^{page 377 note 1} E.g. Taber, Robert, The War of the Flea (New York, 1970)Google Scholar. Despite many of Taber's astute observations, he tends to view guerrilla warfare as universally applicable with little modification.

^{page 378 note 1} This sketchy summary can be supplemented from the works cited below, as well as the following: Chaliand, Gérard, Armed Struggle in Africa: with the guerrillas in ‘Portuguese’ Guinea (London, 1969)Google Scholar; Chilcote, Ronald H., ‘Mozambique: the African nationalist response to Portuguese imperialism and underdevelopment’, in Potholm, Christian P. and Dale, Richard (eds.), Southern Africa in Perspective: essays in regional politics (New York, 1972), pp. 183–95Google Scholar; and Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I, The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950–1962 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969)Google Scholar.

^{page 378 note 2} For an example of this line of reasoning, see Chilcote, Ronald H., Portuguese Africa (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 105Google Scholar.

^{page 378 note 3} Cabral, Amilcar, Report général sur la lutte de libération nationale (Conakry, 1961), p. 30Google Scholar.

^{page 378 note 4} Mondlane, Eduardo, The Struggle for Mozambique (Harmondsworth, 1969), pp. 124–5Google Scholar.

^{page 379 note 1} For further information, see Wheeler, Douglas L. and Pélissier, René, Angola (London and New York, 1971), pp. 173–81Google Scholar.

^{page 379 note 2} To avoid confusion, Holden Roberto's movement will be referred to as the F.N.L.A. in this article.

^{page 380 note 1} Tse-tung, Mao, ‘Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?’, in Selected Works (New York edn. 1954), Vol. I, pp. 65–6Google Scholar.

^{page 381 note 1} Cabral, Amilcar, Palavras de Ordem Gerais do Camarada Amilcar Cabral aos Responsáveis do Partido (Conakry, 1969), p. 23Google Scholar.

^{page 381 note 2} Debray, Régis, Revolution in the Revolution? (New York, 1967), pp. 83–7Google Scholar.

^{page 382 note 1} Maier, F. X., Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique (New York, 1974), p. 33Google Scholar.

^{page 383 note 1} For instances of guerrilla violence along with accounts of Portuguese atrocities, see missionary reports in The Times (London), 10 and 13 July 1973. Another sympathiser who gives an example of guerrilla violence is Davidson, Basil, The Liberation of Guiné (Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 61Google Scholar. Reports of Portuguese army violence are too frequent to require documentation here.

^{page 383 note 2} This group should not be confused with the petty-bourgeoisie which Cabral divided into three: ‘heavily committed, and compromised with colonialism’, ‘revolutionary petty- bourgeoisie’, and the sub-group between, ‘which has never been able to make up its mind’. Amilcar, Cabral, ‘Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea’, a paper delivered at a seminar in Milan at the Frantz Fanon Centre, 1–305 1964Google Scholar, reprinted in Cabral, , Revolution in Guinea, translated by Handyside, Richard (London, 1969), p. 59Google Scholar. By way of contrast, Lenin viewed the petty-bourgeoisie as the ‘most reactionary of all classes’. See ‘The Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats’, translation in Selected Works (Moscow–Leningrad, 1926–1932), Vol. II pp. 501–2.

^{page 383 note 3} Cabral, ‘Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea’, loc. cit. p. 60.

^{page 384 note 1} Hroch, Miroslav, Die Vorkampfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den Kleinen Volkern Europas (Prague, 1968), pp. 160–1Google Scholar, a study of the early stages of nationalism in Bohemia, Slovakia, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Flanders.

^{page 384 note 2} Fei, Hsiao-tung observed that ‘the innovators, in reality, are social outcasts who have lost their traditional status and lead a socially irresponsible life in the treaty ports’, in ‘Peasantry and Gentry: an interpretation of Chinese social structure and its changes’, in The American Journal of Sociology (Chicago), LII, 1, 07 1946, p. 1Google Scholar.

^{page 384 note 3} Mao, , ‘The Establishment of Base Areas’, in Selected Works, II, p. 136Google Scholar.

^{page 386 note 1} President Banda granted permission for unarmed Frelimo combatants to travel through Malawi, while permitting the Portuguese to tranship oil arriving from Beira by railway back across Lake Malawi by motorboat to Meponda in Mozambique's Niassa district. By this indirect route the Portuguese army avoided the mine-infested roads of north-western Mozambique. Paul, John, Mozambique: memoirs of a revolution (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp. 187 and 214Google Scholar.

^{page 386 note 2} Frelimo reportedly traded out cashew nuts, sesame seeds, and groundnuts; the P.A.I.G.C. is said to have exported rice, animal skins, rubber, and bees-wax.

