Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T15:42:04.502Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: the Rôle of the Military in Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Extract

Bullets rather than ballots have dominated politics in Uganda since independence, where two governments have been removed by coups, one by a foreign invasion, and another by an armed rebellion. Force has not only dominated the formal political system, but also threatened the economic and social basis on which democratic processes and progressive development depends. For 25 years predatory military rule and civil war have destroyed lives, skills, and assets, undermined institutional competence and accountability, caused widespread per sonal trauma, suppressed autonomous organisations in civil society, and intensified ethnic hostility and conflict. And Uganda is not alone in this – the middle of the twentieth century was dominated by fascism and war, while sectarian or ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Ulster, Sri Lanka, Somalia, the Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Zaï, Burundi, and Rwanda have inflicted untold damage on people and property.1

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Luckham, Robin, ‘The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: a survey of literature and issues’, in African Studies Review (Atlanta), 37, 2, 1994, pp. 1375.Google Scholar According to The Sunday Telegraph (London), 1 06 1994, by 1989 there had been 72 violent changes of leadership by coups, purges, or military interventions, and 21 assassinations of Presidents or Prime Ministers in 51 African states.Google Scholar

2 See Omara-Otunnu, Amii, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890–1985 (Basingstoke and London, 1987);CrossRefGoogle ScholarMudoola, Dan M., ‘Institution-Building: the case of the NRM and the military in Uganda, 1986–9’, in Hansen, Holger Bernt and Twaddle, Michael (eds.), Changing Uganda: the dilemmas of structural adjustment and revolutionary change (London, 1991), pp. 230–46;Google Scholar and Museveni, Yoweri, What is Uganda's Problem? (Kampala, 1992), section II, which sets out the principles which governed the guerrilla struggle.Google Scholar

3 See, for example, Odetola, T. O., Military Regimes and Development: a comparative analysis of African states (London, 1982), pp. 45.Google Scholar

4 Luckham, loc. cit. p. 2.

5 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (Kampala, 1993).Google Scholar

6 The short preliminary version of this study that appears in Hansen, Holger and Twaddle, Michael (eds.), From Chaos to Order: the politics of constitution-making in Uganda (London, 1995), pp. 7889, includes a section on ‘Theorising civil–military relations’.Google Scholar

7 See, for example, Fallers, Lloyd A. (ed.), The King's Men: leadership and status in Buganda on the eve of independence (London, 1964),Google Scholar and Vincent, Joan, Teso in Transition: the political economy of peasants and class in Eastern Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982).Google Scholar

8 A general overview can be found in Sathyamurthy, T. V., The Political Development of Uganda, 1900–86 (Aldershot, 1991).Google Scholar For a recent account, see Mutibwa, Phares, Uganda Since Independence: a story of unfulfilled hopes (Kampala, 1992).Google Scholar

9 Baynham, Simon, ‘The East African Mutinies of 1964’, in Journal of Contemporary African Studies (Pretoria), 8–9, 1–2, 19801990, pp. 153–80.Google Scholar

10 See ‘Shaban Opolot: Uganda's first army commander’, in Veteran Yearbook (Kampala), 1, 2, 1993, pp. 910.Google Scholar

11 Omara-Otunnu, op. cit. pp. 51 and 97.

12 Lofchie, Michael F., ‘The Uganda Coup – Class Action by the Military’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 10, 1, 05 1972, pp. 23–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Interview, Major-General Zeddy Maruru, May 1994.

14 Omara-Otunnu, op. cit. pp. 86–7.

15 Ibid. p. 97.

16 These events are covered in Sathyamurthy, op. cit. ch. 8.

17 I owe much of this analysis to Major-General David Tinyafunsa, Presidential Defence Adviser, Lieutenant-Colonel Serwanga Lwanga, Chief Political Commissar, and Augustine Ruzindana, Inspector-General of Government. Interviews, April–May 1994.

