^{Page 505 note 1} As Table 1 suggests, south Africa's G.D.P. is some 3.5 times larger than S.A.D.C.C.'s approximate total.

^{Page 505 note 2} Following South Africa's blockade of all road and rail traffic into Lesotho beginning on 1 January 1986, the Government of Chief Leabua Jonathan was overthrown on 20 January by a military council led by General Justin Lekhanya, who had met senior South African security officials in Pretoria three days previously, and the blockade was lifted soon after his seizure of power. The Economist (London), 25 January 1986.

^{Page 506 note 1} Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1986 (London, 1986),Google Scholar with additional information from Africa South of the Sahara, 1987 (London, 1986), and Reginald Herbold Green et al. ‘Children of the Front Line’, Lusaka, 1987, a report prepared for Unicef.Google Scholar

^{Page 506 note 2} Political power, and specifically the making of policy, is highly centralised, because the constitution vests executive power in the President, who is ‘not obliged to follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority’ — as quoted by Tordoff, William and Molteno, Robert, ‘Government and Administration’, in , Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia (Manchester, 1974), p. 244.Google Scholar In addition, as noted by Chikulo, B. C., in ‘Electoral Politics in Zambia's Second Republic: an empirical analysis, 1973–1983’, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zambia, July 1986, p. 82, ‘the President appoints both Party and Government officials from the Secretary-General of the Party, the Prime Minister, Members of the Central Committee, Cabinet Ministers right down to Regional Party functionaries’. The constitution of U.N.I.P. explicitly prohibits the discussion of policy defined, by parliamentary candidates during elections, and the Government has been ready to ban public debate of policy issues on other occasions by e.g. the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions. However, despite the institutional supremacy of the Presidency, it does not follow that Kaunda, the sole holder of the office since 1964, chooses to ignore or is not obliged to consider the interests of the social forces of the political economy, as well as the leading powers, multinationals, and international organisations active in the region.Google Scholar

^{Page 507 note 1} Eriksen, Karen, ‘Zambia: class formation and detente’, in Review of African Political Economy (London), 9, 05-08 1978, p. 7;Google Scholar and Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 7 08 1982.Google Scholar

^{Page 507 note 2} Catholic Institute for International Relations, South Africa in the 1980s (London, 1986), p. 29.Google Scholar

^{Page 507 note 3} Thus the surely correct suggestion to be found in Cohen, Robin, Endgame in South Africa? (London and Paris 1986), p. IX, that the Soweto riots of 1976 probably constituted a ‘break event … which and despite many reversals and setbacks over a prolonged period, direct political representation and participation by the black majority in the central organs of the South African state became inevitable’.Google Scholar

^{Page 507 note 4} Times of Zambia (Ndola), 20 01 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 507 note 5} Zambia Daily Mail, 3 December 1986.

^{Page 508 note 1} Sunday Times of Zambia (Ndola), 15 06, and Times of Zambia, 16 June 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 508 note 2} For example, report of interview between the President and the Reverend Gunter Kaiser, in Times of Zambia, 6 June 1986. Kaunda had, of course, held direct meetings with South African leaders themselves.

^{Page 508 note 3} Speaking in telephone interviews with the British Broadcasting Corporation, Kaunda stated that Zambia would leave the Commonwealth if Britain remained opposed to the imposition of sanctions, and he warned that Margaret Thatcher ‘had better change her mind and see sense’. Times of Zambia, 11 June 1986.

^{Page 508 note 4} It was notable that Zimbabwe, the other African country represented on the seven-member group, did not join Zambia in threatening withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

^{Page 508 note 5} Interview with the Sunday Times of London and the Columbia Broadcasting Service of New York, as reported in Times of Zambia, 2 August 1986.

^{Page 508 note 6} Kaunda's specific commitment was to force Britain to impose sanctions, and not simply to win support from countries such as India, Canada, and Australia, which had only a minor rôle in the region. However, the essential artificiality in Kaunda's unequivocal and repeated threat was revealed when he concurrently stated that ‘the Commonwealth is a wonderful organisation, and everything must be done to keep it going’. The Economist, 19 July 1986.

^{Page 509 note 1} Times of Zambia, 24 May 1986.

^{Page 509 note 2} Ibid. 6 June 1986.

