Described here is a new data set including all successful coups d'état (80), failed coup attempts (108) and reported coup plots (139) for all 48 independent sub-Saharan African (SSA) states for the 46-year period from January 1956 until December 2001. Elite political instability (PI) in this form remains widespread in SSA, in contrast to other regions of the global South. Military-led PI has been shown to adversely affect economic growth and human development in SSA, and is a major cause of the current African ‘crisis’. The frequency of these instability events is given for each state for all 46 years and for the two periods 1956–79 and 1980–2001. A Total Military Intervention Score (TMIS) for each state is calculated and examined over time to explore trends in coup behaviour. The distribution of these events among major African regions is presented. Appendix A lists all coups and failed coups by state and date. Major findings are that military interventions have continued to be pervasive in Africa, despite democratisation trends since 1990; that coups, failed coups and coup plots form a syndrome of military-led PI; that colonial heritage is unrelated to coup activity; that the chance of success when launching a coup attempt has averaged more than 40% since 1958; that once a successful coup has occurred, military factionalism often leads to more coup behaviour; that except for a declining rate of success once a coup is undertaken, there is no major difference between 1956–79 and 1980–2001; that no trends of increasing or decreasing coup behaviour are evident, except that up to around 1975 as decolonisation progressed, TMIS also increased; and that West Africa is the predominant centre of coup activity in SSA, although all African regions have experienced coups. States that have been free of significant PI since 1990 are examined and those with institutionalised democratic traditions appear less prone to coups.

Like its counterparts elsewhere, the small business sector of the Nigerian economy is extremely volatile. A corollary of this volatility is the dearth of long-established firms. One issue that can help to account for the scarcity of long-established firms and also contribute to our understanding of the sector's volatility is succession, the ease with which ownership changes from one hand to another. This paper explores the issue of succession in privately incorporated small firms in south-eastern Nigeria. The finding that nearly half of the closures are attributable to the succession problem has implications for research on the small business sector, and on the development expectations of the sector.

The parliamentary elections of May 2002 in Burkina Faso saw the ruling party loose its exclusionary grip on power. For the first time since the restoration of democracy in 1991, the parliamentary opposition now represents a sizeable group. While it retains the majority, the ruling party has to share legislative power with the opposition. These elections marginally alter the structure of power in a deeply presidential system of government. Several institutional and electoral reforms have played a critical role in strengthening the mechanisms of ‘vertical accountability’ and representative democracy. By assessing recent electoral reforms in Burkina Faso, the article underlines the importance of the electoral system in multiparty elections and thus contributes to our understanding of the effects of changes in electoral rules on the distribution of political outcomes. In particular, it underscores the contribution that institutional engineering and electoral reform can make to further democratisation in a semi-authoritarian context. While many challenges to democratic governance and the rule of law remain, the new political landscape holds the promise of changes in the style of government and the emergence of more consensual modes of governance.

This paper examines the impressive victory by President Paul Biya and his ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) in the 2002 Cameroon legislative election, especially in the light of the near collapse of the regime and the party in 1992, when it almost lost its parliamentary majority. It argues that several factors contributed to this turn of events including the president's skilful use of his power of incumbency to forestall the democratic process, the ineffectiveness of the opposition parties, and the lack of sustained support for genuine democratic change in Cameroon by France and other Western industrialised nations.

The second Kenya debate has prompted a close examination of the role of an ethnic business community – Indians/Asians – in the country's industrial development. While this community does own up to three-quarters of the country's medium and large-scale manufacturing firms, a narrow focus on manufacturing understates the contribution which Africans have made to the economy. A progressive rural business class is more likely to re-invest in profitable farming activities and to branch out into agro-processing, transport and trading than to undertake risky investments in urban manufacturing. As a result, historical ethnic-sectoral cleavages will tend to be reinforced. The article provides new calculations on the extent of African involvement in manufacturing, and reviews an ancillary literature which uses institutional and socio-economic analysis to understand differences in Kenya's business communities.

Last year, Thandika Mkandawire (2002) published an article in the Journal of Modern African Studies proposing ‘an explanation of the violence against the peasantry’ in Africa, referring to people in rural areas who have suffered so much in recent wars across the continent. The article starts by categorising suggestions made by some other authors as to why combatants have used ‘extremely brutal and spiteful forms of violence’ in such a disturbing number of cases. In the opening section of his paper, Mkandawire takes exception to suggestions I have made concerning the antecedents of the 1990s civil war in Liberia, describing my views as ‘essentialist’ and ‘poorly veiled racist’, and alleging that I believe ‘there is something fundamentally wrong with African culture’ (2002: 183).

Stephen Ellis's response can be divided into two parts. One concerns my interpretation of the violence of rebel movements in Africa; the other relates to my misunderstanding of his position. With respect to the former, Ellis raises four objections. I will start with these.