1. Jimmy Carter, “Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 Remarks on Signing H.R. 7020 Into Law,” 11 December 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project (hereafter Peters and Woolley, APP), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44392; Carter: “Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Remarks on Signing H.R. 6410 Into Law,” 11 December 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44390.

2. Richard Nixon, “Remarks on Signing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,” 1 January 1970, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2446.

3. U.S. House, Committee on Government Operations, “Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980: Hearings,” 96th Cong. 2nd sess., 7, 21, and 28 February 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1980), 96. For an important early assessment of different regulatory approaches that warned of society wasting billions of dollars on inefficient regulatory strategies, see Ackerman, Bruce A. and Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Sawyer, James W. Jr., and Henderson, Dale, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality (New York, 1974), 6, 317–30.Google Scholar

4. Carter, “Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 Remarks on Signing H.R. 7020 Into Law”; Jimmy Carter, “White House Conference on Regulatory Reform: Remarks at a Meeting of the Conference,” 11 January 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33016; Carter, “Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Remarks on Signing H.R. 6410 Into Law”; Stanly Godbold, E. Jr., Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter: The Georgia Years, 1924–1974 (New York, 2010), 189, 268.Google Scholar For Carter’s enthusiasm for government reorganization, see Carl P. Leubsdorf, “Political Problems Delay Bureaucratic Streamlining: Analysis,” Baltimore Sun, 4 February 1979, A1, and Thomas Oliphant, “Reorganization: Carter’s Newest Headache: Ending Bureaucracy Is Easier Said Than Done, He’s Finding,” Boston Globe, 8 January 1978, A3.

5. Whether regulatory costs significantly impeded economic growth in the 1970s or worsened that decade’s high inflation is a question that goes beyond the scope of this article. Some economists and historians are deeply skeptical that regulations have imposed costs sufficient to cause industrial relocation or to weaken industrial competitiveness. Others contend that regulatory costs meaningfully slowed economic growth, perhaps half a percent or a percent each year. For a skeptical assessment of regulation’s impact on industrial relocation, see Bruce G. Carruthers and Naomi R. Lamoreaux, “Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards,” unpublished essay, 11 June 2013, copy in the possession of the author; for an assessment of the effects of clean-air regulation on manufacturing competitiveness, see Michael Greenstone, John A. List, and Chad Syverson, “The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing” (10 September 2012), MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 12–24; Greenstone, Michael, “The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures,” Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 6 (December 2002): 1175–1219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This article also does not address the voluminous legal scholarship on the normative value of cost-benefit analysis and enhanced presidential authority over regulation. For selections from this scholarly debate, see Kagan, Elena, “Presidential Administration,” Harvard Law Review 114 (2000–2001): 2245–2385;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment (New York, 2002); Sunstein, “Cost‐Benefit Analysis and the Environment,” Ethics 115, no. 2 (1 January 2005): 351–85; Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity (New Haven, 2010); Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New York, 2004); Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health (New York, 2008). Jonathan Wiener also has written widely on the origins and spread of regulatory oversight. See, for example, Jonathan Wiener, B., “The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight,” in The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Policy, ed. Livermore, Michael A. and Revesz, Richard L. (New York, 2013): 123–41;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Wiener, Jonathan B. and Alemanno, Alberto, “Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies across the Atlantic: The US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the EU Impact Assessment Board (IAB),” in Comparative Administrative Law, ed. Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Lindseth, Peter (Northampton, Mass., 2010), 309–35.Google Scholar

6. For a profile of Alfred Kahn’s efforts on airline deregulation, see McCraw, Thomas K., Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 222–99Google Scholar. See also Kalman, Laura, Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974–1980 (New York, 2010), 240–41;Google Scholar Richard H. K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); Miller Center, “Interview with Jimmy Carter: November 29, 1982,” Charlottesville, University of Virginia, 2003, 45. Carter’s staff also described deregulation as “one of the President’s great domestic legacies,” and as a “major turning point . . . in the way our government approaches basic industries in our country.” “Exit Interview with David Rubenstein, Deputy Director Domestic Policy Staff, December 3, 1980,” 7, and “Exit Interview with Robert (Bob) Thomson, December 10, 1980, 5,” available from the Jimmy Carter Library at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/oralhist.phtml#exit.

7. Houck, Oliver A., “President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking,” American University Law Review 36 (1987): 535–56;Google Scholar Stephen Breyer, “Afterword,” Yale Law Journal 92, no. 8 (1 July 1983): 1614–20, 1614. For Breyer’s examination of regulatory reform, see Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). See also Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (Philadelphia, 1982), and Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air: Or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal (New York, 1981).

8. A Carter administration study of OMB explained that the regular budget had become “only one instrument for allocating resources to meet national needs. Credit programs, tax expenditures, and regulatory activities already have a greater impact than budget decisions in many areas (e.g., environment, housing, energy).” “OMB Organization Study,” n.d. (between June 1978 and March 1979), James T. McIntyre Collection, Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter McIntyre Collection), Box 9, chap. 1, p. 2. For the shift from spending programs to regulatory mandates, see Shep Melnick, R., “From Tax and Spend to Mandate and Sue,” in The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism, ed. Mileur, Jerome M. and Milkis, Sidney M. (Amherst, Mass., 2005), 387–410.Google Scholar

9. Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform; The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, Mass., 1973); Surrey, “The United States Income Tax System: The Need for a Full Accounting,” Speech to Money Marketeers, New York City, 15 November 1967, in Tax Policy and Tax Reform: 1961–1969, ed. Stanley S. Surrey (New York, 1973), 575–85; Zelizer, Julian E., Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945–1975 (New York, 1998), 286–99.Google Scholar

10. For two early accounts of NEPA’s implementation, see Richard N. L. Andrews, Environmental Policy and Administrative Change: Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (Lexington, Mass., 1976); Richard A. Liroff, A National Policy for the Environment: NEPA and Its Aftermath (Bloomington, 1976).

11. George P. Shultz to Heads of Departments and Agencies, “Agency Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and Occupational and Public Health and Safety,” 5 October 1971, online at http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm. For an account of EPA’s experience with Quality of Life review during the Nixon administration, see Percival, Robert V., “Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency,” Law and Contemporary Problems 54, no. 4 (1 October 1991): 127–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 129–38; Joe Green Conley II, “Environmentalism Contained: A History of Corporate Responses to the New Environmentalism” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2006,) 159–65; for a key staff member’s account of the pre-Reagan history of regulatory review, see Jim Tozzi, “OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding,” Administrative Law Review 63 (Special Edition 2011): 37–69. For assessments of regulatory reform at the end of the Ford administration, see also Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform, The Challenge of Regulatory Reform: A Report to the President (Washington, D.C., 1977); Miller, James C. III, “Lessons of the Economic Impact Statement Program,” Regulation 1 (1977): 14–21.Google Scholar

12. George C. Eads, “Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee,” 1 August 1979, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda to James T. McIntyre from OMB Staff and Others, [2/9/78–9/10/79]; Jimmy Carter: “Executive Order 12174: Federal Paperwork Reduction,” 30 November 1979, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31759; Carter, “Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Remarks on Signing H.R. 6410 Into Law.” For a call for regulatory budget and paperwork budget, see Wayne Granquist to Jim McIntyre and John White, 16 November 1979, McIntyre Collection, Box 4, Folder [Congressional Issues, 10/6/79–12/22/79]; “Regulatory Reform: Message from the President of the United States, March 27, 1979,” 96th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1979; see also Narrative of OMB’s relationship to regulation, 15 October 1980, McIntyre Collection, Box 18: Talking Points and Briefings [10/5/80–10/28/80].

