^{page 127 note 1} Nkrumah, Kwame was an enthusiastic advocate of the ‘Africanisation’ of the Ghanaian legal system; Journal of African Law (London), VI, 1962, pp. 103 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. So too was Senghor, Léopold Sédar; M'Beye, Kéba, ‘L'Expérience sénégalaise de la réforme du droit’, in Revue internationale de droit comparé (Paris), XXII, 1970, p. 38Google Scholar.

^{page 127 note 2} Seidman, R. B., ‘Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking, SubSaharan Africa’, in Hutchinson, Thomas (ed.), Africa and Law: developing legal systems in African Commonwealth nations (Madison, 1968), pp. 28–32Google Scholar, asserts that customary law cannot conceivably reflect the common consciousness of all the people of a modern African state, and is inadequate to fulfil the demands of rapid economic development.

^{page 127 note 3} According to Lazar, L., ‘Legal Centralism in South Africa’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly (London), XIX, 1970, pp. 492–507Google Scholar, even in South Africa, customary law has been so eroded as to be incapable of regeneration.

^{page 127 note 4} These countries adopted what could be called a ‘revolutionary’ approach to their legal systems; see David, René, ‘A Civil Code for Ethiopia: considerations on the codification of the civil law in African countries’, in Tulane Law Review (New Orleans), XXXVII, 1962–1963, pp. 188–9Google Scholar, and also ‘La Refonte du code civil dans les états africaines’, in Annales africaines (Dakar), 1962, p. 161Google Scholar.

^{page 128 note 1} Much legislation, concerned with the public weal, obviously cannot afford to take account of individual interests.

^{page 128 note 2} See Harvey, W. B., ‘The Evolution of Ghana Law since Independence’, in Baade, Hans Wolfgang (ed.), African Law: new law for new nations (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1963), p. 69Google Scholar.

^{page 128 note 3} The introduction of the Swiss Civil Code into Turkey in 1926 provided the law for a small urban élite and the legal profession, but remained foreign and incomprehensible for the majority of the population; Unesco, , International Social Science Bulletin (Paris), IX, 1, 1957, pp. 7–85Google Scholar. See also Keuning, J., ‘Some Remarks on Law and Courts in Africa’, in Integration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems in Africa (New York and Ile-Ife, 1971–1972), p. 64Google Scholar.

^{page 128 note 4} According to Blanx-Jouvan, X., ‘Remarques sur la codification du droit privé à Madagascar’, in Revue juridique due Congo (Lubumbashi), 1967, pp. 161 and 1973Google Scholar, informed African opinion is frequently in favour of a radical approach to customary law, while European experts seem to favour a more sympathetic approach.

^{page 128 note 5} Codification has been regarded as a method of modernisation in a number of francophone countries. Cf. René David, ‘Critical Observations Regarding the Potentialities and the Limitations of Legislation in the Independent African States’, in Keuning (ed), op. cit. pp. 44–56.

^{page 129 note 1} The Malagasy legislature adopted an ‘evolutionary’ approach when members resolved on 2 June 1959 that the nation required ‘une législation unifiée, adaptées aux usages des différentes populations de Madagascar et acceptées par elles’. Their attitude to the nuclear and extended family is worthy of note; see Pédamon, M., ‘Les Grandes tendances du droit de la famille à Madagascar’, in Annales de l'Université de Madagascar (Tananarive), II, 1965, pp. 59–85Google Scholar.

^{page 129 note 2} This was one of the conclusions of the London Conference on customary law; see Allott, A. N. (ed), The Future of Law in Africa: record of proceedings of the London Conference, 1959–1960 (London, 1960), pp. 44–6Google Scholar.

^{page 129 note 3} Cf. Suttner, R. S., ‘Towards Judicial and Legal Integration in South Africa’, in South African Law Journal (Cape Town), 85, 1968, p. 450Google Scholar.

^{page 129 note 4} This process is described as talfiq in Islamic law; see Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh, 1964), pp. 197–201Google Scholar, and also Schacht, J., An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964), p. 106Google Scholar. A similar approach was used in the Tanzanian Marriage Act, No. 5 of 1971; see Read, J. S., ‘A Milestone in the Integration of Personal Laws: the new law of marriage and divorce in Tanzania’, in Journal of African Law, XVI, 1972, pp. 19–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page 130 note 1} Amongst the few writers to advocate this approach were Denis V. Cowen, ‘African Legal Studies – a Survey of the Field and the Role of the United States’, in Baade (ed), op. cit. pp. 20–2, and Kollewijn, R. D., ‘Interracial Private Law’, in Schrieke, B., The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilization in the Malay Archipelago (Batavia, 1929), pp. 204–35Google Scholar, concerning problems of interpersonal conflict in the former German, French, British, and Dutch colonies. The earlier enthusiasm, e.g. of Neumeyer and A. de la Porte, to transpose the principles of private international law into the realm of interpersonal conflict, seems to have dissipated completely.

^{page 130 note 2} See Allott, Antony, New Essays in African Law (London, 1970), pp. 182–8Google Scholar, on the concept of race generally.

