^{Page 73 note 1} The primary criterion for distinguishing classes is the relationship to the ‘means of production’, which usually entails, as a subsidiary characteristic, concomitant variations in styles of life. A distinction must be made between class, élite, and stratum. A stratum is a descriptive category, including persons who occupy a similar position on a hierarchical scale of certain situational characteristics, such as income, prestige, style of life. Classes emerge from certain structural conditions and function as interest groupings to effect structural changes. While class consciousness may be absent, classes are ‘objectively’ in conflict because of their ‘productive relations’. In this sense, classes are social conflict groups. Cf. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, 1959)Google Scholar. For an elaboration of the concept of ‘political stratum’, see Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs: democracy and power in an American city (New Haven, 1961), pp. 91–4Google Scholar; for a distinction between class, élite, and stratum, see Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite (New York, 1956), especially pp. 3–30Google Scholar, ‘The Higher Circles’; cf. Mills, , ‘The Power Elite: comment on criticism’, in Dissent (New York), IV, I, Winter 1957, pp. 22–34Google Scholar, which contains the author's defence of his methodology, as well as a general discussion of the conceptual and ideological problems involved in the analysis of social strata.

^{Page 74 note 1} Caste involves five characteristics: (1) a hierarchically organised system of occupations; (2) entrance into an occupation determined by birth; (3) endogamous marriage within occupational and status groupings; (4) ‘objective’ conflict between the interests of the different castes; and (5) subjectively, a situation where even the lowest, most debased castes may assert no grievance, but attest to the rectitude of the moral order and maintain the rightfulness of their own positions in society. See Bensman, Joseph and Rosenberg, Bernard, Mass, Class and Bureaucracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), p. 246.Google Scholar

^{Page 74 note 2} This inferior caste self-acceptance resembles the way in which the lower orders under feudalism accepted a system under which they had few material advantages and still fewer rights of any type. See de Tocqueville's, A. explanation of this phenomenon in Democracy in America (New York, 1960 edn), vol. 1, pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

^{Page 75 note 1} On the historical and traditional basis of Senegal's unity, see Crowder, Michael, Senegal: a study of French assimilation policy (London, 1962).Google Scholar

^{Page 76 note 1} See Hodgkin, Thomas, ‘Background to AOF’, nine articles in West Africa (London), 2 01 to 6 03 1954.Google Scholar

^{Page 76 note 2} In 1961 the population of Senegal was estimated at 3·4 million. The Wolof, with more than a million people, are the largest ethnic grouping in Senegal, as well as the most important political and economic entity. The Serer, with 16·5% of the population, are slightly less numerous than the Peul (17·5%), but much more important socially and politically because of their location and history. The Toucouleur (9%) and Mandingue (6·5%) have social structures similar to those of the Serer and Wolof. The Diola, the major tribe of the Casamance, represent about 9% of the total population of Senegal; they have a tradition of common origin with the Serer, but their social structure is more egalitarian, and without castes. The Lebou, while numbering less than 1% of the population—often counted as a faction of the Wolof—are another group far more important than their numbers would suggest. Territorial concessions negotiated with the French have made the Lebou owners of much of the most valuable property in Dakar. There are many other minor ethnic groups. Sénégal:faits et chiffres (Dakar, 1965 edn), pp. 1–9Google Scholar; this refers to the still unpublished 1961 census.