13. Joe Green Conley shows how businesses reacted quickly in the early 1970s to emphasize the burden of environmental regulation, uncertainty of science, and need to balance costs and benefits. See Conley, “Environmentalism Contained”; for a forceful contemporary attack on business’s use of cost-benefit analysis to undermine federal regulation, see Green, Mark J. and Waitzman, Norman, Business War on the Law: An Analysis of the Benefits of Federal Health/safety Enforcement, rev. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1981).Google Scholar

14. “Obituaries: John R. Quarles Jr., environmental lawyer,” Washington Post, 26 November 2012; John Quarles, Cleaning Up America: An Insider’s View of the Environmental Protection Agency (Boston, 1976); John R. Quarles Jr. to Assistant Administrators, Office Directors, Regional Administrators, “Termination of the Quality of Life Review,” 25 January 1977, online at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/QualLifeReview8.PDF; Alvin L. Alm to Jim J. Tozzi, “Interagency Review of EPA Regulations,” 1 November 1976, viewed online at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/QualLifeReview7.PDF; “Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Policymaking, Faces Little External Review,” Environment Reporter, 3 September 1976, 693–97; for Tozzi’s assessment of the Quality of Life program, including his concession that “environmentalists had a legitimate gripe that EPA was singled out,” see Kathryne Bernick to Jim Tozzi, 5 August 1977, viewed online at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_ABA1.PDF; Percival, “Checks Without Balance”; Nina Cornell to Charlie Schultze, “OMB’s EIA Proposal,” 8 September 1977, Collection JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Jimmy Carter Library, Box 75: Folder 4. According to EPA’s Douglas Costle, Quarles opted out of the Quality of Life program in order to “take the heat” before Costle took over. See Douglas M. Costle: Oral History Interview (Washington, D.C., 1996).

15. William V. Shannon, “Quiet Issue,” New York Times, 18 September 1976: 13; Gladwin Hill, “Conservationists Expecting Carter to Open New Era for Environment,” New York Times, 5 November 1976, 15; Gustave Speth, J., Hall, Khristine L., and Perrin Quarles, J., “OMB and EPA: Who Sets Environmental Policy?” August 1976, online at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/QualLifeReview6.PDF (accessed 19 May 2014).Google Scholar

16. Kneese, Allen V. and Schultze, Charles L., Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy (Washington, D.C., 1975), 3;Google Scholar Schultze, Charles L., The Public Use of Private Interest (Washington, D.C., 1977), 2–5;Google Scholar see also U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, “Hearing on the Nomination of Charles L. Schultze: January 11, 1977,” 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1977, 26–27; for Schultze’s role as the primary “impetus” for the Carter administration’s regulatory review program, see William Nordhaus, interview with the author, 7 May 2014, New Haven.

17. For the distinction between Quality of Life Review process and Carter administration goals, see Bert Lance to William J. Moshofsky, 24 March 1977, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_Lance.pdf; Jimmy Carter: “Report to the American People: Remarks From the White House Library,” 2 February 1977, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7455; Carter reiterated these commitments in his 15 April 1977 anti-inflation program statement, Jimmy Carter: “Anti-Inflation Program Statement Outlining Administration Actions,” 15 April 1977, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7356.

18. Carter conveyed his personal investment in regulatory reform with handwritten notes to aides urging them to move more aggressively. See, for example, Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, “Regulatory Reform Initiatives,” 3 August 1977, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 75:4. The Carter administration’s commitment was bolstered by a January 1977 report describing regulatory decisions as too often “made on the basis of guesses or flimsily held beliefs, with very little attention to the actual economic or social consequences of regulation.” Agencies considered regulatory analysis “another pro forma hurdle.” Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform, The Challenge of Regulatory Reform: A Report to the President (Washingto, D.C., 1977); Stan Schneider to Dr. Press, “Material on Federal Regulation for Use in Presidential Message,” 2 March 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:7; Gerald R. Ford: “Statement on the Report of the Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform,” 14 January 1977, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5561. See also Council of Economic Advisers to Economic Policy Group, “Economic Impact Analysis,” 21 February 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:5.

19. Rick Neustadt to Si Lazarus, 28 February 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:7; Bruce Yandle to Robert W. Crandall, “Examples of Regulatory Action Which Could Benefit from Procedural Reform,” 24 February 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:7; for door sills, see McIntyre Collection, Box 8: McIntyre, Jim–Briefing Material for Confirmation Hearing, 3/18/78 [1]; Charles L. Schultze, Stu Eizenstat, Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, “Reform of OSHA,” 27 May 1977, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 75: Regulatory Reform [2].

20. Jimmy Carter, “Anti-Inflation Program Statement Outlining Administration Actions,” April 15, 1977, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7356. Stan Morris to Si Lazarus, “Economic Impact Analysis,” 24 February 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:5; Thomas D. Hopkins to Robert W. Crandall, “Pending Government Actions,” 9 February 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70: 7; Stan Schneider to Dr. Press, “Material on Federal Regulation for Use in Presidential Message,” 2 March 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70: 7. See also “Examples of Regulatory Activities That Effect Both the Consumer and Industry,” n.d., no author, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:7; “The Adverse Impacts Resulting from a Select Group of Regulations Which Did Not Go Through Interagency Review,” JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:7; Charles L. Schultze, Stu Eizenstat, Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, “Reform of OSHA,” 27 May 1977, Carter Library, Collection JC-CEA, Records of the Council of Economic Advisers (hereafter JC-CEA) Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 75: Regulatory Reform [2]. For an overview of the administration’s larger struggle with inflation, see Biven, W. Carl, Jimmy Carter’s Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits (Chapel Hill, 2002)Google Scholar; for monthly inflation rates, see “Historical Inflation Rates: 1914–2015,” at http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/, based on price data found at Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI Detailed Report: Data for December 2014” online at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1412.pdf, table 24.

21. Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, “Regulatory Reform Initiatives,” 3 August 1977, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 75:4.

22. Council of Economic Advisers to Economic Policy Group, “Economic Impact Analysis,” 21 February 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:5; see also Charlie Schultz to Jimmy Carter, “Economic Impact Analysis,” 7 October 1977, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 75:4. For cautionary warnings about NEPA as a “source of confusion and litigation,” see William D. Nordhaus to Economic Policy Group, “A Balancing Act,” 12 January 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73:1. For the growing pressure from businesses to calculate and reduce regulatory costs, see Conley, “Environmentalism Contained,” 159-65. For the expanding Washington conversation about regulatory reform, see also Eduardo Federico Canedo, “The Rise of the Deregulation Movement in Modern America, 1957–1980” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008), 262–319. The new journal Regulation, which the American Enterprise Institute started in 1977, played an important role in facilitating this policy conversation during the Carter years. Anne Brunsdale, “About This Journal,” Regulation 1 (1977): 2; William H. Jones, “Corporate Regulation Said Wasteful,” Washington Post, 18 May 1975: N1. James C. Miller, who worked for the Council on Wage and Prices Stability during the Ford administration, co-directed the Institute’s new Center for the Study of Business Regulation. Miller and several of his former colleagues published studies of their work at COWPS in Miller, James C. III and Yandle, Bruce, eds., Benefit-Cost Analyses of Social Regulation: Case Studies from the Council on Wage and Price Stability (Washington, D.C., 1979).Google Scholar For sample publications charting regulatory reform activities in Washington, see American Enterprise Institute, Major Regulatory Initiatives during 1978: The Agencies, the Courts, and the Congress (Washington, D.C., 1978)Google Scholar, and Regulation and Regulatory Reform: A Survey of Proposals of the 95th Congress (Washington, D.C., 1978).

23. Presidential Oral History Program, “Interview with James McIntyre: October 28–29, 1981,” Carter Presidency Project, University of Virginia: Miller Center of Public Affairs, 2005, 39, 43.

