During the 1990s, African governments sought to translate their commitment to privatise state enterprises into action. In doing so, they faced questions concerning the form in which these enterprises would be sold, to whom and on what terms. This paper examines the privatisation of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) between 1992 and 2000. It argues that the capacity of the Zambian government to determine the answers to these questions was constrained by a number of factors, of which the most important were the strategies pursued by potential purchasers, the demands of donors and the financial weakness of ZCCM itself.

African countries are among those receiving the most foreign aid per capita. Many detractors blame that aid for encouraging dictatorship and undermining democracy. This article takes a contrary view. It analyses the relationship between the amount of development assistance given to sub-Saharan countries in the 1990s, and changes in their political systems. There is empirical evidence that arbitrary, unrepresentative government diminished in Africa. The data also suggest a positive, though small, correlation between development assistance and democratisation in the 1990s. The issue now facing many African countries is how to consolidate and extend these reforms on their own, with less external support.

Civil society has been associated with challenges and popular struggles for state and democratic reforms. Though these may relate to the articulation of substantive ethnic, regional and communal demands, few studies have addressed the dynamics and ramifications of their engagement in struggles other than democratisation. This study focuses on the ramifications of the entrance of civil society into a regional resource agitation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The study finds that civil society has flowered, taken over and escalated the struggle and constructed itself into a solid formation of regional resistance. Civil groups have reconstructed the agitation into a broad, participatory, highly mobilised and coordinated struggle and redirected it into a struggle for self-determination, equity and civil and environmental rights. The study denotes the roles that civil society can play in the sociopolitical process and reveals the dynamics of their encounters with the state and multinational corporations.

Given that incomes in South Africa are distributed very unequally, it might be expected that the establishment of representative democracy would result in the adoption of redistributive policies. Yet overall inequality has not declined since 1994. The electoral and party system provides uneven pressure for redistribution. The fact that poor South Africans have the vote ensures that some areas of public policy do help the poor. The post-apartheid government not only inherited a surprisingly redistributive set of social policies (welfare, education and health care), but has made changes that entail even more redistribution. But these policies do little to help a core section of the poor in South Africa: the unemployed, and especially households in which no one is working. Other public policies serve to disadvantage this marginalised constituency: labour market and other economic policies serve to steer the economy down a growth path that shuts out many of the unskilled and unemployed. The workings of these policies remain opaque, making it unlikely that poor citizens will use their vote to effect necessary policy reforms.

The decentralisation programme in Mali received a boost when municipal elections were finally held in 1998–99. This programme, initiated in 1992, is notable for its scope and the degree of autonomy extended to rural and urban communes. Given Mali's history of failed attempts at decentralisation, the current administration's commitment to the programme suggests that political motives are driving the reform. The decentralisation effort began as an attempt to placate separatist Tuareg groups in the north of Mali, and was subsequently extended to include the rest of the country. I argue that the extent of the programme, as well as the relative zeal with which it has been carried out, are products of a political strategy of cooptation on the part of President Alpha Oumar Konaré. This political analysis of decentralisation serves as a supplement to policy analyses of decentralisation in general.

Following a negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to deal with crimes of the past regime. Despite the detail of submissions and the length of the Final Report, this article highlights the partiality of truth recognised by the Commission. The usefulness of acknowledged truth to deal with South Africa's past is shown to have been neutralised by wider concerns of social and criminal justice. In detailing the governmental reticence to provide reparations, the judicial disregard to pursue prosecutions, and the dismissal of responsibility for apartheid at a wider social level, the author argues that opportunities for reconciliation and developmental change are limited. Against the problems of crime, violence and unresolved land issues, the potential of the TRC to build a ‘reconciliatory bridge’ is called into question. The truth offered by the Commission increasingly appears of limited value.