1. U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command, Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1986 (St. Louis, n.d.), 61, Historical Resources Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as CMH).

2. The only study that examines the subject from an acquisition perspective is An Abridged History of the Army Attack Helicopter Program (Washington, D.C., 1973). It focuses primarily on the Cheyenne and discusses briefly the origins of the advanced attack helicopter.

3. Lack of space precludes all but a very brief introduction to the military procurement literature. See, for example, McNaugher, Thomas J., New Weapons, Old Politics: America’s Military Procurement Muddle (Washington, D.C., 1989)Google Scholar; Ronald Fox, J., Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons (Boston, 1974)Google Scholar; Fox, with James L. Field, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition (Boston, 1988); Gansler, Jacques S., The Defense Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1980)Google Scholar; Gansler, Affording Defense (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Brown, Michael E., Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hampson, Fen, Unguided Missiles: How America Buys Its Weapons (New York, 1989)Google Scholar; Stevenson, James P., The $5 Billion Misunderstanding: The Collapse of the Navy’s A-12 Stealth Bomber Program (Annapolis, Md., 2001)Google Scholar; Rasor, Dina, ed., More Bucks, Less Bang: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons (Washington, D.C., 1983)Google Scholar; and Rasor, , The Pentagon Underground: Hidden Patriots Fighting Against Deceit and Fraud in America’s Defense Program (New York, 1985).Google Scholar

4. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Acquisitions: Summary of Recurring Problems and Systemic Issues, 1960–1987, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-88-135BR (Washington, D.C., September 1988); and William E. Kovacic, “Blue Ribbon Defense Commissions: The Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems,” in Arms, Politics, and the Economy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Robert Higgs (New York, 1990).

5. Gene Smith, “Lockheed Shows ‘a New Kind’ of Combat Aircraft,” New York Times, 13 December 1967, 5.

6. “Cheyenne Prototype Tested as Speedy Combat Helicopter,” Army Research and Development 8 (May 1967): 6.

7. Hawkes, Russell, “Lockheed Diversifies for New Markets,” Aviation Week 72 (23 May 1960): 65, 67, 69.Google Scholar

8. McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics, 26–38, 43–44, 52–66, 218 (n. 30); Peck, Merton J. and Scherer, Frederic M., The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston, 1962)Google Scholar, chap. 15 (esp. 407–18); Fox, Arming America, 228–29, 232–33, 243–47.

9. Allen, Matthew, Military Helicopter Doctrines of the Major Powers, 1945–1992: Making Decisions About Air-Land Warfare (Westport, Conn., 1993), 3–14Google Scholar. On the evolution of armed helicopter technology prior to the Vietnam War, see Richard P. Weinert Jr., A History of Army Aviation, 1950–1962 (Fort Monroe, Va., 1991).

10. This concept was not new. For a brief historical overview, see Robb, Raymond L., “Hybrid Helicopters: Compounding the Quest for Speed,” Vertiflite 52 (Summer 2006): 30–54.Google Scholar

11. “XH-51A Reaches 160 mph. in Flight Tests,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 78 (13 May 1961): 90–91; Miller, Barry, “Tests Pave Way for Application of IHAS in Army’s AAFSS,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 84 (16 May 1966): 106, 108Google Scholar; Hunter, George S., “Lockheed Tests AH-56A Rigid Rotor Unit,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 86 (24 April 1967): 55, 59Google Scholar; “Lockheed Unveils Rigid Rotor AH-56A,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 86 (8 May 1967): 25–26.

