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3. See, for example, “Pakistan Nuclear Tests, Following India's, Alter the Global Landscape,” Wall Street Journal, 29 May 1998, A1, A10; and Ricks, Thomas E., “India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry Conjures Up Wargame Scenarios, Worrying U.S. Military,” Wall Street Journal, 24 06 1998, A20.Google Scholar

4. See, for example, Bahgat, Gawdat, “The Iraqi Crisis in the New Millennium: The Prospects,” Asian Affairs 31 (06 2000): 149–159Google Scholar; and Spector, “Repentant Nuclear Proliferants,” 30–31.

5. See, for example, Rosenthal, Elisabeth, “North Korea Says It Will Unseal Reactor,” New York Times, 13 05 1998, A10Google Scholar; and Spector, “Repentant Nuclear Proliferants,” 27–29.

6. See, for example, Brigagao, Clovis and Fonrouge, Marcelo F. Valle, “Argentina and Brazil: A Regional Model of Confidence Building for Nuclear Security,” International Journal of Peace Studies 3 (07 1998): 99–107Google Scholar; Cohen, Avner and Pilat, Joseph F., “Assessing Virtual Nuclear Arsenals,” Survival 40 (Spring 1998): 129–144Google Scholar; and Spector, “Repentant Nuclear Proliferants,” 24–27.

7. See, for example, Cohen and Pilat, “Assessing Virtual Nuclear Arsenals,” 129–44; Spector, “Repentant Nuclear Proliferants,” 29–30; and “World Nuclear Power Summary, 1998,” World Almanac & Book of Facts 2000 (New York, 1999), 167.Google Scholar

8. See, for example, Lindsay, James M., “The Nuclear Agenda,” Brookings Review 18 (Fall 2000): 8–11Google Scholar; “Pakistan Nuclear Tests, Following India's, Alter the Global Landscape,” A1, A10; Ricks, “India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry Conjures Up Wargame Scenarios,” A20; Schlesinger, James R., “Nonproliferation and U.S. Nuclear Policy,” Washington Quarterly 20 (Summer 1997): 103–106.Google Scholar

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10. See, for example, Botti, Timothy J., The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945–1958 (Westport, Conn., 1987)Google Scholar; Divine, Robert A., Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960 (New York, 1978)Google Scholar; Rosenberg, David Alan, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3–70Google Scholar; and Soapes, Thomas F., “A Cold Warrior Seeks Peace: Eisenhower's Strategy for Nuclear Disarmament,” Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980): 57–70Google Scholar. For more information on the U.S.-French nuclear debates, see, for example, Ullman, Richard H., “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989): 3–32.Google Scholar

11. A good work on this point is Trachtenberg, Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, 1999)Google Scholar. Tractenberg's central thesis is that two paramount and interconnected concerns propagated Cold War policies, namely, fears about how the United States and her NATO allies could defend themselves against the Soviet Union and worries that Germany might gain access to nuclear weapons. Accordingly, if one accepts Trachtenberg's argument, American presidents had an incentive to reject international control of nuclear weapons because they believed that the Soviet Union might exercise its influence and dilute the strength of NATO and, moreover, Germany might join the nuclear club as part of an international consortium. See also, for example, Rosenberg, David Alan, “Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945–68,” Journal of Strategic Studies 9 (03 1986): 35–51Google Scholar; and Walker, Samuel J., Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass., 1987).Google Scholar

12. Brown, Walton, “Assessing the Impact of American Nonproliferation Policy: 1970–1980: An Analysis of Six Cases” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1982), 1.Google Scholar

13. For a cogent analysis of this point, see especially Stueck, William, “Placing Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy,” in The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post–New Deal Era, ed. Fink, Gary M. and Graham, Hugh Davis (Lawrence, Kan., 1998), 244–266.Google Scholar

14. Radioactive nuclides in radioactive materials differ in the intensity of their radiation, that is, by the number and energy of rays or particles emitted per second per unit of volume. Uranium and plutonium used in commercial nuclear reactors to generate electricity are high-level radioactive waste. Such waste is generated either by producing used nuclear fuel in commercial reactors or through reprocessing (chemical separation of the uranium and plutonium from other elements). “Spent nuclear fuel” is a term of art used to describe fuel removed from commercial reactors because the fuel can no longer produce electricity efficiently. The League of Women Voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer: A Handbook for Citizens (New York, 1993), 20–22.Google Scholar

15. Jimmy Carter acknowledged the new emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation in his major speech to the United Nations in May 1976. “Nuclear Energy and the New World Order,” Address by Governor Jimmy Carter at the United Nations, 13 May 1976, 2, “Nuclear Issues” Folder, Box 25, Carlton Neville Collection, Subject File: “Nuclear Economic through Nuclear Issues,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

16. Despite Nixon's seeming insensitivity to arms control concerns, at least one commentator observed that his administration witnessed “a major breakthrough in arms control treaties; a wide range of mutual cooperation agreements; and a generally improved atmosphere of détente.” Aitken, Jonathan, Nixon: A Life (Washington, D.C., 1993), 433.Google Scholar

17. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Non-Proliferation Policy: 1970–1980,” 59.

