Dominic Ongwen is an indicted war criminal and former child soldier in one of the world's most brutal rebel organisations, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Ongwen is at once victim and perpetrator: what justice strategy is relevant? I introduce the concept of complex political perpetrators to describe youth who occupy extremely marginal spaces in settings of chronic crisis, and who use violence as an expression of political agency. Ongwen represents a troupe of young rebels who were ‘bred’ in the shadows of illiberal war economies. Excluded from the polity, or rather never having been socialised within it, such complex political perpetrators must be recognised in the debate on transitional justice after mass atrocity, lest cycles of exclusion and violence as politics by another means continue.

In 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf defeated George Weah to become President of Liberia and the first woman elected to head an African country. Women voters were widely credited with her victory. This paper quantifies this claim by analysing newspaper content during the election period to gauge civil society group activity. It finds that consistency in their activities may have allowed women's groups to surpass other civil society groups in impacting the election. Activity levels of women's groups remained stable between the election and run-off periods, unlike other major group types whose activity level dropped by between 37% and 70%. It concludes that the environment surrounding the 2005 election was conducive to participation by women because of their existing, latent power in many spheres; their long experience as peacebuilders; the decimation of conventional social and political structures; Liberian women's experience in leadership positions; the failure of multiple male-dominated efforts; and the presence of a well-qualified female candidate.

This paper examines inter-ethnic conflict over grazing land previously accessed as common property. It presents results of a study undertaken in Mieso district of eastern Ethiopia where two ethnic groups maintain different production systems – pastoral and agropastoral. The historical change in land use by one of the ethnic groups, resource scarcity, violation of customary norms, power asymmetry and livestock raids are among the factors that have contributed to the recurrence of conflict. Particularly important is the role of raids in triggering conflict and restricting access to grazing areas. Socio-economic and political factors are responsible for power asymmetry and the increasing scale of raids. An increase in the frequency of violence and a decline in the capacity of customary authority in conflict management advance the role of the state in establishing enforceable property rights institutions. This will succeed only if policies and interventions are redirected at suppressing incentives for violence, establishing new institutional structures in consultation with clan elders of both parties, and building internal capacity to monitor conflict-triggering events.

During 1999–2007, a labour-led but broad-based socio-economic rights movement, which focused on a pro-poor (and therefore highly popular) anti-fuel price hike message, persuaded and/or pressured Nigeria's federal legislature, the National Assembly, to: mediate between it and the Executive Branch of Government; take it seriously enough to lobby it repeatedly; re-orient its legislative processes; explicitly oppose virtually all of the Executive Branch's fuel price hikes; and reject key anti-labour provisions in a government bill. Yet the movement did not always succeed in its efforts to influence the National Assembly. This article maps, discusses, contextualises and analyses these generally remarkable developments. It also argues that while many factors combined to facilitate or militate against the movement's impact on legislative reasoning, process and action during the relevant period, this movement's ‘mass social movement’ character was the pivotal factor that afforded it the necessary leverage to exert considerable, if limited, influence on the National Assembly.

In order to give an account of the Congolese tragedy since independence, the inhabitants of Haut-Katanga often resort to four different narratives: the abandonment by Belgium; the biblical curse on Africans; the conspiracy of Western capitalism; or the alienation of life powers by Whites. Though these four stories offer different scenarios, they are all constructed with two types of actors – Whites and Congolese people. This article suggests that this racial/national frame finds its origins in colonial and national ideologies, which have left their mark on Haut-Katanga, and that it continues today to structure the narratives through which people remember their post-colonial history. Collective memory and racial/national identity are reciprocally constituted in these stories, but in different terms. They offer, accordingly, different ways of influencing the present.

Recent studies on vigilante groups show how they often begin as popular schemes for imposing order, before degenerating into violent militias which contribute in turn to social and political disorder. The Masai, a group of khat sellers and consumers in the Ugandan border town of Bwera, represent a more complex case. By using vigilance tactics in the provision of security, the Masai actually help to shape public authority within Bwera town instead of creating institutional chaos. They also provide a range of services, imposing a degree of order on illegal cross-border activities in the area. However, a closer look at the Masai shows that their vigilance activities are mainly performed out of self-interest, as a quid pro quo enabling them to continue their illegal activities of smuggling, general criminality outside town and illegal drug use. Therefore they straddle the ‘crime or social order’ dynamic, representing a criminal gang of illegal drug traffickers which also provides services for public community interests. As such, they contribute to both order and crime.