^{Page 509 note 3} Ibid. 24 May, and Zambia Daily Mail, 23 June 1986. Indeed, Washington appears to hold the Zambian Government in comparatively high regard. As reported in Zambia Daily Mail, 20 November 1982, the Vice-President, Bush, George, described Kaunda as a man of vision who was expected to assist in the settlement of the Namibian and other regional problems. By way of contrast, when a Zimbabwean minister criticised United Stated policy towards South Africa in July 1986, Washington took economic reprisals immediately.Google Scholar

^{Page 509 note 4} Ibid. 1 July 1986. No evidence was offered that the British Government contemplated any such action.

^{Page 510 note 1} This in a system where what the President or his deputies do not say is often not discussed or presented in the media, and where books and magazines are extremely scarce.

^{Page 510 note 2} Outstanding examples were the correspondence which took place in 1968, subsequently published by the Zambian Government as Dear Mr Vorster…Details of Exchanges Between President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa (Lusaka, 1971), and the meeting between the two leaders in 1975.Google Scholar

^{Page 510 note 3} Zambia Daily Mail, 23 August 1982.

^{Page 510 note 4} Times of Zambia, 10 October 1983.

^{Page 510 note 5} Zambia Daily Mail, 23 August 1982. Kaunda was not quoted as having stipulated that South Africa's membership could only be considered after majority rule, nor did he say that he had referred to this precondition when he sought to avert racial conflict.

^{Page 510 note 6} Zambia Daily Mail, 31 October, and Times of Zambia, 28 November 1986.

^{Page 511 note 1} As accurately stated in an editorial in the Herald (Harare), 9 01 1987: ‘The men who run the [apartheid system]… are no fools. They know exactly what they are doing. We are being caught unawares dangerously too often.’Google Scholar

^{Page 511 note 2} The release of Mugabe, Robert and Nkomo, Joshua was a supposed outcome of Kaunda's meeting with Vorster in 1975, which he described as a major contribution to Zimbabwe's independence struggle;Google ScholarAfrica Now (London), 06 1982, p. 37. Similarly after his meeting with Botha in 1982, three A.N.C. members who were due to be executed were pardoned; Zambia Daily Mail, 7 August 1982.Google Scholar

^{Page 511 note 3} Catholic Institute, op. cit. p. 29. A basically uncritical approach to Kaunda and ‘the nationalist politicians’ around him is to be found in the chapter on Zambia in Hanlon, Joseph, Beggar Your Neighbours: apartheid power in Southern Africa (London, 1986).Google Scholar

^{Page 511 note 4} The attack was directed against a transit camp for A.N.C. refugees located some 10 km south of Lusaka, but its exact nature is unclear. According to Times of Zambia, 22 May 1986, Kaunda told a news conference that bombs dropped by South African aircraft were preceded by gunfire from persons using two vehicles painted in the colours of the Zambian police – hence the subsequent reference to a commando raid. It appears to have occasioned no response from the Zambian military, and its intensity and destructiveness were far less than the simultaneous attack on an A.N.C. building in the heart of Harare.

^{Page 512 note 1} Times of Zambia, 21 May 1986.

^{Page 512 note 2} The Government intended in 1975 to build as many as 106 rural reconstrucion centres (each of which would have an intake of between 200 and 800 settlers), and some K12 million was allocated for the initial establishment of 50. By the end of 1976, however, the number of settlers totalled 7,120, with an average of 143 per centre, and by 1986 there were only 1,400 settlers in all 50, of which 11 showed signs of viability. Report of the Committee on Agriculture, Lands and Cooperatives for the Third Session of the Fifth National Assembly (Lusaka, 1986), pp. 13–20.Google ScholarKaunda nevertheless maintained his commitment to the Z.N.S., albeit for the rather indefinite future. He said in September 1986 that the Government would ‘soon start’ recruiting thousands of jobless youths to undergo military training before deployment to rural reconstruction centres, and that the exercise would start before the end of the year; Zambia Daily Mail, 11 September 1986. Two months later, the Z.N.S.was directed to prepare for a massive recruitment drive; Times of Zambia, 13 November 1986. And in December the President told a political education seminar for the armed forces that ‘mere rhetoric will definitely not lead us anywhere’, and that the Z.N.S.would ‘soon start’ a country-wide recruitment programme; Zambia Daily Mail, 10 December 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 512 note 3} Sunday Times of Zambia, 15 June 1986.

^{Page 512 note 4} Times of Zambia, 22 May 1986. Kaunda was talking to foreign correspondents in Lusaka, and was not reported as exempting some or many white farmers from his condemnation.