18. See, for example: Chafetz, Glenn, “The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Journal of Politics 57 (08 1995), 743–775Google Scholar; Pickell, Gregory A., “Strength in an Unsettled World: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy 15 (01 1996): 81–90Google Scholar; Quester, George H., The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore, 1973)Google Scholar; Ruether, Rosemary Radford, “A Biased U.S. Calls Shots on Nuclear Weapons,” National Catholic Reporter 32 (31 05 1996): 17Google Scholar; Schlesinger, “Nonproliferation and U.S. Nuclear Policy,” 103–6; Smith, Gerard and Cobban, Helena, “A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs 67 (Summer 1989): 53–69Google Scholar; Speed, Roger D., “International Control of Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Quarterly 20 (Summer 1997): 179–184Google Scholar; Steinberg, Gerald, “Beyond NPT,” Technology Review 99 (05 1996): 64–65Google Scholar; and Yergin, Shattered Peace.

19. This comment is not technically accurate. On 28 October 1976, six days before the 1976 presidential election, President Ford ordered a temporary ban on spent-fuel reprocessing. Consequently, when Carter assumed the presidency in January 1977, he was not the first president to link nuclear deterrence with a ban on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Gerrard, Michael B., Whose Backyard, Whose Risk: Fear and Fairness in Toxic and Nuclear Waste Siting (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 28.Google Scholar

20. Carter, Jimmy, Why Not the Best? (New York, 1975), 58–65.Google Scholar

21. For more information on Carter's 1976 campaign strategy, see, for example, Strong, Robert A., “Pondering the Post-Scandal Election Dynamic,” Christian Science Monitor, 16 03 1999, 11Google Scholar. For more detailed background information on the factors that influenced Jimmy Carter's political development, see, for example, Brinkley, Douglas, “A Time for Reckoning: Jimmy Carter and the Cult of Kinfolk,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (12 1999): 778–797Google Scholar; and Wooten, James, Dasher: The Roots and Rising of Jimmy Carter (New York, 1978).Google Scholar

22. See, for example, McBride, Betsy and O'Connor, Sharon Lloyd, Transporting Radioactive Spent Fuel: An Issue Brief (Washington, D.C., 1996)Google Scholar; Means, Jeffrey L., Long-Term Performance of Spent Fuel Waste Forms (Washington, D.C., 1987)Google Scholar; and U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Spent Fuel Management and Reprocessing Systems, Bubble, Bubble, Toil and Trouble: Reprocessing Nuclear Spent Fuel (Washington, D.C., 1983).Google Scholar

23. Candidate Carter's nuclear policy was sufficiently ambiguous to allow him to appear both antinuclear when it suited his purposes and pronuclear when that stance seemed politically expedient. Thus, he was able to assure most of his audiences that nuclear power was necessary to meet the nation's energy needs and yet, when he addressed a group of antinuclear environmentalists upset about the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant in New Hampshire, he remarked that only “as a last resort would I continue to use nuclear power.” Glad, Betty, Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House (New York, 1980), 310Google Scholar. For additional information on Carter's deliberately “fuzzy” approach to many issues in the 1976 campaign, including nuclear weapons proliferation and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), see especially Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Power and Principle (New York, 1983), 7Google Scholar; Elliott, Euel W., Presidential Voting in Contemporary America—A Revisitionist View (Boulder, Colo., 1989), 45Google Scholar; and Moens, Alexander, Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision Making (Boulder, Colo., 1990), 65Google Scholar. For more information on the early history of the environmental movement, especially the genesis of the nuclear freeze and disarmament factions, see, for example, Wittner, Lawrence S., Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970 (Palo Alto, 1997)Google Scholar. Another useful history of the early antinuclear movement can be found in Smith, R. Allen, “Mass Society and the Bomb: The Discourse of Pacifism in the 1950s,” Peace & Change 18 (10 1993): 347–372.Google Scholar

24. For more on the Nixon-Kissinger approach to foreign policy, especially with respect to nuclear nonproliferation strategies, see, for example, Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York, 1995), esp. 608–611Google Scholar; and Mead, Walter Russell, Mortal Splendor: The American Empire in Transition (New York, 1987), esp. 88, 185.Google Scholar