18 Omara-Otunnu, op. cit. pp. 89–91.

19 These are reviewed in Sathyamurthy, op. cit. pp. 632–4, and in Mamdani, Mahmood, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda (London, 1983).Google Scholar

20 I attempted to demonstrate the logic (‘rationale’ rather than ‘rationality’) of the Amin régime in Brett, E. A., ‘The Political Economy of General Amin’, in IDS Bulletin (Brighton), 7, 1, 04 1975, pp. 1522.Google Scholar

21 Interview, Ali, Moses, former Minister in both the Amin and Museveni régimes, March 1994.Google Scholar

22 This view was put to me by President Amin himself in April 1973 at a public reception.

23 Omara-Otunnu, op. cit. p. 107. Musoke, Kintu, now Prime Minister, had been arrested in September 1972 after the ‘invasion’ from Tanzania. He spent a week in Makindi barracks, during which time 42 Acholi and Langi senior police and prison officers were executed, as well as Frank Kalimuzo, the Vice-Chancellor of Makerere University. Interview, April 1994.Google Scholar

24 Ali claims he was sidelined after suggesting that Amin should take action one of his associates who had murdered three airforce men; and Maruru believes he lost Amin's support after persuading him not to execute Denis Hills, author of a critical account of his activities.

25 See documents reproduced in Campbell, H. G. C., ‘The Commandist State in Uganda’, D.Phil. dissertation, Sussex University, 1979, Appendix.Google Scholar

26 Ibid. p. 452. In 1973 I attended a meeting in Serere Country, Teso, between the new military governor and the local chiefs who were put through a military drill and inspection, and then told that their prime task was to identify potentially subversive elements.

27 Omara-Otunnu, op. cit. p. 138.

28 Information from Maruru, Charles Alai, and Yoana Kanyomusi on Sum, and from Salim Saleh on Fronasa. I am grateful to Major-General Saleh for access to his personal memoir ‘In Good Faith’, covering the period up to his entry into the bush war in 1981. This is selectively reprinted in Veteran Yearbook, 1, 2, 1993.Google Scholar

29 Sathyamurthy, op. cit. pp. 658 and 698, and Mutibwa, op. cit. pp. 113–14, provide accounts.

30 See, for example, Mutibwa, op. cit. pp. 138ff. Commonwealth observers claimed that the elections had produced a ‘worthy and valid conclusion’, but apparently agreed to overlook many deficiencies because of the chaotic conditions which prevailed. Some felt that only the UPC had the organisation and experience required to govern and, most especially, that an external attempt to set the process aside would be politically disastrous. Personal communications, Victoria Brittain of The Guardian (London) and Patsy Robinson, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

31 Cited in Mutibwa, op. cit. p. 130.

32 Interview, Major-General Eli Timwine, April 1994.

33 Ibid. Saleh's memoir provides a graphic account of beatings, imprisonment, and attempted murder.

34 Interview, Lwanga.

35 According to Major-General Emilio Mondo, local people believed that Obote had given orders to ‘turn the area into a game park’. Interview, November 1993.

36 See Museveni, op. cit. section II, and ‘Uganda Resistance News’, reprinted in NRM Publications, Mission to Freedom (Kampala, n.d.).Google Scholar

37 Amnesty International, Uganda: evidence of torture (London, 1985),Google Scholar and Gillier, Joan, Bracken, Pat, and Kabagamba, Stella, ‘Ugonada:war women and rape’ in The Lancet (London), 337, 1991, p. 604.Google Scholar

38 See, for example, Amaza, Ondonga ori, ‘Let Us All become Banyarwanda and Crush These Fascists’, in Veteran Yearbook, 2, 1, 1994, and personal interview, 04 1994.Google Scholar

39 Interview, Kanyomusi.

40 Personal communication, Tim Allen, who travelled widely in West Nile and also in Luwero.

41 Interview, Brigadier-General Muntu, Mugisha, May 1994. Saleh claims that 980 UNLA soldiers were persuaded to join the NRA after they captured Mbarara barracks, and subsequently took part in the liberation of Kampala.Google Scholar

42 Interview, Tinyafunsa. For the text of the Nairobi Peace Accords, see Omara-Otunnu, op. cit. Appendix C.

43 The analysis presented in this section is based upon field research and consultancy work carried out in Gulu, Kitgum, Apac, Soroti, and Kumi between 1990 and 1992.

44 Confirmed by Muntu, interview.

45 The National Movement for the Liberation of Uganda (Nalu), led by Amin Bazira, a former Deputy Minister under Obote, emerged in Kasese District in the West in June 1989, and was active for a few years. See The Guide (Kampala), 28 06 1989,Google Scholar and The New Vision (Kampala), 21 09 1992.Google Scholar

46 Gingyera-Pincyewa, A. G., Northern Uganda in National Politics (Kampala, 1992), p. 1.Google Scholar

47 Interviews, Ali and Mondo.

48 Allen, Tim, ‘Understanding Alice: Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement in context’, in Africa (London), 61, 3, 1991, p. 371.Google Scholar

49 Interview, Alai.

50 Adimola, Andrew, ‘Adimola: “the lion” of Gulu’, in Veteran Yearbook, 1, 2, 1993, pp. 34–5.Google Scholar

51 For the rise of Lakwena, see Omara-Otunnu, Amii, ‘The Struggle For Democracy in Uganda’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 2, 06 1992, pp. 443–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52 Allen, loc. cit. p. 378.