^{Page 76 note 3} On the history and social structure of the Wolof, see: Victoria Bomba Coifman, ‘Wolof Political and Social Organization until the Nineteenth Century’, paper presented to the 1965 meeting of the (American) African Studies Association; Brigaud, Félix, Histoire traditionnelle du Sénégal (St. Louis, Senegal, 1962), especially pp. 312–31Google Scholar for further bibliography; and Silla, Ousmane, ‘Le Système des castes dans la société ouolof’, in France-Eurafrique (Paris), 148, 01 1964, pp. 38–46.Google Scholar

^{Page 77 note 1} The Toucouleur caste system involved several more gradations than that of the Wolof and Serer. Abdoulaye Diop describes in considerable detail the class nature of Toucouleur society in his important study, Société toucouleur et migration (Dakar, 1964)Google Scholar. A study of the social structure of the Serer provides additional insight into the caste and class system of traditional Senegal. The persistence of caste among the Serer was startlingly detailed by a Senegalese middle-level civil servant, who in a recent interview unburdened himself about the modem difficulties of maintaining a household of ‘slaves’ and other dependents on a modest, shrinking budget. While economic relations have changed, certain social patterns of subordination obviously persist to the present day. The work of Martin A. Klein is essential for an understanding of the historical development of the Serer, particularly the impact of Islam. See his Islam and Imperialism in Senegal, Sine-Saloum, 1847–1914 (Stanford, 1968)Google Scholar. See also Diagne, Pathé, ‘Royaumes sérères: les institutions traditionnelles du Sine-Saloum’, in Présence africaine (Paris), 54, 1965, pp. 142–72.Google Scholar

^{Page 77 note 2} For legends on the origin of Caste, see Brigaud, op. cit. p. 239, and Angrand, A.–P., Manuel français-oulof (Dakar, 1963), p. 81.Google Scholar

^{Page 77 note 3} The exact beginnings of the Wolof are uncertain. Broadly, the founding of the Wolof state can be dated somewhere during the thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries.

^{Page 77 note 4} Every year in Walo at the Gamou festival of the birth of Mohammed, all the Kangame were obliged to appear before the ruling Brak, and present him with their tribute of one- third of the year's income. Non-authorised absence of a Kangame was punishable by his destitution and sometimes death. An annual Gamou is still held at Linguere in memory of the Wolof emperor, Bour Djoloff Bouna N'Diaye. It is interesting to note that the presiding officers in 1965 were grand marabouts rather than descendants of the emperor. Special envoys were sent by the Khalif General of the Tidjaniya brotherhood, as well as officers representing the Mourides. The sons and nephews of the last Bour attended and intermingled with the marabouts and local notables, as did government ministers, representatives of the U.P.S. (Union progressiste sénégalaise) and important administrative officials from the region. Dakar matin (Dakar), 10 02 1965.Google Scholar

^{Page 79 note 1} Klein, op. cit. p. 21.

^{Page 80 note 1} Ibid. p. 58.

^{Page 80 note 2} Sénégal: faits et chiffres, 1965, p. 8.Google Scholar

^{Page 81 note 1} Thoré, Luc, ‘Manage et divorce dans la banlieue de Dakar’, Cahiers d'études africaines (Paris), IV, 16, p. 492Google Scholar. See also Silla, Ousmane, ‘Persistence des castes dans la société Wolof contemporaine’, in Bulletin de l'I. F. A. N. (Dakar), XXVIII (B), 3–4, 07–10 1966, pp. 731–70.Google Scholar

^{Page 81 note 2} Detailed facts about status reversal among the Toucouleur, as one example of a general phenomenon, are given in ‘Les Budgets familiaux’ (Dakar, 1958, mimeo.); see especially pp. 22, 23, and 27. In 1957, when this study was carried out by the Mission socio-économique du fleuve, fishermen and artisans on the average had an income from their traditional occupations about 25% higher than members of the Torobé, the highest traditional caste of the great landed proprietors. The authors of the report attribute this primarily to differing attitudes towards work in a changing social situation. It is not clear from this document how extensive and universal a status reversal there was. My interviews in Dakar, 1965, among the many influential Toucouleur members of the National Assembly universally indicated they were of high-caste origin. Unpublished findings by Abdoulaye Diop tend to confirm this.