^{Page 512 note 5} Ibid. 30 June 1986.

^{Page 513 note 1} Zambia Daily Mail, 12 July 1986.

^{Page 513 note 2} Ibid. 7 July 1986.

^{Page 513 note 3} Ibid. 20 June 1986.

^{Page 513 note 4} Ibid. 19 September 1986.

^{Page 513 note 5} Ibid. 15 August 1986. When partly as a result of such measures, the number of international tourists visiting the country seriously fell, the Government reversed its position in order to blame malicious rumours in the foreign media that Zambians were hostile to visitors. Statement to Parliament by the Minister for Tourism, reported in ibid. 23 March 1987.

^{Page 514 note 1} Ibid. 5 July 1986.

^{Page 514 note 2} Zimbabwean civil aviation officials were reportedly ‘puzzled’ by the incident because Air Zimbabwe had a block clearance to overfly Zambia and other countries on its scheduled flights to Europe. The aircraft captain had made the mandatory check over Lusaka for normal clearance when denied permission to continue. International Herald Tribune (Paris), 14 10 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 514 note 3} Times of Zambia, 28 November 1986.

^{Page 514 note 4} The technique had, of course, been used before. In the 1978 presidential and parliamentary elections, according to Chikulo, op. cit. p. 47: ‘All the blame for Zambia's difficulties was put on external actors and their internal “counter-revolutionary” collaborators. In this way, the Rhodesian UDI crisis was a blessing in disguise to the Zambian Government.’ But it also seems clear that the threat from Pretoria in recent years has been greatly exaggerated, both by Kaunda and some sympathetic observers. Thus, Hanlon, op. cit. p. 244, sees ‘a consistent thread’ in Pretoria's dealings with Lusaka: ‘when Zambia is in difficulties, South Africa exploits those troubles’. It could better be said that South Africa usually does not exploit Zambia's many and frequent difficulties, and that it is not obviously in Pretoria's interests to want to do so.

^{Page 514 note 5} ‘Food Riots Out’, declared the President on the front page of the Times of Zambia, 3 November 1986. He typically explained that price rises were the result of conditions imposed on Zambia by International Monetary Fund.

^{Page 514 note 6} The closure did not affect the airports, or persons entering Zambia by land. Zambia Daily Mail, 10 December 1986.

^{Page 515 note 1} The Prime Minister of Zambia told Parliament that rioting and looting began on 6 December in Kitwe, but there had been clashes the previous day between demonstrators and the police in that town, and in Chicago on 3 December. The borders remained semi-closed until 11 December, and the curfew continued until the 15th. Ibid. 11–12 and 16 December 1986.

^{Page 515 note 2} The official total of deaths was announced as early as 11 December 1986, and never subsequently revised. However, at least one killing was reported that same day, when a man was shot as a curfew breaker in the doorway of his house in Ndola; Zambia Daily Mail, 12 December 1986, and 13 December 1986. It was later claimed in Parliament by Mumbuna, Mufaya that the number killed in rioting on the Copperbelt was in the region of 80; Times of Zambia, 22 January 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 515 note 3} Zambia Daily Mail, 11 December 1986.

^{Page 515 note 4} Ibid. 29 December 1986.

^{Page 515 note 5} Times of Zambia, 2 February 1987.

^{Page 515 note 6} Ibid. 1 January 1987.

^{Page 515 note 7} Lest this view proved unpersuasive, the president also reminded parliamentarians that it was U.N.I.P. ‘which fostered their membership of this House’. Zambia Daily Mail, 17 January 1987.

^{Page 516 note 1} The somewhat bizarr nature of this case was not lessened when two of this inept trio–a Briton, Australian, and New Zealander — of ‘self-confessed spies’ were despatched to Harare rather than imprisoned in Lusaka. Times of Zambia, 5 and 7 January 1987.

^{Page 516 note 2} Ibid. 1 January 1987.

^{Page 516 note 3} Ibid. 7 January 1987.

^{Page 516 note 4} Ibid. 15 January 1987.

^{Page 516 note 5} Ibid. 22 January 1987. It was during this debate that Mumbuna asked why the Government had said that only 15 people were killed in the riots.

