minus the rate of inflation.

9. “Interview with John McGonigle, Robert Plaze, and David Silver on Developments in the Mutual Fund Industry: Money Market Mutual Funds,” Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Historical Society, conducted on 29 March 2005 by Martin Lybecker, p. 1. For changing attitudes on rate ceilings, see the many congressional hearings on financial reform convened in the aftermath of the first oil shock; some examples include “Extension of Regulation Q,” United States Senate Committee on Banking, House, and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 20, 21, and 22 March 1973, 33–37; “Reform of Financial Institutions—1973,” Senate Committee on Housing, Banking, and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 11, 12, and 25 September 1974, 2–7; and “To Extend Regulation Q?” Senate Committee on Housing, Banking, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 7 February 1977, 11–14.

10. Commercial paper is a form of corporate borrowing that firms issue to fund short-term debt obligations such as payroll. Its notes are unsecured, meaning they are backed only by the company’s stated promise of repayment, not by collateral. For more on the history of commercial paper, see Handal, Kenneth V., “The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts,” University of Chicago Law Review 39, no. 2 (1972): 362–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. Robert Bennett, “A Bank, by Any Other Name . . .” New York Times, 27 December 1981, F1; Linda Grant, “It Looks Like a Bank, Acts Like a Bank But Its Name Is Merrill Lynch,” Los Angeles Times, 15 March 1981, G1; and also “Competition and Conditions in the Financial System,” Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 13, 14, 18, and 19 May 1981, 934.

12. The excitement over the CMA was also attributable to Merrill’s sophisticated computer module that automatically “swept” excess funds back into new investments. Traditional investment accounts let excess cash idle at the whim of a financial adviser, but Merrill’s emerging digital capacities ensured monetary gains would be compounded continuously; see Harvey Shapiro, “Putting All Your Assets in One Basket,” New York Times, 20 November 1983, F11; Deborah Rankin, “Lure of Money Management Accounts,” New York Times, 19 September 1982, 151; Joseph Nocera, A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Money Class (New York, 1994), 106–25, 149–65; and also “Competition and Conditions in the Financial System,” United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 28 April, 6 and 7 May 1981, 89.

13. The Glass Steagall Act partitioned the business of banking between commercial banks that engaged in depository lending and investment banks that sold financial securities on Wall Street. Glass-Steagall refers to the following four sections of the 1933 National Banking Act—Section 16, which limited bank dealings in securities to “the purchase and sale of such securities, without recourse, solely upon the order and for the account of customers,” and stipulated that “no member bank shall underwrite any issue of securities”—Section 20, which mandated that “no member bank shall be affiliated with a securities corporation”—Section 21, which made it unlawful “for any person, corporation or other organization engaged in the issue, underwriting or selling of securities to receive deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a pass book or certificate”—and last, Section 32, which required that “no officer or director of a member bank shall be an officer, director or manager of an organization engaged principally in the securities business,” and prohibited “correspondent relationships between member banks and securities organizations.” The Glass-Steagall wall was reinforced in the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act, which prevented holding companies from acquiring affiliates that traded securities and engaged in other “non-banking” activities; see Perkins, Edwin J., “The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History,” Banking Law Journal 88, no. 6 (1971): 483–528.Google Scholar

14. Lines had been blurred before. Commercial banks had tried to underwrite municipal bonds and had even been allowed to help facilitate certain kinds of securities transactions during the 1970s. But these were minor turf violations at best. MMFs were a different animal. Their invention represented the first time one segment of the banking sector threatened the other in a serious way; see generally Sametz, Arnold, Keenan, Michael, Bloch, Ernest, and Goldberg, Lawrence, “Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: An Evaluation of Current Developments and Regulatory Issues,” Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 2 (1979): 155–93Google Scholar; Evans, John R., “Regulation of Bank Securities Activities,” Banking Law Journal 91, no. 7 (1974): 611–23;Google Scholar New York Clearing House Association, “Commercial Bank Private Placement Advisory Services: The Legal and Public Policy Issues,” Banking Law Journal 95, no. 3 (1978): 333–61Google Scholar; Spencer, Lee B. Jr., “Regulation of Bank Securities Activities: The Effects of the SEC Bank Study,” Banking Law Journal 95 (1978): 616–33Google Scholar; “Banks Yearn to Underwrite Municipal Bonds,” Chicago Tribune, 17 June 1979, F3; and Martin Baron, “Sorting Through Those Accounts That Do It All,” Los Angeles Times, 20 February 1983, H1.