^{Page 82 note 1} This was a universal result of European conquest, whether the system was direct or indirect rule. For two discussions of the same phenomenon in British areas, see Rattray, R. S., Ashanti Law and Constitution (London, 1929)Google Scholar, and Busia, K. A., The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London, 1951).Google Scholar

^{Page 82 note 2} Delavignette, Robert, Freedom and Authority in French West Africa (London, 1956), p. 75.Google Scholar

^{Page 83 note 1} See Klein, op. cit.

^{Page 83 note 2} See the account of Monteil, Vincent, L'Islam noir (Paris, 1964), particularly pp. 49–104 and 121–49.Google Scholar

^{Page 83 note 3} On the impact of Islam see, for example, Marty, Paul, Etudes sur l'Islam au Sénégal, (Paris, 1917) 2 volsGoogle Scholar; Trimingham, John Spencer, A History of Islam in West Africa (London, 1962)Google Scholar; and Lewis, I. M. (ed.), Islam in Tropical Africa (London, 1966).Google Scholar

^{Page 84 note 1} Oluruntimehin, B. Olatunji, ‘Resistance Movements in the Tukulor Empire’, in Cahiers d'études africaines, VIII, 5, 1968, pp. 123–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{Page 84 note 2} The Wolof had founded small principalities under Lamanes, a Serer word meaning proprietors, chiefs of the soil; Brigaud, op. cit. p. 50.

^{Page 84 note 3} Monteil, Vincent, ‘Lat-Dior, Damel du Cayor et l'islamisation des Wolofs au XIXe siècle’, in Archives de sociologie des religions (Paris), 16, PP. 77–104Google Scholar. Thiam, Medoune, Cheickh Amadou Bamba, fondateur du mouridisme, 1850–1927 (Conakry, 1964)Google Scholar, provides a short history of marabout-Tiedo relations and the appeal of Islam to the peasant, pp. 6–8. The most complex view of the historical development of Islam in terms of the changing nature of its appeal to various social classes is presented by J. C. Froelich, ‘Essai sur les causes et méthodes de l'islamisation de l'Afrique de l'Ouest du XIe siècle au XXe siècle’, in Lewis (ed.), op. cit. pp. 160–73.

^{Page 85 note 1} Suret-Canale, Jean, Afrique noire occidentale et centrale (Paris, 1958), pp. 127–9.Google Scholar

^{Page 85 note 2} Monteil, Vincent, ‘Islam et développement au Sénégal’, in Austruy, Jacques (ed.), L'Islam face au développement économique (Paris, 1961), p. 61.Google Scholar

^{Page 86 note 1} For a discussion of the differences between and within the various brotherhoods and a history of their origins, see Chailly, M.et al., Notes et études sur l'Islam en Afrique noire (Paris, 1962)Google Scholar, especially Quesnot, F., ‘Les Cadres maraboutiques de l'Islam sénégalais’, pp. 127–95Google Scholar; and see p. 194 for some idea of the size of the various brotherhoods, as follows: Tidjaniya, I,029, 577; Mouride, 423, 273; Quadriya, 302,457; Layene, 15,430; Hamalliste, 7, 511. These figures were only very rough estimates, for a total population of 2.3 million. Today, the population of Senegal is estimated at well over 3.5 million, and the proportion of Mourides has vastly increased.

^{Page 86 note 2} Cf. Thiam, op. cit. pp. 7–8.

^{Page 86 note 3} Bourlon, Abel, ‘Note breve sur l'organisation municipale du Sénégal’, Centre de hautes études administratives sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes (Paris, 1959, mimeo.).Google Scholar

^{Page 87 note 1} Gorer, Geoffrey, Africa Dances (London, 1935), New York edn, 1962, p. 42.Google Scholar

^{Page 87 note 2} Thiam, op. cit. p. 16. Amadou Bamba (in exile) had first met Diagne (working as a French civil servant) in 1902 in Gabon; ibid. p. 8.

^{Page 87 note 3} F. Quesnot, ‘Influence du mouridisme sur le tidjanisme’, in Chailly et al., op. cit. p. 117.

^{Page 87 note 4} Bourlon, op, cit. P. 14.

