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14. Ibid., 7.

15. Ibid., 6. See also 22–27.

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18. For the purposes of this discussion, I follow Gerring in understanding class warfare to be one possible form of populism.

19. See, for instance, Burnham, , “The System of 1896: An Analysis,” The Evolution of American Electoral Systems, ed. Kleppner, et al. (Westport, Conn., 1981), 158Google Scholar; Hofstadter, , The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York, 1955)Google Scholar; Ladd, , American Political Parties, 161Google Scholar; Milkis, Sidney M., The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal (New York, 1993), 21Google Scholar; Sundquist, , Dynamics of the Party System, chap. 3Google Scholar.

20. This account of Democratic ideological history complements realignment theory’s emphasis on 1932. That year’s “critical election” and the federal government’s ensuing activist policies created a massive partisan realignment in favor of the Democrats. Sundquist writes: “The millions of voters who switched from the Republican to the Democratic party or were mobilized into the electorate as Democrats for the first time, attracted by the Democratic program and the Rooseveltian personality and leadership … made the latter the country’s clear majority party for the first time in eighty years” (Sundquist, 214. See also Key, , “A Theory of Critical Elections,” Journal of Politics 17 (February 1955): 3–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Key, “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” 198–210; Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics.) Even critics of realignment theory recognize the 1932 election as a turning point in American political history. Indeed, for realignment skeptics, 1932 is perhaps the only election in the canon that clearly satisfies the theory’s requirements. (e.g., Shafer, , The End of Realignment, Shafer, , ed. (Madison, 1991Google Scholar); Mayhew, , Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre (New Haven, 2002), 141Google Scholar). In addition, a key statistical study demonstrates the significance of 1932. Jerome Clubb, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale measure the amount of enduring electoral change each presidential election produced from 1836 to 1964. They show that Roosevelt’s first contest for the White House produced the largest and most significant lasting change of any election in their study (Clubb, Jerome, Flanigan, William H., and Zingale, Nancy H., Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History (Beverly Hills, 1980), chap. 3Google Scholar. See especially table 3.1a, pages 92–93). Thus, not only did 1932 purportedly bring about a sea change in the dominant strain of Democratic ideology, but it also brought the party to power for the better part of the next several decades.

Yet it is important to note that these two outcomes (ideological change and electoral dominance) represent two separate and not necessarily connected claims. The first identifies an intraparty ideological hinge point. Theoretically, a shift in Democratic ideology could make the party less popular, more popular, or result in no popularity change and could occur independently of any specific election. By contrast, realignment’s emphasis on 1932 is more broadly concerned with the relationship between the two major parties and their relative levels of electoral success. In theory, then, the two developments are not co-dependent. Practically, however, it is not a coincidence that these two literatures both emphasize 1932 because there is obvious overlap between them. And this convergence makes for a neat, logical, causal narrative. It is comforting, in a sense, to have everything coalesce around 1932. Under this appealing and accessible plot line, the Democratic Party, led by Roosevelt, reacted to the Depression’s economic horrors and the do-nothing policies of Herbert Hoover with a new ideology geared toward the nation’s challenges. As a result, the electorate rallied to the Democratic banner, thereby crushing Republican dominance rooted in the “System of 1896” and ushering in a new political era.

21. This is not to say that the party’s ideology was synonymous with the liberal Democrats’ position. The Democratic Party was, in Milkis’ words, a “bifactional party with durable ideological and policy divisions” (75–76). Conservative Southern Democrats were powerful and influential in many respects. Nonetheless, Roosevelt’s policies did represent the dominant strain of the party and was clearly in control of the party’s national rhetoric (the “presidential party,” as Gerring calls it). Milkis, , The President and the Parties, 75–76Google Scholar; Gerring, , Party Ideologies in America, 6Google Scholar. For more on the Southern Democrats, see Rae, , Southern DemocratsGoogle Scholar.

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24. Gerring says the transition happened between 1948 and 1952. Gerring, , Party Ideologies in America, 17Google Scholar.

25. Ibid., 188 (italics in original). I follow Gerring in using “Populism to refer to the ideology of the Democratic party in the 1896–1948 period and populism to invoke the general (nonspecific) concept” (188). See also Bimes, Terri and Mulroy, Quinn, “The Rise and Decline of Presidential Populism,” Studies in American Political Development 18, no. (2004): 136–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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27. Ibid., 193–200.

28. Milkis, , The President and the PartiesGoogle Scholar. Milkis argues that political parties had always been primarily ensconced in state and local politics; governing at the national level was often only an afterthought. Roosevelt and his New Deal allies recognized that this feature of American politics limited the ability of a president to initiate the kind of progressive action needed in the early 1930s. As a result, Roosevelt engineered a reshuffling of American government in which the executive was at the center of the action and in a better position to direct a coherent policy agenda.

29. Roosevelt famously asserted as much in his commencement address at Oglethorpe University in 1932: “The country needs … persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. The millions who are in want will not stand by silently forever while the things to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Oglethorpe University Address,” 22 May 1932. See also Gerring, , Party Ideologies in America, 228Google Scholar.

30. This is not to say that everything changed. Postwar Democrats, for instance, had a similar understanding of social justice, welfare, and wealth redistribution.

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101. Krock, Arthur, “In the Nation: Self Reexamination Continues in the Supreme Court,” New York Times, 4 April 1944, 20Google Scholar. See also Keyssar, , The Right to Vote, 248Google Scholar; Sitkoff, Harvard, A New Deal for Blacks (New York, 1981), 229–37Google Scholar; Elliott, Ward E. Y., The Rise of Guardian Democracy: The Supreme Court’s Role in Voting Rights Disputes, 1845–1969 (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 78–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102. Klinkner, and Smith, , The Unsteady March, 195Google Scholar. Incidentally, it was about this time that general elections became competitive in the South—at least at the presidential level.

103. Kennedy, , Freedom from Fear, 855Google Scholar.

104. See, for instance, Gaddis, John Lewis, The Cold War: A New History (New York, 2005), 5–47Google Scholar.

105. Ibid., 10–14.

106. Gerring, , Party Ideologies in America, 274Google Scholar.

107. Ibid., 251–53.

108. “Speech by Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, Albuquerque, September 12, 1952,” History of American Presidential Elections, vol. 4, ed. Schlesinger, , 3308–9Google Scholar.

109. Gerring, , Party Ideologies in America, 252Google Scholar.

110. Shefter, , “War, Trade, and U.S. Party Politics,” in Shaped by War and Trade, ed. Katznelson, and Shefter, , 113–33Google Scholar.

111. John W. Compton, “From Commerce to Mission: The Impact of the Spanish-American War on Republican Party Ideology,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago (20 April 2006).