12. Established in 1962 as part of a department-wide reorganization, the Army Materiel Command managed all phases of the acquisition cycle—research and development, testing and evaluation, production and procurement, inventory management, storage and distribution, and maintenance—through a network of separate subordinate commands: missile command, electronics command, munitions command, weapons command, mobility command, test and evaluation command, and supply and maintenance command. Although they maintained in-house R&D and limited production capabilities, the subordinate commands relied heavily on industrial contractors to manufacture weapon systems and their components. The mobility command (and its successor organizations) managed the Cheyenne program. Arsenal for the Brave: A History of the United States Army Materiel Command, 1962–1968 (Washington, D.C., 30 September 1969), chap. 1; “Army Materiel Command Activation ‘Merges’ Technical Services,” Army Research and Development 3 (August 1962): 4–5; Plattner, C. M., “Army AAFSS Proposals Due Nov. 23,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 81 (9 November 1964): 92Google Scholar. For a detailed discussion of the Army’s reorganization in the early 1960s, see Hewes, James E. Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963 (Washington, D.C., 1975), chaps. 8–10.Google Scholar

13. An Abridged History of the Army Attack Helicopter Program, 4–6; “Funding Problems Cloud AH-56A Debut,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 87 (18 December 1967): 20; “Prototype AH-56As Under Construction,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 87 (18 December 1967): 56; “AH-56A Set to Move to Production Phase,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 88 (15 January 1968): 40.

14. McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics, 34–35. The origins of concurrency and the use of the concept in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are examined in Elliott V. Converse III, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960, vol. 1 of History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C., 2012).

15. David A. Anderton, “Merger Debates Dominate IAS Meeting,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 76 (29 January 1962): 27; “AH-56 Meets Rotor, Avionics Problems,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 89 (9 September 1968): 31; “AH-56 Wreckage Studied for Cause of Crash in Sea,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 90 (24 March 1969): 23; C. M. Plattner, “AH-56 Remains Grounded as Lockheed Answers Army,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 90 (5 May 1969): 33; Ted Sell, “Army Raps Lockheed in Copter Crash Study,” Los Angeles Times, 7 October 1969, 24. Lockheed lost another helicopter later that year, when a prototype suffered heavy damage during a wind tunnel test at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Ames Research Center in California. “News Digest,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 91 (22 September 1969): 31.

16. Peter Grose, “Army May Cancel Lockheed Copter,” New York Times, 12 April 1969, 1, 71; “Army Cancels AH-56 Production Phase,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 90 (26 May 1969): 24–25; U.S. Army Materiel Command, Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington, D.C., 1 September 1971): 73–75, CMH. The origins of the Cobra can be traced back to 1963, when the Bell Helicopter Company began testing the Sioux Scout, an armed variant of the firm’s Model 47 multipurpose light helicopter. See Bulban, Erwin J., “Bell Demonstrates New Design for Tactical Helicopter,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 79 (23 September 1963): 30–32Google Scholar; and “Bell Sioux Scout Tests Attack Helicopter Concepts,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 79 (4 November 1963): 67–68Google Scholar. The Cobra incorporated design features and components from the Sioux Scout test aircraft and the UH-1B escort gunship serving in Vietnam. It adopted from the Scout a slim, low-drag fuselage; short wings for increased lift and additional weapons payload capacity; a turret for a machine gun or grenade launcher mounted under the nose; and in-line tandem seating for the pilot and gunner. To simplify the transition from development to production, speed service entry, and reduce maintenance costs, the Cobra used the standard UH-1B transmission, rotor system, and turbo-shaft engine. Flight testing of the Cobra started in September 1965, and Bell began delivering production helicopters—designated the AH-1G—to the Army two years later. Erwin J. Bulban, “Bell Testing UH-1B Fire Support Version,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 83 (20 September 1965): 32; George C. Wilson, “Army Picks Huey Cobra as Interim AAFSS,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 83 (22 November 1965): 22–23; “New Huey Cobra Testing Begins,” Army Research and Development 7 (November 1966): 13; “Army Orders Huey Cobra to Replace UH-1B,” Army Research and Development 7 (May 1966): 14.

17. “Army Cancels AH-56 Production Phase,” 25.