25. Strong, Robert A., Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge, 2000), 73Google Scholar. For more information on the Carter administration's human rights emphasis, see also Apodaca, Clair and Stohl, Michael, “United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (03 1999): 185–198Google Scholar; Kaufman, Victor S., “The Bureau of Human Rights during the Carter Administration,” Historian 61 (Fall 1998): 51–66Google Scholar; Mead, Mortal Splendor, 91–100; and Smith, Gaddis, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York, 1986).Google Scholar

26. For more on the nuclear strategies adopted by the Nixon and Ford administrations, see, for example, Greene, Robert, The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations (Bloomington, 1992)Google Scholar. In his memoirs, Carter explained that his reason for considering nuclear energy production in conjunction with nonproliferation was because the stakes were so high. “Despite opposition from some of the suppliers of advanced technology, I wanted to do everything possible to prevent this capability from spreading to any additional nations,” he wrote. In developing foreign policy, he insisted that his administration “had to wrestle with technical, political, economic, and moral questions of enormous difficulty,” but it was the president's duty to consider each of these issues in reaching his decisions. Carter, Jimmy, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982), 215–216Google Scholar. Accordingly, if “suppliers of advanced technology” suffered from the nuclear energy–nonproliferation linkage, it was a small price to pay in the interests of national security.

27. Carter, “Nuclear Energy and the New World Order,” 2. One commentator noted that Carter's May 1976 speech to the United Nations was an important part of the candidate's effort to distinguish himself from the competition on selected foreign policy issues. “This speech presently stands as the most elaborate expression of his view on any foreign policy issue,” Ross Baker observed in 1977. Baker, Ross K., “The Outlook for the Carter Administration,” in The Election of 1976: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Pomper, Marlene M. (New York, 1977), 130.Google Scholar

28. For more discussion on this point, see, for example, Strong, Working in the World, 72–75.

29. This decision to reject international solutions to nonproliferation questions also caused Carter to turn away from the idea of a Multilateral Force (MLF), the notion that NATO should create a nuclear force owned and operated by participating nations as a defensive measure against Soviet aggression. The MLF concept originated as early as the Eisenhower administration and gained ground until the Johnson administration rejected this approach in championing the NPT. The Carter administration firmly closed the door on the MLF in pursuing a policy that eventually led to passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. See, for example, Maddock, “The Nth Country Conundrum,” 315–23, 525–26, 528.

30. Letter from Townsend M. Belser, attorney at law, Columbia, South Carolina, to Dr. John W. Gofman, Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Division of Medical Physics, University of California, Berkeley, 12 May 1976, “Nuclear Issues” Folder, Box 25, Carlton Neville Collection, Subject File: “Nuclear Economics Through Nuclear Issues,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

31. Ellis, Harry B., “Carter Would Shift U.S. Toward Solar Energy,” Christian Science Monitor, 25 05 1976, n.p.Google Scholar

32. “Nuclear Waffle?” Los Angeles Times, 28 December 1976, section II.

33. Candidate Carter often derided President Ford's weak leadership, commenting that the incumbent had abdicated his responsibilities as president, leaving it to his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, to develop foreign policy. “Mr. Kissinger has been the president of this country,” Carter said on several occasions. Swansbrough, Robert H., “Forging a New Beginning: President Carter's Foreign Policy Beliefs,” Southeastern Political Review 16 (Spring 1988): 120Google Scholar. See also Maga, Timothy P., The World of Jimmy Carter: U.S. Foreign Policy, 1977–1981 (West Haven, Conn., 1994), 6–7Google Scholar; and George Coleman Osborn with Martin, Ron, The Role of the British Press in the 1976 American Presidential Election (Smithtown, N.Y., 1981), 13, 165.Google Scholar

34. For more discussion on this point, see, for example, Plotkin, Henry A., “Issues in the 1976 Presidential Campaign,” in The Election of 1976: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Pomper, Marlene M. (New York, 1977), 35–53, esp. 47–49.Google Scholar

35. Mailgram from Jon-Paul Wendt, 8 Ransom Road, Apt. 15, Brighton, Massachusetts 02135, to Carter-Mondale Headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia, 7 October 1976, “Nuclear Waste [2]” Folder, Box 26, Carlton Neville Collection, Subject File: “Nuclear Opposition through Offshore Oil and Gas,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