53 This was confirmed by Obalatum, Michael, a former UPA rebel in Kumi, who had been a teacher in Ngora until forced to flee into the bush by threats from the NRA. Interview, March 1991.Google Scholar

54 The evidence is extensively reviewed in Amnesty International, Uganda: the failure to safeguard human rights (London, 1992).Google Scholar See also, Pirouet, M. Louise, ‘Human Rights Issues in Museveni's Uganda’, in Hansen, and Twaddle, (eds.), op. cit. pp. 197209.Google Scholar

55 Interview, Betty Bigombe, January 1990 and The New Vision, 28 September 1992.

56 See, for example, Omara-Otunnu, op. cit. pp. 176–9.

57 Figures provided by Mondo, Major-General from the Veteran's Assistance Board. The low proportion from Buganda is apparently because ‘many districts, especially those in Central Uganda, did not satisfy their quotas’, for economic reasons, according to the Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission, p. 371.Google Scholar

58 I am grateful to Alai, Charles for access to ‘The Peace Agreement Between the Uganda Government and the Uganda People's Democratic Movement’, 3 June 1988.Google Scholar

59 The New Vision, 30 November 1990, and interviews, Epelu-Opio, J. and Akello, Grace, 19901991.Google Scholar

60 These comments are based on my experience during 1990–1991 with the intial study for the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme in Kumi, Soroti, and Kitgum, and the management in Kumi District of the Oxfam relief programme, which depended on RC representatives to list and identify beneficiaries, and to organise deliveries.

61 See Amnesty International, op. cit. 1992.

62 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, revised edn. (Kampala, 1991).Google Scholar

63 Amnesty International, op. cit. 1992. p. 78.

64 See Brett, Amelia, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress in War-Affected Regions of Uganda’, in Allen, Tim (ed.), In Search of Cool Ground: displacement and homecoming in Northeast Africa (London, forthcoming).Google Scholar

65 This point was made forcibly by Kategaya, Eriya, Deputy Prime Minister, to local Itesot leaders at a seminar which I attended in Kumi in 1991.Google Scholar

66 UPF literature produced by Peter Otai in London focused almost exclusively on the nondemocratic nature of the NRM régime and the ‘rape, murder and torture of the people’ in the North. ‘Political and Security Situation in North and Eastern Uganda’, Uganda People's Front, London, 1992, p. 4.

67 See Amnesty International, op. cit. 1992, pp. 63 and 67.

68 Betty Bigombe was voted Woman of the Year in 1994 for her work in bringing peace to the North. The Monitor (Kampala), 6 05 1994.Google Scholar

69 These were the conditions which the Army Commander, Brigadier-General Muntu, claimed that a militray régime must meet if it was to survive. Interview, May 1994.

70 Uganda Confidential (Kampala), 55, 22 11 1993.Google Scholar

71 See Colletta, Nat and Ball, Nicole, ‘War and Peace’, The Monitor, reprinted from Finace and Development (Washington, DC), 06 1993; the authors are World Bank offcials. I am indented to Major-General Mondo for further information about the programme.Google Scholar

72 When the Army Council elected 10 representatives to the Constituent Assembly, key criteria were ‘contribution to the struggle’ and ‘political clarity’, which strongly favoured ‘originals’ and ‘worked against “late-comers” ’, according to The Monitor, 10 May 1994.

73 See Cullimore, Charles, ‘Uganda: the making of a constitution’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 32, 4, 12 1994, pp. 707–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

74 ‘Memorandum of Constitutional Proposals on the New National Constitution from the National Resistance Army’, Office of the Chief of Staff, Kampala, 4 11, 1991.

75 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission.

76 Parliamentary Debates, National Consultative Council, Official Report (Kampala), Vol. 4, 10 1979, p. 95.Google Scholar

77 Interview, Muntu.

78 This issue was pressed very strongly by Major-General Tinyafunsa.

79 Lieutenant-Colonel Serwanga Lwanga, ‘The Role of the Army in Uganda's Politics Since Independence’, seminar paper for the Uganda Constitutional Commission, 20 July 1989.