Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
Of the 21 members of the Arab League, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania has received perhaps the least attention, ranking far behind other North African states, much less those closer to the Arab—Israeli fault-line or the recent Gulf conflict. Mauritania's desperate economic condition (a G.N.P. per capita of only $446 in 1984) has been occasionally publicised, as well as advancing desertification (reaching even into the centre of the capital, Nouakchott), and the tensions between the ruling Beydane (‘white’) Arabs, supported by their cultural/political allies, and the black African tribes concentrated in the Senegal River valley that erupted into violence in April 1989, and which led to a near-war between Senegal and Mauritania.
1 See, for example, The New York Times, 2 March 1984; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 8 June 1986; and The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 9 June 1987.Google Scholar Also Parker, Ron, ‘The Senegal—Mauritania Conflict of 1989: a fragile equilibrium’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 29, 1, 03 1991, pp. 155–71.Google Scholar
2 Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, The Western Saharans: background to conflict (London and Totowa, NJ, 1980), pp. 223–6.Google Scholar
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4 Thompson and Adloff, op. cit. pp. 224–6.Google Scholar
5 Ibid. pp. 51–3.
6 Handloff (ed.), op. cit. pp. 24–6.Google Scholar
7 Thompson and Adloff, op. cit. p. 52. As to relations between Libya and Mauritania during Ould Daddah's presidency, see Burgat, Francois, ‘Qadaffi's “Unitary” Doctrine: theory and practice’, in René, Lemarchand (ed.), The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's policies in Africa (Bloomington, 1988), p. 26.Google Scholar
8 Ibid.
9 See Hodges, Tony, ‘The Origins of Saharawi Nationalism’, in Third World Quarterly (London), 5, 1, 01 1983, pp. 41 and 44–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
10 Ibid. pp. 32–7, for an analysis of the economic changes, resultant sedentarisation, and climatic and educational factors, as well as the increasingly close contact not only with the Spanish colonisers, but also with nationalist currents elsewhere in the developing world.
11 Handloff, op. cit. p. 79.
12 Franck, Thomas, ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’, in American Journal of International Law (Washington, DC), 70, 1976, pp. 706 and 709–11.Google Scholar
13 Ibid. pp. 714–17.
14 Thompson and Adloff, op. cit. p. 175.
15 Ibid. p. 286.
16 See Hodges, Tony, Western Sahara: the roots of a desert war (Westport, CT, 1983), p. 238.Google Scholar
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18 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986 (Washington, DC, 1987), p. 85Google Scholar. Mauritania, by 1978, was spending over 60 per cent of its revenue on the military establishment.
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21 Ibid. pp. 278–9.
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25 For the text of the agreement, see Colin, Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: annual survey and documents, 1979–80 (New York, 1980), p. B571Google Scholar. According to the provisions of a secret addendum, Mauritania was to hand over Tiris el-Gharbia to the Polisario Front, but this was not done because Morocco quickly occupied and annexed the area. Mauritania did, however, maintain a small garrison in La Guera, a Western Saharan settlement directly opposite the vital port of Nouadhibou, to prevent it, too, from being overrun by Morocco.
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27 Handloff, op. cit. p. 36. See also Colin, Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: annual survey and documents, 1980–81 (New York, 1981), pp. B548–9, 552–3,Google Scholar and ibid. 1981–1982 (New York, 1982), pp. B474–5.
28 Ibid. 1983–1984 (New York, 1985), p. B494.
29 Handloff, op. cit. pp. 36–7.
30 See Africa Contemporary Record, 1981–82, p. B482, and Africa Confidential (London), 28 January 1981.Google Scholar
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33 Handloff, , op. cit. pp. 37 and 125, and Africa Contemporary Record, 1983–84, p. B495. For a description of the organisation of the S.E.M.s,Google Scholar see Schissel, Howard, ‘Saharan Sandstorn Blows On’, in Africa Report (New Brunswick, NJ), 28, 3, 05–06 1983, pp. 56–7.Google Scholar
34 See McDougall, Ann, ‘A Letter from Nouakchott’, in Africa News (Durham, NC), 24, 11, 3 06 1985, pp. 8–10 and 15. Also, Africa Contemporary Record, 1985–86, pp. B107–13.Google Scholar
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36 See Africa Contemporary Record, 1984–85, p. B531, for details of Mauritanian military personnel and equipment, although levels of service ability and readiness were often considerably lower than those implied by official figures, due mainly to lack of funds and trained personnel.Google Scholar
37 Zartman, I. William, ‘Foreign Relations of North Africa’, in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia), 489, 01 1987, p. 20. Ould Taya himself said, in an interview reported in The New York Times, 28 February 1985, that ‘What we really want is to have relations with all countries in the region’.Google Scholar
38 Handloff, op. cit, pp. 56–8.
39 Doyle, Mark, ‘Nouakchott's New Nationalism’, in Africa Report, 34, 5, 09–10 1989, p. 38.Google Scholar
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41 Reported in The New York Times, 28 February 1985. For discussion of racial tensions during this period, see West Africa, 8 December 1986, p. 2583, and 19 January 1987, pp. 110–11.Google Scholar
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45 See West African, 24–30 October 1988, pp. 1984–5.