24. Miller Center, “Interview with Jimmy Carter: November 29, 1982,” Charlottesville, University of Virginia, 2003, 10–11; “Interview with James McIntyre: October 28–29, 1981,” 6, 39, 43, 91; James L. Rowe Jr., “A Surprise at OMB: McIntyre’s Secret: He Thinks Like Carter,” Washington Post, 8 January 1978: F1; Robert S. Greenberger, “Mr. Nice Guy?—Carter’s Budget Chief, Often Called Too Soft, Is Facing a Crucial Test,” Wall Street Journal, 30 November 1978: 1; for concern about the perception that OMB had “lost access or clout with the President,” see Bo Cutter to Jim McIntyre, “Issues, Problems, or Projects the President Might Wish to Know About,” 22 September 1977, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda to James T. McIntyre from OMB Staff and Others, [10/21/77–12/2/77]. For Lance’s self-confidence and interpersonal skills, see Interview with Harrison Wellford, Washington, D.C., 29 July 2015. Lance would “put his big old arm around, and Carter would kind of disappear like he was absorbed into this huge mass,” Wellford recalled.

25. Nina Cornell to Charlie Schultze, “OMB’s EIA Proposal,” 8 September 1977: JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 75:4; Charlie Schultze to The President, “Economic Impact Analysis,” 7 October 1977, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 75: Folder 4; Douglas M. Costle to Charles Schultze, “Economic Analysis Program,” 24 August 1977, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_CEA.pdf.

26. “Regulatory Review Process,” September 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; Charlie Schultze to The President, “Economic Impact Analysis,” 7 October 1977, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 75: Folder 4; Thomas Hopkins, telephone interview with the author, 5 January 2015. CEA and COWPS began to develop this interagency approach early in 1977: see Council of Economic Advisers to Economic Policy Group, “Economic Impact Analysis,” 21 February 1977, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:5; Barry Bosworth to George Schultze and William Nordhaus, “Economic Impact Analysis Proposal (some clarifications?),” 2 March 1977, and Barry Bosworth to Charles Schultze, Lyle Gramley, and William Nordhaus, “Options for an Incomes Policy,” 8 February 1977 in JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Staff Files, Box 145: Bosworth, Barry [2]. For a retrospective look at COWPS’s activities, see Thomas D. Hopkins, Benjamin Miller, and Laura Stanley, “The Legacy of the Council on Wage and Price Stability,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2014. The Mercatus Center has created an online archive of hundreds of COWPS filings at http://cowps.mercatus.org/.

27. Bert Lance to Jimmy Carter, 23 August 1977, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda to the President [8/1/77–8/29/77]; James T. McIntyre to Jimmy Carter, “Executive Order on Improving Government Regulations,” n.d. (March 1978), viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_OMBMemoMarch1978.pdf; on turn to executive action, see Stuart Eizenstat to Jimmy Carter, 21 February 1978, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda from Administration Officials [8/27/77–1/22/79]; Jimmy Carter: “Executive Order 12044: Improving Government Regulations,” 23 March 1978, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30539; Granquist, Wayne G., “Summary and Analysis of Public Comments,” Federal Register 43, no. 58 (24 March 1978): 12665–70.Google Scholar

28. Recent studies have shown that byssinosis is likely caused by bacterial endotoxins, rather than by the dust itself, and it can be partially reversed and treated with asthma medication. The threat also can be reduced by washing raw cotton to reduce its bioactivity. But in the late 1970s, byssinosis was thought to be caused by the cotton dust itself and to result in emphysema. For discussion of the recent epidemiological literature on byssinosis, see Wang, Xiao-Rong, Zhang, Hong-Xi, Sun, Bi-Xiong, Dai, He-Lian, Pan, Lei-Da, Eisen, Ellen A., Wegman, David H., Olenchock, Stephen A., and Christiani, David C., “Is Chronic Airway Obstruction from Cotton Dust Exposure Reversible?” Epidemiology 15, no. 6 (November 1, 2004): 695–701;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed Shi, Jing, Mehta, Amar J., Hang, Jing-qing, Zhang, Hongxi, Dai, Helian, Su, Li, Eisen, Ellen A., and Christiani, David C., “Chronic Lung Function Decline in Cotton Textile Workers: Roles of Historical and Recent Exposures to Endotoxin,” Environmental Health Perspectives 118, no. 11 (1 November 2010): 1620–24;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed Su, Wen-Lin, Chen, Yeong-Hwang, Liou, Saou-Hsing, and Wu, Chin-Pyng, “Meta-Analysis of Standard Mortality Ratio in Cotton Textile Workers,” European Journal of Epidemiology 19, no. 11 (1 January 2004): 989–97;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed Wang, X-R., Eisen, E. A., Zhang, H-X., Sun, B-X., Dai, H-L., Pan, L-D., Wegman, D. H., Olenchock, S. A., and Christiani, D. C., “Respiratory Symptoms and Cotton Dust Exposure: Results of a 15 Year Follow up Observation,” Occupational and Environmental Medicine 60, no. 12 (1 December2003): 935–41;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed for revision of the legal standard to include a new process for washing cotton, see OSHA, Office of Communications, “Cotton Dust Standard Amendments Effective Today,” U.S. Department of Labor, 6 April 2001, viewed online at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=246.

29. Although the cotton-dust regulation predated Carter’s 1978 executive order and thus did not go through a systematic regulatory analysis, Nordhaus advocated White House intervention to “show in a dramatic and confrontational way the Administration’s commitment to less burdensome regulations.” William Nordhaus to Stu Eizenstat, Charlie Schultze, and Robert Strauss, “OSHA Cotton Dust Standard,” 22 May 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 162 (Nordhaus): Folder 1; William Nordhaus, interview with the author, 7 May 2014, New Haven.

30. Perspectives on Current Developments,” Regulation: AEI Journal on Government and Society (January–February 1981): 5–6;Google Scholar Peter Behr, “Cabinet Cotton-Dust Row Put Decision up to Carter,” Baltimore Sun, 11 June 1978, A4; Helen Dewar, “Carter Clears Way for Issuance of Cotton Dust Limit,” Washington Post, 8 June 1978, A9; Eads, George C. and Fix, Michael, Relief or Reform? Reagan’s Regulatory Dilemma (Washington, D.C, 1984), 58–59;Google Scholar for a comparison of the cost of the proposed versus final cotton-dust standards, see Thomas Hopkins to Barry Bosworth, William Nordhaus, and Charles Schultze, “OSHA Lead Standard,” 6 July 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73:2; David Burnham, “Cotton Dust Rule Issued; Both Sides Are Unhappy: Union Goes to Court,” New York Times, 20 June 1978: D3; for overview of CEA’s involvement in developing the cotton-dust standard, see Elmer B. Staats to Paul G. Rogers, 4 October 1978, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_GAOLet100478.pdf; Reagan also sought to reverse the cotton-dust rule and push for respirators, but his OSHA appointee resisted and ended up prevailing on engineering controls. Dick Kirschten, “The 20 Years War,” National Journal, 11 June 1983, viewed at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20_Years_War.pdf; “Supreme Court Upholds OSHA’s Cotton Dust Standard, Deals Setback to Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 11 Environmental Law Reporter (1981): 10163; Stephan Wermiel and Robert S. Greenberger, “Justices Uphold Exposure Limits on Cotton Dust: Decision, a Big Victory for Labor, Undercuts Reagan Bid to Curb OSHA,” Wall Street Journal, 18 June 1981, 3.

31. Jack Watson and Bruce Kirschenbaum to Jimmy Carter, “Proposed Initiative for De-Regulation,” 13 July 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; Rick Neustadt to Diane Steed, 28 August 1978, Comments on your August 19 Memo on Evaluating E.O,” in JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:12; Si Lazarus to Stu Eizenstat, “Watson/Kirschenbaum Draft on De-regulation Proposal,” 14 July 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; “Historical Inflation Rates: 1914–2015,” at http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/.

32. Lazarus to Eizenstat, “Watson/Kirschenbaum Draft on De-regulation Proposal”; Si Lazarus to Rick Neustadt, 29 August 1978, in JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:12; see also Neustadt’s criticism of OMB’s “failure to provide adequate oversight,” in Rick Neustadt to Stu Eizenstat, “Attached Action Memo on Regulatory Reform,” 28 August 1978, in JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:12; Stu Eizenstat to the President, “Regulatory Reform Enforcement,” 2 September 1978, in JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:12; Jimmy Carter to Jim McIntyre, 4 September 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:13.