15. For footage of the Chicago City Limits skit, see “Banking on the Future,” Copyright © 1986 Bankers Trust, produced by Galan and Associates Productions Inc., http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O38lPLrMfTg.

16. For more on the deregulation of brokerage commissions, see Nocera, A Piece of the Action, 106–25.

17. “Bankers See Possibility of a Challenge to Merrill Lynch Plan,” Wall Street Journal, 17 October 1977, 39; “Special Report: Chipping Away at Glass-Steagall?” American Bankers Association Journal (May 1979): 56; Robert Bennett, “Sanford’s New Banking Vision,” New York Times, 17 March 1985, F1; and Andrew Albert, “Bankers Trust Puts Virtually All of Its Businesses Under One Big Financial Tent,” The American Banker, 23 April 1986, 2.

18. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 519 F. Supp. 602 (1981); Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 716 F.2d 92 (1983); and William Hall, “Money Centre Banks Challenge Rules on Commercial Paper Business,” Financial Times, 11 June 1986, 34.

19. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 444 F.2d 841 (1970), 9–10.

20. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), 21.

21. See Reuel E. Schiller, “The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law,” Michigan Law Review 106, no. 3 (2007): 399–442; and also Landis, James M., The Administrative Process (New Haven, 1938), 67.Google Scholar

22. Stigler, George, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, no. 1 (1971): 3–21Google Scholar; Kariel, Henry S., The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford, 1961)Google Scholar; McConnell, Grant, Private Power & American Democracy (New York, 1966)Google Scholar; Kolko, Gabriel, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-interpretation of American History, 1900–1916 (Chicago, 1967)Google Scholar; and Fellmeth, Robert C., The Interstate Commerce Omission, the Public Interest, and the ICC: The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on the Interstate Commerce Commission and Transportation (New York, 1970).Google Scholar

23. See generally Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1972)Google Scholar; and Schlesinger, Arthur M., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973).Google Scholar

24. For examples in the case law, see Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (1971); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 462 F.2d 846 (1972); Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (1973); Mobile Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 483 F.2d 1238 (1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 477 F.2d 495 (1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (1973); and Home Box Office v. Federal Communications Commission, 567 F.2d 9 (1977). For legal scholarship on the broadened scope of judicial review, see Stewart, Richard, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law,” Harvard Law Review 88, no. 8 (1975): 1667–1813.Google Scholar

25. Wright, J. Skelly, “Courts and the Rulemaking Process,” Cornell Law Review 59.3 (1973–74): 378, 396Google Scholar; “Letter from Carl A. Auerbach to Henry J. Friendly,” 21 November 1977, Henry J. Friendly Papers, Box 205 Folder 3, Harvard Law School Library, Harvard University, 1; “Letter from Walter Gellhorn to William R. Andersen,” 12 August 1980, Walter Gellhorn Papers, General Correspondence: A-B, 1975–83, Box 312, Unmarked Folder, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, 1–2; see also two recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) that advised against judicial reengagement: “ACUS Recommendation 72–5: Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability,” adopted 14 December 1972, 38 Federal Register 19792 (23 July 1973), 1–3; and “ACUS Recommendation 76–3: Procedures in Addition to Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking,” adopted 3–4 June 1976, 41 Federal Register 29654 (19 July 1976).

26. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972); and United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224 (1973).

27. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

28. Victor Rosenblum, “Supreme Court’s April Shower on Judicial Review of Rulemaking,” Administrative Law Review 30 (1978): xi; “D.C. Circuit Behavior Cause for Concern,” Legal Times, 17 September 1979, 1–3.

29. A.G. Becker v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 519 F. Supp. 602 (1981).

30. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 693 F.2d 136 (1982).

31. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 716 F.2d 92 (1983).

32. Gary Hector, “The Banks Invade Wall Street,” Fortune, 7 February 1983, 44; Scott McMurray, “Schwab Rides the Bull Market to Double Earnings,” American Banker, 13 September 1983, 1.