18. See Keatley, Robert, “Lockheed’s Costly C5A Fuels Critics’ Attacks on Pentagon Efficiency,” Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1969, 1, 20Google Scholar; “Lockheed Seeks Pentagon’s Help,” New York Times, 6 March 1970, 1, 12; Barry Miller, “Complex Problems Hit Lockheed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 92 (30 March 1970): 56–60; James Flanigan, “Packard: Lockheed Must Find Funds or Go Under,” Los Angeles Times, 28 May 1970, D11, D13; and Al Delugach, “Lockheed Returns to Profit Column for 1st Time in 3 Years,” Los Angeles Times, 2 March 1972, E12, E15. On the F-111, see Coulam, Robert F., Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton, 1977).Google Scholar

19. “Lockheed Flight Testing AH-56 with Modified Controls, Blades,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 92 (30 March 1970): 66–67; Hieronymous, William S., “AH-56 Faces New Army Tests,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 93 (16 November 1970): 58–62.Google Scholar

20. The Army’s strength dropped from a wartime peak of 1.5 million in 1968 to nearly half that number in 1973. Weigley, Russell F., History of the United States Army (Bloomington, 1984), 561Google Scholar; Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1977), 5, CMH; Doughty, Robert A., The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1946–1976, Leavenworth Papers, No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., August 1979), 40–46.Google Scholar

21. Trask, Roger R. and Goldberg, Alfred, The Department of Defense, 1947–1997: Organization and Leaders (Washington, D.C., 1997), 31–34, 80–81, 86–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walton S. Moody, “Reform School: The High-Priced Education of David Packard,” unpublished manuscript, revised by Joel Davidson, 10 August 2006, 1–3, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Rosslyn, Va. (hereafter cited as OSDHO). I am grateful to Drs. Moody and Davidson for sharing this manuscript with me and also to OSDHO for granting me permission to cite it.

22. Initially, the DSARC had four members: the director of defense research and engineering and three assistant secretaries of defense (for installations and logistics, systems analysis, and comptroller). The director of defense research and engineering chaired the council during the first two milestone reviews, and the assistant secretary of defense (installations and logistics) ran the proceedings at milestone three. Trask and Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 35; Moody, “Reform School,” 8–12, 15–18.

23. U.S. General Accounting Office, The Process for Identifying Needs and Establishing Requirements, Report No. 092321 (Washington, D.C., June 1974), 7–39, 7–40.

24. Moody, “Reform School,” 12–14, 24–25; Plattner, “Army AAFSS Proposals Due Nov. 23,” 92–93; “AAFSS Winners,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 82 (1 March 1965): 17. The Office of the Secretary of Defense formally incorporated competitive prototyping into its policy guidance for weapon systems acquisition in 1977. Edmund Dewes et al., Acquisition Policy Effectiveness: Department of Defense Experience in the 1970s, Report No. R-2516-DR&E (Santa Monica, Calif., October 1979), 1–3, 17, 22.

25. Department of Defense Directive, No. 5000.1, “Acquisition of Major Defense Systems,” 13 June 1971, 4–5, OSDHO.

26. The lack of evidence precludes a definitive explanation, but it is likely that dissatisfaction with Lockheed’s prior performance prompted the Army to award the company a no-fee contract. U.S. Army Materiel Command, Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1 December 1972), 61–63, CMH; U.S. Army Materiel Command, Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1971 (Alexandria, Va., 31 March 1974), 38–39, CMH; U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1972 (Alexandria, Va., 1 February 1977), 107, CMH.

27. An Abridged History of the Army Attack Helicopter Program, 9–10; “Second Thoughts,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 93 (17 August 1970): 13; “One Senate Unit Defends Armed Helicopters, Another Cuts Funds,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 97 (10 July 1972): 15.

28. Prior to the cancelation of the program in 1972, the Army had briefly considered modification of the Cheyenne for the anti-armor mission in Europe. The Army tested prototypes equipped with anti-armor missiles and infrared imaging technology for nighttime flying. Cecil Brownlow, “AH-56 Operational Requirements Revised,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 93 (9 November 1970): 18; Ropelewski, Robert R., “Army Completing AH-56A Tests,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 96 (22 May 1972): 55, 59–61.Google Scholar

29. “Army Plans New Attack Helicopter Competition,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 97 (14 August 1972): 21; Allen, Military Helicopter Doctrines of the Major Powers, 14–25.