^{Page 517 note 1} The other seven measures referred to in the text were a ban on (1) new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa, (2) the promotion of tourism, (3) all new bank loans, and (4) the import of uranium, coal, iron, and steel; the termination of (5) all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa, and (6) double-taxation agreements; and the withdrawal of (7) all consular facilities in South Africa, apart from a few exceptions. The Thatcher Government in Britain only agreed to put a voluntary ban on new investments and the promotion of tourism in South Africa, but said that it would accept any European Community decision to ban the import of coal, iron, steel, and gold coins from South Africa.

^{Page 517 note 2} Zambia Daily Mail, 6 August 1986.

^{Page 517 note 3} Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1986.

^{Page 517 note 4} The Works and Supply Minister, who was also chairman of the Government's contingency planning committee, declined to make any comment. Times of Zambia, 7 August 1986.

^{Page 518 note 1} Ibid. 11 August 1986. The instructions for the mass production of food would have borne fruit only in the distant future, if at all. When the President earlier said that the Government was examining measures to cushion the effects of sanctions on the Zambian economy, he had also refrained from substantiation. Ibid. 10 July 1986.

^{Page 518 note 2} Tazara, , Ten Years of Tazara Operations: review and perspective (Lusaka, 1986), pp. 13 and 16.Google Scholar

^{Page 519 note 1} Ibid. pp. 14–20.

^{Page 519 note 2} Times of Zambia, 22 and 26 March, and 4 July 1985. According to Tazara, op. cit. staff are recruited on an equal basis from the two countries, thereby reflecting the representation on its Council of Ministers and Board of Directors. The General Manager at the headquarters is a Zambian and the Deputy General Manager is a Tanzanian.

^{Page 519 note 3} For example, nearly 2,000 tonnes of fertiliser and more than 30,000 new grain bags were stolen en route from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka in 1986. Zambia Daily Mail, 21 January 1987.

^{Page 519 note 4} The General Manager, Mapara, Standwell, gave an assurance in August 1986 that Tazara was ready to carry the bulk of Zambia's exports and imports in the event of a South African economic blockade. But he said that ‘What is of crucial importance is to ensure that we have sufficient motive power and wagons’, and he noted that Tazara's capacity was under-utilised. Interview with Times of Zambia, 12 August 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 519 note 5} More than 300 workers in Zambia were thereby deprived of their jobs and July salaries. The Minister of Labour and Social Services, Hapunda, Frederick, refused to comment ‘because the Government has not yet received a report on the matter’. Zambia Daily Mail, 12 and 13 August 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 520 note 1} The two Governments each owned 35 per cent of the shares. Zamtan originally held a monopoly on the movements of Zambia's foreign trade to the north, and other hauliers acted as sub-contractors. Chitendwe, Moses, ‘The Rise and Fall of Zamtan’, in National Mirror (Lusaka), 9 02 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 520 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 520 note 3} Ibid.

^{Page 520 note 4} Times of Zambia, 27 November 1986. The official rate at the Government's foreign-exchange auction that week was K14.68=U.S. $1.00.

^{Page 521 note 1} Ibid. 15 August 1986.

^{Page 521 note 2} Kaunda as Chairman had called the meeting of the Frontline states which preceded that of S.A.D.C.C., and afterwards declared that ‘the situation in Southern Africa has reached boiling point. We are close to an explosion’. Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1986.

^{Page 521 note 3} Prime Minister Mugabe became Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1986, and sanctions became the key issue of the meeting then being held in Harare. It eventually agreed to establish a solidarity fund, which would provide financial aid to Frontline states affected by sanctions, and to create a ministerial committee to persuade the major industrialised countries to take more initiatives against Pretoria. The Economist, 13 September 1986.

^{Page 522 note 1} Zambia Daily Mail, 9 October 1986.

^{Page 522 note 2} The line runs for a substantial distance through Zaire before entering western Angola where U.N.I.T.A. is active.

^{Page 522 note 3} Kaunda was then returning from a one-day meeting with the Zairean President and the Angolan Foreign Minister. Times of Zambia, 24 November 1986.

^{Page 522 note 4} The Economist, 18 October 1986.

^{Page 522 note 5} Zambia Daily Mail, 2 February 1987.

^{Page 522 note 6} Times of Zambia, 20 February 1987. Swaziland's and Lesotho's position on the issue was perhaps closer to Malawi's than to Botswana's. In addition, Tanzania had few or no links to cut with South Africa, while Angola and Mozambique were consumed by war and counterinsurgency.

^{Page 523 note 1} Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August 1986.