33. W. Michael Blumenthal and Charles L. Schultze to Lawrence R. Klein, 5 August 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Meetings Files, Box 142:14; George W. Ball, William G. Bowen, Lawrence R. Klein, Arthur M. Okun, and Robert V. Roosa to Jimmy Carter, “Suggestions for Dealing with Inflation and the Dollar,” 20 September 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Meetings Files, Box 142:14; William Nordhaus, “Memorandum on the Regulatory Review Process,” 16 August 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; William Nordhaus to Charlie Schultze, “Regulation in the Anti-Inflation Proposal,” 7 September 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 163 (Nordhaus): Folder 2; William Nordhaus, interview with the author, 7 May 2014, New Haven.

34. Draft Memo to President, n.d. (likely September or October 1978), JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre, and Charlie Schultze to the President, 8 October 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8.

35. White House economic advisers argued that the emphasis on EPA and OSHA reflected their “heavy rule-making calendar” and that many traditional economic agencies necessarily escaped review since they had quasi-independent status, not subject to Carter’s Executive Order. See George Eads to All Regulatory Analysis Review Group Participants, “Possible Items of RARG Interest for the Remainder of Calendar Year 1979,” 1 May 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]; Merrill Brown, “Economic Advisers Zeroing in on Costs of Proposed Rules,” Washington Star, 11 May 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 9; for concern about balance among types of regulations reviewed, see Charlie Schultze to Stu Eizenstat, Fred Kahn, Jim McIntyre, and Frank Press, 17 April 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 74:9; Si Lazarus to Charlie Schultze and Stu Eizenstat, “Lunch Conversation with Dick Ayers,” 25 September 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8.

36. Charles Warren and Gus Speth to Jimmy Carter, “Inflation and Environmental and Health Regulations,” 18 September 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8. Carter caused consternation among his domestic policy staff by scrawling a cryptic “I agree” on the top of Warren and Speth’s memo. For agitated response from other White House advisers, see William Nordhaus, “Memorandum on the Regulatory Review Process,” 16 August 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; Si Lazarus to Bill Nordhaus, “Your 9/21 Draft of Memo on Warren/Speth,” 25 September 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8.

37. Report on Meeting regarding Regulatory Calendar, 18 October 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; Walter S. Mossberg, “Key U.S. Regulatory Officials Propose Interagency Council to Issue New Rules,” Wall Street Journal, 20 October 1978; Helen Dewar, “Regulatory Curbs Weighed in Anti-Inflation Plan,” Washington Post, 18 October 1978, A4; Paul G. Rogers et al. to Jimmy Carter, 20 October 1978, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_CongLet1078.pdf; Barbara Blum to Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre, and Charlie Schultze, 19 October 1978, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda to James T. McIntyre from OMB Staff and Others, [2/9/78–9/10/79]; Ad Hoc Council of Regulatory Agencies to Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre, and Charlie Schultze, 19 October 1978, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda to James T. McIntyre from OMB Staff and Others, [2/9/78–9/10/79]; Hubert Harris, OMB’s liaison with Congress, later recalled his shock at the agencies’ assertion of independence: “It was to [m]e an astonishing point of view that people who had been appointed by the President, who ostensibly worked for the President—if not in fact, at least in theory—telling him that he couldn’t control their actions.” “Interview with James McIntyre: October 28–29, 1981,” 17.

38. Jimmy Carter, “Anti-Inflation Program Address to the Nation,” 24 October 1978, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30040; Jimmy Carter “Strengthening Regulatory Management,” 31 October 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 75: Regulatory Reform [2]; “OSHA Scraps 928 Rules It Brands as ‘Nitpicking,’” Los Angeles Times, 25 October 1978, E14; “EPA Chief Will Direct New Panel to Monitor Effects of Regulations,” Wall Street Journal, 1 November 1978, 41. Carter’s generalities and his relatively mild tone disappointed his economic advisers, who had sought a much more forceful statement committing the administration to specific action. See, for example, Bill Nordhaus to Charlie Schultze, “Regulation,” 6 October 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 163 (Nordhaus): Folder 1; Rick Neustadt to Those Working on the Regulatory Announcement, 11 October 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8. Although Nordhaus called the regulatory calendar a first step toward “a procedure to budget the regulatory burden,” Nordhaus ultimately concluded that regulatory budgeting was useful only as an “analogy,” not as a practical tool to allocate regulatory costs. See Litan, Robert E. and Nordhaus, William D., Reforming Federal Regulation (New Haven, 1983)Google Scholar, 5. Eizenstat, McIntyre, and Schultze also wanted Carter to explicitly assert the president’s authority to determine the timing and content of agency regulations to ensure that a “proper balance is struck between regulatory objectives and economic costs.” Environmental groups “claim that you have no such authority,” they explained, and Carter needed to assert his power over executive branch agencies. See Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre, and Charlie Schultze to the President, 8 October 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; Bill Nordhaus to Charlie Schultze, “Public Relations on the Big Five,” 29 November 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 163 (Nordhaus), Folder 1. For the administration’s view that the president had the inherent authority to direct executive agencies, and did not need new statutory authority, see also Richard M. Neustadt to David Ginsburg, 27 July 1979, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:9; Lloyd Cutler to Martin Tolchin, 8 January 1979, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:9; for Kahn’s appointment, see Miller Center, “Interview with Alfred E. Kahn: December 10–11, 1981,” Charlottesville, 2003. While Kahn formally oversaw the Council on Wage and Price Stability staff who worked on regulatory analysis, he focused primarily on wages and prices, and the Council on Economic Advisers continued to play the primary leadership role on regulation. Thomas Hopkins, telephone interview with the author, 5 January 2015.

39. Hobart Rowen, “The President’s New Priorities,” Washington Post, 30 November 1978, A15; President’s Reorganization Project, “Reorganization and Management Strategy 1979,” 3 November 1978, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda to James T. McIntyre from OMB Staff and Others, [2/9/78–9/10/79]; James T. McIntyre Jr., “Remarks Before the Business Council, Hot Springs, Virginia,” 13 October 1978, McIntyre Collection, Box 8: [McIntyre, Jim—Remarks, 10/13/78–10/28/78].

40. Rick Neustadt, draft memo from Stu Eizenstat and Jim McIntyre to Jimmy Carter, “Regulatory Reform—1979 Legislative Program,” 15 December 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 75: Regulatory Reform [2]; “Key Regulatory Reform Initiatives,” Draft, n.d., JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 75: Regulatory Reform [2]; “Certain Regulatory Problems,” Draft, 1 December 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 75: Regulatory Reform [2]; “Remarks of James T. McIntyre, Jr. Before the Business Council,” 15 February 1979, McIntyre Collection, Box 2: Folder Business Council Remarks—Washington, D.C., [2/15/79]; for a brief overview of the administration’s regulatory review legislation, see Granquist, Wayne G., “The Role of the Office of Management and Budget,” in Reforming Regulation, ed. Clark, Timothy B., Kosters, Marvin H., and Miller, James Clifford (Washington, D.C., 1980), 137–39.Google Scholar