30. Department of Defense Directive, No. 5000.1, “Acquisition of Major Defense Systems,” 4; U.S. Army Materiel Command, Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1971, 41; An Abridged History of the Army Attack Helicopter Program, 10. The $1.6 million covered the cost of a fully equipped, flight-ready helicopter. House Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Army, Advanced Attack Helicopter Development Program: Hearings Before Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 22 March 1973, 55–56, 74.

31. See, for example, Fink, Donald E., “Hughes AAH Entry Shuns Innovations,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 99 (19 November 1973): 47–49.Google Scholar

32. House Committee, Department of the Army, Advanced Attack Helicopter Development Program, 71, 82.

33. U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1973 (Alexandria, Va., 1 April 1978), 239, CMH; U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1974 (Alexandria, Va., 1 October 1979), 213–14, CMH; Brown, David A., “Army Assigns Top Priority to Helicopters and SAM-D,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 98 (26 March 1973): 51.Google Scholar

34. U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1973, 191; U.S. Army Materiel Readiness and Development Command, Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1977 (Alexandria, Va., 1 February 1980), 340, CMH; John Getze, “$317.7 Million Army Copter Job Won by Hughes,” Los Angeles Times, 11 December 1976, A1.

35. House Committee on Appropriations, Army Tactical Aircraft: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 June 1980, 36–38.

36. Like the Army’s Cheyenne and the Air Force’s C-5A programs earlier in the decade, the Navy’s new Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine program did not transition seamlessly from development to production. By 1980, cost overruns and schedule delays at the prime contractor, the Electric Boat Company, had begun to draw sharp criticism from the Congress. See Richard Burt, “Pentagon Reports Serious Difficulties in Trident Program,” New York Times, 25 December 1980, A1; and Stephen Webbe, “Troubled Trident Submarine Program to Get Priority Congressional Attention,” Christian Science Monitor, 4 December 1980, 1.

37. See, for example, Richard Halloran, “Caucus Challenges Defense Concepts,” New York Times, 12 January 1982, B8; Marsh, Alton K., “Military Reform Caucus Seeks Targets,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 116 (29 March 1982): 55–56Google Scholar; and Fialka, John J., “‘Congressional Military Reform Caucus’ Lacks a Budget but Has Power to Provoke the Pentagon,” Wall Street Journal, 13 April 1982, 56.Google Scholar

38. In 1982, the Congress required the Department of Defense to establish an independent weapons testing office headed by a new assistant secretary of defense. OSD did not fill the position until the end of 1984. Also in 1984, the Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act, which mandated greater use of competitive bidding rather than sole-source selection in military procurement. McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics, 78, 82, 223 (n. 90). See also William E. Kovacic, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Public Regulation of the Weapons Acquisition Process,” in Arms, Politics, and the Economy.

39. The Office of the Secretary of Defense added a fourth milestone—demonstration and validation—to the DSARC review process in 1977 that required a renumbering of each stage in the acquisition cycle: program initiation (milestone zero), demonstration and validation (milestone one), full-scale engineering development (milestone two), and production and deployment (milestone three). See Department of Defense Directive, No. 5000.1, “Major System Acquisitions,” 18 January 1977, 3–4, OSDHO.

40. The requirement also included a 30-mm. rapid-fire cannon placed on the underside of the airframe and launchers for 2.75-inch rockets mounted on short stub wings behind the cockpit. “Army Awards $115 Million for AAH Development,” Army Research and Development 14 (July–August 1973): 2.

41. House Committee, Department of the Army, Advanced Attack Helicopter Development Program, 83; “Army Helicopter Details Coming,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 97 (23 October 1972): 16.

42. Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of the Army: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on S. 920, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 13 March 1975, 4441; U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1974, 220; U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1975 (Alexandria, Va., 1 November 1976), 213, CMH; Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1976 (Washington, D.C., 1977), 133, CMH. OSD changed the name of milestone two from “full-scale development” to “full-scale engineering development” in December 1975. Department of Defense Directive, No. 5000.1, “Acquisition of Major Defense Systems” (22 December 1975), 3, OSDHO.