^{Page 523 note 2} Edelman, Mark, Assistant A.I.D. Administrator for Africa, was discussing ‘United States Assistance to Southern Africa’ on the telephone with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance. Times of Zambia, 3 December 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 523 note 3} Patten was interviewed in Harare: the ‘deliberate government policies’ were those of the independent states and not South Africa. Ibid. 2 February 1987.

^{Page 523 note 4} Ibid. 28 November 1986.

^{Page 523 note 5} Kaunda said once more in March that he had been working on a programme to co-ordinate sanctions with other unspecified Frontline states. Ibid. 2 March 1986.

^{Page 523 note 6} Statement by the Zambian Foreign Minister, Luke Mwananshiku, at a meeting in London. Ibid. 9 March 1987.

^{Page 523 note 7} Ibid. 20 March 1987. While the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations both energetically opposed sanctions in various international forums, the United States Congress imposed a range of embargos on South Africa in October 1986.

^{Page 524 note 1} The Minister did not specify the period concerned, but at the auction on 2 August 1986 more than $22 million was made available to bidders, compared with previous weeks when only $9 million was at stake. See Zambia Daily Mail, 30 October 1986, which also reported that all subsidiaries of the National Import and Export Corporation had been directed to stop importing from South Africa. However, this instruction had little visible effects in Lusaka's parastatal and privately-owned shops.

^{Page 524 note 2} Times of Zambia, 5 January 1987. South African Transport Services is the parent corporation for the railways, harbours, airlines, and some road haulage.

^{Page 524 note 3} National television interview, reported in Zambia Daily Mail, 16 February 1987.

^{Page 524 note 4} Hanlon, op. cit. pp. 249 and 340.

^{Page 524 note 5} Ibid. p. 340.

^{Page 525 note 1} Oppenheimer replied appropriately that he was touched by these words and was happy that Kaunda was concerned about peaceful change in Africa. Times of Zambia, 2 March 1985.

^{Page 525 note 2} Hanlon, op. cit. p. 54.

^{Page 525 note 3} Kaunda appeared to ignore the substance of these remarks, since he told the delegation that Zambia appreciated the line that a number of businessmen had taken on sanctions and reiterated his warning of an imminent explosion. Zambia Daily Mail, 12 August 1986.

^{Page 525 note 4} Hanlon, op. cit. pp. 40 and 53.

^{Page 526 note 1} Martin, David and Johnson, Phyllis, The Chitepo Assassination (Harare, 1985), pp. 17–18, quote Kaunda as saying ‘I didn't want to bother Samora about it. I just mentioned it to Tiny Rowland’. This occurred before the overthrowal of fascism in Portugal, and Mozambique's independence in 1975.Google Scholar

^{Page 526 note 2} Eriksen, loc.cit. p. 10, and Cliffe, Lionel, ‘Zambia in the Context of Southern Africa’, in ‘The Evolving Structure of Zambian Society. Proceedings of a Seminar, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, May 1980’, pp. 256–7.Google Scholar

^{Page 526 note 3} Martin, David and Johnson, Phyllis, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Chimurenga war (London and Harare, 1981), pp. 129–30.Google Scholar

^{Page 526 note 4} Chitepo stated in an interview in The Guardian (London), in 12 1974:Google Scholar‘There will be no talks…involving our movement until Mr Smith recognizes the right to immediate majority rule…Until we hear that man…speak those words, our war goes on…until we have liberated every acre of our country…We are not going to be bound by whatever is decided in Lusaka, great as is our respect for the leaders who are gathering there’. Quoted in The Chitepo Assassination, pp. 22–3. According to Martin and Johnson, Kaunda ‘was furious at Chitepo's remarks’.Google Scholar

^{Page 526 note 5} Evidence is presented in The Chitepo Assassination, that the killer was ‘Chuck’ Hind, assisted by Sutherland, Robert, both Rhodesian agents. However, Masipula Sithole,Google Scholar in his review of this exposé in The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXIII, 3, 09 1985, pp. 547–50, is not convinced: ‘It could have been Hind (and Sutherland) for all we know, but not from the evidence in the book [which is]…fascinating reading, and convincing as fiction’.Google Scholar

^{Page 527 note 1} Most of Z.A.N.U.'s leaders who were not already in Rhodesian prisons, as well as some 1,000 trained guerrillas, were detained in Zambia, while many others were abandoned inside north-eastern Rhodesia. The Chitepo Assassination, p. 60.

^{Page 527 note 2} Ibid. p. 58 and pt. 3.

