THE question of how countries in Africa are dealing with the control and restructuring of their military forces and security agencies has aroused some scholarly and political interest but little systematic research. The story of the transition in Ghana may be said to have begun when the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was removed by a coup d'état on 4 June 1979 and replaced by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) headed by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. The young officers had intervened, as they soon explained, because of the growing corruption and deteriorating conditions of service, the severe economic crisis and reduced military budgets, and the mismanagement of both the Armed Forces and the national government. Although power was restored to civilians only four months later, Rawlings intervened again on 31 December 1981 after the régime headed by President Hilla Limann had failed in the view of supporters of the ‘June 4 Movement’ to respond effectively to the problems faced by Ghana. Ironically this coup by Rawlings, widely known as his ‘Second Coming’, and described with some truth as ‘a popular affair’, interrupted efforts that were being made to re-professionalise the Armed Forces and restore civilian control.