43. An Abridged History of the Army Attack Helicopter Program, 10; House Committee on Appropriations, Army Tactical Aircraft and Missile Programs: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 18 June 1981, 337. Operation of the TOW, which armed UH-1B helicopters had successfully demonstrated in combat in Vietnam in the spring of 1972, required the co-pilot/gunner to hold the crosshairs of the onboard optical sight on the target throughout the launch sequence, while a jam-proof wire link physically connected to the missile provided automatic course corrections during flight. Unlike the TOW, the Hellfire gave the Apache the flexibility to dash for cover immediately after launch and engage enemy positions from protected locations. It received commands for target acquisition and directional control from onboard TADS/PNVS, ground-based, or airborne laser guidance systems carried on other aircraft. Working together, these autonomous systems could target and track multiple missiles launched at different vehicles or installations simultaneously from a single helicopter, hence the term “fire-and-forget.” Only the onboard TADS/PNVS required the co-pilot/gunner to maintain visual contact with the target until missile impact. Cagle, Mary T., History of the TOW Missile System (Huntsville, Ala., 20 October 1977), 26, 163–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Robinson, Clarence A. Jr., “Army Nears Armed Helicopter Choice,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 98 (14 May 1973): 16Google Scholar; “Attack Roles to Grow with Expanded Capacity,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 109 (3 July 1978): 93Google Scholar; Thomason, Jeffrey H., “Hellfire: A Weapon System Whose Time Has Come,” Army Aviation Digest 24 (May 1978): 4–7.Google Scholar

44. The evolution of battlefield tactics during this period culminated in two major revisions of Army doctrine: the introduction of the Active Defense in 1976 and AirLand Battle six years later. See John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, Va., June 1984); and Trauschweizer, Ingo, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence, Kans., 2008).Google Scholar

45. Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of the Army: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on S. 3000, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 29 March 1974, 4985–86.

46. In March 1976, during a hearing of the Senate Armed Service Committee’s Subcommittee on Tactical Air Power, Hanby’s successor, Colonel Frank Palermo, acknowledged that the added cost of the Hellfire upgrade, which the DSARC had just approved for full-scale engineering development, “is still within the AAH design to cost of $1.6 million in fiscal year 1972 dollars.” Senate Armed Services Committee, Tactical Air Programs: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on S. 2965, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 March 1976, 4714.

47. Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Aviation Programs: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on S. 1210, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 2 March 1977, 4048, 4055; Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Combat Helicopter and Air Defense Programs: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on S. 2571, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 March 1978, 4820.

48. Trask and Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 100–105; J. R. Nelson and Karen W. Tyson, A Perspective on the Defense Weapons Acquisition Process, IDA Paper P-2048 (Alexandria, Va., September 1987), II-55–II-60.

49. John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman, Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–1993 (Fort Monroe, Va., 1993), chap. 5; Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C., 1988), 239, CMH; U.S. General Accounting Office, Budgetary Pressures Created by the Army’s Plans to Procure New Major Weapon Systems Are Just Beginning, Report No. MASAD-82-5 (Washington, D.C., 20 October 1981), i–iii, 1–8, 14–15.

50. U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1980 (Alexandria, Va., 30 April 1982), 177, CMH. Procurement included the cost of production minus expenses for research and development.

51. By the spring of 1981, the procurement cost had increased less than 2 percent to $4.821 billion. House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Army’s AH-64 Helicopter Program: Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5968 [H.R. 6030] Before the Committee on Armed Services, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 March 1982, 329.

52. The name of the Army Materiel Command changed to the Materiel Development and Readiness Command in 1976. “Schedule Slip in AH-64 Forecast,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 110 (11 June 1979): 42; “Budget, Technical Items Delay Attack Helicopter,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 111 (2 July 1979): 17; Edward Browne to Donald Keith, 8 September 1981, 1, box 8, folder: “Backchannel Messages, Incoming, A-Z, (81),” Donald R. Keith Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. (hereafter cited as Keith Papers).

