^{Page 91 note 1} Doxey, Margaret P., Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York, 1971);Google ScholarGaltung, Johan, ‘On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: with examples from the case of Rhodesia’, in World Politics (Princeton), XIX, 04 1967, pp. 378–416;Google ScholarGilpin, Robert, ‘Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective’, in Knorr, Klaus and Trager, Frank H. (eds.), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas, 1977);Google ScholarKnorr, Klaus, ‘International Economic Leverage and Its Uses’, in Knorr, and Trager, (eds.), op. cit.;Google ScholarKindleberger, Charles P., ‘US Foreign Economic Policy, 1776–1976’, in Foreign Affairs (New York), LV, 01 1977, pp. 395–417;Google ScholarLosman, Donald L., International Economic Sanctions: the cases of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia (Albuquerque, 1979);Google Scholar and Wallensteen, Peter, ‘Characteristics of Economic Sanctions’, in Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), 3, 1968, pp. 248–67.Google Scholar

^{Page 91 note 2} Barber, James, ‘Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument’, in International Affairs (London), LV, 07 1979, pp. 367–84;Google ScholarHufbauer, Gary C. and Schoot, Jeffrey J., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington, D.C., 1985);Google ScholarLindsey, James M., ‘Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: a reexamination’, in International Studies Quarterly (Guildford), XXX, 2, 06 1986, pp. 153–74;Google ScholarOlson, Richard Stuart, ‘Economic Coercion in World Politics: with a focus on North-South relations’, in World Politics, XXXI, 07 1979, pp. 471–94;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Weintraub, Sidney (ed.), Economic Coercion and US Foreign Policy: implications of case studies from the Johnson Administration (Boulder, 1982).Google Scholar

^{Page 92 note 1} Barber, loc. cit., and Lindsey, loc. cit.

^{Page 92 note 2} Baldwin, David A., Economic Statecraft (Princeton, 1985).Google Scholar

^{Page 92 note 3} Ibid. p. 133.

^{Page 93 note 1} Ibid. pp. 13–14.

^{Page 93 note 2} Ibid. p. 98.

^{Page 93 note 3} Ibid. p. 133.

^{Page 93 note 4} Ibid. p. 63.

^{Page 94 note 1} Lindsey, loc. cit. pp. 155–6.

^{Page 94 note 2} Minter, William, ‘South Africa: straight talk on sactions’, in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), 65, Winter 1986–1987, pp. 46–7, makes an important distinction between eliminating apartheid in a narrow sense (‘the explicit ideology of rigid racial separation that was tagged as introduced in 1948 by Afrikaner nationalists’) and in a broad sense (‘the system that has reserved political rights and economic privilege for whites in South Africa for more than a century’). The goal of compliance assumes that the latter would be the object of the sanctions effort.Google Scholar

^{Page 95 note 1} Becker, Charles M., ‘Economic Sanctions Against South Africa’, in World Politics, XXXIX, 2, 01 1987, p. 147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{Page 95 note 2} Lundahl, Mats, ‘Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa’, in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Stockholm), 86, 1, 01 1984, p. 78;Google Scholar Minter, loc. cit. p. 51; and Orkin, Mark, Disinvestment: the struggle and the future (Johannesburg, 1986), pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

^{Page 95 note 3} Minter, loc. cit. p. 52.

^{Page 95 note 4} Weissman, Stephen, ‘Dateline South Africa: the Opposition speaks’, in Foreign Policy, 58, Spring 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 95 note 5} Brody, Richard A., ‘Black South African Opinion on Disinvestment’, in PS (Washington, D.C.), 19, 4,Google ScholarFall 1986, pp. 852–6.Google Scholar

^{Page 96 note 1} Baldwin, op. cit. p. 193, and Minter, loc. cit. p. 46.

^{Page 96 note 2} Kaempfer, William H. and Lowenberg, Anton D., ‘A Model of the Political Economy of International Investment Sanctions: the case of South Africa’, in Kyklos (Basel), 39, 3, 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 97 note 1} Love, Janice, The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: local activism in global politics (New York, 1985);Google Scholar and Shepherd, George W. Jr, Anti-Apartheid: transnational conflict and western policy in the liberation of South Africa (Westport, 1977).Google Scholar

^{Page 98 note 1} Lindsey, loc. cit.; Strack, Harry R., Sanctions: the case of Rhodesia (New York, 1978).Google Scholar

^{Page 98 note 2} Minter, loc. cit. p. 49.

^{Page 98 note 3} Barber, loc. cit.

^{Page 98 note 4} Strack, op. cit.

^{Page 99 note 1} Ferguson, Clyde and Cotter, William, ‘South Africa: what is to be done?’, in Foreign Affairs, LVI, 2, 01 1978, pp. 253–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{Page 99 note 2} Myers, Desaix III et al. , U.S. Business in South Africa: the economic, political and moral issues (Bloomington, 1980).Google Scholar

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^{Page 99 note 4} The New York Times, 27 July, 5 November, and 4 December 1986; 25, 27, and 31 January and 4 April 1987.

