Since the restoration of traditional leaders in Uganda in 1993, the Kingdom of Buganda has developed unusually effective institutions, financing mechanisms and policy tools, re-building itself as a quasi-state. The reinforcement of Buganda's empirical statehood provides one of the farthest-reaching examples of the current trend of traditional resurgence in African politics and to some extent supports claims for the participation of traditional structures in contemporary political systems. Yet, the Buganda experiment also highlights the limits of traditional resurgence as a mode of reconfiguration of politics in Africa. First, it is unclear how the kingdom can maintain the momentum of its revival and the allegiance of its subjects in view of its fiscal pressure on the latter and the limited material benefits it provides to them. Already the monarchists are finding it difficult to translate the king's symbolic appeal into actual mobilisation for development, shedding doubts on one of the main justifications for the kingdom's rebirth. Second, Buganda's claims to political participation clash with the competing notion of sovereignty of the post-colonial state. These limits are likely to confront other similar experiments across the continent.

In Africa, the management of border disputes varies from sub-region to sub-region. Most puzzling is the difference between West Africa and the Horn of Africa. In the latter, border disputes are much more likely to escalate into war than in the former. Seeking to solve this puzzle, this study focuses on the territorial integrity norm. It departs from existing accounts of this norm in two ways: first, it does not choose the region but the sub-region as the level of analysis. Second, it does not isolate the territorial integrity norm from its social context but analyses the interplay of the norm with the social structure in which it is embedded. It concludes that the territorial integrity norm in West Africa is part of a social structure different from that in the Horn of Africa. It is this difference that explains the different patterns of conflict management in the two sub-regions.

In this era of neo-liberal capitalist economics in Africa, has organised private capital in the form of business associations (BAs) become more active in public life or developed influence in public policy formation or implementation? This analysis examines the impact of five key factors to explain varying activity levels and influence of BAs in Ghana and Nigeria since independence: levels of capitalist development and hence size of the capitalist class; strength and autonomy of the capitalist class; strength of capitalist ideology; democratic vs. authoritarian rule; and impact of external hegemonic powers and ideologies. The paper finds that Nigeria's BAs are more highly developed, have had higher activity levels, and had more influence, however limited, than Ghana's. Externally generated economic liberalisation has stimulated higher levels of BA activity, but not necessarily the political space for BA autonomy. Political democratisation appears to increase political space, BA access to the state, and policy influence.

The example of Zimbabwe in 2000 shows that in a context of violent election campaigning, the role of international election observation is an ambiguous one. Unlike earlier elections organised by the Zimbabwean government, international donors wanted to observe its 2000 parliamentary election amidst a deepening crisis. They noted that the elections would not be free and fair in their view. Neighbouring countries with a more positive view joined the observation exercise. The government's discriminatory invitation and accreditation policy, the observers' emphasis on the peacefulness of the polling rather than free and fair elections, and the selective publication of their reports in various media, were affected both by the political agendas of the domestic players and by the governments which sent the observers. The difference between the Western view of the government, which had changed drastically since the 1980s and early 1990s, and the view of neighbouring governments, was crucial and may become significant elsewhere in Africa.

By 1980, Ethiopia was gripped in escalating civil wars. After a series of punitive expeditions had failed to suppress them, the government organised large-scale operations in the early 1980s against the insurgencies in the eastern and northern territories. The operations seemed to have been informed by what is called ‘total strategy’. Although the emphasis was on the coercive component, the state also used psychological and economic incentives. The results were mixed. The eastern rebels were defeated more easily because they were factious. The northern campaign failed because of the rebels' staunchness and the terrain's unsuitability. In a cold test of wills, the Eritrean fighters not only held the offensive to a stalemate, but also went on to win total military victory. Same strategy, different outcomes: this suggests that no single counter-insurgency strategy can always have the same results as it is influenced by numerous factors that may vary from one place to another.