36. Historians consider the mid-1950s as a pivotal time for the industry because this marked the appearance of the first nuclear-powered submarine, the Nautilus, as well as President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. It also marked the first time that previously classified nuclear reactor designs were made available to public utilities and private companies anxious to move beyond fossil fuels and provide commercial, nuclear-generated electricity. After the 1950s, the civilian nuclear industry no longer tracked developments in the defense industry owing to a decision by the newly created Department of Defense to classify many of its nuclear operations. Jacob, Gerald, Site Unseen: The Politics of Siting a Nuclear Waste Repository (Pittsburgh, 1990), 26Google Scholar. To expedite industry development, in 1957 Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act, the nation's first nuclear liability insurance law. The act was designed to alleviate fears over the financial solvency of the new industry in the event of an accident. Two years later, Commonwealth Edison's Dresden facility, located in Morris, Illinois, became the first industry-built and government-licensed nuclear power plant. For the next two decades, the nuclear industry grew tremendously. The Midwestern Office of the Council on State Governments, Handbook of High-Level Radioactive Waste Transportation (Lombard, Ill.: DOE/CH/10402-19, 10 1992), 5.Google Scholar

37. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 48–49.

38. For more information on the Nixon administration's nuclear policymaking goals, see, for example, Terriff, Terry, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, 1995).Google Scholar

39. Rosenbaum, Walter A., Environmental Politics and Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C., 1998), 279–281.Google Scholar

40. For more information on reprocessing in general, see, for example, Carter, Luther J. and Pigford, Thomas H., “Confronting the Paradox in Plutonium Policies,” Issues in Science & Technology 16 (Winter 1999/2000): 29–36Google Scholar; and Sailor, William C., “The Case Against Reprocessing,” Forum for Applied Research & Public Policy 14 (Summer 1999): 108–112.Google Scholar

41. In 1976, Barnwell, South Carolina, served as a regional disposal site for low-level radioactive waste, and a plan for supplanting the facility was codified in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Act of 1983. It was also the site of a planned spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. Bullard, Clark W., “Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Regaining Public Confidence,” Energy Policy 20 (08 1992): 712–720Google Scholar. See also Kearney, Richard C. and Stucker, John J., “Interstate Compacts and the Management of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes,” Public Administration Review 45 (01–02 1985): 210–220.Google Scholar

42. “4/7/77—Statement—Nuclear Power Policy” Folder, Box 3, “Staff Offices/Speechwriters—Chron File,” 3/18/77—Swearing In—Ambassador [Richard N.] Gardner through 4/18/77—Energy Speech [3], Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia. The full text of the speech can be found in Carter, Jimmy, “Nuclear Power Policy,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 13 (7 04 1977): 502–507Google Scholar. See also “House Sustains Carter Defense Program,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (30 04 1977): 804Google Scholar, and “Nuclear Policy: Carter Halts Use of Plutonium as Fuel,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (9 04 1977): 681–682.Google Scholar

43. “Nuclear Proliferation: April 27 Message to Congress,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (7 05 1977): 867Google Scholar. The full text of the speech can be found in Carter, Jimmy, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 13 (27 04 1977): 611.Google Scholar

44. Carter, Jimmy, “University of Notre Dame,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 13 (22 05 1977): 777.Google Scholar

45. Ibid., 778.

46. The text of his United Nations address can be found in Carter, Jimmy, “United Nations Address Before the General Assembly,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 13 (4 10 1977): 1469–1477Google Scholar. He discussed nonproliferation especially at 1471–73.

47. “Nuclear Arms Pact Near, Carter Tells UN,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (8 10 1977): 2154–2157.Google Scholar

48. For more on Carter's difficult first year in office owing to his support for this, and other, controversial and contentious foreign policy initiatives, see, for example, Quirk, Paul J., “Presidential Competence,” in The Presidency and the Political System, 3d ed., ed. Nelson, Michael (Washington, D.C., 1990), 163–187, esp. 179Google Scholar; Rosati, Jerel A., The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior (Columbia, S.C., 1987), esp. 124–125Google Scholar; and Thomas, Norman C., Pika, Joseph A., and Watson, Richard A., The Politics of the Presidency, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C., 1994), 224–228.Google Scholar

49. Developing a workable nonproliferation policy was important to President Carter because, in his view, it was an integral component of the administration's strategy for limiting nuclear weapons worldwide through moral, executive-based leadership that included a variety of measures, such as negotiating the SALT treaties. “Restraints on the size, nature, and testing of existing arsenals were just one side of the coin,” Carter wrote in his memoirs. “The other was preventing the spread of nuclear explosives to those nations which did not yet have them.” Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, 215. See also Hargrove, Erwin C., Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good (Baton Rouge, 1988), 135–137.Google Scholar

