^{Page 37 note 1} See Anber, Paul, ‘Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), v, 2, 1967Google Scholar. The best histories of the earlier period are Coleman, James S., Nigeria: background to nationalism (Berkeley, 1962)Google Scholar, and Sklar, Richard L., Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963).Google Scholar

^{Page 37 note 2} Kano had been the scene of anti-Ibo riots in 1953, in which 50 Ibos died.

^{Page 37 note 3} The North officially maintains that ‘irresponsible news media’ had aroused the ‘ordinary man’ in the street into ‘spontaneous retaliation’ for the incidents in the East a few days earlier; see Nigeria 1966 (Lagos, 1966)Google Scholar. This is not consistent with evidence gathered by the author in the North. The disturbances were planned carefully by the local city chiefs of Kano, Sokoto, Jos, Bauchi, Maiduguri, and Kaduna. They provided cars for the Hausa gangs, secured the support of Northern soldiers, and supplied lists of the names and addresses of Ibos. An explanation of the causes underlying Hausa behaviour awaits further research; see Legum, Cohn, ‘The Peoples of Nigeria’, in The Observer (London), 16 10 1966Google Scholar, and Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., ‘The Cultural Background to the Crisis’, in African Affairs (London), LXVI, 262, 01 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 38 note 1} The official Eastern figure of 1·8 million is too high. Registration of the heads of returning families by the Eastern Region Refugee Commission reached 214,000 on 28 February 1967, which was the last day for registration. The average refugee family included members. This amounted to slightly less than 1·2 million. These figures are subject to some error, particularly where refugees failed to register or non-refugees registered. However, the Commission's elaborate checking procedure probably prevented gross inaccuracies.

^{Page 39 note 1} Northern Nigeria Statistical Yearbook, 1965 (Kaduna, 1966), table 134, pp. 106–7.Google Scholar

^{Page 39 note 2} Ibid. table 48, pp. 39–40. Non-Nigerians are included in the totals, but not shown separately.

^{Page 40 note 1} Economic Development in Northern Nigeria, 1962–66 (Kaduna, 1967), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 40 note 2} Ibid. p. I.

^{Page 40 note 3} No explicit capital-output ratio was given for the Plan. However, a ratio of 375 is implicit in the assumption that a i 5 per cent investment rate would yield a 4 per cent annual growth rate. Guideposts for the Second National Development Plan (Lagos, 1966), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 40 note 4} National Development Plan (Lagos, 1962), pp. 34–5.Google Scholar

^{Page 41 note 1} Sources: Progress Report (Lagos, 1964), pp. 27–9Google Scholar; and Annual Report of the Central Bank [of Nigeria] (Lagos), 1967 and 1968.Google Scholar

^{Page 41 note 2} Private investment data are estimates only, based on preliminary figures for the Federal Plan in 1965 and computations by the Northern Region Government.

^{Page 42 note 1} Dean, E. R., ‘Factors Impeding the Implementation of Nigeria's Six Year Plan,’ in The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies (Ibadan), VIII, I, 1966, pp. 120–1.Google Scholar

^{Page 42 note 2} Northern Nigeria Statistical Yearbook, 1965, tables 242 and 253, pp. 192 and 201.Google Scholar

^{Page 43 note 1} In February 1966 the Military Government ordered an investigation into the affairs of the N.N.M.B. and the N.N.D.C. See A White Paper on the Military Government Policy for the Reorganisation of the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation (Kaduna, 1966)Google Scholar, and A White Paper on the Northern Nigeria Military Government's Policy for the Comprehensive Review of the Past Operations and Methods of the Northern Nigeria Marketing Board (Kaduna, 1967).Google Scholar