^{Page 527 note 3} Quoted in The Struggle for Zimbabwe, p. 210.

^{Page 527 note 4} The Chitepo Assassination, p. 27.

^{Page 527 note 5} As reported by de Villiers, Marquand, a director of Lonrho in South Africa, who had engaged in corporate diplomacy in contacts between Kaunda and Vorster during 1973–5. The Struggle for Zimbabwe, pp. 284–5.Google Scholar

^{Page 527 note 6} Ibid. p. 285.

^{Page 527 note 7} Nyerere objected to Kaunda's proposed settlement, to the timing of Smith's visit, and to the rôle of London. Ibid. pp. 285–6.

^{Page 528 note 1} Marcum, John A., The Angolan Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), Vol. 2, pp. 261 and 276.Google Scholar

^{Page 528 note 2} ‘Briefings’, Review of African Political Economy, 5, 01-04 1976;Google ScholarHanlon, Joseph, Apartheid's Second Front (Harmondsworth, 1986), p. 16; and Marcum, op.cit. pp. 277 and 281.Google Scholar

^{Page 528 note 3} As the then chief of the C.I.A.'s Angola task-force noted: ‘Most of what [the CIA] knew about the FNLA came from Roberto, the chief recipient of our largesse’, and ‘we knew even less about Savimbi and UNITA’. Stockwell, John, In Search of Enemies (London, 1979), p. 95.Google Scholar

^{Page 528 note 4} Ibid. pp. 90 and 94.

^{Page 529 note 1} The American initiative had originated with Kissinger and his strategy of worldwide confrontation with the Soviet Union. Ibid. pp. 38 and 200.

^{Page 529 note 2} Report by Ashford, Nicholas, The Times (London), 12 02 1976, and ‘Briefings’, loc.cit. pp. 85–6.Google Scholar

^{Page 529 note 3} Kaunda had met Vorster at the Victoria Falls in August 1975, and Rowland may have facilitated Savimbi's meeting also since, as Stockwell says, ‘a London/Rhodesian investment company’ had provided the UNITA leader with an executive jet-aircraft. Stockwell, op. cit. pp. 146 and 192, and The Times, 12 February 1976.

^{Page 529 note 4} Stockwell, op.cit. p. 193.

^{Page 529 note 5} Stockwell adds, ibid. pp. 191 and 195, that South Africa ‘came into the conflict cautiously at first, watching the expanding U.S. programme and timing their steps to the CIA's.’ Such cautiousness was why Pretoria had sought the prior approval of Zambia, Zaīre, and Côte d'Ivoire for the invasion.

^{Page 529 note 6} Marcum states, op.cit. pp. 274–5, that Cuba's intervention represented ‘a decisive turning point’, but it ‘followed upon substantial intervention by others’, and was ‘partly an improvised response to South Africa's intrusion’. See also Johnson, R. W., How Long Will South Africa Survive? (London, 1977), p. 163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{Page 529 note 7} Among the regional states, Mozambique and Tanzania opposed Zambia's position and called for the immediate recognition of the M.P.L.A. régime. The Economist, 10 and 17 January 1976.

^{Page 530 note 1} Of Zambia's other close allies against the M.P.L.A., Zaire refused recognition until August 1976, as does the United States today, some 12 years after Angola's independence.

^{Page 530 note 2} Zambia Daily Mail, 9 October 1986.

^{Page 530 note 3} The Mobutu Government continues to provide Savimbi with support bases and supply lines, and it is from Zaire that the C.I.A. supervises U.S. assistance, including training on new weapons such as Stinger missiles. The Economist, 5 April 1986, and the The Guardian Weekly (London), 10 08 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 530 note 4} After his 1982 meeting with Botha, the U.S. Vice-President, Bush, George, emphasised that the Zambian Government was one of the very few that had offered constructive suggestions on Angola, and encouragingly stated: ‘Together we will continue to explore ways in which our assistance can be more supportive of your goals’. Zambia Daily Mail, 20 November 1982.Google Scholar

^{Page 531 note 1} National Commission for Development Planning, Economic Review 1986 and Annual Plan 1987 (Lusaka, 1987), pp. 12–13.Google ScholarThe earlier decline in G.D.P. per capita, 1974–1980, was 52 per cent, and was considered by the I.L.O. as ‘among the largest in developing countries’ then. International Labour Office,Google ScholarZambia: basic needs in an economy under pressure (Addis Ababa, 1981), p. xxv.Google Scholar

^{Page 531 note 2} National Commission for Development Planning, Economic Review 1985 and Annual Plan 1986 (Lusaka, 1986), Introduction.Google Scholar

^{Page 531 note 3} Chikwanda, Alexander, ‘Business Chat’ in Zambia Daily Mail, 18 December 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 531 note 4} Ibid. 15 April 1987, and Economic Review 1986 and Annual Plan 1987, p. 100. These totals for formal-sector wage employment include foreign workers (roughly 3 per cent in each case).