50. This point is discussed in some depth in Mozley, Robert F., The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Seattle, 1998), esp. 70–71.Google Scholar

51. Curtis, Carl T., “Controversy over the Carter Administration's Approach to National Energy Policy,” Congressional Digest 57 (08–09 1978): 205.Google Scholar

52. “Bill to Establish Controls on Exports of Nuclear Fuels Approved by Senate Panel,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (12 11 1977): 2430–2432Google Scholar. See also “Antiproliferation Goal: House Votes Strict Controls on Exports of Nuclear Fuels,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (8 10 1977): 2152–2153.Google Scholar

53. “Controls on Exports: Legislation to Reduce Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Signed by President,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (11 03 1978): 639.Google Scholar

54. Carter, Jimmy, “Veto of Department of Energy Authorization Bill: Message to the Senate Returning S. 1811 Without Approval,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 13 (5 11 1977): 1726–1727.Google Scholar

55. McBride and O'Connor, Transporting Radioactive Spent Fuel: An Issue Brief, 4.

56. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 60–61.

57. McBride and O'Connor, Transporting Radioactive Spent Fuel: An Issue Brief, 4.

58. For a discussion of President Carter's difficulties over the Panama Canal, see, for example, Strong, Robert A., “Jimmy Carter and the Panama Canal Treaties,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 21 (Spring 1991): 269–286Google Scholar; and Skidmore, David, “Foreign Policy Interest Groups and Presidential Power: Jimmy Carter and Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 23 (Summer 1993): 477–497.Google Scholar

59. President Carter's difficulties with the Congress, especially during his first year in office, are well documented. See, for example, Davidson, Roger H. and Oleszek, Walter J., Congress and Its Members, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C., 1990), esp. 241–242, 351Google Scholar; Jones, Charles O., The Trustee Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress (Baton Rouge, 1988), esp. 137–139Google Scholar; and Skowronek, Stephen, “Presidential Leadership in Political Time,” in The Presidency and the Political System, 3d ed., ed. Nelson, Michael (Washington, D.C., 1990), 150–156.Google Scholar

60. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 66–67.

61. “Proliferation Issue: Senate Approves Stricter Controls on Nuclear Exports,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (11 02 1978): 349–350.Google Scholar

62. “Controls on Exports: Legislation to Reduce Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Signed by President,” 637–44. President Carter did not engineer this triumph on his own. He had considerable bipartisan assistance from two Senators: John Glenn, a Democrat from Ohio, and Charles Percy, a Republican from Illinois. See, for example, “Given High Marks: John Glenn: Science Background Helps in Managing Nuclear Bill,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (11 03 1978): 641.Google Scholar

63. Carter, Jimmy, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Statement on Signing H.R. 8638 into Law,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 14 (10 03 1978): 501.Google Scholar

64. For more information on congressional and industry reactions to Carter's “heavy-handed” approach to nonproliferation, see, for example, Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 58–71; and Congress and the Nation, 1977–1980 (Washington, D.C., 1981), 5:149.Google Scholar

65. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 58–71. See also Palmer, Norman D., The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New York, 1984), 215–218.Google Scholar

66. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 69. The NNPA provisions were highlighted and discussed in “Controls on Exports: Legislation to Reduce Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Signed by President,” 640–44.

67. McBride and O'Connor, Transporting Radioactive Spent Fuel: An Issue Brief, 4.

68. In the absence of a deep geologic repository or a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing option, commercial generators of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste have relied on a series of creative techniques to handle the growing stockpile of material. Not surprising, the availability of options for temporarily storing waste depends upon the characteristics of a particular utility's facilities. Most utilities remove spent fuel from a reactor and store it underwater in a temporary storage pool. U.S. Department of Energy, Transporting Spent Nuclear Fuel: An Overview (Washington, D.C.: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/RW-0065, 03 1986), 13. Methods of at-reactor spent nuclear fuel diverge at that point.Google Scholar

69. To increase storage-pool capacity, some utilities rerack spent fuel in assembly casings using stainless steel or boron (that is, neutron absorbing) racks so the assemblies are denser, hence closer together, than in the usual configuration. This new arrangement allows for more economical use of storage space. Jacob, Site Unseen: The Politics of Siting a Nuclear Waste Repository, 54. See also, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, Final Version Dry Cask Storage Study (Washington, D.C.: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/RW-0220, 02 1989), I-16–I-19Google Scholar. As an added benefit, reracking is relatively inexpensive and is licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal agency responsible for, among other things, licensing nuclear handling and storage technologies. U.S. Department of Energy, “Cooperative Demonstration Projects for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Backgrounder (Washington, D.C.: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/RW-1038, 04 1987), 2Google Scholar. A difficulty occurs with reracking, however, owing to potential structural and seismic constraints inherent in size and strength limitations in the pool floor. U.S. Department of Energy, Final Version Dry Cask Storage Study, I-19.