41. Stu Eizenstat, Fred Kahn, Jim McIntyre, and Charlie Schultze to Jimmy Carter, “Actions on Major Regulatory Proposals,” 20 November 1978, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:8; Ben A. Franklin, “Lawsuit Is Filed to Bar White House Advisers from Intervening in Writing Regulations on Strip Mines: Thought to Be First,” New York Times, 14 January 1979: Peter Behr, “Is Worker Protection Too Expensive?” Baltimore Sun, 30 October 1978, A1, 14; Steven Rattner, “Environmental Agency Softens Rules in Bid to Be More Moderate and Efficient,” New York Times 19 January 1979, A8; Margot Hornblower, “Muskie Criticizes White House Meddling with EPA Rules,” Washington Post, 27 February 1979, A2; Rick Neustadt to Stu Eizenstat, “Status Report: Oversight of Major Regulations,” 13 April 1979, Carter Library, Collection JC-CEA, Records of the Council of Economic Advisers, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: Briefing Book: Regulatory Reform 11/79 [2]. In another case addressing the problem of sulfur emissions, proposed Clean Air Act regulations would have required power plants to remove 90 percent of the sulfur content from all kinds of coal, regardless of whether it was low- or high-sulfur coal. White House economists argued that a lower percentage reduction (70 percent) from low-sulfur coal could accomplish a similar pollution-control goal while saving over a billion dollars per year. Handicap accessibility presented another controversial issue. The Department of Transportation’s original proposal mandated accessibility for all new and existing urban mass-transportation facilities and vehicles. The revised proposal extended the schedule for achieving the goal, and excluded some existing transit stations where “extraordinary costs” were involved. According to one administration estimate, the policy change meant savings of $600 million on a rule estimated to cost $1.6 billion, with only a relatively modest loss in service. Memo to Charlie Schultze, “DOT: Non-Discriminatory Access by Handicapped Persons to Federally-Assisted Transportation Programs,” and Rick Neustadt to Stu Eizenstat, “Status Report: Oversight of Major Regulations,” 13 April 1979, in Carter Library, Collection JC-CEA, Records of the Council of Economic Advisers, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: Briefing Book: Regulatory Reform 11/79 [2]. For background on Costle’s emphasis on innovation at EPA, see Clark, Timothy B., “New Approaches to Regulatory Reform—Letting the Market Do the Job,” National Journal 32 (11 August 1979): 1316–22;Google Scholar “Costle, Douglas,” in American Environmental Leaders: From Colonial Times to the Present (Amenia, N.Y., 2008), http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/ghael/costle_douglas/0 (accessed 8 May 2014); Ernest B. Furgurson, “Doug Costle: Hard-headed at the EPA,” Baltimore Sun, 14 May 1978, K5; Rich Jaroslovsky, “Douglas Costle’s Balancing Act,” Wall Street Journal, 11 April 1980, 20; Douglas Martin, “Dealing in Dirt: EPA Ponders Letting Concerns Buy and Sell ‘Right’ to Pollute Air,” Wall Street Journal, 15 December 1978, 1; for Costle’s “regulatory reform guru” William Drayton’s overview of regulatory reform initiatives, see William Drayton Jr., “A Tougher Job Requires Smarter Regulation,” in Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Planning and Management, “Regulatory Reform Initiatives: Progress Report,” October 1979, Collection JC-AINFL, Records of the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Inflation, 1977–81, Ron B. Lewis Subject Files, Box 79: Folder Executive Order 12044 [Improving Government Standards], 3/78–7/80, Carter Library. IMG_8091; Costle, Oral History Interview; Miller Center, “Interview with Alfred E. Kahn: December 10–11, 1981,” Charlottesville, University of Virginia, 2003. Drayton earlier explored the idea of economic incentives as a regulatory strategy for tobacco in William Drayton Jr., “The Tar and Nicotine Tax: Pursuing Public Health Through Tax Incentives,” Yale Law Journal 81, no. 8 (1 July 1972): 1487–1516. For challenges inherent in market-based regulation, see Ackerman et al., Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality, esp. 260–81.

42. “Remarks of Senator Edmund S. Muskie,” University of Michigan, 14 February 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73:1; see also Edmund S. Muskie, “Regulation,” Week of April 23, 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73: 1; Margot Hornblower, “Muskie Criticizes White House Meddling With EPA Rules,” Washington Post, 27 February 1979, A2; Edmund Muskie to Douglas M. Costle, 26 March 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]; see also Edmund Muskie to Charles Schultze, 17 January 1979, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/CarterSenMuskieLet011779.PDF; Edmund S. Muskie to Charles L. Schultze, 12 March 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]; for discussion of desirable procedures for executive branch involvement in rule making, see William Nordhaus to Joan Davenport, 6 December 1978, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 74: Regulation: Surface Coal Mining [2]; John M. Harmon to Nina Cornell and Simon Lazarus, “Proposed Procedure for Reviewing the Economic Impact of Major Regulations,” n.d., JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 74: Regulation: Surface Coal Mining [2]; for the OMB general counsel’s analysis of executive-office involvement in agency rule making, see William M. Nichols to the Deputy Director, “EOP Involvement in Agency Rulemaking,” 1 February 1979, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_OMBGenCounselMemo020179.pdf; for the Office of Legal Counsel’s guidance and approval of executive office participation in the Office of Surface Mining’s regulation development, see Larry A. Hammond to Cecil D. Andrus, “Consultation with Council of Economic Advisers Concerning Rulemaking under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,” JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [4]; for GAO’s earlier assessment of economic agencies involvement in agency rule making, see Elmer B. Staats to Paul G. Rogers, 4 October 1978, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_GAOLet100478.pdf. See also Verkuil, Paul R., “Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House,” Columbia Law Review 80 (1980): 943–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43. Margot Hornblower, “Muskie Criticizes White House Meddling with EPA Rules,” Washington Post, 27 February 1979, A2; U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, “Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution,” 96th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1979, 27, 29, 175. See also Edward Cowan, “Economic Advisers’ New Role: A Look at Performance,” New York Times, 10 May 1979: D1; Si Lazarus to Regulatory Process Bill File, “Meeting with Karl Braithwaite and Leon Billings,” 16 February 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73:1. Billings considered cost-benefit analysis a kind of “witchcraft” and a “fraud.” Leon G. Billings, “Cost Benefit Analysis,” 3 February 1975, in Edmund S. Muskie Papers, Bates Library, Series V: Subseries C, Box 74:10.

44. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, “Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis by Regulatory Agencies: Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, July 30, October 10 and 24, 1979,” 96th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1980, 1, 3–4, 119, 123–24; Bob Eckhardt to James T. McIntyre Jr., 28 October 1980, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_CongrLet102880.pdf. In November 1979, Green led twenty-five consumer, labor, and environmental organizations in urging Carter to oppose formal cost-benefit analyses and a rigid requirement that the least burdensome alternative be chosen. Rattner, Steven, “Coalition Opposes Regulatory Change,” New York Times, 4 November 1979, 46;Google Scholar Mark Green et al. to Jimmy Carter, 2 November 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]. For Green’s broader critique of cost-benefit analysis, see also Green, “The Faked Case Against Regulation: Business Propaganda Focuses on Costs, Ignores Savings in Health and Safety Laws,” Washington Post, 21 January 1979, C1; and Green and Waitzman, Business War on the Law (first edition, 1979). The AFL-CIO also strongly opposed the Carter administration’s regulatory reform initiatives, complaining that the White House had acted “by fiat,” encroaching on Congress’s power to direct agency actions through legislation. Carter’s Executive Order merely served “as an escape valve from pressures of private business which has no other goal than to escape regulation entirely.” See Kitty Bernick to George Eads et al., “FYI: AFL-CIO Views on RARG and E.O. 12044,” 2 April 1980, Staff Office: Council of Economic Advisers, George C. Eads’s Meetings Files, Carter Library (hereafter Eads Files), Box 266: 4/9/80, Wed. 10 a.m. Meeting on RARG issues. The White House economic staff heard similarly scornful attacks on regulatory analysis in an “acrimonious meeting” with Department of Labor staff regarding the Service Contract Act. Department of Labor staff members “accused us of representing the corporate interests of America (and the mainline economics profession’s support of these interests),” reported one of Eads’s staff members. “When I suggested that the function of such a regulatory analysis was analogous to the budgetary process for expenditures, there were amused smiles on the faces of the assembled throng.” The White House staff, in turn, thought that the Labor Department’s approach to regulatory analysis was “senseless” and largely “worthless” in its methodology. Dan Saks to George Eads, “Staff level meeting with ESA on the Regulatory Analysis for the proposed Service Contract Regulations,” 2 June 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 6/10/80, Tues. 12 p.m. Meeting with Wayne Granquist; Bob Goldfarb, Tom Hopkins, and John Morrall (COWPS) and Dan Saks (CEA) to Craig Barrington and Roland Droitsch, 2 June 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 6/10/80, Tues. 12 p.m. Meeting with Wayne Granquist.

