The pursuit of an African Renaissance has become an important aspect of regional cooperation between South Africa and its neighbours. Transfrontier conservation areas, or ‘Peace Parks’ as they are popularly called, have been identified as key instruments to promote the African Renaissance dream, and are increasingly advocated and justified on this basis. By fostering joint conservation (and tourism) development in Southern Africa's marginalised border regions, Peace Parks are claimed to further international peace, regional cooperation and poverty reduction, and thus serve basic ideals of the African Renaissance. This article critically explores this assumption. Using the joint South African-Mozambican-Zimbabwean Great Limpopo Park as a case study, it argues that in reality the creation of Peace Parks hardly stimulates and possibly even undermines the realisation of the African Renaissance ideals of regional cooperation, emancipation, cultural reaffirmation, sustainable economic development and democratisation. So far, their achievement has been severely hindered by domination of national interests, insufficient community consultation, and sensitive border issues such as the illegal flows of goods and migrants between South Africa and neighbouring countries. Furthermore, exacerbation of inter-state differences induced by power imbalances in the region, and harmonisation of land use and legal systems across boundaries, are increasingly becoming sources of conflict and controversy. Some of these problems are so severe, we conclude, that they might eventually even undermine support for African Renaissance as a whole. Utmost care is thus required to optimally use the chances that Peace Parks do offer in furthering an African Renaissance.

In the 1990s, Senegal and South Africa undertook decentralisation reforms that caused a considerable stir in academic and policy communities. But how much decentralisation actually occurred, and how autonomous are subnational governments in two of Africa's leading democracies? This article assesses the mix of decentralising reforms in these two countries. Subnational officials are now elected and receive revenue transfers, but remain limited by other measures, including low tax-raising capacity, tight central control over spending, limited access to capital markets, and even insecure legal rights in their own jurisdictions. While the decline of governing parties provides incentives for decentralisation in some areas, central states successfully resist attempts to devolve fiscal decisionmaking authority to subnational levels.

The stated economic policy of the African National Congress (ANC) underwent a dramatic shift in the 1990s, away from a soft-left redistributionist position to one much more closely aligned with the policy preferences of the South African business community. To what extent can this shift be attributed to lobbying efforts by that community? The article reviews the development of economic policy by the ANC in the 1990s, and concludes that while business was undoubtedly influential in this process, much of that influence was indirect and derived from two sets of sources: first, the international policy consensus around the neo-liberal reform agenda; and second, indirect signals from ‘the market’ by means of such mechanisms as movements in the value of the currency, and investor and business confidence.

Civil society has been an active mobilisational and agitational force in the resource conflicts of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria. The paper examines the gender segment of civil society and its character, forms and roles in these conflicts. The central argument is that marginality can be a basis of gendered movements and their engagement in struggles for justice, accommodation and fair access to benefits. Utilising secondary data and primary data elicited from oral interviews, the study identifies and categorises women groupings and identifies their roles and engagements in the oil economy. It finds that community women organisations (CWOs), with the support of numerous grass-roots women organisations, are the most active and frequently engaged in the local oil economies, where they have constructed and appropriated traditional women protests as an instrument of engagement. The paper notes the implications of women protest engagements and particularly their exasperation with previous engagements, the depth of their commitments, and the extension of the struggle beyond the threshold of normal social behaviour.

Guerrilla organisations vary greatly in their relations with civilians living in territories that they control. The NRA presents a rare, though not unique, case of a guerrilla group whose commitment to popular support deepened into democratic village management during the course of its civil war. The significant causal factors in deepening this commitment were its ideological conviction, relative military strength, dependence on civilian material assistance, and need for accommodation with civilian preferences in its operational area. It withdrew this commitment when it was under severe military pressure. Military survival was central to NRA calculations, but insufficient to determine its relations to civilians. In those phases of the war when the NRA soldiers were relatively secure, these other factors determined the type of civilian participation it supported. It organised clandestine civilian committees for assistance when it was dependent on civilians. During those periods when it held territory, it held elections for committees which managed their villages without NRA supervision.

This article traces the evolution of the Nigérien–Nigerian boundary over the past 20 years. It focuses in particular on a single border crossing that separates two neighbouring Hausa villages of equivalent demographic size, administrative status, and economic importance. During the past two decades, border control, monitoring and surveillance have gradually intensified, resulting in the establishment of immigration and customs offices on the Nigerian side of the boundary and a douane (customs) post on the Nigérien side. However, local inhabitants do not view these changes in terms of ethnic partition or division. Rather, they see border control infrastructure positively, in terms both of development and national identity. For the border line Hausa, identity is not zero-sum: feeling more and more Nigérien/Nigerian does not result in diminution of their ‘Hausa-ness’. Post-9/11 international pressures to intensify border controls and monitoring in regions where Muslim extremists are thought to shelter highlight contradictions between indigenous and international conceptions of the African frontier.