Rod consolidation is another temporary storage strategy often used by utilities. As the name implies, this process requires that utilities dismantle a spent-fuel assembly, separate fuel rods from the hardware that holds them together, rearrange the rods into a more compact array, and separately store the non-fuel-bearing hardware. Rod consolidation can double the density of fuel rods in a single canister, increasing the capacity of storage pools and providing savings in spent-fuel transportation costs. U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/RW-0216, 12 1989), 18.Google Scholar

The success of rod consolidation was vividly illustrated when the Northeast Utility Services Company (NUSCO) completed an in-pool consolidation demonstration at the Millstone 2 Reactor near Waterford, Connecticut, in September 1987. U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/RW-0189, 08 1988), 27Google Scholar. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) in Idaho Falls, Idaho, installed a rod-consolidation pilot program in 1987. By the end of that year, INEL had successfully consolidated forty-eight assemblies. The data gathered were used to design prototype production-scale equipment. Equipment delivery and cold (i.e., nonradioactive) testing began at INEL late in 1989. U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Report to Congress (12 1989), 18.Google Scholar

Like reracking, rod consolidation has limitations and uncertainties. It causes heavier weight loadings, thus creating possible seismic and load constraints. Moreover, consolidating fuel rods requires handling, processing, and disposing of assembly hardware as well as the fuel rods themselves. These additional steps increase the amount of radioactive materials that must be handled and, therefore, theoretically increase the risk of an accident. Southern States Energy Board, Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste Transportation Primer (Norcross, Ga.: Southern States Energy Board, 07 1987), I-18.Google Scholar

70. If reracking and rod consolidation are not always considered viable temporary solutions, a utility can transship radioactive material among several facilities, although this option might be dismissed with the pejorative adage of “borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.” Utilities with several nuclear reactors may have surplus storage at one site, thus allowing the company to transport spent fuel between its own pools. Transshipping delays the need to deploy other storage options or construct additional storage space. For example, before the dry-cask storage facility owned and operated by Duke Power Company began operating in 1987, shipments from the utility's Oconee, South Carolina, facility to its William B. McGuire facility in North Carolina were common. In 1987, Duke Power transshipped seventyfive spent fuel assemblies. Southern States Energy Board, Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste Transportation Handbook (Norcross, Ga.: Southern States Energy Board, DOE-FC01-92RW00247, 01 1995), 8–9.Google Scholar

Many utilities have rejected the transshipping option because it triggers the NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) syndrome among citizens along the transportation and disposal corridor. As evidenced by public protests, no one wants high-level radioactive waste shipped near his or her homes, schools, and businesses. To impress this point on nuclear utilities and shippers, some state laws and ordinances specifically ban transshipping on the grounds that it unnecessarily increases the risk of handling radioactive materials. Moreover, the decision to delay construction of a new utility storage facility does not solve the utility's problem; it only delays the inevitable decision. U.S. Department of Energy, Spent Fuel Storage Requirements, 1990–2040 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE/RL-90-44, 11 1990), 3.3.Google Scholar

71. An additional option for improving a reactor site's storage capacity is to use dry-cask storage technology. Most containers housing spent nuclear fuel must be immersed in water to cool down the fuel assembly and ensure that no radiation escapes. Dry storage technology, however, allows casks, modules, and drywells (vaults) to be stored outside of a storage pool. This feature allows utilities to increase the amount of waste that can be stored on-site because the utility does not have to link storage capacity to pool capacity. U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Report to Congress (12 1989), 18.Google Scholar

Until a geologic repository or a temporary storage facility can be constructed, dry storage appears to be the most effective and safest short-term answer to the nuclear waste conundrum. It provides a relatively simple and passive form of spentfuel storage. The technology is reasonably priced, requires low maintenance, and theoretically provides additional storage capacity, as needed (although the NRC will not license a dry storage facility indefinitely, no matter how advanced the technology). U.S. Department of Energy, “Cooperative Demonstration Projects for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” 2.