^{Page 531 note 5} Economic Review 1986 and Annual Plan 1987, p. 10, and World Bank report on the initial impact of economic reforms quoted in Zambia Daily Mail, 10 April 1987.

^{Page 531 note 6} According to the I.L.O., op.cit. p. 47, about 80 per cent of rural and 26 per cent of urban households lacked sufficient income in 1980 to meet even their minimum private consumption needs.

^{Page 532 note 1} Kaunda recently said that the Government was compelled to seek foreign financial support in a situation where the mines were expected to earn $800–1,000 million in 1987 but demand for foreign exchange was $1,500–2,000 million per annum. Zambia Daily Mail, 17 January and 23 April 1987.

^{Page 532 note 2} In 1985 G.D.P. was K7,048.6 million at current prices, and the official exchange rate was K3.30 = U.S. $1.00. In 1986 G.D.P. was K12,097.9 million at current prices, and $1.00 averaged K8.90. Economic Review and Annual Plan 1986, p. 32, and Economic Review 1986 and Annual Plan 1987, pp. 11 and 13.

^{Page 532 note 3} Economic Review 1986 and Annual Plan 1987, p. 26.

^{Page 532 note 4} In 1983 Mexico was the biggest borrower from the international banks, with a total debt of $69,800 million, followed by Brazil, which had to pay 42.6 per cent of its export earnings to meet interest-servicing payments on a debt of $68,200 million. The Economist, 31 March 1984.

^{Page 532 note 5} ‘The IMF's African Nightmare’, in South (London), 07 1985, pp. 31–6.Google Scholar

^{Page 532 note 6} Thus, according to a Central Committee member, Lisulo, Daniel, the I.M.F. has hindered Zambia's development through bad advice, and in the words of the Secretary-General of U.N.I.P., Grey Zulu, has created ‘untold misery and suffering’. Zambia Daily Mail, 11 December 1986, and Times of Zambia, 13 December 1986. While it is almost the axiomatic view of the political leaders that Zambia's problems are caused by external forces, there has been an effort to rebut these charges by the World Bank. Its Resident Representative in Zambia, Uche Mbanefo, told a Lusaka seminar in January 1987 that the economic problems afflicting Zambia and other African countries were the result of 20 years of disastrous policies, lack of productivity, and shortage of managerial skills: ‘we cannot blame [the I.M.F. and the World Bank] for the existence of these problems, nor for trying to suggest to us ways of getting out of them’. Zambia Daily Mail, 14 January 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 533 note 1} As reported in Times of Zambia, 16 April 1987, the President referred to the I.M.F. as prescribing a ‘killer’ programme for Zambia, and said that if unnamed western countries were to tie aid to his stand on liberation in the region, ‘I am ready to starve’. However, that aid to Zambia could be reduced on the grounds of the Government's irremediable economic mismanagement was, of course, not impossible.

^{Page 533 note 2} Statements made in Washington in July 1985 by, respectively, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Armacost, Michael, and the American Ambassador-Designate to Zambia, Paul Hare. Zambia Daily Mail, 20 July 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 533 note 3} Times of Zambia, 13 December 1984.

^{Page 533 note 4} National Mirror, 21 February 1987.

^{Page 533 note 5} Times of Zambia, 23 November 1985.

^{Page 534 note 1} Musokotwane responded angrily, and warned Zambians against criticism of the leadership for the alleged mismanagement of the economy. Times of Zambia, 14 October, and Zambia Daily Mail, 18 October 1985. According to the Guardian Weekly, 27 January 1985, Kaunda's planned journey to Norway, accompanied by 67 aides, for meetings scheduled to last only one and a half hours, caused the Government in Oslo to be fearful that a visit on such a scale would harm public attitudes to foreign aid.

^{Page 534 note 2} Zambia Daily Mail, 3 December 1985. Other corporations which acted similarly included, it has been said, Zambia Railways and the government-owned Zambia Daily Mail.

