Since the decolonisation process in the continent began after World War II, West Africa stands out as the only zone of ‘negative’ peace. This terminology merely implies that the formal absence of international wars has been precariously maintained on an unstable basis by threats, deterrence, and/or a lack of will or capability to enter into interstate hostilities. Leaving aside the liberation struggle waged by Guinea-Bissau against Portugal 1965–74, and with the exception of a very brief armed conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso, there have been no wars among the 16 member-states of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), which is quite remarkable given the region's multi-ethnic and multinational character, and the persistence of numerous territorial disputes. This starkly contrasts with widespread internal violence, military coups, and virulent civil wars, notably in Nigeria 1967–70, Liberia 1990–6, and Sierra Leone 1993–6. As the title of this article implies, the convoluted reality of West Africa can be characterised by relative international peace, in contrast to domestic conflicts.

Democratisation has been the subject of much scholarly discussion during the past few years, notably the so-called ‘third wave’ that is taking place in Africa and the former Soviet bloc. Of particular interest is the concept of the abertura, or opening of the political system, that many have come to believe is the prerequisite for a fully fledged transition to democracy. After years of military rule, this is what appears to have occurred in Ethiopia, and hence the aims of this article are (i) to trace the origins and platforms of the various political parties that have had a relatively open forum for opposition since 1991, (ii) to evaluate their effectiveness both in providing a viable alternative to the régime in power and in aggregating the interests of the different societal and ethnic groups, and (iii) to examine the future of democracy in their country.

The people of Madagascar found themselves increasingly immersed in a veritable socio-economic and political quagmire from 1975 until 1993, with their highly unpopular President, Admiral Didier Ratsiraka, was removed from office. Many of those who had played such an important rôle in easing him into power in 1975 by being activists in Zatovo Western Andevo Madagasikara (Zwam), a coalition of angry students, intellectuals, peasants, as well as disaffected middle and upper class elements, were again on hand in 1993, but this time to jeer and curse him after the results of the presidential elections had been announced to a largely enthusiastic public. However, the apparently fickle temperament of Malagasy voters had been demonstrated before and, ironically, some members of the same disparate groups had cheered just as enthusiastically when President Philibert Tsiranana, the leader of the pro-French Parti social démocratique (PSD), had been forced to step down in 1972 in the face of their urban-led revolutionary movement centred in the capital, Tananarive (later renamed Antananarivo), only months after winning the presidential elections with over 99 per cent of the votes.

‘The State Stops at PK 12’ – i.e. 12 kilometres from the capital, Bangui.

The situation described by this statement, often heard in the Central African Republic, seems to conform to the objectives of the currently fashionable policies of decentralisation and structural adjustment – for example, to end ‘too much state’. However, the absence of the state in the rural areas of the CAR is so striking that the position in certain respects has almost reached the level of caricature. It also reflects the more general situation in other parts of the continent where the excesses of a centralised, over-staffed post-colonial régime can coexist perfectly with the pronounced absence in the rural areas of certain functions which are commonly supposed to be provided by the state, including basic administration and justice, as well as social, educational, and health services.

It would seem that one of Africa's few growth industries in recent years has been the stampede of scholarship attempting to account for the failure of the state to generate meaningful economic development. While academics argue over whether the primary culprits are kleptocratic governing élites, Western imperialist forces, or unfair market conditions in the global economy, the realities of African political life show an increasing reactionary trend away from the political integration of the state. Some criticise the integrity of state structures as being Western inventions that have little capacity to respond to African needs, and note the rise of pre-colonial traditional structures organised around ethnic or tribal considerations. Some argue that capitalism in the African context is not able to generate capital accumulation sufficient to improve living standards. Still others suggest that anti-democratic patriarchal forces prevent capitalism from effectively generating maximum growth.

‘Governance’ and ‘exclusion’ are two buzz words of the 1990s.This short article describes some paradigms – i.e. ideal forms – of social exclusion and of governance of the economy, and presents a framework for analysing the types of policy actually found in the real world. It has two purposes. The first is to stress that governance takes a variety of forms, each one of which has its strengths and weaknesses in meeting the objectives of the economy and society. The second is to conduct a cursory exploration into the types of exclusion associated with different kinds of governance, and to comment on the implications for economic policy when the forms do not correspond to the wishes of society. What follows is not designed to promote a particular strategy, but to provide a structure within which any policy can be better understood, and therefore more effectively promoted or opposed, depending on the reader's own objectives.

The ownership, management, and supervision of South Africa's automobile industry has since its inception been overwhelmingly white. It was also highly oppressive in that the foremen, armed with powers of hiring, promotion, and dismissal, ruled the shopfloor with grim determination. Black workers, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, increasingly confronted these labour relations practices with collective industrial action that sometimes made enterprises ‘ungovernable’. Over the last few years, however, structures and agreements have risen that serve to eliminate confrontations and place profitability at the centre of everyone's concerns. This consensual approach to labour relations is informed by corporatism, and involves the participation of unions, employers, as well as other collective bodies, in state institutions.