33. Garn hit a roadblock at the House Banking Committee when Fernand St. Germain (D-R.I.), a longtime supporter of Wall Street, refused to act on an S&L rescue that contained broader changes to Glass-Steagall. The resulting compromise—the 1982 Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act—deregulated thrifts but included no far-reaching reforms on bank securities privileges. Garn reopened the Glass-Steagall debate in the subsequent session but was thwarted by a combination of securities industry lobbying, the act’s 50th anniversary, challenges presented by divided government, and a general hesitance to revisit the issue of financial reform; see “Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981,” Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, and 30 October 1981, 885–86; “Financial Institutions in a Revolutionary Era,” House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 10 December 1981, 1–114; and “Securities Activities of Depository Institutions,” Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 4, 9, 10, and 12 February 1982, 2–25.

34. “Joint Petition for Writ of Certiorari,” 29 April 1983, Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, 693 F.2d 136 (1982); “Petition for Writ of Certiorari,” 13 October 1983, Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 716 F.2d 92 (1983).

35. 44 Federal Register, 71779, 11 December 1979.

36. See “Peter Nulty, “A Brave Experiment in Pollution Control,” Fortune, 12 February 1979, 120–23; William Drayton, “Getting Smarter About Regulation,” Harvard Business Review, no. 81405 (July–August 1981): 1–4; Allen Kneese and Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy (Washington, D.C., 1975); and Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest (Washington, D.C., 1977).

37. For background on the controversy, see the lower ruling by the D.C. Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (1982); and also Thomas W. Merrill, “The Story of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born,” in Eskridge, William N., Frickey, Philip P, and Garrett, Elizabeth, Statutory Interpretation Stories (New York, 2011), 168–71Google Scholar.

38. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

39. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).

40. Ibid.

41. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 207 (1984).

42. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 627, F. Supp. 695 (1986).

43. See Mayburg v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 740 F.2d (1984); New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Maine, 742 F.2d l (1984); and also Lawson, Gary and Kam, Stephen, “Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine,” Administrative Law Review 65, no. 1 (2013): 22–26.Google Scholar

44. See, for instance, Purcell’s award-winning Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America (New Haven, 2000).

45. Director’s class was only one part of a larger renaissance in neoclassical economic thought occurring at the University of Chicago in the postwar period; see generally Burgin, The Great Persuasion; Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe; Mirowski and Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pèlerin; and Harvey, David, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York, 2005)Google Scholar.

46. Levi, Edward H., “Aaron Director and the Study of Law and Economics,” Journal of Law & Economics 9 (1966): 3–4Google Scholar. For more on the Law & Economics movement generally, see Duxbury, Neil, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1995), 341–64Google Scholar; Rodgers, Dan, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), 56–63Google Scholar; and Teles, Steven, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (Princeton, 2008), 90–134, 181–219.Google Scholar

47. See Bork, “The Goals of Anti-Trust Policy,” American Economic Review 57, no. 2 (1967): 242–53; and Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, 1978).

48. Neal, Andrea, “Robert Bork: Advocate of Judicial Restraint,” American Bar Association Journal 73 (1987): 82–86Google Scholar; for an elaboration on his jurisprudence, see Bork, “Original Intent: The Only Legitimate Basis for Constitutional Decision-making,” Judges Journal 26, no. 3 (1987): 13–17; and Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York, 1990).

49. I borrow this term from Laura Kalman’s The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (New Haven, 1996) to refer to the idea that the judiciary should be a proactive agent of policy change.

50. For more on the Reagan administration’s approach to judicial selection, see Smith, William French, “Urging Judicial Restraint,” American Bar Association Journal 68 (1982): 59–61Google Scholar; and Browning, Graeme, “Reagan Molds the Federal Court in His Own Image,” American Bar Association Journal 71 (1985): 60–64.Google Scholar

51. Antonin Scalia, “Regulatory Reform: The Game Has Changed,” Regulation, January–February 1981, 13.

52. For secondary material on the legislative veto, see Watson, H. Lee, “Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,” California Law Review 63, no. 4 (1975): 983–1094Google Scholar; Sundquist, James L., The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C., 1981), 344–66Google Scholar; Fisher, Louis, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President (Princeton, 1985), 162–83Google Scholar; and Craig, Barbara Hinkson, Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle (New York, 1988), 36–57.Google Scholar

53. Woodward, David and Levin, Ronald M., “In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action,” Administrative Law Review 31, no. 3 (1979): 329–44 (329–30)Google Scholar.

