This paper shows that shifting the portfolio allocation of a government-run pension fund towards more equity investment, ceteris paribus, tends to reduce the aggregate capital stock as well as the average consumption level of all individuals except the poor retirees who consume more on average but at the cost of increased uncertainty. If a larger capital stock is desired, reducing the supply of publicly supplied goods is the most effective tool. That change also increases the average private consumption of all the young and the wealthy retirees although it does reduce the average consumption and uncertainty of the old non-savers.

In order to help in designing an accurate pension reform, we determine the resource allocation in an endogenous fertility model that generates an endogenous demographic transition by means of distinguishing between female and male labor. We analyze the problem of the optimal solution and characterize the decentralization of the first best. We show that a pension policy linking pension benefits to the number of children acts as a corrective tax system able to restore both the optimal capital stock and the optimal rate of population growth as a single instrument. We also show that neither a Beveridgean pension scheme nor a Bismarckian one can decentralize the first best.

Policymakers seeking to design efficient and smoothly functioning pension systems for their aging workforces are beginning to acknowledge the key importance of administrative expenses when formulating rules for pension plan structure and fee disclosure requirements. This study explores the links between retirement plan offerings and pension expenses for a wide range of private and public sector pension plan types, using an invaluable new data set on two thousand Australian pension funds. Our analysis indicates how pension plan design can strongly influence plan expenses and consequently eventual retirement security.

The bear market that began in 2000 focused attention on two issues – pensions and profits. The initial pension problem was the big decline in value of individual 401(k) accounts. The profit issue was misconduct and stock options. In fact, there is another compelling issue involving both pensions and profits – the impact of the bear market on defined benefit pension plans.

Plan sponsors have a projected benefit liability, which until recently was covered by the rise in asset values during the extended bull market. When stock values fell by 50 percent, sponsors for the first time in decades had to contribute to their pensions. But even without the decline in the stock market, sponsors of defined benefit plans were going to face increased pension contributions in the coming decade. The reason is a host of regulatory and legislative changes in the late 1980s that slowed or limited pension contributions.

Our analysis suggests that in the absence of the stock market boom and the regulatory and legislative changes that reduced funding, the average firm's contribution to its pension plan would have been 50 percent higher during the 1982–2001 period; corporate profits would have been roughly 5 percent lower.

The deferred contributions are coming due. The decline in the stock market and an ageing population imply that contributions would double from their current level. As the economy emerges from recession and the bear market draws to a close, firms and investors must be prepared to contend with a strong headwind from pension funding obligations that could slow the recover.