^{Page 534 note 3} Mwauluka, Patrick, in Times of Zambia, 9 February and 3 March 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 534 note 4} F. K. Chisa in ibid. 12 February 1987.

^{Page 535 note 1} Ibid. 19 October 1985.

^{Page 535 note 2} Zambia Daily Mail, 4 December 1986.

^{Page 535 note 3} Ibid. and Times of Zambia, 5 February 1986.

^{Page 535 note 4} Times of Zambia, 6 December 1986.

^{Page 536 note 1} As reported in Zambia Daily Mail, 25 March 1987, the previous day a group believed to be U.N.I.P. militants had attacked nurses and a clinical officer at Matero clinic. At an early stage of the strike, the Minister of General Education, Kabwe, Basil, told a teachers' meeting that it was not government policy to apologise for inefficiency. Times of Zambia, 9 March 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 536 note 2} Zambia Daily Mail, 4 April 1987. Kaunda was being interviewed by the Harare Herald.

^{Page 536 note 3} Ibid. and Times of Zambia, 14 April 1987. On the first occasion Kaunda referred to two Zambians armed with rifles having been arrested on a mission to cause chaos and help overthrow the Government, and on the second to a box intended to ‘beef up destruction and unrest in the [Copperbelt]’, because it contained a revolver, ammunition, and instructions on making petrol bombs which had been sent from South Africa in December but intercepted by Zambian authorities. He also said that the fact that most of the goods looted during the riots were not foodstuffs underlined the contention that it was the work of the enemy. This was the extent of the President's substantiation of his allegations against South Africa.

^{Page 536 note 4} Times of Zambia, 23 March 1987.

^{Page 537 note 1} Ibid. 7 April 1987.

^{Page 537 note 2} Zambia Daily Mail, 6 March 1987.

^{Page 537 note 3} Interview with the Harare Herald, 4 April 1987.

^{Page 537 note 4} Times of Zambia, 13 December 1986. An experienced former diplomat, chairman of the House of Chiefs, and member of the Central Committee, Mapanza is reported to believe that the Government is largely to blame for the country's ailing economy, according to Venarcious Mwansa, ‘Spotlight’, in Zambia Daily Mail, 3 March 1987.

^{Page 538 note 1} Times of Zambia, 19 February 1987.

^{Page 538 note 2} Chikwanda, Alexander, in Zambia Daily Mail, 15 January 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 538 note 3} Ibid. 12 March 1987.

^{Page 538 note 4} Ibid. 29 December 1983.

^{Page 538 note 5} Times of Zambia, 26 July 1986.

^{Page 539 note 1} Zambia Daily Mail, 4 April 1987. By way of contrast, Mulundika, Godfrey, the Managing Director of Zambia Airways, claimed to be ‘ready’ for the effects of sanctions: ‘in fact, they might just work in our favour’. Times of Zambia, 28 February 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 539 note 2} Comparative data are provided in Hanlon, op.cit. pp. 246–7.

^{Page 539 note 3} Times of Zambia, 30 June 1986.

^{Page 539 note 4} As of early 1987 some 90,000 tonnes had reportedly been distributed. Ibid. 25 February 1987.

^{Page 539 note 5} Sparks, Allister, Guardian Weekly, 12 October 1986. According to International Institute for Strategic Studies,Google ScholarThe Military Balance, 1986–1987 (London, 1986), pp. 129 and 139, the 12,000 Zimbabweans represented about 30 per cent of the country's total armed forces (42,000), and perhaps three-quarters of Mozambique's regular forces (15,800).Google Scholar

^{Page 539 note 6} Military Balance, p. 136, and Zambia Daily Mail, 6 March 1987.

^{Page 540 note 1} ‘Children of the Frontline’, pp. 9–10.

^{Page 540 note 2} Kaunda backhandedly commended Banda for ‘Seeing Sense’. Zambia Daily Mail, 29 April 1987.

^{Page 540 note 3} The support of Mozambique was costing Zimbabwe itself up to U.S.$3 million a week. ‘Children of the Frontline’, p. 9.

^{Page 540 note 4} Times of Zambia, 29 April 1987, ‘soon’ being suggestive of the indefinite future.

^{Page 540 note 5} Military Balance, pp. 136 and 138.

^{Page 540 note 6} Soon after the ‘food riots’ the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Tembo, was replaced by the Deputy Commander, after having held the post for only 20 months. Times of Zambia, 15 January 1987.