Is intergenerational risk sharing desirable and feasible in funded pension schemes? Using a multi-period OLG model, we study risk sharing between generations for a variety of realistic collective funded pension schemes, where pension benefits and contributions may depend on the funding ratio and the asset returns. We find that well-structured intergenerational risk sharing via collective schemes can be welfare-enhancing vis-à-vis the optimal individual benchmark. Moreover, from an ex ante perspective the expected welfare gain of the current entry cohort is not at the cost of the older and future cohorts.

In this paper, we address the issue of determining the optimal contribution rate of a defined benefit pension fund. The affiliate's mortality is modelled by a jump process and the benefits paid at retirement are function of the evolution of future salaries. Assets of the fund are invested in cash, stocks, and a rolling bond. Interest rates are driven by a Vasicek model. The objective is to minimize both the quadratic spread between the contribution rate and the normal cost, and the quadratic spread between the terminal wealth and the mathematical reserve required to cover benefits. The optimization is done under a budget constraint that guarantees the actuarial equilibrium between the current asset and future contributions and benefits. The method of resolution is based on the Cox–Huang approach and on dynamic programming.

Labour supply responses among older people are estimated on 1996 cross-section register data covering all Norwegians aged 55–68, with an inter-temporal structural model of retirement decisions. Simulations illustrate the impact of introducing flexible pension take-up with actuarial adjustment. With the option of perfect consumption smoothing via the credit market, the reform which comes into effect in Norway from 2011 will reduce the share of retired persons in the age bracket 60–67 (in the base year 15–16%) by around 3 percentage points. With no consumption smoothing, the reduction will be 0.75 percentage points.

We estimate the portfolio effect of changes in social security wealth exploiting a decade of Italian pension reforms. The Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth records detailed portfolio data and elicits expectations of retirement outcomes, thus allowing us to measure expected social security wealth and assess to what extent Italian households perceive the innovations brought about by the reforms. We find that households have responded to cuts in pension benefits mostly by increasing real estate wealth, and that this response is stronger among households able more accurately to estimate future social security benefits. We also compute that for the average household consumable wealth increases by 40 percent of the reduction in social security wealth.

All states provide pension plans to their teachers and civil servants; however, these plans vary across the states. We present a history of the development of teacher retirement plans during the twentieth century, describe how teacher plans relate to retirement plans for other state employees, and assess the impact of teachers not being included in Social Security on the benefits they receive from their employer pension plan. Over the past 25 years, public school teacher retirement plans in the United States have increased in generosity as benefit formulas have been increased, salary averaging periods have been reduced, and the normal retirement age has been lowered. We employ data from retirement plans in the states to estimate the impact of social and economic factors on the replacement rates for teachers retiring with 30 years of service.

There is a potential conflict of interest between a pension fund sponsor and future pensioners when they share unequally in the pension fund performance. Thus, when a scheme offers a yearly guaranteed minimum return to pensioners, as is presently the case with German Pensionskassen, the sponsors cannot afford to invest in risky assets and consequently, pensioners end up with safe but very low expected returns. We examine optimal investment strategies for sponsors under alternative performance sharing rules and seek the rules that are most beneficial to pensioners. We find that the current yearly performance sharing rule imposed on Pensionskassen could be tilted in favor of sponsors without impairing the welfare of pensioners. We also find that the welfare of pensioners would be greatly enhanced if the guaranteed minimum return were applied to the cumulative return since inception of the scheme rather than to yearly returns. The ensuing credit risk taken by pensioners on sponsors could be kept to a minimum by proper regulation; this would induce sponsors to adopt safe constant proportionality portfolio insurance (CPPI) style investment strategies.