Dry-cask storage programs began in 1977 at the Nevada Test Site and have become part of extensive test and demonstration programs since that time. In July 1986, the Virginia Power Company became the first U.S. utility to receive an NRC license for dry storage at the company's Surry Nuclear Plant near Williamsburg, Virginia. The facility began operating in 1987. U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Report to Congress (08 1988), 27.Google Scholar

A second dry storage system, the Nutec Horizontal Modular System (NUHOMS) Spent Fuel System, is used by several nuclear utilities, including Carolina Power & Light Company at its H. B. Robinson facility in South Carolina, Duke Power Company at its Oconee Plant in South Carolina, and Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's Calvert Cliffs, Maryland, facility. Other dry-cask storage technologies include the Modular Vault Dry System (MVDS) and a Ventilated Storage Cask (VSC) system. All such technologies are variations on a common theme, namely, a need to increase the number of options available to nuclear utilities for containing spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the short term. Southern States Energy Board, Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste Transportation Handbook, 10.

Dry storage is a developing technology, and some utilities have hesitated to commit resources to this option until more data are available on the performance of existing storage facilities. In some cases, where land is scarce or other technical and legal constraints exist, the technology may be impracticable. It remains to be seen whether this option will prove to be a viable, ongoing solution to the problem of temporarily storing waste. McBride and O'Connor, Transporting Radioactive Spent Fuel: An Issue Brief, 4.

72. “Nuclear Waste Management, 9/11/79 [Briefing Book]” Folder, Box 145, “Staff Offices/Office of Staff Secretary/Handwriting File,” 9/10/79 [1] through [9/12/79—Not Submitted—DF], Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

73. “Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management,” Washington, D.C., 03 1979, 99Google Scholar, “Nuclear Waste Management, 9/11/79 [Briefing Book]” Folder, Box 145, “Staff Offices/Office of Staff Secretary/Handwriting File,” 9/10/79 [1] through [9/12/79—Not Submitted—DF], Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

74. White House Memorandum from Frank Press to the President, Monday, 21 March 1977, 2:30–2:50 p.m., 2, “Nuclear Policies, 3/21/77–1/28/80” Folder, Box 6, STAFF OFFICES, Science and Tech. Advisor to the President—Press, “Aid to Egypt, 3/24/79 through U.S.-China Science and Technology, 5/77–8/79,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

75. “Vol. I: Economic and Environmental Implications of a U.S. Moratorium, 1985–2010,” The Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 08 1976Google Scholar, “Nuclear Opposition” Folder, Box 26, Carlton Neville Collection, Subject File: “Nuclear Opposition through Offshore Oil and Gas,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

76. For more on this point, see Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community, beginning at 121.

77. Brown, Walton L., “Presidential Leadership and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 24 (Summer 1994): 566.Google Scholar

78. For a more detailed analysis on this point, see, for example, Brands, H. W., India and the United States: The Cold Peace (New York, 1990)Google Scholar; and Ganguly, Sumit, “The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes: A Race to Oblivion,” in The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century, ed. Thomas, Raju G. C. (New York, 1998), 272–283.Google Scholar

79. For a good general discussion of this subject, see Jones, Rodney, Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the Bomb, and Saudi Arabia (Berkeley, 1980).Google Scholar

80. The decision to restore aid to the Pakistanis was especially controversial because General Zia's legitimacy as a leader was suspect owing to his role in executing former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. When General Zia visited Washington, President Carter said, much to the dismay of supporters of U.S. human rights policy, that the dictator's “knowledge of the sensitivities and ideals of American life make him particularly dear to us.” Dumbrell, John, The Carter Presidency: A Reevaluation (Manchester, England, 1995), 187Google Scholar. See also Ganguly, “The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes,” 272–83.

81. For more on this point, see Ganguly, “The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes,” 279; and McMahon, Robert J., The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York, 1994), esp. 6.Google Scholar

82. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 124–33.

83. Ironically, this was the reasoning that the Institute for Energy Analysis and science adviser Frank Press argued for in 1976 and 1977, respectively, to no avail. For a full discussion of the controversy surrounding the 1978 transfer of nuclear material to India, see Nuclear Fuel Export to India, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 24 May 1978 (Washington, D.C., 1978).

84. Brown, “Assessing the Impact of American Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1970–1980,” 133–34. See also Palmer, The United States and India, 215–18; and The Tarrapur Nuclear Fuel Export Issue, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 18 and 19 June 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1980).

85. The text of the executive order can be found in Carter, Jimmy, “Executive Order 12218,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16 (19 06 1980): 1137.Google Scholar

86. Hoffman, Stanley, “Requiem,” Foreign Policy 42 (Spring 1981): 14Google Scholar. In the opinion of another commentator, this confusion in the Carter administration's policies was especially pronounced with respect to nuclear issues. “The contradictions in Carter's own beliefs, plus the conflicts over these questions among his top advisers, created vulnerabilities that arms control opponents could easily exploit.” Gallagher, Nancy W., The Politics of Verification (Baltimore, 1999), 170Google Scholar. To be fair, however, foreign policy almost always involves “schizophrenia” owing to competing and occasionally contradictory objectives. Moreover, when domestic issues are considered along with foreign policy initiatives, the result often is a confusing mix of conflicting laws and policies.

