We present a quantitative analysis of the impact of differential ageing and pension reforms on capital and labor market and, in particular, on intra-European capital flows. To this end, we develop a stylized general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents for the three largest European countries: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The model presents a structure halfway between pure general equilibrium models with rigorous microeconomic foundations and accounting models where the macroeconomic environment remains exogenous. We show that the dynamics of capital accumulation and pension system sustainability are totally different depending on the assumption concerning economic openness. Finally, in the long run, resorting to debt financing seems to be a dead end to finance retirement systems.

With significant under funding of public defined benefit pension plans, public debate often focuses on funding problems, neglecting benefit-side factors that contribute to under funding. In this study we examine the benefit side by calculating the value of deferred compensation, using a unique dataset of salary histories for recent university retirees covered by the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association plan. We find sizable levels of deferred compensation that is associated with retirement age and period, job class, service years, and to some extent gender, with administrators receiving the highest levels. We also find wage–earning profiles to underestimate salary growth for higher-paid employees.

Administrative and investment costs per participant appear to vary widely across pension funds. These costs are important because they reduce the rate of return on the investments of pension funds and consequently raise the cost of retirement security. This article examines the impact of determinants of these costs, such as the size, governance, pension plan design and outsourcing decisions, using data on all Dutch pension funds across the 1992–2004 period, including more than 10,000 observations. We find that economies of scale dominate the strong dispersion in both administrative and investment costs across pension funds. Industry-wide pension funds are significantly more efficient than company funds and other funds. The operating costs of pension funds' defined contribution plans are lower than those of defined benefit plans. Higher shares of pensioners make funds more costly, whereas the reverse is true when relatively many participants are inactive.

The solvency crisis in 2001–2004 urged Dutch pension funds to reconsider their final-pay plans with de facto unconditional indexation. Most pension funds switched to an average-wage plan with solvency-contingent indexation. This pension plan redesign was the outcome of a new compromise between the major stakeholders of Dutch pension funds. The redesign is of interest as it results in a hybrid combination of DB and DC. This new setting indeed greatly improves solvency risk management. Moreover, the new plan structure appears to be welfare-dominant compared to other collective plan settings and individual alternatives, as it improves the conditions for intergenerational risk sharing. However, drawbacks of the new plans are the lack of transparency and potential welfare loss for individuals because of the inherent contingent claim structure of the new plan. Moreover, the plan redesign has led to value redistribution from older to younger plan participants.

This study quantifies the possible consequences to stakeholders of reforms to the excise tax on reversions of excess pension assets. Under the US Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, funding in defined benefit (DB) plans is likely to improve significantly. Many plans may become overfunded over time, owing to the shortfall amortizations mandated by the PPA, as well as to precautionary contributions by sponsors and to plan investment returns. This analysis shows that a more moderate excise tax rate together with a reasonable funding threshold for asset reversions would not only enable sponsors to spend the excess funds on other corporate needs, thereby lowering the cost of sponsorship of DB plans, but also would open a considerable revenue source for the government, with only a small increase in bankruptcy cost for the PBGC. Plan participants could also gain in an alternative reform, which would require a partial transfer of excess assets to them along with a still-lower reversion tax rate. These findings also hold for plan sponsors with various degrees of risk tolerance or only making the PPA-required minimum contributions.