45. Si Lazarus to Regulatory Process Bill File, “Meeting with Karl Braithwaite and Leon Billings,” 16 February 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73:1; Charles L. Schultze, “Social Regulation: The New Challenge,” Remarks before the Commonwealth Club of California, 13 April 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]; see also Council of Economic Advisers, Annual Report (Washington, D.C., 1979), 85–91; James T. McIntyre Jr., “Remarks Before the Edison Electric Institute,” 11 April 1979, Atlanta, McIntyre Collection, Box 9.

46. “OMB Organization Study,” n.d. (between June 1978 and March 1979) McIntyre Collection, Box 9, chap. 1, p. 4. OMB sought to fulfill some of this oversight role with a spring 1979 report on how the individual agencies had been fulfilling their responsibilities under Carter’s executive order. See “Agency Regulatory Performance Assessment,” April/May 1979, in JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:13; see also Charlie Schultze and Fred Kahn to Jimmy Carter, “OMB’s Status Report on E.O. 12044, Improving Government Relations,” 4 May 1979, Carter Library, Collection JC-AINFL, Records of the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Inflation, 1977–81, Ron B. Lewis Subject Files, Box 79: Folder Executive Order 12044 [Improving Government Standards], 3/78–7/80.

47. Jimmy Carter note on James T. McIntyre Jr. to President, “Status Report on E.O. 12044, Improving Government Regulations,” 30 April 1979, in Carter Library, Collection JC-DPS: Records of the Domestic Policy Staff, 1976–81 (hereafter JC-DPS), Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:13.

48. Rick Neustadt to Stu Eizenstat, “Talking Points for Lunch with John White on Regulatory Reform,” 19 June 1979, JC-DPS, Richard Neustadt’s Files, Box 70:9. For the lack of enforcement power inherent in the Carter regulatory review process, see Litan, Robert E. and Nordhaus, William D., Reforming Federal Regulation (New Haven, 1983), 67–79.Google Scholar

49. James T. McIntyre Jr. to Abraham Ribicoff, 20 February 1980, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_LegProp022080.pdf; James T. McIntyre and Stuart Eizenstat to Edward M. Kennedy, 24 July 1980, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_WhiteHouseLet072480.pdf.

50. George C. Eads, “Testimony Before the Committee on Oversight and Governmental Management,” 10 October 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]; “Briefing Book- Regulatory Reform, 11/79 [2],” JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]. In an illustration of the process strategy at work, the secretary of labor wrote to the departments’ executive staff in January 1979 to outline new regulatory procedures that would help ensure that “all regulations published by the Department are of high quality and can be defended.” The new procedures stipulated a written development plan for each regulation, including a clear statement of need, regulatory alternatives, and significance, and noting whether a full regulatory analysis was required. Secretary of Labor to Executive Staff, “Regulatory Procedures within the Department,” 30 January 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73:1; Si Lazarus to Chuck Knapp, DOL Regulatory Procedures,” 13 February 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 73:1. For a discussion of the ways that agencies could use the internalization of regulatory analysis to protect themselves from external review, see Nou, Jennifer, “Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review,” Harvard Law Review 126 (May 2013): 1755–1837.Google Scholar

51. Narrative of OMB’s relationship to regulation, 15 October 1980, McIntyre Collection, Box 18: Talking Points and Briefings [10/5/80–10/28/80]; Morton Mintz, “Order to Trim Paperwork Has the Agencies Howling,” Washington Post, 13 July 1980, A1; Jimmy Carter: “Executive Order 12174: Federal Paperwork Reduction,” 30 November 1979, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31759. For a legal history and early assessment of the Paperwork Reduction Act and earlier federal initiatives, see Funk, William F., “The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law,” Harvard Journal on Legislation 24, no. 1 (1987): 1–116;Google Scholar for EPA pushback against OMB’s use of Federal Records Act as way to clear regulations, see Henry E. Beal to Diane Steed, 13 November 1980, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_EPAMemo121380.pdf; for industry and OMB’s use of reporting requirements to challenge EPA’s noise regulations governing garbage compactors, see James T. McIntyre Jr. to Douglas Costle, n.d. (September–October 1980), viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_OMBLetSept-Oct80.pdf; for the effort to constrain EPA contractors collecting data on hazardous waste, see James T. McIntyre Jr. to Douglas Costle, 2 October 1979, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_OMBLet100279.pdf.

52. Timothy B. Clark, “Making Regulation Pay,” National Journal, 26 July 1980, 1239 in McIntyre Collection, Box 18: Talking Points and Briefings [10/5/80–10/28/80]; Merrill Brown, “Proposed Bill Asks Agencies to List Major Rules’ Costs,” Washington Post, 25 March 1980: F1; “EPA Fears Proposal to Tally Costs Will Result in ‘Regulatory Budget,’” Environment Reporter, 9 May 1980, 38; Wayne Granquist to Herky Harris and Jim Frey, “Regulatory Cost Accounting Act,” 25 March 1980, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_OMBMemo032580.pdf. For the Commerce Department’s call for a regulatory budget, see C. L. Haslam to Cecil D. Andrus, 10 October 1979, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_DOCLet101079.pdf; for the Commerce Department’s broader advocacy for a regulatory budget, see Juanita M. Kreps to Jimmy Carter, “Regulatory Reform,” 26 May 1978, McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda from Administration Officials [8/27/77–1/22/79]; for the idea that cost accounting could lay the groundwork for future regulatory budget, see also Lester M. Salamon to Philip S. Hughes, 5 August 1980, viewed online at www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_UrbanInstituteLet080580.pdf; Stu Eizenstat and Jim McIntyre to Jimmy Carter, “Regulatory Reform—1979 Legislative Program,” Richard Neustadt Draft, 1 November 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Meetings Files, Box 142:18; Charles L. Schultze, “Social Regulation: The New Challenge,” Remarks Before the Commonwealth Club of California, 13 April 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2]; for a discussion of the challenge of estimating regulatory costs and frequent overestimation by the government, see Harrington, Winston, Morgenstern, Richard D., and Nelson, Peter, “On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 297–322.3.0.CO;2-X>CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53. Jimmy Carter: “Budget Message to the Congress Transmitting the Fiscal Year 1981 Budget,” 28 January 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32851; Art Pine, “Defense Rises, Deficit Falls in Carter Budget,” Washington Post, 29 January 1980; “Excerpts from Fact Sheet on Program,” New York Times, 15 March 1980, 34; for a contemporary critique of excess federal credit and its impact on the economy, see “Controlling Federal Credit,” Wall Street Journal, 18 March 1980, 24; Eileen Alt Powell, “Carter Sees Federal Loan Programs As a Threat to Private Capital Markets,” Wall Street Journal, 16 January 1981, 5; see also Break, George, “Government Spending Trends in the Postwar Period,” in The Federal Budget: Economics and Politics, ed. Wildavsky, Aaron B., Boskin, Michael J., and Abellera, James W. (San Francisco, 1982), 39–62,Google Scholar 58–60; for an analysis of the utility of credit budgets and Reagan’s use of them for the 1982 budget, see U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Federal Credit Activities: An Analysis of President Reagan’s Credit Budget for 1982, Staff Working Paper, April 1981.

