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Recovering authentic global position system L1 signals under spoofing using dual receiver direct positioning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2021

Chao Sun Open the ORCID record for Chao Sun [Opens in a new window] ,
Joon Wayn Cheong ,
Andrew G. Dempster ,
Hongbo Zhao Open the ORCID record for Hongbo Zhao [Opens in a new window]  and
Wenquan Feng
Chao Sun
Affiliation:
School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China
Joon Wayn Cheong
Affiliation:
The Australian Centre for Space Engineering Research (ACSER), School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Andrew G. Dempster
Affiliation:
The Australian Centre for Space Engineering Research (ACSER), School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Hongbo Zhao*
Affiliation:
School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China
Wenquan Feng
Affiliation:
School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, China
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Spoofing is a kind of deliberate interference that aims to manipulate global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers into counterfeit position solutions. Conventional anti-spoofing methods are implemented prior to the calculation of the position solution, depending on the specific spoofing attack mechanisms. The paper presents a spoofing detection and mitigation method implemented in the position domain. The proposed method projects the correlograms of the visible satellites to a position-clock bias domain to construct the position domain projected correlogram. P(Y) code signatures retrieved from a reference station receiver are used to identify the counterfeit position solution and remove it from the victim receiver. Compared with the conventional single-channel spoofing detection technique, the proposed anti-spoofing method is more robust against thermal noise by combining the energy from multiple satellites. Detailed mathematical derivation of the statistical characteristics of this method is presented. Its effectiveness is validated using a realistic dataset generated by a Spirent GNSS simulator and NordNav wideband front-end. Results show that the proposed algorithm is capable of not only detecting a spoofing attack but also removing the spoofing effect from the victim receiver.

Keywords

global position systems (GPS) vulnerabilityanti-spoofingdual receiverdirect positioning
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Navigation , Volume 74 , Issue 4 , July 2021 , pp. 782 - 800
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Navigation 2021

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