¹ See Thomas, Scott, The Diplomacy of Liberation: the international relations of the African National Congress of South Africa, 1960–1985 (London, 1995).Google Scholar

² Meli, Francis, South Africa Belongs to Us: a history of the ANC (London, Harare, and Bloomington, 1988), p. 46.Google Scholar

³ Ibid. p. 55.

⁴ For an excellent account of the ANC during this second phase, see Alden, Chris, ‘From Liberation Movement to Political Party: ANC foreign policy in transition’, in The South African Journal of International Affairs (Johannesburg), 1, 1, Spring 1993, pp. 63–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See, especially, Nel, Philip, ‘The ANC and Communism’, in Esterhuyse, Willie and Nel, (eds.), The ANC and its Leaders (Cape Town, 1990), pp. 42–66.Google Scholar

⁶ This is an adaptation of Canadian phraseology that the goal of sanctions was to bring the South African régime ‘to its senses, not its knees’. See Black, David and Klotz, Audie, ‘International Legislation and Domestic Political Change: implications for South African foreign relations’, in Southern African Perspectives (Bellville, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995), No. 42, p. 10.Google Scholar

⁷ For an account of the deterioration in USSR/ANC relations from 1990 onwards, see Vladimir Shubin, ‘Reflections on Relations between the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and South Africa in the 1980's and 1990's’, in ibid. No. 37, 1994, pp. 24–31. Moscow only informed the ANC about Neil van Heerden's visit at the last minute, and claimed that officially he was supposed to be just in transit to Tokyo. This prompted a sceptical ANC official to ask: ‘What happened to geography? How is the way to Japan via Moscow?’ Ibid. p. 28.

⁸ Geldenhuys, Deon, ‘The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations’, in Schrire, Robert (ed.), Malan to De Klerk: leadership in the apartheid state (London, 1994), p. 287. Quoting F. W. de Klerk's speeches during 1990–1, Geldenhuys emphasises that the President shared the old vision of South Africa as the ‘undisputed economic engine of Southern Africa’, and as occupying a ‘leadership role which history has carved out for us on a continent facing many problems’.Google Scholar

⁹ Venter, Denis, South Africa and the African Comity of Nations: from isolation to integration (Pretoria, Africa Institute of South Africa, 1993), Research Paper No. 56, pp. 39–41.Google Scholar

¹⁰ African National Congress, ‘Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa’, May 1992. For an indication of the extent to which van Heerden's ‘New Diplomacy’ has been assimilated by the ANC, see ‘South Africa's Foreign Policy Objectives’ by Pahad, Aziz, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chatham House, London, 18 November 1994.Google Scholar

¹¹ Alden, loc. cit. p. 75.

¹² Calland, Richard and Weld, David, ‘Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern World: an exploratory essay’, in Southern African Perspectives, No. 38, 10 1994, p. 1.Google Scholar

¹³ See Birchall, Robin, ‘South Africa and the European Union: between Lomé and bilateralism’, in South African Institute of International Affairs, International Update (Johannesburg), 1 07 1995.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Spence, J. E. (ed.), Change in South Africa (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs and Pinter, 1994), p. 21.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For a perceptive elaboration and critique of this view, see Davies, Robert, ‘South African Foreign Policy Options in a Changing Global Context’, in Southern African Perspectives, No. 40, 01 1995, pp. 1–12.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Comment made by Dr Phillips, Ian (ANC-MP) at a conference on ‘South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa’,Johannesburg,13–14 July 1995.Google ScholarJan Smuts House News (Johannesburg), 3, 2, 11 1995, p. 6.Google Scholar

¹⁷ The Nigerian question continues to vex policy-making and its attentive public in South Africa. The GNU's difficulty involves resolving the tension between a formal commitment to Nigeria's democratic opposition, stemming from a belief in the indivisibility of human rights, and a pragmatic grasp of the dangers of diplomatic isolation within Africa which might well be a by product of Mandela's high-profile rôle in calling for economic sanctions to be imposed on General Abacha's régime. In essence, this dilemma is an example of the classic ‘choice’ between framing foreign policies in accordance with what justice demands or what circumstances permit. That South Africa is now a ‘normal’ state in this regard can be seen in the attempt by the Foreign Ministry to abort a conference organised by prominent Nigerian dissidents by refusing to grant entry visas to many of Abacha's opponents in April 1996. For an account of the divisions within the ANC leadership over what is desirable and what is possible in this regard, see Johnson, R. W., ‘ANC Presses Pretoria to Abandon Anti-Abacha Line’, in The Times (London), 1 04 1996, p. 9.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The Sowetan (Johannesburg), 4 10 1994.Google Scholar See also, Gutteridge, William, South Africa's Continuing Defence Dilemmas (London, 1995), Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Project No. 4, p. 2.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Reuters Report (London), 17 05 1995.Google Scholar

²⁰ For an account of the Evans/Suttner controversy and the Maphai/Vale initiatives, see Weekend Argus (Cape Town), 5 12 1993,Google Scholar and Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 12 02 1994,Google Scholar as well as Weekly Mail (Johannesburg)Google Scholar and The Guardian (London), 05 1995.Google Scholar

²¹ See Ohlson, Thomas and Stedman, Stephen John, with Davies, Robert, The New Is Not Yet Born: conflict resolution in Southern Africa (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 277–81.Google Scholar