^{Page 295 note 1} Africa Diary (New Delhi), 33, 11–1708 1962, p. 697.Google Scholar

^{Page 295 note 2} Jorre, John de St, ‘Looking for Mercenaries (and Some Pen-Portraits of Those We Found)’, in Transition (Kampala), XXXIII, 10/11 1967, p. 24.Google Scholar

^{Page 296 note 1} See Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince, translated with an introduction by George Bull (Harmondsworth, London, 1961), pp. 77–90.Google Scholar All quotations of Machiavelli in this article have been taken from this edition.

^{Page 297 note 1} Ibid. p. 77.

^{Page 297 note 2} Ibid. pp. 77–8.

^{Page 298 note 1} Ibid. p. 79.

^{Page 298 note 2} Ibid. pp. 83–4.

^{Page 298 note 3} Ibid. pp. 79 and 86–7.

^{Page 299 note 1} Calculations are my own, based on figures for January 1966 drawn from Wood, David, ‘The Armed Forces of African States’, in Adelphi Papers, no. 27 (London), 04 1966, p. 28.Google Scholar The comparative data for other regions are from Zartman, I. William, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), p. 90.Google Scholar

^{Page 300 note 1} East African Standard (Nairobi), 13 11 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 300 note 2} Uganda Argus (Kampala), 11 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 301 note 1} See Legum, Colin, ‘Recruiting Row as Mercenaries Feud over Nigeria’, in The Observer (London), so 12 1967.Google ScholarHoare's, memoirs have recently been published under the unashamed title, Congo Mercenary (London, 1967).Google Scholar In an interview appearing in the Sunday Nation (Nairobi), 17 12 1967,Google Scholar Dr Michael Okpara, former premier of the Eastern Region and now a spokesman for Biafra, categorically denied that Biafra was using or even attempting to recruit mercenaries.

^{Page 301 note 2} Machiavelli, , The Prince, p. 78.Google Scholar

^{Page 301 note 3} Ibid. p. 87. Although Africa's leaders would never regard themselves as being ‘Machiavellian' because of its pejorative connotations, there is some reason to believe that, when others use mercenaries against them, they regard it as Machiavellian. For example, when it was reported that mercenary parachutists were dropping on Kisangani in 1967, Radio Kinshasa stated: ‘The imperialists have put into effect their Machiavellian plans.’ Africa Diary, VII, 32, 6–1208 1967, p. 3510.Google Scholar

^{Page 302 note 1} Machiavelli, , The Prince, pp. 86 and 79.Google Scholar

^{Page 302 note 2} This tabulation includes successful military coups, military-led secessions, or military actions instrumental in bringing about governmental changes; and attempted military takeovers, secessions, and mutinies that failed to gain power but were ultimately disclosed for one reason or another. See appendix of my monograph, Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa (Nairobi, 1968).Google Scholar

^{Page 303 note 1} For an unusual expression of this viewpoint with reference to Africans serving in British forces during World War II, see Itote, Waruhiu (General China), ‘Mau Mau’ General (Nairobi, 1967), p. 10.Google Scholar

^{Page 304 note 1} See the speech by Nyerere, Julius K., East African Standard (Nairobi), 27 01 1964,Google Scholar explaining his use of British troops. For a more analytical treatment of these events see Mazrui, Ali A. and Rothchild, Donald, ‘The Soldier and State in East Africa: some theoretical conclusions of the army mutinies of 1964’, in Western Political Quarterly (Salt Lake City), XX, 1, 03 1967, pp. 82–96.Google Scholar

^{Page 304 note 2} In the Cameroun (1960 and 1961) to help restore order; in Congo (Brazzaville) in 1960 to help the Government quell inter-tribal warfare, and again in September 1962 (and also in Gabon) when a disputed soccer game resulted in riots against resident nationalists from op. posing sides; ‘several interventions’ in Chad between 1960 and 1963; in Niger, a French ‘show of force’ in December 1963 to discourage a military uprising against President Diori; and twice in Mauritania (1961) to assist the Government in dealing with tribal agitation. Peyrefitte's statement is quoted in: ‘Gabon: putsch or coup d'état?’, in Africa Report (Washington), IX, 3, 03 1964, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

^{Page 304 note 3} See Angove, Rodney, ‘Intervention Force’, in Sunday Nation, 12 11 1967.Google Scholar In no time this newly formed, special unit was called into action. According to Le Monde (Paris), 17 11 1967,Google Scholar a company of French paratroops was sent to Bangui, Central African Republic, shortly before 11 November. The company was drawn from the 11 th Division. La Force d'intervention.

^{Page 304 note 4} See ‘France's, Military Role in Africa’. in Africa Report, IX, I, 01 1964, p. 10.Google Scholar

^{Page 305 note 1} Africa Diary, VI, 31, 25–3107 1966, pp. 2963–4.Google Scholar

^{Page 306 note 1} East African Standard, 27 Jaunary 1964. See also the explanations of Prime Minister Obote, ibid. 25 Jaunary 1964, and President Kenyatta, ibid. 8 February 1964.

^{Page 307 note 1} Mazrui, Ali A., Towards a Pax Africana (London, 1967), p. 205.Google Scholar

^{Page 309 note 1} It is important to note that a Swahili edition of The Prince will be published by the East African Publishing House, Nairobi, sometime in 1968, with an introduction by Professor Mazrui.

^{Page 309 note 2} Much of the discussion in this essay concerning the problem of mercenaries and auxiliaries is framed in essentially negative terms; i.e. what is to be avoided. For Machiavelli's advice on the more positive requirements for creating a good state and his views on the relationship between the state and the citizenry, a thorough examination of The Discourses would be imperative. A convenient edition is The Prince and the Discourses with an introduction by Max Lamer (New York, 1940).

^{Page 310 note 1} Mazrui, , Pax Africana, p. 206.Google Scholar