46 Amnesty International, Mauritania, pp. 22–3.
47 King, John, ‘Iraq's Growing Involvement in Mauritania’, in Middle East International (London), 3 08 1990, p. 18Google Scholar. President Ould Taya made a second state visit to Iraq in October 1989. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports: Near East and South Asia (Washington, DC), 26, 27 and 30 October 1989, pp. 26, 11, and 21, respectively. Hereafter FBIS-NES.
48 Africa Research Bulletin: economic series (London), 27, 1, 28 February 1990, p. 9857, hereafter referred to as ARB/ES.Google Scholar
49 Africa Confidential, 8 February 1991.
50 Africa Contemporary Record, 1981–82, p. B474.
51 Parker, loc. cit. pp. 159–60.
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53 ARB/PS, 26, 8, 15 September 1989, p. 9370.
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55 ARB/PS, 27, 5, 15 June 1990, p. 9700, and 10, October 1990, p. 9874, referring to armed action by Flam militants. Returning the favour, Mauritania reportedly backed a low-level armed insurgency in Senegal's Casamance region, according to Africa Confidential, 12 October 1990.Google Scholar
56 For details of actions taken against black Mauritanians during 1989–90, see ARB/PS, 26, 7, 15 August 1989, pp. 9339–40, and 27, 10, October 1990, pp. 9873–4.Google Scholar
57 Quoted by Mark Doyle in West Africa, 24–30 July 1989, p. 1200.
58 Africa Confidential, 12 October 1990.
59 See Economist Intelligence Unit (E.I.U.) Country Report, Mauritania (London), No. 1, 1991, p. 38, and 1991–1992, p. 62; Parker, loc. cit. p. 167; and King, ‘Iraq's Growing Involvement in Mauritania’, p. 18.Google Scholar
60 Africa Confidential, 2 June and 24 August 1990.
61 Ibid. 29 June 1990 and 8 February 1991 for details.
62 This may help to explain why few of the many severe criticisms made during 1988–91 about the régime's political alignment and human rights record were directed against Ould Taya personally.
63 Africa Confidential, 29 June 1990 and 8 02 1991.
64 See The New York Times, 24 April 1990, The Washington Times, 30 May 1990, and Africa Confidential, 24 August 1990 and 8 February 1991, reflecting a difference of opinion as to whether any missile-launch equipment was emplaced in Mauritania by August 1990.Google Scholar
65 ARB/PS, 27, 8, 15 September 1990, p. 9808.
66 Ibid. pp. 9811–2. See also, FBIS-NES, 18 October 1990, p. 16, for statement by Mauritania's Foreign Minister that his country opposes the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.
67 West Africa, 28 January–3 February 1991, p. 113, and E.I.U. Country Report, Mauritania, No. 1, 1991, p. 39. The stories of refuge for Saddam Hussein's family were denied by Mauritania. See also, FBIS-NES, 17 and 22 January 1991, pp. 8 and 18, respectively.Google Scholar
68 ARB/ES, 27, 10, 16 October to 15 November 1990, p. 10169, for analysis. The effects of a rise in oil prices and the existing cessation of trade with Senegal made a bad situation even worse. These factors were discussed and analysed at length in a commentary by Agence France Presse broadcast by French Radio. See FBIS—NES, 17 October 1990, p. 14.Google Scholar
69 Africa Confidential, 24 August and 14 September 1990.
70 See ARB/PS, 28, 1, 1–31 January 1991, p. 9734, and West Africa, 1–7 April 1991, p. 483, 22–28 April 1991, pp. 600–1, 13–19 May 1991, p. 756, and 8–14 July 1991, p. 1124. Also, The Boston Globe, 21 August 1991.
71 E.I.U. Country Report, Mauritania, 3, 1991, pp. 11–12 and 34–5. For an assessment of the proposed reforms and the reaction of opposition forces, see ARB/PS, 28, 4, April 1991, pp. 10081–3, and West Africa, 29 April–5 May 1991, p. 654. On the promulgation of the constitution and multi-partyism, see ARB/PS, 28, 8, August 1991, p. 10230.
72 See Nordlinger, Eric A., Soldiers in Politics: military coups and governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1977), pp. 65–6 (general observations), 88–92 (economic concerns and internal violence), and 149–59 (military attitudes in ‘communally divided societies’).Google Scholar