Despite stipulations in the Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that all ‘other armed groups’ be demobilised by January 2006, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) continued to maintain a significant armed presence in South Sudan. This paper analyses the dynamics of the organisation, the impact of its ongoing presence on the security situation and reconstruction efforts, and attempts by the government of South Sudan to counteract the SSDF from January to August 2006. It argues that the strategies implemented by the government to counter the SSDF were fairly successful in that there was no major return to conflict. However, it concludes that the SSDF's continued presence, while hindered, has the potential to spark a return to civil war.

The choice of indigenous versus European languages in education should be a hotly contested issue. Surprisingly, in much of Africa it is not. African states have dramatically increased their use of local languages in education over the last decade. This increase, however, has not proceeded from vocal demands on government by various language groups. Instead, it is the result of two more subtle factors: the changed attitude of a former coloniser and the work of language NGOs on the ground. These two forces have altered governments' perceptions about the utility of African languages in their education strategies. Because this political process works through persuasion, rather than bargaining, it allows choices about language in education to be less contentious than popularly assumed, separating this process from the violent ethnolinguistic conflict that is so often associated with Africa.

The article analyses the relationship between the Anglican Church of Rwanda and evangelical Episcopalians in the United States. In 2000, the archbishop of Rwanda, Emmanuel Kolini, in a move that gained great support for Rwanda's post-genocide recovery, ordained several bishops to preside over congregations of orthodox, evangelical Americans who had severed their relationship with the Episcopalian Church of the United States over issues such as the blessing of same-sex marriages and the ordination of openly gay clergy. The result was the creation of the Anglican Mission in the Americas, a missionary province in the United States that acknowledges Kolini as its archbishop. Such actions have made Rwanda the current cause célèbre not only of AMIA but the wider evangelical community. While the relationship offers great support for Rwanda's recovery, the Anglican Church has presented to American evangelicals a misleading narrative of Rwanda's past and present political situation.

This article examines the ways in which illicit gem mining in Madagascar indicates the highly variable impacts of globalisation in sub-Saharan Africa. It argues that distinct categories such as global/local, legal/illegal and traditional/modern have lost much of their explanatory power. Far from being distinct categories, they are indivisible and constitute a single, complex whole which produces enormous wealth, coupled with high degrees of poverty and marginalisation in precisely the same locations. It is clear that Africa's participation in globalisation has not been just about ‘joining’ the world economy; instead it has been characterised by highly selective forms of global connection which have been combined with highly visible and very real forms of disconnection.

This paper discusses land issues in a specific Ivorian context: that of a former no man's land located in lower Côte d'Ivoire. In this region, one does not find the autochthon-migrant dichotomy that generally structures the land issue in southern Côte d'Ivoire. This situation therefore offers an opportunity to document the conditions of access to land and inter-ethnic relationships in a situation characterised by the lack of autochthonous stakeholders. In this context, land rights and land transfers have been moulded by the interplay between migration flows, the dynamics of the smallholder plantation economy, and the rise of land markets. The picture that results is a patchwork, in terms of ethnic land control, where land rights are quite secure. The crucial land issue arises from the active land lease market, with a large acreage of land rented out to Burkinabè pineapple producers – again, without major conflicts. This situation is contrasted with the neighbouring Abouré country, where a conflict over tenancy practices arose in 2001.

Home historically to a politically engaged youth sector, Nigeria has, over the past two decades, witnessed a growing incidence of religious extremism involving educated youth, especially within university campuses. For all its important ramifications, and despite the continued infusion of social and political activity in the country by religious impulse, this phenomenon has yet to receive a systematic or coherent treatment in the relevant literature. This paper aims to locate youthful angst displayed by Nigerian university students within the context of postcolonial anomie and the attendant immiseration of civil society. Youth religious extremism on Nigerian campuses reflects both young people's frustration with national processes, and their perceived alienation from modernity's ‘cosmopolitan conversation’.

This article addresses the question of why Ethiopia's post-1991 decentralisation reform is not taking the desired direction of matching diverse needs with available resources and creating accountable, responsive and autonomous regional governments. Given regional governments' relatively diverse socio-economic positions, the intention of the reform to create autonomous regions with devolved administrative, fiscal and political power is appropriate. Nonetheless, the implementation of the elements of the reform – expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, intergovernmental fiscal transfer and sub-national borrowing – is flawed. Existing studies that question the effectiveness of Ethiopia's devolution focus on political or fiscal aspects, and fail to link the de facto centre-region political power relationship with intergovernmental fiscal relations. This article, based on detailed field research in three regional governments, argues that the flawed intergovernmental fiscal relations reform is best explained by the clientelistic relationship between central and regional political parties.

