^{page 552 note 1} On the frequency with which works on Nigerian foreign policy use terms such as ‘great’, ‘major’, or ‘leading’ power, see Fasehun, Orobola and Shaw, Timothy M., ‘Bibliographic Guide to Nigerian Foreign Policy: orthodox and radical literatures’, in Nigerian Journal of International Studies (Ibadan),Google Scholar forthcoming.

^{page 552 note 2} See, for instance, the strikingly titled but otherwise disappointing book by Wayas, Joseph, Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa (London, 1979).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 553 note 1} Cowan, L. Gray, ‘Nigerian Foreign Policy’, in Tilman, R. O. and Cole, Taylor (eds.), Nigerian Political Scene (Durham, N.C. 1962), p. 116.Google Scholar

^{page 553 note 2} Akinyemi, A. Bolaji, Federalism and Foreign Policy: the Nigerian experience (Ibadan, 1974), p. 191.Google Scholar

^{page 553 note 3} Aluko, Olajide, ‘Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations with Special Reference to the Organisation of African Unity’, in African Affairs (London), 72, 287, 04 1973, p. 362.Google Scholar

^{page 553 note 4} Herskovits, Jean, ‘Dateline Nigeria: a black power’, in Foreign Policy (Washington), 29, Winter 1977–1978, p. 171.Google Scholar See also her ‘Democracy in Nigeria’, in Foreign Affairs (New York), 58, 2, Winter 1979/1980, pp. 314–35.Google Scholar

^{page 554 note 1} Nzimiro, Ikenna, ‘The Political and Social Implications of Multi-National Corporations in Nigeria’, in Widstrand, Carl (ed.), Multinational Firms in Africa (Uppsala, 1975), p. 210.Google Scholar

^{page 554 note 2} For a general comparison of the contents and claims of these two modes, see Shaw, Timothy M., ‘Foreign Policy, Political Economy and the Future: reflections on Africa in the World system’, in African Affairs, 79, 315, 04 1980.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The notion of ‘foreign policy’ employed in this article is, of course, a broad one: all interactions with and policies towards ‘external’ actors, whether they be individuals, classes, other non-state actors, other states, regional institutions, and universal organisations. This goes beyond official relations and ideologies to embrace a wide variety of ’transnational’ linkages.

^{page 554 note 3} For a comparative discussion about the analytic and political debates over the intention and direction of Zambian foreign policy, see Shaw, Timothy M., ‘Dilemmas of Dependence and (Under) Development: conflicts and choices in Zambia's present and prospective foreign policy’, in Africa Today (Denver), 26, 4, 1979. pp. 43–65.Google Scholar

^{page 555 note 1} Ofoegbu, Ray, The Nigerian Foreign Policy (Enugu, 1979), p. ix.Google Scholar

^{page 555 note 2} Williams, Gavin, ‘Introduction’, in Williams, Gavin (ed.), Nigeria: economy and society (London, 1976), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

^{page 555 note 3} Akinyemi, A. Bolaji, ‘Nigerian Foreign Policy in 1975: national interest redefined’, in Oyediran, Oyeleye (ed.), Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975 (Ibadan, 1978), p. 112.Google Scholar See also Aluko, Olajide, ‘The “New” Nigerian Foreign Policy: developments since the downfall of General Gowon’, in Round Table (London), 264, 10 1976, pp. 405–14,Google Scholar one of the few articles to argue that the Murtala Mohammed/Obasnjo period represents a continuity rather than a change.

^{page 556 note 1} For a succinct and suggestive introduction to the industrial, exchange, regional, military, social, and theoretical implications of N.I.C.s, see Väyrynen, Raimo, ‘Economic and Military Position of Regional Power Centres’, in Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), 16, 4, 1979, pp. 349–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 556 note 2} On this rôle, see Fasehun, Orobola, ‘Nigerian Politics and the Roles of Nigeria in the OAU, 1963–1976’, Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers University, 1979.Google Scholar On national rôle orientations in general, see Holsti, Kal, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, in International Studies Quarterly (Beverly Hills), 14, 3, 09 1970, pp. 233–309.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 556 note 3} On power politics, see the classic study by Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1967 edn.).Google Scholar

^{page 557 note 1} Gambari, Ibrahim A., ‘Nigeria and the World: a growing internal stability, wealth, and external influence’, in Journal of International Affairs (New York), 29, 2, 1975, pp. 164–5.Google Scholar See also Ahmed, A. B., ‘Dynamism and Foreign Policy in Nigeria's Second Republic’, in New Nigerian (Kaduna), 4361, 5 03 1980, pp. 5 and 9;Google Scholar and Atumba M. Shima, ‘Nigeria's Foreign Policy Before and Now’, in ibid. 4363, 8 March 1980, pp. 5 and 7.