^{Page 88 note 1} Mission Roland Portères, Aménagement de l'économie agricole au Sénégal (Dakar, 1952), vol. I, P. 103.Google Scholar

^{Page 88 note 2} For an extended discussion of the ambivalent relations between the founder of the Mourides and the French, see Behrman, Lucy C., ‘Ahmad Bamba, 1850–1927’, in Willis, John (ed.), Studies on the History of Islam in West Africa (forthcoming).Google Scholar

^{Page 89 note 1} Bourlon, op. cit. p. 16.

^{Page 90 note 1} Portères, op. cit. vol. III, p. 105.

^{Page 90 note 2} See, for example, the section on the Mourides, in ‘Rapport général sur les perspectives de développement de Sénégal’ (Dakar, 2nd edn 1960, mimeo.), 2 volsGoogle Scholar. This semi-official study of Senegal's society and economy was used as the basis for drawing up the national Development Plan.

^{Page 90 note 3} Portères, op. cit. p. 106.

^{Page 90 note 4} Seurin, Jean-Louis, ‘Etudes sociales et partis politiques’, in Annales africaines (Paris, 1958), pp. 141–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 91 note 1} Cf. on this point and the contemporary politics of Senegal: Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter, Political Parties in French West Africa (New York, 1964)Google Scholar; Michael Crowder, op. cit.; and Markovitz, Irving Leonard, Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude (New York, 1969).Google Scholar

^{Page 91 note 2} Source: Dakar matin, systematically examined from September 1964 to July 1965. In the table, a delegation is only counted as one visit, regardless of the number of people involved.

^{Page 92 note 1} The following announcement appeared in Dakar matin, 2 December 1964: ‘The Khalif General of the Mourides, El Hadj Falilou M'Backe, informs the public that henceforth all persons desiring to obtain from him any type of intervention with the members of the government, authorities of the private and semi-private sector, political personalities, etc., should address themselves directly to his official representative, El Hadj Bamba Gueye, attaché of the Cabinet to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Dakar. ‘The Khalif General of the Mourides wants it to be known that he, from now on, intends to receive personally in consultation only those moved by considerations of a strictly religious order and matters connected thereto.’

^{Page 92 note 2} See, for example, ‘Le Gouverneur Abdou N'Dene N'Diaye quitte Kaolack’, in Dakar matin, 25 11 1964, and cf. note 4, p. 77, above.Google Scholar

^{Page 92 note 3} On the nature and condition of the co-operatives, see the reports prepared under the auspices of the Ministry of Rural Economy, e.g. Belloncle, Guy, ‘Le Mouvement copératif au Sénégal, bilan et perspectives’ (Dakar, 1964, mimeo.).Google Scholar

^{Page 93 note 1} For a further discussion of the compatibilityof Islam, socialism, and economic development, and some of the problems involved, see, for example: Jacques Austruy (ed.), op. cit.; Safran, Nadav, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass., 1961)Google Scholar; and Cahiers de l'institut de science économique appliquée (Paris), 106, 10 1960Google Scholar, L'Islam: l'économie et la technique.

^{Page 93 note 2} For example, Sigmund, Paul, in The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York), 1963, p. 7Google Scholar, says that traditional leaders ‘try to preserve the existing oligarchic order and view the disruptive forces of modernization as a threat to their maintenance of power’.

^{Page 93 note 3} See, for example, David Apter's works, The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton, 1961)Google Scholar and The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965)Google Scholar. See also Georges Balandier's notion of ‘restricted social space’ for the proper functioning of traditional societies in his Sociologie actuelle d'Afrique noire (Paris, 1955), p. 499.Google Scholar

^{Page 95 note 1} See the chapter on ‘Education’ in the U.S. Army Area Handbook for Senegal (Washington, D.C., 1963).Google Scholar

^{Page 96 note 1} On ideology in Senegal, see Irving Leonard Markovitz, op. cit.