The arrest and prosecution in March 2006 of the former Liberian warlord-President Charles Taylor by the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, for war crimes including the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and the arrest and prosecution of the Congolese warlord, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, by the International Criminal Court, accused of enlisting child soldiers in the DRC war, have raised expectations that finally international conventions and customary international laws protecting children in conflict zones will now have enforcement powers. But why has it taken so long to protect children in conflict situations despite the volume of international treaties and conventions? What do we know about the phenomenon of child soldiering, and why are children still routinely recruited and used in Africa's bloody wars? This article argues that against the background of unfolding events relating to prosecution for enlistment of child soldiers, the international community is beginning to wake up to the challenge of enforcing its numerous ‘paper protection’ instruments for the protection of children. However, a range of challenges still pose serious threats to the implementation and enforcement of the international conventions protecting children. Extensive research fieldwork in Liberia and Sierra Leone over three years reveals that the application of the restrictive and Western-centric definition and construction of a ‘child’ and ‘childhood’ raises inherent difficulties in the African context. In addition, most war-torn and post-conflict African societies are faced with the challenge of incorporating international customary laws into their domestic laws. The failure of the international community to enforce its standards on child soldiers also has to do with the politics of ratification of international treaties, in particular the fear by African governments of setting dangerous precedents, since they are also culpable of recruitment and use of child soldiers.

As evidence of the failure of policy-based aid mounted in the early 1990s, a ‘new aid agenda’ developed. The agenda emphasised among other things, the importance of dialogue and partnership in order to help build ownership of more complex second-generation reforms. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has developed as the key instrument for implementing this partnership in much of sub-Saharan Africa. However, this is not the only objective of the PRSP. Tanzania, at the forefront of attempts to restructure government–donor relations and one of the first countries to prepare a PRSP, illustrates the tensions created by the PRSP's complex genealogy and how these are being worked out in practice.

This article traces the rise and decline of a grassroots community organisation in rural Senegal. It has three aims. First, it problematises the sometimes idealistic nature of the rhetoric and literature on community-based development. Second, it suggests three factors that contribute to the effectiveness of rural self-help organisations: educated and technocratically skilled leadership, unintentionally benevolent state neglect, and a willingness to syncretically recycle elements of ‘traditional' social order and culture in the service of contemporary development tasks. Finally, the demise of the community-based organisation examined here suggests a need to shift focus away from the institutionalisation of community-based or civil society organisations per se, and to consider instead the routinisation of the participatory, empowering, and deliberative socio-political conditions that make possible the regular emergence of new grassroots organisations across time within a given community. Recent events (since 2005) in the village in question support this shift, as a new generation of community leaders has begun to craft a new community organisation, explicitly built from the detritus of the older organisation described in this article.

Religious modes of thinking about the world are widespread in Africa, and have a pervasive influence on politics in the broadest sense. We have published elsewhere a theoretical model as to how the relationship between politics and religion may be understood, with potential benefits for observers not just of Africa, but also of other parts of the world where new combinations of religion and politics are emerging. Application of this theoretical model requires researchers to rethink some familiar categories of social science.

Economic crisis and structural adjustment in Ghana have put large numbers of formal sector employees and civil servants out of work. This informalisation process has gendered consequences. Unemployed people, rural–urban migrants and school-leavers of both genders seek employment in the urban informal economy, and increasingly take up ‘female’ occupations – particularly in retail trade. Overcrowding in women's economic domains thus occurs. This study examines the livelihood strategies of informally employed men and women in Accra. It is argued that gender ideologies regarding appropriate occupations for women and men are continuously adapted in response to a changing political economy. Thus, even if female traders face competition, declining returns and a heavier dependency burden, frustration with government policies failing to create decent jobs (for men) is more prevalent than gender antagonism and ridicule of those who find gender-atypical ways of eking out a living.

Analyses of the rise of violent vigilantism in Africa have focused increasingly on the ‘uncivil' character of African society. This article challenges the recourse to cultural or instrumentalist explanations, in which vigilantism is portrayed as a reversion to violent indigenous institutions of law and order based on secret societies and occultist practices, or is viewed as a product of the contemporary institutional environment of clientelism and corruption in which youth struggle for their share of patronage resources. The social and political complexities of contemporary African vigilantism are revealed through an account of the rise and derailment of the infamous Bakassi Boys vigilante group of south-eastern Nigeria. Based on extensive fieldwork among the shoe producers of Aba who originally formed the Bakassi Boys in 1998, this article traces the process through which popular security arrangements were developed and subsequently hijacked by opportunistic political officials engaged in power struggles between the state and federal governments. Detailing the strategies and struggles involved in the process of political hijack, this inside account of the Bakassi Boys reveals the underlying resilience of civil notions of justice and public accountability in contemporary Africa.

