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8. Only moderate party realignment occurred in some states, such as California, between 1910 and 1920, and third-party candidates, though attracting considerable attention, made no major inroads into the two-party system; Allen, Howard W. and Clubb, Jerome, “Progressive Reform and the Political System,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 65 (July 1974): 130–45Google Scholar. For example, in 1912 only one Progressive was elected governor and none was elected to the Senate. Seventeen (4 percent) minor-party candidates were elected to the House of Representatives in 1912, and the socialist presidential candidate received 6 percent of the popular vote. However, by 1916 the socialist percent of the popular presidential vote dropped to only 3.2 percent. Electoral margins of popular support for the Democratic presidential candidate in 1912 and 1916, Woodrow Wilson, failed to reach 50 percent, marking the elections of those years as “deviating” rather than as “critical or realigning” elections; Allen and Clubb, “Progressive Reform,”

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27. As a result of replacement, some congressional districts are represented by more than one House member in the 63d Congress; see Appendixes A, B, and C.

28. All referenda and initiative votes used in this study were reported in state yearbooks by county voting returns. The lack of gerrymandering in the Progressive Era makes for a fairly easy reorganization of county voting returns into district-level votes. The one exception is the case of major cities comprising only part of one county. In the absence of subcounty information, a city is assigned its county level. State legislature Lower Assembly roll-call votes are recoded to represent districts by coding the county and roll-call votes of each state legislator and then aggregating to the district-level.

29. A factor analysis done within states on all votes used in this study confirms that labor, woman suffrage, and prohibition votes fall on issue dimensions consistent with their substantive content. Also, probit analysis was done for each issue area, which each state entered as a dummy variable along with the composite, pooled issue-votes, to determine whether there might be independent effects stemming from a particular state on roll-call votes. However, no independent state effects were evident with the measure of constituency-issue opinion in the equation. Therefore, analysis proceeded with the pooled measures of constituency-issue positions.

30. Quartiles of support are based upon scholarly conventions defining marginality, such as competitive districts defined as those in which there is only marginal support for the candidate, measured as a winning margin of only 5 percent or less, Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies, 112. Thus, marginal district support for a legislative policy is 50–55 percent and marginal district opposition is 45–49 percent.

31. The Clayton Anti-Trust Act came before the House twice. The first vote is analzyed here, since it is generally considered to be the one most favored by labor interests compared to the second vote on the conference report, which had modified labor features of the initial bill.

32. Bensel, Sectionalism; Sanders, “Industrial Concentration.”

33. I am indebted to Elizabeth Sanders for making trade-area industrialization classifications available for use in this study.

34. Ecological correlation problems limit the certainty of inferences that can be drawn about individual behavior from district-level data. However, the findings reported are suggestive of a possible underlying relationship.

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37. A negative sign indicates greater support by Democrats, while a positive sign indicates greater support by Republicans.

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