^{page 387 note 1} On the importance of these base areas, see McColl, Robert W., ‘The Insurgent State: territorial bases of revolution’, in Annals of the Association of American Geographers (Lawrence, Kan.), 59, 4, 12 1969, PP. 613–31Google Scholar.

^{page 387 note 2} Cabral, , Palavras de Ordem Gerais, p. 23.Google Scholar

^{page 387 note 3} Cited in McColl, Robert W., ‘A Political Geography of Revolution: China, Vietnam, and Thailand’, in Journal of Conflict Resolution (Ann Arbor), XI, 2, 06 1967, P. 155Google Scholar.

^{page 388 note 1} Rudebeck, Lars, Guinea-Bissau: a study of political mobilization (Uppsala, 1974), pp. 176–7Google Scholar.

^{page 389 note 1} Israel is not often mentioned as a donor. Felgas, Héllo, Os Movimentos Terroristas de Angola, Guiné, Moçambique (Lisbon, 1966), P. 73Google Scholar; Venter, Al J., The Zambezi Salient: conflict in Southern Africa (Old Greenwich, Conn. 1974), P. 76Google Scholar.

^{page 390 note 1} For easily attainable examples, see Chilcote, Ronald H. (ed.), Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: documents (Stanford, 1972)Google Scholar, especially Roberto, Holden, ‘Autobiographical Statement’, pp. 62–3Google Scholar, and Neto, Agostinho, ‘Angola in Historical Perspective’, p. 214.Google Scholar

^{page 391 note 1} Marcum, John, ‘Three Revolutions’, in Africa Report (New York), XII, 8, 11 1967, p. 21Google Scholar.

^{page 391 note 2} Chilcote, Ronald H., ‘The Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), VI, 3, 10 1968, p. 385Google Scholar.

^{page 392 note 1} For one of many accounts, see Mondlane, , The Struggle for Mozambique, pp. 118–21.Google Scholar

^{page 392 note 2} Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), 1, December 1963, p. 9.

^{page 394 note 1} de Andrade, Mario, La Lutte de liberation nationale dana les colonies portugaises (Algiers, 1967), p. 42Google Scholar.

^{page 394 note 2} Cabral, , ‘Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea’, in Revolution in Guinea, p. 60.Google Scholar

^{page 394 note 3} Roughly, 40,000 Portuguese troops in Guinea-Bissau, 70,000 in Mozambique, and 50,000 in Angola faced about 6,000 guerrilla fighters of the P.A.I.G.C., 10,000 of Frelimo, and 3,000 of the M.P.L.A. Unita and the F.N.L.A. probably had less than 2,000 full-time fighters together in Angola by 1974.

^{page 395 note 1} Davidson, Basil, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's people (Garden City, N.Y., 1972), pp. 227–31Google Scholar.

^{page 395 note 2} Mao, , ‘On Protracted War’, in Selected Works, II, pp. 183–4Google Scholar; and Giap, Vo Nguyen, People's War People's Army (New York, 1965), pp. 101–10Google Scholar. It can be added, parenthetically, that the Chinese war against Japan never progressed through the prescribed three stages.

^{page 396 note 1} For a discussion of the ‘decisive battle’ idea among North Vietnamese and Algerian guerrilla leaders, see Johnson, Chalmers, ‘The Third Generation of Guerrilla Warfare’, in Asian Survey (Berkeley), VIII, 6, 06 1968, pp. 442 and 444Google Scholar and Ali, Bashir Hadj, ‘Some Lessons of the Liberation Struggle in Algeria’, in World Marxist Review (Toronto), VII, 1, 01 1965, pp. 54–5Google Scholar.

^{page 396 note 2} Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1963 edn.), pp. 272–3 and 269.

^{page 396 note 3} Giap, op. cit. p. 79.

^{page 397 note 1} This opinion was expressed by General Costa Gomes, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, on Portuguese television. Expresso (Lisbon), 16 May 1974.

^{page 397 note 2} Kenneth, Maxwell, ‘The Hidden Revolution in Portugal’, in New Tork Review of Books, 17 04 1975, p. 31.Google Scholar

^{page 398 note 1} Judging by official Portuguese casualty figures, this area was clearly the most dangerous towards the end of the three wars. From 1 November 1973 to 23 January 1974 the numbers of soldiers killed were as follows: 108 in Mozambique, 56 in Guinea-Bissau, and 54 in Angola. Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin (London), XIV, 2, April p. 18.

^{page 399 note 1} A dubious exception to this statement might be Castro's take-over in Cuba. A strong case, however, can be made that the revolution here was not Marxist until after Castro achieved power.