The literature on democratisation in diverse and divided societies suggests that procedural and institutional innovations can help create the conditions for democracy by adjudicating among groups with competing claims for recognition and inclusion. Some of the most critical assumptions about the relationship between ethnic identity and formal political institutions have been tested in Ethiopia since the early 1990s. Ethnic federalism is a unique and controversial attempt to account for the contested nature of ethnic identities in contemporary Ethiopian politics through a variety of mechanisms, including the use of a referendum to determine ethnic identity. In 2001 the Siltie people voted to separate from the Gurage ethnic group. With this political manoeuvre, the Siltie accessed greater levels of political power and greater resources, but also recognition under the constitutional arrangement as a distinct ethnic group. The Siltie case suggests that formal political institutions have a limited, though important, role in resolving contested citizenship claims. At the same time, it raises vital questions about the challenges of procedural solutions in the context of contested citizenship and democratic transition in sub-Saharan Africa.

Africa's police are usually assessed in terms of their adherence to democratic criteria. This results in inaccurate analysis because the police are actually governed according to presidential preference. This article uses the role of Africa's chief police officers to explore the relationship between presidents and their police, and the location of influence within the police. It identifies the significant variables shaping police governance in four countries with comparable institutional structures – Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe – and confirms the negligible role played by public accountability.

Observation of the 2005 Ethiopian elections in two rural communities in south-east Amhara State reveals a picture very different from that presented in national-level analyses derived largely from urban areas. Deeply entrenched attitudes to power and government in the study area make the idea of peaceful electoral competition inconceivable. Peasants are first and foremost concerned to vote for the winning side, since to do otherwise carries intense risks to their welfare and even survival. The freedom with which the main opposition party was able to campaign until a few weeks before the election convinced many peasants that the government had abdicated, and that they should vote for the opposition as the likely winners. Belated mobilisation of the ruling party and state apparatus challenged this perception and created great uncertainty. This peasantry's political, economic and cultural alienation, allied to authoritarian rule and a lack of voter information placed genuinely ‘free and fair’ elections out of reach.

Recent social, economic and political changes in the Western Saharan refugee camps in southwest Algeria have import not only for the project of Western Saharan nationalism, but also for the ongoing peace process. These are examined through a background to the Western Sahara conflict, and an appraisal of the camps' internal processes of elite politics, self-management and recent post-war socio-economic change.

Since the acceptance of multi-party democracy as the most viable alternative to autocracy and military rule in Africa, democratic rule has become the vogue. Nigeria's attempt at democracy was (and is) accompanied by patronage politics, whereby certain personalities exact great influence on the political process. This study spotlights Chief Lamidi Adedibu and his patronage style in Nigerian politics, and shows that Adedibu gained political ‘patronic’ prominence during Nigeria's Third Republic in the 1990s, through the provision of the survival needs of the poor majority who are, mostly, used as thugs for protection against challenges from opponents and for political leverage. Since then, he has remained a ‘valuable tool’ of ‘any government in power’ and politicians ready to provide the necessary goods for onward transmission to clients.

Narrative is an important means of structuring and giving meaning to experience. While the resulting framework is incomplete because human beings choose only particular aspects to remember, narratives often persist and influence behaviour, often to poor effect. Considering this, the example of the Luo of Kenya is a cautionary one, particularly given African neopatrimonial understandings of state and society. Luo lore establishes the group as once elite and now in abject poverty, victim of a powerful and jealous Kikuyu enemy. This article explores the nature of this elite status, and the means by which group members have responded to particular indicators at the expense of others. This re-examination invites questioning of Luos' conclusion that they were, as respondents say, ‘put out in the cold' from a position of prominence, a stance that has helped shape Kenya into ethnic rather than policy interests.

This paper investigates a paradoxical case of business success in one of the world's worst-governed states, Angola. Founded in 1976 as the essential tool of the Angolan end of the oil business, Sonangol, the national oil company, was from the very start protected from the dominant (both predatory and centrally planned) logic of Angola's political economy. Throughout its first years, the pragmatic senior management of Sonangol accumulated technical and managerial experience, often in partnership with Western oil and consulting firms. By the time the ruling party dropped Marxism in the early 1990s, Sonangol was the key domestic actor in the economy, an island of competence thriving in tandem with the implosion of most other Angolan state institutions. However, the growing sophistication of Sonangol (now employing thousands of people, active in four continents, and controlling a vast parallel budget of offshore accounts and myriad assets) has not led to the benign developmental outcomes one would expect from the successful ‘capacity building’ of the last thirty years. Instead, Sonangol has primarily been at the service of the presidency and its rentier ambitions. Amongst other themes, the paper seeks to highlight the extent to which a nominal ‘failed state’ can be successful amidst widespread human destitution, provided that basic tools for elite empowerment (in this case, Sonangol and the means of coercion) exist to ensure the viability of incumbents.