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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2011
The changing patterns of federal government policy toward the automobile industry provide fruitful material for analyzing how economic power is translated into political power. Government policy toward the auto industry involves an extensive number of decision-making points, and policy-makers are confronted with the nation's largest industry and the largest industrial corporation in the country (GM). This article examines government policy toward the auto industry from 1918 to 1988, focusing on the social constraints limiting the industry's political influence and the economic conditions that increase the vulnerability of government officials to industry lobbying.
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29. 52 FR 10,096 (1987).
30. 50 FR 40,528 (1985).
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