^{Page 44 note 1} Sources: Economic Deselopment in Northern Nigeria, 1962–1966, p. 4Google Scholar; Selected Indicators of Economic Growth in Northern Nigeria, 1962–1964 (Kaduna, 1965)Google Scholar; and Northern Nigeria Statistical rearbook, 1965, table 116, p. 191, and tables 126–7, p. 200Google Scholar. See also Central Bank (Lagos), IV, 1, 06 1966Google Scholar, and The Nigeria Trade Journal (Lagos), xv, 2, 06/09 1966.Google Scholar

^{Page 44 note 2} Following the split of the Action Group of the West into the Awolowo and Akintola factions in 1964, law and order broke down. By November 1965 it was extremely dangerous to drive the 89 miles from Lagos to Ibadan, the most important road in the country.

^{Page 45 note 1} Textile manufacturers in Kano and Kaduna had projected capital expenditures of about £1·3 million, and mining companies anticipated investments totalling £700,000. Only Nigerian Textiles Ltd, Nortex Ltd, and Gardi Textiles Ltd went ahead with their plans, investing £475,000, of which £330,000 was provided by Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd. Annual Report of Northern Jsfigeria Investments Lid, 1966 (Kaduna, 1967).Google Scholar

^{Page 45 note 2} The Nigeria Trade Journal, XV, 2, 1966, pp. 79–85.Google Scholar

^{Page 45 note 3} Figures calculated from Estimates of the Government of Northern Nigeria, 1965–66; 1966–67; and 1967–1968 (Kaduna, 1966, 1967 and 1968)Google Scholar. The capital budget for the first nine months of 1966 is an estimate only, as this period cuts across two fiscal years, 1965–6 and 1966–7. It assumes an even flow of planned investment over the nine months.

^{Page 45 note 4} The Eastern Military Government held up 79 engines, 170 oil tankers, and 1,064 freight wagons. These figures are contained in an unpublished report housed in the Office of the Military Governor, Enugu.

^{Page 46 note 1} Source: unpublished survey by the Ministry of Economic Planning (Kaduna, 1966, mimeo).

^{Page 47 note 1} Source: unpublished survey by the Ministry of Economic Planning (Kaduna, 1966, mimeo.).

^{Page 48 note 1} Ibid.

^{Page 48 note 2} Northern Nigeria Statistical Tearbook, 1965, table 528, p. 101.Google Scholar

^{Page 49 note 1} Wages rose by 4d. to 5s. 4d. per day.

^{Page 49 note 2} Central Bank, IV, 2, 09 1968.Google Scholar

^{Page 49 note 3} News of this arrangement leaked out, and licensed buying agents scrambled for the limited funds, each anxious to purchase his seasonal share. In a number of areas, the agents violated the law by offering the farmer less than the minimum price for his produce on the grounds that the Board ‘has not got enough to go round this year’. Many are thought to have accepted lower prices, but the precise extent of this practice is unknown.

^{Page 50 note 1} There is a port at Baro which can accommodate small freighters.

^{Page 50 note 2} The Nigeria Trade Journal, XV, 2, 1966, pp. 79–85.Google Scholar

^{Page 51 note 1} Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Lagos, 1967).Google Scholar

^{Page 51 note 2} Hay, A. M. and Smith, R. M. T., ‘Preliminary Estimates of Nigerian Inter-regional Trade’, unpublished paper, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1967, tables A1, A15, and A16, pp. 21, 39, and 40.Google Scholar

^{Page 51 note 3} Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

^{Page 52 note 1} Annual Report of Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd., 1966.

^{Page 52 note 2} It is known that large amounts of Ibo capital flowed from Northern to Eastern banks between May and October 1966, but exact figures are not available. Capital holdings by Hausa and Yoruba entrepreneurs were small compared to Ibo deposits.

^{Page 52 note 3} Estimates of the Government of Northern Nigeria, 1967–68.

^{Page 53 note 1} ‘Estimates of the Gross Domestic Product of Northern Nigeria’, unpublished document of the Ministry of Economic Planning (Kaduna, 1968, mimeo.).Google Scholar