87. Congress and the Nation, 5:149. See also McCormick, John, American Foreign Policy and Values (New York, 1985), 107.Google Scholar

88. In his memoirs, Carter indicated that his unwillingness to antagonize India was because he was concerned about the nation's reluctance to condemn the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Carter recalled the precarious nature of U.S.-Indian relations in 1979–80: “When Indira Gandhi was re-elected Prime Minister of India, I called to congratulate her and to ask for her cooperation regarding our hostages [in Iran] and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. She was polite but cold. It was obvious she did not wish to discuss anything of substance. Within a few days, I learned why. The Indian representative's speech in the United Nations was strongly supportive of the Soviets' invasion as were those of Czechoslovakia and Vietnam. Even Cuba was more reticent in its praise than India.” Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, 479. According to one well-known commentator, the problems of Indian-U.S. relations extended back as far as the Eisenhower administration, when the two nations reached a low point in 1953–56. Even though relations improved in subsequent years, cross-cultural misunderstandings continually exacerbated tensions. Brands, India and the United States: The Cold Peace, esp. 5–9. See also Limaye, Satu P., U.S.-Indian Relations: The Pursuit of Accommodation (Boulder, 1993), esp. 96–98.Google Scholar

89. Perhaps with his increased foreign policy experience, the president accepted the Institute for Energy Analysis's and science adviser Frank Press's recommendation that it was preferable to work with a country to contain its nuclear weapons proliferation capabilities rather than oppose it and thereby push the country to obtain technology from other sources, some of which might be hostile to American interests. See, for example, Brown, “Presidential Leadership and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 565–66; and Ricks, “India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry Conjures Up Wargame Scenarios,” A20. In the words of one commentator, “American policymakers never succeeded in constructing a rational, effective approach to the myriad challenges posed by India and Pakistan.” McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 6.

90. Carter, Jimmy, “Export of Special Nuclear Material and Components to India; Message to Congress,” in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16 (19 06 1980): 1138.Google Scholar

91. In July 1981, the incoming Reagan administration reversed the Carter administration's policy of strictly controlling exports of “peaceful” nuclear energy technology and materials. In Reagan's view, the domestic nuclear industry and nations that did not constitute a “proliferation risk” should not be damaged by a blanket policy that limited all nuclear technology transfers. At the same time, the United States pledged its continued support for nonproliferation policy in general and vowed to support the IAEA in its quest to inspect the nuclear capability of nations suspected of developing nuclear weapons. However, during the 1980s, in the wake of the Reagan policy change, many other nations—Argentina, Brazil, India, Iraq, and Pakistan—developed and stockpiled nuclear weapons while the United States, in the words of commentator Walton L. Brown, “seemingly turned a ‘blind eye’ to proliferation.” Brown, “Presidential Leadership and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 567–68. See also Kiernan, V. G., “Peddling Arms in Paris,” Technology Review 94 (11–12 1991): 18–19.Google Scholar

92. For more discussion on the failure of President Carter's foreign policy initiatives, especially in the area of arms control, see Rosati, Jerel A., “Jimmy Carter, a Man Before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse of the First Post–Cold War Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 23 (Summer 1993): 459–476Google Scholar; and Skidmore, David, “Carter and the Failure of Foreign Policy Reform,” Political Science Quarterly 108 (Winter 1993–1994): 699–729.Google Scholar

93. Southern States Energy Board, Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste Transportation Handbook, 22.

94. For a more in-depth discussion of the change between the Carter and Reagan administrations, see Kiernan, “Peddling Arms in Paris,” 18–19; Mead, Mortal Splendor, 260–61; and Mutimer, David, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security (Boulder, 2000), starting at 51.Google Scholar

95. Brinkley, Douglas, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands-On’ Legacy of Our Thirty-Ninth President,” Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 505–529, esp. 522Google Scholar. See also Kaufman, Burton I., The Presidency of James Earl Carter (Lawrence, Kan., 1993)Google Scholar; Reichard, Gary W., “Early Returns: Assessing Jimmy Carter,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (Summer 1990): 603–620Google Scholar; Rozell, Mark J., “Carter Rehabilitated: What Caused the Thirty-ninth President's Press Transformation?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 23 (Spring 1993): 317–330Google Scholar, and Sanchez, J. M., “Awaiting Rehabilitation: The Carter Presidency in Political Science Textbooks,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27 (Spring 1997): 284–296.Google Scholar