^{Page 100 note 1} The major exception to a characterisation of the South African economy as ‘small and open’ is its rôle as the principal supplier of gold in the western industrialised world. Lundahl, ‘Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa’, pp. 68–9.

^{Page 100 note 2} Myers et al. op. cit p. 39. See also Barber, James et al. , The West and South Africa (London, 1982);Becker, loc. cit.;Google ScholarHoughton, D. Hobert, The South African Economy (New York, 1976);Google ScholarLitvak, Laurence et al. , South Africa: foreign investment and apartheid (Washington, D.C., 1978);Google Scholar Lundahl, ‘Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa’; and Porter, Richard C., ‘International Trade and Investment Sactions: potential impact on the South African economy’, in Journal of Conflict Resolution (Beverly Hills), XXIII, 4, 12 1979, pp. 579–612.Google Scholar

^{Page 100 note 3} Lundahl, ‘Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa’, p. 69.

^{Page 100 note 4} Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, South Africa: time running out (Berkeley, 1981), p. 130.Google Scholar

^{Page 100 note 5} Houghton, op. cit.

^{Page 101 note 1} Myers et al., op. cit. p. 39.

^{Page 101 note 2} Barber et al., op cit. p. 58.

^{Page 101 note 3} Quoted in Litvak et al., op. cit. p. 41.

^{Page 101 note 4} Porter, loc. cit. p. 589.

^{Page 101 note 5} Battersby, John, ‘Pretoria Reaches Pact on Debt It Froze in '85’, in The New York Times, 25 March 1987;Google Scholar and Paul Lewis, ‘Western European Nations Impose Weakened Sanctions on Pretoria’, in Ibid. 17 September 1986.

^{Page 101 note 6} Myers et al., op. cit. pp. 41–2.

^{Page 101 note 7} Litvak et al., op. cit.; and Barber et al., op. cit.

^{Page 101 note 8} Battersby, loc. cit.; and Minter, loc. cit. p. 55.

^{Page 103 note 1} The Economist (London), 25 10 1986, p. 33.Google Scholar

^{Page 103 note 2} South Africa, 1986.

^{Page 103 note 3} In 1981, for example, 35 per cent of all cars sold in South Africa were Japanese models assembled under licensing agreements. United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations, ‘Studies on the Effects of the Operations and Practices of Transnational Corporations’, New York, June 1983.

^{Page 103 note 4} Smith, Timothy H., ‘South Africa: the corporate connection’, in Africa Report (New Brunswick), 32, 3, 05–06 1987, p. 19.Google Scholar

^{Page 103 note 5} Fund, Africa, Unified List of United States Companies with Investment or Loans in South Africa and Namibia (New York, 1986).Google Scholar

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^{Page 104 note 1} Alan Cowell, ‘The Ambiguity of Divestment’, in The New York Times, 31 December 1986; and Keith H. Hammonds, ‘Out of Africa? Well, Not Really’, in Ibid. 17 August 1986.

^{Page 104 note 2} Baldwin, op. cit. pp. 40–1.

^{Page 104 note 3} Becker, loc. cit.; Marvin, J. D., ‘Sanctions Against South Africa: the impact and the aftermath’, in Segal, Ronald (ed.), Sanctions Against South Africa (Harmondsworth, 1964); Porter, loc. cit.; and Spandau, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{Page 105 note 1} Porter, loc. cit. p. 590.

^{Page 105 note 2} Becker, loc. cit. pp. 160–1

^{Page 105 note 3} Ibid. pp. 161–3.

^{Page 105 note 4} Lundahl, ‘Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa’, p. 73.

^{Page 106 note 1} Porter, loc. cit. p. 587.

^{Page 106 note 2} Becker, loc. cit. p. 164; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, loc. cit. p. 388; and Porter, loc. cit. pp. 590–1.

^{Page 106 note 3} Becker, loc. cit. p. 165, and Porter, loc. cit. pp. 590–1.

^{Page 106 note 4} Becker, loc. cit. p. 164.

^{Page 107 note 1} Becker, loc. cit. pp. 169–70; Cooper, J. H., ‘Southern Africa and the Threat of Economic Sanctions’, in South African Journal of Economics (Johannesburg), 52, 4, 1984, pp. 266–81;Google Scholar Minter, loc. cit.; and Walters, Ronald, ‘Beyond Sanctions: a comprehensive U.S. policy for Southern Africa’, in World Policy Journal (New York), Winter 1986–1987, pp. 91–110.Google Scholar

^{Page 110 note 1} Friedman, Thomas L., ‘Israel Will Curb Arms for Pretoria’, in The New York Times, 19 March 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 111 note 1} Research is needed into just how many western partners would be sufficient to impose the various degrees of hardship outlined by Porter. Specifically, since Britain and the United States are the two largest partners, an investigation might be able to determine whether or not they alone (assuming others do not increase their levels of trade and investment at the same time) could impose sanctions severe enough to create significant economic hardships in South Africa.