54. Scalia, “The Game Has Changed,” 13.

55. Ibid., 13–15.

56. Starr, Kenneth, “Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era,” Yale Journal on Regulation 3, no. 2 (1986): 283–312.Google Scholar

57. General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelhaus, 742 F.2d 1561 (1984).

58. Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 744 F.2d 133 (1984).

59. Chemical Manufacturers Assc’n v. National Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); United States v. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).

60. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986).

61. See Mikva, Abner J., “How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?” American University Law Review 36, no. 1 (1986): 6–7Google Scholar; and Wald, Patricia, “The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now,” George Washington Law Review 55, nos. 4–5 (1987): 727–28.Google Scholar

62. For secondary material on the early rise of Chevron deference, see Lawson and Kam, “Making Law Out of Nothing at All,” 26–29, 30–39; and also Thomas Merrill, “The Story of Chevron,” 191–92.

63. See Scalia, Antonin, “The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation,” Antitrust Law Journal 55, no. 1 (1986): 193–94Google Scholar; the judiciary was not always an ally of deregulation, however. Reuel Schiller has shown how commitments to originalism, textualism, and other canons of statutory construction led to pro-regulatory outcomes in various instances; see Schiller, “An Unexpected Antagonist: Courts, Deregulation, and Conservative Judicial Ideology,” in Making Legal History: Essays in Honor of William E. Nelson, ed. Daniel L. Huselbosch and Richard B. Bernstein (New York, 2013), 264–92.

64. James Weidner, John M. Liftin, David A. Schulz, Mark Holland, and Bruce E. Braverman, “Brief of Securities Industry Association,” submitted 6 March 1984, 6.

65. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 807 F.2d 1052 (1986); Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987), cert denied.

66. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 821 F.2d 810 (1987); and Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988), cert denied.

67. The three commercial banks mentioned in this paragraph were given permission to underwrite government bonds and mortgage-backed securities in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 839 F.2d 47 (1988); and Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 847 F.2d 890 (1988).

68. “New Securities Powers for Bank Holding Companies,” Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 6 August 1987, 7; Robert E. Taylor, “Proxmire Moves to Revive Bill Allowing Banking Firms to Underwrite Securities,” Wall Street Journal, 4 October 1988, A12; John Yang and Bruce Ingersoll, “Banks Feel Frustrated as Congress Gets Cold Feet About Allowing Entry into Investment Banking,” Wall Street Journal, 24 June 1987, 58; Robert Litan, “Bank Revolution Won’t Wait for Congress,” Wall Street Journal, 10 November 1987, 36; “How Senators Saw the Crash,” Toronto Star, 3 February 1988, F1; Posner, Norman S., “Big Bang and the Financial Services Act Seen Through American Eyes,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 14, no. 2 (1988): 317–38Google Scholar; and Semkow, Brian, “Deregulation of Japan’s Financial Markets,” International Financial Law Review 6, no. 8 (1987): 34–39.Google Scholar

69. “H.R. 10—The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,” House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 10, 11, and 12 February 1999, 197–229; “The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Financial Services Modernization,” Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 24 and 25 February 1999, 2–7.

70. F. Jean Wells and William D. Jackson, “Major Financial Services Legislation, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (P.L. 106-102): An Overview,” CRS Report, 16 December 1999, 1–15; and Covington and Burling, “Financial Modernization: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Summary,” 12 November 1999, 1–53.

71. For a recent work that examines the fluid boundaries between public and private, see Brian Balogh’s synthesis, The Associational State: American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia, 2015).

72. “Showcase Panel III: Formalism and Deference in Administrative Law,” 2013 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, 25 November 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RNXMTwaqgs.

73. Christopher J. Walker, “Courts Regulating the Regulators,” RegBlog, 25 April 2016, http://www.regblog.org/2016/04/25/walker-courts-regulating-the-regulators/.

74. See his concurrences in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 575 U.S. ___ (2015); and in Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 576 U.S. ___ (2015); Thomas cited in his opinions new research by Philip Hamburger, a Columbia law professor and noted Chevron skeptic; see Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (Chicago, 2014).

75. George F. Will, “Battling the Modern American Administrative State,” Washington Post, 27 November 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/battling-the-modern-administrative-state/2015/11/27/a1c639ba-9392-11e5-8aa0-5d0946560a97_story.html; Charles Krauthammer, “Can Obama Write His Own Laws?” Washington Post, 15 August 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-can-obama-write-his-own-laws/2013/08/15/81920842-05df-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html.