54. Stu Eizenstat and Rick Neustadt to Jimmy Carter, 31 October 1979, “Regulatory Reform,” McIntyre Collection, Box 35: Memoranda from Administration Officials [1/22/79–7/25/80]; Kitty Bernick to George Eads and Ron Lewis, “RARG Inactivity,” 26 March 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 4/9/80, Wed. 10 a.m. Meeting on RARG issues. Eads insisted that there was no “inactivity” and assured Bernick, “You find them; I’ll RARG them.” George Eads to Kitty Bernwick, “RARG ‘Inactivity,’” 1 April 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 4/9/80, Wed. 10 a.m. Meeting on RARG issues. RARG reviews were fewer than originally anticipated because the “pace of issuing significant new regulations has slowed considerably,” Schultze explained to Carter in June 1980. Charlie Schultze to Jimmy Carter, “Extension of the Life of the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG),” 26 June 1980, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 74:9. Eads previously explained to Schultze, “No, the ‘watchdog’ is not asleep. There just haven’t been any serious burglary attempts.” George Eads to Charlie Schultze, “Update on Major Upcoming Regulations—or, ‘Where Is RARG?” 20 September 1979, Folder 6.

55. Rick Neustadt to George Eads, Ron Lewis, and Jim Tozzi, “Regulatory Reform Program,” 22 February 1980, and Ron Lewis to George Eads, Si Lazarus, Rick Neustadt, and Jim Tozzi, “Discretionary Pending Regulations,” 25 February 1980, in Eads Files, Box 266: 4/9/80, Wed. 10a.m. Meeting on RARG issues.

56. Si Lazarus to George Eads, Ron Lewis, Jim Tozzi, and Rick Neustadt, “Regulatory Reform,” 25 February 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 4/9/80, Wed. 10 a.m. Meeting on RARG issues; George Eads to Stu Eizenstat, “Actions That Could be Announced Re: Regulatory Reform,” 25 February 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 4/9/80, Wed. 10 a.m. Meeting on RARG issues.

57. For David Stockman’s rhetorical attack on environmental regulations, see, for example, Peter Behr and Merrill Brown, “One-Year Moratorium Recommended on New Regulations,” Washington Post, 9 November 1980, G1; David Stockman and Jack Kemp, “Memo to Reagan: ‘Avoiding an Economic Dunkirk,’” New York Times, 14 December 1980, F19; for OMB’s development of a “target” list of regulations for scrutiny, see Jim J. Tozzi, Deputy Administrator, OIRA, to Deputy Associate Directors, “Further Guidance on Reporting Federal Employment and Cost Savings Due to Reduction in Regulation,” 10 February 1981, National Archives, College Park, OMB OIRA Folder 3.95 #3, 1981–82 Regulatory Management 51-87-41, Box 3.

58. Jimmy Carter: “Regulatory Reform Statement on Receiving a Report from the Regulatory Council,” 28 April 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33338; Jimmy Carter: “Alternative Approaches to Regulation Memorandum from the President,” 13 June 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44568. See also Peter J. Petkas to Regulatory Reform Message/Speech Planners, 9 April 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 4/10/80, Thurs. 4 p.m. Regulatory Council Initiatives (Rick Neustadt); Memorandum to Agency Heads, “The Use of Innovative Techniques in Regulatory Programs,” Draft 4, April 1980, Eads Files, Carter Library, Box 266, 4/10/80, Thurs. 4 p.m. Regulatory Council Initiatives (Rick Neustadt); U.S. Regulatory Council, “An Introduction to Innovative Techniques,” May 1980, Eads Files, Box 266, 4/10/80, Thurs. 4 p.m. Regulatory Council Initiatives (Rick Neustadt).

59. Talking Points for Ribicoff Meeting,” 19 May 1980, McIntyre Collection, Box 18: Talking Points and Briefings [5/5/80–5/28/80]. Anticipating that there would be no regulatory reform bill to sign, Carter formally renewed his executive order on regulatory reform in June. Wayne Granquist to Jim McIntyre, “Meeting of the President with Regulatory Council,” 13 June 1980, McIntyre Collection, Box 18: Talking Points and Briefings [6/2/80–6/30/80]; Charlie Schultze to Jimmy Carter, “Extension of the Life of the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG),” 26 June 1980, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 74:9; Jimmy Carter: “Executive Order 12221: Improving Government Regulations,” 27 June 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44672; In July, Carter also announced modest changes in regulatory schedules and requirements that would save auto companies $600 million over the next four years. Timothy B. Clark, “Making Regulation Pay,” National Journal, 26 July 1980, 1239 in McIntyre Collection, Box 18: Talking Points and Briefings [10/5/80–10/28/80]. For the administration’s fulfillment of its regulatory promises, see Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez to Charlie Schultze, “Regulatory Promises Made to the Auto Industry,” 16 January 1981, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze’s Subject Files, Box 74: Regulatory Activities. Carter’s auto industry regulatory relief was more modest than the industry hoped, in part because of the administration’s forecasting of fuel prices and demand for more efficient vehicles. An OMB review of auto industry regulatory expenditures anticipated for the 1980–85 period examined thirty-six EPA and forty-two NHTSA pending or existing regulations and found that almost 80 percent of the projected expenditures were attributable to fuel economy standards. Wayne Granquist, Kitty Bernick, George Eads/Dave Harrison to Jim McIntyre, Stu Eizenstat, and Charlie Schultze, “OMB Review of Auto Regulations,” 23 May 1980, Eads Files, Box 266: 5/30/80, Fri. 5 p.m. Meeting on Auto Regulations (McIntyre/Granquist). Anticipating continued high gasoline prices, OMB argued that the administration could offer little meaningful regulatory relief to the automobile companies, since most of the fuel economy expenditures would occur “in the absence of federal regulations because of the increasing consumer demand for more fuel efficient automobiles.” Van Ooms to James T. McIntyre, 13 May 1980, McIntyre Collection, Box 18: Talking Points and Briefings [5/5/80–5/28/80].

60. Jimmy Carter: “Regulatory Flexibility Legislation Statement on House of Representatives Approval of the Legislation,” 9 September 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45018; Jimmy Carter: “Regulatory Flexibility Act Remarks on Signing S. 299 Into Law,” 19 September 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45087. For administration views on earlier flexibility proposals, see James T. McIntyre Jr. to James Abourezk, 8 September 1978, in JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130.

61. Presidential Oral History Program, “Interview with James McIntyre: October 28–29, 1981,” Carter Presidency Project, University of Virginia: Miller Center of Public Affairs, 2005, 5, 69–70, 111; Funk, “The Paperwork Reduction Act.” For the OMB staff’s key role pushing the legislation through in the lame duck session, see Peter Behr, “If There’s a New Rule, Jim Tozzi Has Read It,” Washington Post, 10 July 1981, A21; for the crucial importance of OIRA and its predecessor division’s staffing and structure to Reagan’s deregulatory initiatives, see Jim Tozzi, “OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record,” Administrative Law Review 63 (Special Edition 2011): 37–69, 52; for consolidation of COWPS staff into OIRA, see Thomas Hopkins, telephone interview with the author, 5 January 2015; for a skeptical view of how OIRA would operate, see Eads, George, “Harnessing Regulation: The Evolving Role of White House Oversight,” Regulation 5 (May–June 1981): 19–26.Google Scholar

