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Prospects for a Democratic Left in Postcommunist Russia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Thomas F. Remington
Thomas F. Remington
Affiliation:
Emory University
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Extract

Parties of the democratic left have fared surprisingly poorly in postcommunist Russia. The reasons for this have to do with the legacy of the communist state, particularly the weakness of organized social associations outside the state and the continuing strength of patrimonial and corporatist patterns of state-society relations, together with constitutional and electoral institutions in the post-1993 system that undermine incentives for a system of competitive national political parties.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 15 , Issue 1: Special Issue: The Future of the Democratic Left in Industrial Democracies , January 2003 , pp. 130 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 2003

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References

Notes

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20. The 1993 Constitution provides for removal of a president through impeachment. The procedure consists of four basic steps. The State Duma must vote by a two-thirds majority (or three hundred affirmative votes) in favor of impeachment; the Supreme Court must affirm that the president's actions constitute grave crimes or treason; the Constitutional Court must rule that no procedural violations were committed in the Duma's approval of the decision to impeach; and the Federation Council must vote by a two-thirds majority to remove the president. Initiating impeachment proceedings gives the Duma leverage over the president, in that once the Duma has approved (by the required two-thirds majority) the motion to impeach, the president may not dissolve the Duma and call new elections.

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27. RFE/RL Newsline, 13 August 2001.

28. VTsIOM survey results published on the Polit.ru Web site: <www.polit.ru/printable/483733.html> on 13 May 2002.

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