^{page 130 note 3} In South Africa a marriage in customary law receives only very limited recognition, and is strictly distinguished from the common law union. The former may not even be termed a ‘marriage’ in terms of the controlling legislation, viz. the Black Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927. See Rubin, Leslie, ‘The Adaptation of Customary Family Law in South Africa’, in Hilda, and Kuper, Leo (eds.), African Law: adaptation and development (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), pp. 208–12Google Scholar, and also the comments by Cowen, op. cit. p. 19.

^{page 130 note 4} Seidman, R. B., ‘The Reception of English Law in Colonial Africa Revisited’, in Eastern Africa Law Review (Dar es Salaam), II, 1969, pp. 53–4Google Scholar – a distinction easily drawn in the days before increased social and commercial intercourse between Africans and Europeans.

^{page 130 note 5} Baxter, I. F., Essays on Private Law, Foreign Law and Foreign Judgements (Toronto, 1966), p. 22Google Scholar, and Falconbridge, J. D., Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Toronto, 1954 edn.), pp. 39–40Google Scholar.

^{page 131 note 1} Cf. Allott, op. cit. ch. 6. But the factors that he considers relevant in the choice of law process cannot all be conceived as ‘connecting factors’ in the sense in which that term is used in this article. Some, such as the existence of a remedy, do not exist in the factual complex at all.

^{page 131 note 2} Cowen, op. cit. p. 22, argues for a revival of the mediaeval concept of personal law.

^{page 131 note 3} Suttner, R. S., ‘Internal Conflict of Laws – an Unwarranted Rigidity?’, in South African Law Journal, 87, 1970, pp. 18–23Google Scholar, argues for a more dynamic approach to the conflict of laws in South Africa in order to break down the barriers of segregation. Also see his ‘Towards Judicial and Legal Integration in South Africa’, loc. cit. and Lazar, loc. cit.

^{page 131 note 4} See Suttner's, R. S. discussion of this problem in the South African context; ‘Legal Pluralism in South Africa: a reappraisal of policy’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XIX, 1970, pp. 134–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page 131 note 5} Allott, op. cit. p. 189.

^{page 131 note 6} According to Raeburn, W., ‘Dispensing with the Personal Law’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XII, 1963, pp. 127–8Google Scholar: ‘Domicile is essentially inclusive. Its purpose is to provide a basis of free intercourse between members of different communities settling in each other's territories. Nationality, on the other hand, whether feudal or revolutionary in origin, is extremely exclusive. Its characteristic is the welding of the regular inhabitants of a given territory into a self-contained social and political unit.’ See also Schmidt, Folke, ‘Nationality and Domicile in Swedish Private International Law’, in International Law Quarterly, IV, 1951, p. 39Google Scholar.

^{page 132 note 1} For a brief summary, see Phillips, Arthur (ed.), Survey of African Marriage and Family Life (London, 1953), pp. 181ff.Google Scholar, and Salacuse, Jeswald W., An Introduction to Law in French-Speaking Africa, Vol. 1, Africa South of the Sahara (Charlottesville, 1969), pp. 43–54Google Scholar.

^{page 132 note 2} See Robert, A., ‘A Comparative Study of Legislation and Customary Law Courts in the French, Belgian and Portuguese Territories in Africa’, in Journal of African Administration (London), XI, 1959, pp. 124–41Google Scholar, for a discussion of the rôle of the state in the process of assimilation.

^{page 132 note 3} Salacuse, op. cit. pp. 51–2.

^{page 132 note 4} Cf. Kollewijn, op. cit. pp. 225–30, regarding the French attitude to customary law.

^{page 132 note 5} Such as in South Africa, in terms of the Black Administration Act, No. 38 of 1927, and in Rhodesia, under the Native Law and Courts Act, ch. 104. Cf. Allott, op. cit. pp. 193–6.

^{page 132 note 6} However, life-style would have little relevance in commercial, constitutional, and criminal law, for example.

^{page 133 note 1} For a discussion of the merits and demerits of domicile and nationality in private international law, see North, P. M., in Cheshire's Private International Law (London, 1974), pp. 190–1Google Scholar.

^{page 133 note 2} Kollewijn, op. cit. pp. 234–5. It must be conceded immediately, of course, that private international law does not have a value-free attitude to systems of foreign law since, via the exclusionary rule, the forum may refuse to apply an external rule as being contrary to its own system of public policy. This same policy consideration was built into the various conflict systems of colonial régimes; Allott, op. cit. pp. 158–75. A synthesis of the two approaches is suggested by Leslie, R. D., ‘The Repugnancy Rule in African Law and the Public Policy Rule in Conflict of Laws’, in Acta Juridica (Cape Town), 1979, pp. 117–27Google Scholar.

^{page 134 note 1} Cf. Bartholomew, G. W., ‘Private Interpersonal Law’, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1, 1952, p. 326CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Allott, op. cit. pp. 115–17.

^{page 134 note 2} See the conclusions of the London Conference, 1959–1960. Cf. the Dar es Salaam Conference on Local Courts and Customary Law, Integration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems in Africa, pp. 4–16, where such unanimity was not present.

^{page 134 note 3} And with regard to the difficulties of maintaining the consistency and unity necessary to sustain a process of judicial development of the rules of customary law, see Lloyd Fallers, ‘Customary Law in the New African States’, in Baade (ed.), op. cit. pp. 81–2.