53. House Committee, Army Tactical Aircraft and Missile Programs, 332; House Committee, U.S. Army’s AH-64 Helicopter Program, 323–24, 329; John O. Marsh Jr. to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 23 November 1981, 1, box 1, folder: “Correspondence, Official, November 1981,” Jay R. Sculley Papers, George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Va. (hereafter cited as Sculley Papers).

54. The Army had always intended to maintain an active inventory of AH-1 Cobra gunships equipped with TOW missiles suitable for use in less demanding battlefield environments. Early in 1982, the Army’s attack helicopter fleet included one thousand Cobras, of which 815 had been fielded. Cuts in the Apache procurement total prompted no changes in the Army’s existing plans to deliver sufficient quantities of the new helicopter to forward deployed units in Europe. Army units in the United States absorbed the 15 percent reduction ordered by Marsh. House Committee, Department of the Army, Advanced Attack Helicopter Development Program, 83; Senate Committee on Armed Services, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Program: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on S. 2248, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 4 February 1982, 2030–31.

55. Marsh to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 23 November 1981, 1; House Committee on Appropriations, Army Tactical Aircraft Programs: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 May 1982, 464; House Committee, U.S. Army’s AH-64 Helicopter Program, 323–24, 329–30; Senate Committee, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Program, 1978–79.

56. Marsh to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 23 November 1981, 1.

57. Senate Committee, Army Aviation Programs, 4048; House Committee, Army Tactical Aircraft and Missile Programs, 334.

58. Patrick M. Roddy to Vincent Puritano, 18 November 1981, box 3, folder: “DRB, November 21, 1981,” Records of the Defense Resources Board, OSDHO.

59. DARCOM repriced ammunition based on reduced inflation estimates and absorbed funds taken from cuts in the Roland surface-to-air missile program and the just-canceled Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS). DARCOM also secured the release of additional resources by postponing the award of production contracts for the forward-looking infrared weapons sighting system for the Cobra attack helicopter and the M992 field artillery ammunition supply vehicle. Senate Committee, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Program, 2003, 2024–25; House Committee, Army Tactical Aircraft Programs, 464–65.

60. Senate Committee, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Program, 1974.

61. “Reagan Picks 2 Army Aides,” New York Times, 1 October 1981, A25.

62. House Committee, U.S. Army’s AH-64 Helicopter Program, 325.

63. Ibid., 327–28, 346.

64. Senate Committee, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Program, 1994–95.

65. Percy A. Pierre to the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 27 January 1981, 1–2, box 1, folder: “Correspondence, Official, 6 January 1981–3 February 1981,” Sculley Papers.

66. Senate Committee, Army Combat Helicopter and Air Defense Programs, 4821.

67. House Committee, Army Tactical Aircraft and Missile Programs, 366, 370–71, 383–84, 414–15; U.S. Army Aviation Research and Development Command, Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1980 (St. Louis, 14 July 1981), 66, CMH.

68. W. H. Sheley Jr. to Melvin Price and John Tower, 3 August, 1982, 2–3, http://archive.gao.gov/d42t14/119110.pdf (copy also in author’s possession); House Committee, U.S. Army’s AH-64 Helicopter Program, 325; Senate Committee, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Program, 1984, 1986, 1992.

69. Each selected acquisition report summarized technical, schedule, quantity, and cost information for major weapons programs. See Department of Defense Instruction, No. 7000.3, “Selected Acquisition Reports, (SAR),” 23 September 1975, 1–2, OSDHO.

70. Pierre to the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 27 January 1981, 1; Senate Committee, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Program, 2022; U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Report of Major Activities, Fiscal Year 1975, 211; U.S. General Accounting Office, Status of Advanced Attack Helicopter Program, Report No. PSAD-77-32 (Washington, D.C., 25 February 1977), 5.