62. In contrast to the U.S. emphasis on assessing the impact of regulatory rules, impact assessment in the European system has primarily involved draft statutes rather than rules, although this distinction is changing. For the French case, see Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Perroud, Thomas, “Impact Assessment in France: U.S. Models and French Legal Traditions,” European Public Law 20, no. 4 (2014): 649–79;Google Scholar for the European Union, see Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Egidy, Stefanie, and Fowkes, James, Due Process of Lawmaking: The United States, South Africa, Germany, and the European Union (Cambridge, 2015), 231–33;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Grad, Frank P., “A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (‘Superfund’) Act of 1980,” Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 8 (1982): 1–36;Google Scholar Jimmy Carter, “Niagara Falls, New York Remarks on Signing the West Valley Demonstration Project Act and the Love Canal Agreement,” 1 October 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45190; Carter, “Health and Medical Care for Love Canal Area Residents Statement on a Request to Congress for Appropriations,” 24 October 1980, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45364; Salzman, James and Thompson, Barton H., Environmental Law and Policy, 3rd ed. (New York, 2010): 220–39Google Scholar; Stanley E. Morris, “Memorandum for Distribution,” 15 May 1979, in George Eads Meetings Files, JC-CEA, Box 256: 5/24/79 Thurs. 1 p.m. Superfund Meeting [1]; “Staff Analysis of Superfund Legislation,” in George Eads Meetings Files, JC-CEA, Box 256: 5/24/79 Thurs. 1 p.m. Superfund Meeting [1]; George Eads to Eliot Cutler, “Superfund,” 1 June 1979, George Eads Meetings Files, JC-CEA, Box 256: 5/24/79 Thurs. 1 p.m. Superfund Meeting [1]; Larry White to Charlie Schultze and George Eads, “Draft Legislation on Oil Spills, Hazardous Substance Spills, and Abandoned Dumps,” 14 May 1979, in George Eads Meetings Files, JC-CEA, Box 256: 5/24/79 Thurs. 1 p.m. Superfund Meeting [1]; Anthony J. Parisi, “Who Pays? Cleaning Up the Love Canals: The Dumps Around Us: Who Will Pay to Clean Up All the Other Love Canals?” New York Times, 8 June 1980, F1; “Superfund Superrush,” Wall Street Journal, 20 November 1980, 26; I. Peterson and L. Garmon, “EPA in the Dumps: Superfund Squabbles,” Science News 123, no. 9 (26 February 1983): 132–34. For a discussion of Superfund’s problematic design and high costs relative to program benefits, see E. Donald Elliott, “Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?” Natural Resources & Environment 6, no. 3 (1 January 1992): 11+; James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, “How Costly Is ‘Clean’? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 18, no. 1 (1 January 1999): 2–27; Revesz, Richard L. and Stewart, Richard B., eds., Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science, and Law (Washington, D.C., 1995)Google Scholar; Barnett, Harold C., Toxic Debts and the Superfund Dilemma (Chapel Hill, 1994)Google Scholar; Acton, Jan Paul, Understanding Superfund: A Progress Report (Santa Monica, 1989)Google Scholar. Reagan’s advisers reportedly acquiesced in passing the Superfund bill during the lame duck session in order to settle the controversial toxics issue before Reagan took office. The administration soon struggled with the legislation’s mechanisms and costs, however, and with its own ambivalence toward implementing the law. Reagan’s OMB director, David Stockman, had criticized the legislation extensively prior to its passage. Rita Lavelle, the assistant administrator of EPA appointed to implement Superfund, had close ties to the chemical industry. In 1984, after an extended public controversy over Superfund, Lavelle was sentenced to six months in prison for lying to Congress about potential favoritism toward a former employer accused of disposing toxic wastes at the Stringfellow Acid Pits in Riverside, California. “On Nod From Reagan, ‘Superfund’ Resurrected,” Hartford Courant, 23 November 1980, A10; Philip Shabecoff, “Rita Lavelle Gets 6-Month Term and Is Fined $10,000 for Perjury,” New York Times, 10 January 1984, A1.

63. For more on Carter’s effort to balance these competing ideas, see his 1979 State of the Union speech, as discussed in J. Brooks Flippen, Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right (Athens, Ga., 2011), 208. For the legal activity spurred by Superfund, see Lawrence Hurley, “Lawyers Still Cleaning Up over Superfund Sites,” New York Times, 3 January 2011; Revesz and Stewart, eds., Analyzing Superfund, 8–10.

64. Memo for Donald Kennedy, Charlie Schultze, and John White, 9 May 1979, JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Briefing Book Files, Box 130: [2].

65. “Talking Points: Reagan Economic Announcement,” 9 September 1980, Collection JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 72. In a similar spirit, on a copy of a September 1980 speech by Reagan, a Carter staffer, most likely Richard Neustadt, wrote “we’ve done this” next to Reagan’s call to “review regulations that affect the economy, and change them to encourage economic growth.” Ronald Reagan, “A Strategy for Growth: The American Economy in the 1980s,” Speech to the International Business Council, Chicago, 9 September 1980, Collection JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 72; Presidential Oral History Program, “Interview with James McIntyre: October 28–29, 1981,” Carter Presidency Project, University of Virginia: Miller Center of Public Affairs, 2005, 5, 69–70, 111; see also Charlie Schultze to Jimmy Carter, “Major Economic Themes for the Debate,” 23 October 1980, Collection JC-CEA, Charles L. Schultze Subject Files, Box 72.

66. Reagan, “A Strategy for Growth; Reagan, “Government & Business in the ‘80s,” Wall Street Journal, 9 January 1981, 18; Reagan: “Inaugural Address,” 20 January 1981, Peters and Woolley, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43130; David Stockman and Jack Kemp, “Memo to Reagan: ‘Avoiding an Economic Dunkirk,’” New York Times, 14 December 1980, F19.

67. Ronald Reagan, Memorandum to Cabinet, 29 January 1981, online at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/ReaganMemo.PDF; Executive Order 12291, 17 February 1981, 46 FR 13193, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., 127. James Miller, who headed the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs during Reagan’s first year in office and then led OMB during Reagan’s second term, recalled in a 2001 interview that he and C. Boyden Gray pushed Executive Order 12291 through very quickly in the administration’s first weeks, taking the regulatory agencies “completely by surprise,” before their political appointees were fully established. The executive order was presented to agency general counsels as a finalized document already signed by the president. Miller Center, “Interview with James Miller: November 4, 2001,” Charlottesville, University of Virginia, 2005, 21.

68. Costle, Oral History Interview.

69. For “next logical steps,” and “completely different,” see William Nordhaus, interview with the author, 7 May 2014, New Haven. For “eviscerate,” see Christopher DeMuth, telephone interview with the author, 19 November 2012. To the OMB staff members actually trying to implement regulatory reform in the Reagan administration, some of whom had simply moved over from COWPS, the heated rhetoric and political polarization was “endlessly infuriating,” DeMuth said. For a related account of how the Reagan administration’s regulatory relief rhetoric “posed problems for the progress of benefit-cost analysis,” see also Thomas Hopkins, telephone interview with the author, 5 January 2015. See also Costle, Oral History Interview. For a similar argument that Reagan’s “antiregulation approach . . . dissipated much of the political momentum for regulatory reform,” see W. Kip Viscusi, “The Misspecified Agenda: The 1980s Reforms of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation,” in American Economic Policy in the 1980s, ed. Martin Feldstein (Chicago, 1994), 453–504, 501; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State (New York, 1993), 9; Percival, “Checks Without Balance,” 174. Carter economic adviser George Eads called Reagan’s abandoned relief effort a “long, expensive detour,” in George C. Eads and Michael Fix, Relief or Reform? Reagan’s Regulatory Dilemma (Washington, D.C, 1984), 6, 11. Reagan economic adviser Murray Weidenbaum largely blamed the “strong language and public stands” of James Watt and Anne Gorsuch for arousing environmental opposition, but conceded that the concept of “regulatory relief” rather than “reform” may “have set the wrong tone.” Murray L. Weidenbaum, “Regulatory Reform Under the Reagan Administration,” in The Reagan Regulatory Strategy: An Assessment, ed. George C. Eads and Michael Fix (Washington, D.C, 1984), 17–18. Efforts to pass regulatory reform legislation, for example, which would have explicitly extended regulatory analysis requirements to independent agencies, met strident opposition and failed to proceed. For recent continuing efforts to extend regulatory analysis requirements to independent regulatory agencies, see S. 1173, “Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013,” 113th Congress, and Administrative Conference of the United States, “Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory Agencies, Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013–2,” adopted 13 June 2013, online at https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/benefit-cost-analysis-independent-regulatory-agencies. For the assertion that independent agencies should already be subject to regulatory review requirements, see Strauss, Peter L. and Sunstein, Cass R., “The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking,” Administrative Law Review 38, no. 2 (1 April 1986): 181–207.Google Scholar