^{page 557 note 2} Akinyemi, A. Bolaji, ‘Introduction’ to his collection on Nigeria and the World: readings in Nigerian foreign policy (Ibadan, 1978), pp. x–xi.Google Scholar On the notion of a continuing consensus over the definition of the Nigerian ‘national interest’, see Oyovbaire, Sam E., ‘The National Interest and Nigerian Foreign Policy’, in New Nigerian Supplement, 4351, 23 02 1980, pp. 1 and 3.Google Scholar

^{page 558 note 1} Osoba, Segun, ‘The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National Bourgeoisie’, in Review of African Political Economy (London), 13, 05–08 1978, p. 65.Google Scholar

^{page 559 note 1} See, for instance, the majority of papers presented at the International Conference on Non-Alignment, January 1980, and the Conference of the Nigerian Society for International Affairs, February 1980, both held at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.

^{page 559 note 2} As Gavin Williams notes, loc.cit. p. 1, most analysis of Nigeria to date has been within established disciplines and theories: ‘These limitations have led much academic research to evade the crucial questions of interpreting Nigerian society… The central problems facing Nigeria, like all other societies, are no respecters of the conventions and conveniences of academia. They originate from specific historical events and make present history’. See also his ‘Editorial: Nigeria’, in Review of African Political Economy, 13, May–August 1978, pp. 1–7.

^{page 559 note 3} Osoba, loc.cit. p. 69.

^{page 560 note 1} Schatz, Sayre P., Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 1 and 2.Google Scholar

^{page 560 note 2} Osoba, loc.cit. pp. 65–6.

^{page 560 note 3} As Bill Freund comments, because the industry is capital-intensive, ‘the impact of oil had very little direct effect on the mass of Nigerians; it was the vast sums that suddenly accrued to the Nigerian government which has [sic] been decisive’. ‘Oil Boom and Crisis in Contemporary Nigeria’, in Review of African Political Economy, 13, May–August 1978, p. 93.

^{page 561 note 1} For introductions to this world-system perspective, see Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World System: capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the sixteenth century (New York, 1974)Google Scholar, and The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, 1979);Google Scholar also Chirot, Daniel, Social Change in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1977).Google Scholar

^{page 561 note 2} Hughes, Barry B. and Strauch, Patricia A., ‘The Future of Development in Nigeria and the Sahel: projections from the World Integrated Model (WIM)’, in Shaw, Timothy M. (ed.), Alternative Futures for Africa (Boulder, 1981).Google Scholar

^{page 561 note 3} This exchange takes place largely at the international level. One definition for modern agriculture suggests that this is the transformation of oil (fertilisers, power for transportation and irrigation, etcetera) into food at the national level. In which case, once Nigeria organises for its oft-promised ‘green revolution’ it might be able to realise its considerable agricultural potential. Cf. Oculi, Okello, ‘Dependent Food Policy in Nigeria, 1975–1979’, in Review of African Political Economy, 15/16, 05–12 1979, pp. 63–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 561 note 4} On the declining importance and production of traditional exports, and on the growth of consumer-oriented, import-substitution ‘industries’, like textiles, vehicle assembly, soap and beer production, see the Monthly Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos. For a critical analysis of these processes and the growth of a nascent bourgeoisie, see Fadahunsi, Akin, ‘A Review of the Political Economy of the Industrialisation Strategy of the Nigerian State, 1960–80’, in Africa Development (Dakar), 4, 2–3, 1979, pp. 106–23.Google Scholar

^{page 562 note 1} Wilmot, Patrick F., In Search of Nationhood: the theory and practice of nationalism in Africa (Ibadan, 1979), p. 123.Google Scholar

^{page 562 note 2} For comparable attempts to contrast traditional and radical approaches to regionalism, non-alignment, N.I.E.O., and foreign policy, see Shaw, Timothy M., ‘Towards a Political Economy of Regional Integration and Inequality in Africa’, in Nigerian Journal of International Studies, 2, 2, 10 1978Google Scholar, ‘The Political Economy of Nonalignment: from dependence to self-reliance’, in International Studies (New Delhi), 07–09 1980Google Scholar, ‘Dependence to (Inter) Dependence: review of a debate on the (New) International Economic Order’, in Alternatives (New York), 4, 4, 03 1979, pp. 557–78,Google Scholar and, with Aluko, Olajide, ‘Introduction: the political economy of African foreign policy’, in Shaw, Timothy M. and Aluko, Olajide (eds.), The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: comparative analysis (Farnborough, 1981).Google Scholar

