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2. Tarrow, Sidney and Tilly, Charles, Contentious Politics (Oxford, 2006).Google Scholar

3. For a recent synthesis on the notion of taxpayers’ consent, see also The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective, ed. William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra, and Monica Prasad (New York, 2009), 1–27.

4. On examples of tax resistance and tax compliance, see Bergman, Marcelo, “Tax Reforms and Tax Compliance: The Divergent Paths of Chile and Argentina, ” Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (2003): 593–624CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Clarence, Y. H. Lo, Small Property versus Big Government: Social Origins of the Property Tax Revolt (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990)Google Scholar; Martin, William Isaac, The Permanent Tax Revolt (Palo Alto, 2008).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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6. On this issue of trust, see Levi, Margaret, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism (Cambridge, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Slemrod, Joel, Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement (Ann Arbor, 1992)Google Scholar; Daunton, Martin, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914 (Cambridge, 2001).Google Scholar

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8. Quotation in Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad, The New Fiscal Sociology, 1.

9. “Incivisme fiscal . . . is a productive event in which the concepts, metaphoric relationships, and suppositions that serve to theorize and hence delineate the most appropriate means and ends of power are challenged, reviewed, and reconfigured. Although a moment of political conflict, it cannot be reduced to the mere jockeying of social groups for control over material resources,” in Roitman, Janet, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 8. For a similar approach, see also Hmed, Choukri, “Les mouvements sociaux et la politisation de l’argent public, ” in Gouverner (par) les finances publiques, ed. Bezes, Philippe and Siné, Alexandre (Paris, 2011), 225–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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14. Redding, Sean, Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in Rural South Africa, 1880–1963 (Athens, Ohio, 2006).Google Scholar

15. For this kind of interpretation, on a recent African case, see Kelsall, Tim, “Governance, Local Politics, and Districtization in Tanzania: The 1998 Arumeru Tax Revolt, ” African Affairs 99 (2000): 533–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The author counters the idea according to which this rural tax revolt was a triumph of “popular participation” and a sign of discontent toward corrupt political leaders. On the contrary, he insists on the role played by local elites, on their “machinations,” and their attempts at strengthening their local networks.