71. House Committee, U.S. Army’s AH-64 Helicopter Program, 330.

72. James Ambrose to Barry Goldwater, 26 March 1982, 1–2, Ambrose to Tower, 29 March 1982, box 1534, folder: “S. 2448, PT. I,” Record Group 46, Records of the United States Senate, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

73. Sheley to Caspar Weinberger, 1 December 1981, 1–2, 6–7, box 2, folder: “Correspondence, Official, 4 January 1982–18 January 1982,” Sculley Papers. On Weinberger’s instructions, the Army replied to the GAO’s criticisms, dismissing each one in turn. See James P. Malorey to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition, 23 December 1981, and Jay R. Sculley to the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 13 January 1982, box 2, folder: “Correspondence, Official, 4 January 1982–18 January 1982,” Sculley Papers.

74. “AH-64 Decision Postponed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 115 (7 December 1981): 23; “Army to Increase AH-64 Funding,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 116 (15 March 1982): 23.

75. Weinberger to the Secretary of the Army, 15 April 1982, 1, Robert J. Lunn to the Undersecretary of the Army, 7 February 1983, Ambrose to Weinberger, n.d., box 6, folder: “Correspondence, Official, 11 March 1983–18 March 1983,” Sculley Papers.

76. Hughes served as the prime contractor and system integrator for the Apache program. A network of subcontractors manufactured the components and subsystems that the company assembled into finished aircraft. Hughes limited in-house production to the main rotor head, portions of the cockpit, and the 30-mm. cannon. House Committee on Armed Services, Army Force Requirements: Hearings on H.R. 2287 [H.R. 2969], Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 15 March 1983, 520–21.

77. The T700-GE-701 engine was a more powerful variant of the T700-GE-700 engine that General Electric had manufactured in quantity for the Army’s fleet of UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters. The Army approved the engine upgrade for the Apache in February 1981. Malorey to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition, 24 February 1981, Arthur Daoulas to Tower, 27 February 1981, box 1, folder: “Correspondence, Official, 9 February 1981–27 February 1981,” Sculley Papers; U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1981 (Arlington, Va., 30 September 1982), 189, CMH; House Committee, Army Tactical Aircraft Programs, 459.

78. Maxwell Thurman to Distribution, 19 November 1982, box 12, folder: “Backchannel Messages, Incoming, N-Z, (82),” Keith Papers; House Committee on Appropriations, Army Aviation Programs: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 22 March 1983, 196.

79. Richard D. Kenyon to the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Tactical Warfare), 10 August 1982, 2, box 4, folder: “Correspondence, Official, 2 August 1982–16 August 1982,” Sculley Papers. The Army planned to acquire all 515 helicopters according to the following production schedule: 11, 48, and 112 in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984, respectively; 144 each in fiscal years 1985 and 1986; and 56 in fiscal year 1987. House Committee, Army Force Requirements, 532.

80. Kenyon to the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Tactical Warfare), 10 August, 1982, 2; Browne to the Under Secretary of the Army, 29 September 1982, box 17, folder: “CG’s Notes-82,” Keith Papers; Browne to Keith, 18 August 1982, box 16, folder: “XO’s File (May–Aug.), (1983),” Keith Papers.

81. Ambrose quoted in Browne to the Undersecretary of the Army, 29 September 1982, Keith to Lunn, 4 October 1982, box 17, folder: “CG’s Notes-82,” Keith Papers; Keith to Ambrose, 26 October 1982, box 17, folder: “Undersecretary of the Army Taskers, 1982-File B,” Keith Papers.

82. House Committee, Army Aviation Programs, 135, 195.

83. U.S. Army Aviation Research and Development Command, Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1983 (St. Louis, n.d.), 52, CMH; U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command, Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1984 (St. Louis, 2 May 1985), 49, CMH.

84. Sculley to the Undersecretary of the Army, 7 April 1983, 1, box 6, folder: “Correspondence, Official, 1 April 1983–8 April 1983,” Sculley Papers.

85. An important step in this direction is the five-volume history of post–World War II weapon systems acquisition in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force that is currently being written under the auspices of the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Converse, Rearming for the Cold War, is the first volume in this series. For a preliminary overview of the four remaining volumes, see Brown, Shannon, ed., Providing the Means of War: Historical Perspectives on Defense Acquisition, 1945–2000 (Washington, D.C., 2005).Google Scholar