^{page 563 note 1} On these see, for example, Garba, J. N., ‘The New Nigerian Foreign Policy’, in Quarterly Journal of Admimstration (Ibadan), 11, 3, 04 1977, pp. 136–46.Google Scholar See also Dickson, Martin, ‘Foreign Policy: new dynamism’, in Financial Times (London), Nigerian Survey, 1 10 1979, p. ix,Google Scholar and Gambari, Ibrahim A., ‘Political Constraints on Our Foreign Policy’, in New Nigerian Supplement, 4351, 23 02 1980, pp. 2, 3, and 6.Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 1} For more on Africa's middle powers, see Shaw, Timothy M., ‘Kenya and South Africa: “sub-imperialist” states’, in Orbis (Philadelphia), 21, 2, Summer 1977, pp. 375–94,Google Scholar and ‘Inequalities and Interdependence in Africa and Latin America: sub-imperialism and semi-industrialism in the semi-periphery’, in Cultures et Développement (Louvain), 10, 2, 1978, pp. 231–63.Google Scholar On Nigeria's distinctiveness within this grouping, see Väyrynen, loc.cit. pp. 358–9 ‘Nigeria has emerged clearly as a political and economic leader of West Africa… Nigeria is in a category of her own, possessing roughly two-thirds to three-fourths of the power base within ECOWAS. It is no wonder that she is able to extend her economic presence to other member countries of the Community…ECOWAS probably comes closest to being a regional bloc dominated by a single regional power center. It is an institutional arrangement through which Nigeria can exert economic and political influence.’

^{page 565 note 1} Anglin, Douglas G., ‘Nigeria: political non-alignment and economic alignment’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 2, 2, 07 1964, p. 262.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 566 note 1} Gambari, , ‘Nigeria and the World’, p. 139.Google Scholar Cf. Hunt, Geoffrey and Theodoropoulos, Christos, ‘Nigeria: will civilian rule bring democracy?’, in African Communist (London), 79, Fourth Quarter 1979, pp. 88–101.Google Scholar

^{page 567 note 1} Biersteker, Thomas J., Distortion or Development? contending perspectives on the multinational corporation (Cambridge, 1978), p. 161.Google Scholar

^{page 567 note 2} Osoba, loc. cit. pp. 74 and 77.

^{page 567 note 3} Schatz, op.cit. p. 46.

^{page 568 note 1} Ibid. p. 3.

^{page 568 note 2} Ibid. p.ix. For a more critical, materialist view of different bourgeois fractions and national capitalisms, see Leys, Colin, ‘Development Strategy in Kenya Since 1971’, in Canadian Journal of African Studies (Ottawa), 13, 1–2, 1979, pp. 295–320.Google Scholar

^{page 568 note 3} Osoba, loc.cit. p. 63. Contrast this statement with Obasanjo's opening quotation.

^{page 569 note 1} Schatz, op.cit. p. 266.

^{page 570 note 1} Cf. a somewhat similar focus and formulation proposed by Biersteker, op.cit. p. 150: ‘the Nigerian example illustrates that there are different types of comprador groups. Although all organise the access of multinational corporations to the Nigerian market, there are important differences between investment compradors, commercial compradors and state compradors’.

^{page 570 note 2} Osoba, loc.cit. pp. 71–2.

^{page 571 note 1} There is considerably more writing on the foreign policy of Nigeria than on any other African state (except, perhaps, the ‘special’ case of South Africa). There are also more trained and professionally active social scientists in Nigeria (particularly in the fields of political science and international relations) than in any other country on the Continent (let alone the large number of those still in the diaspora). Yet because of the widespread adoption of traditional modes of analysis, Nigerian scholars have yet to have a proportional impact on the frontiers of, and debates within, these sub-fields. See DeLancey, Mark W., ‘The Study of African International Relations’, in his collection on Aspects of International Relations in Africa (Bloomington, 1979), pp. 1–38.Google Scholar

^{page 571 note 2} Ikenna Nzimiro, in addition to proposing a typology of class relations, alliances, and contradictions for Nigeria, is critical about the prevalence of conservatism in the universities, both institutional and intellectual. He calls for a new tolerance of radicalism, and for a revival of creativity. See The Crisis in the Social Sciences: the Nigerian situation (Mexico City, 1977)Google Scholar, Third World Forum Occasional Paper Number 2, especially pp. 27–51. On the dominance of orthodox perspectives, see Fasehun and Shaw, ‘Bibliographic Guide to Foreign Policy’.

^{page 572 note 1} For an interesting overview of this intense period of change and continuity, see Akinyemi, A. Bolaji, ‘Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy’, in Oyediran, Oyelye (ed.), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966–79 (London, 1979), pp. 150–68.Google Scholar

^{page 572 note 2} Ofoegbu, op.cit. p. 43.

^{page 572 note 3} On the U.S. case, see Shoup, Laurence and Minter, William, Imperial Brains Trust: the Council on Foreign Relations and United States foreign policy (New York, 1977).Google Scholar

^{page 573 note 1} See Sklar, Holly (ed.), Trilateralism: elite planning for world management (Boston, 1979).Google Scholar

^{page 573 note 2} See the powerful critiques in Ake, Claude, Social Science as Imperialism: the theory of political development (Ibadan, 1979), especiälly pp. 1–98,Google Scholar and Nzimiro, , The Crisis in the Social Sciences, especially pp. 17–26.Google Scholar